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ABSTRACT 
This study takes a new look at Anglo-Spanish relations 
between 176; and 178;. They are examined from the point of 
view of Spain and her use of the 1761 alliance with France. 
During this period Spain had ber own objectives, not always 
coinciding witb France's. Bbe was seriously restricted in 
tbe foreign field by her need of French support, but, on the 
wbole, sbe managed to pursue them quite effectively. 
An analysis is made of Spain's failure to win new 
friends wbo would reduce her d,ependence on Erencb support, 
and a fresh interpretation of the Falkland Islands crisis ot 
1770-1771 is attempted. 
Tbe problems arising from the general relaxation in 
Anglo-Spanish colonial issues after 1771 are fully examined, 
together with the restraining influence of Spain on France's 
European commitments. Britain's American struggle is also 
considered in 80 far as it enabled Spain to find a solution 
to' ber disputes with Portugal in the .Ri. ver Plate (Portugal 
was Britain's traditional ally), and in order to aa •• ss the 
o.tcom. of the Jaerican War of Independence against the 
background of Spain's objectives after the Seven Y,ears War. 
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FOREWORD 
At first sight it might seem that a study of Anglo-
Spanish relations as such offers little help in inter-
preting the general pattern of Western European politics in 
the second half of the eighteenth century. Certainly, the 
view of French and English historians alike seems to be that 
Spain's foreign policy during Carlos Ill's reign had no 
"'", 
individual character; according to this view, France was the 
dominant partner of the Family Compact, and Bourbon policy 
was formulated in Paris and carried out by French diplo-
matists. Spanish scholars, on the other hand, tend to forget 
that France was the stronger power of the two and are 
usually carried away by the realization that Spain had a 
foreign policy of her own; they are inclined to equate 
aspirations with achievements. 
The task that I set myself in writing this thesis 1s 
to re-examine these two views, bringing into the discussion 
quite a large amount of fresh evidence emerging from my 
search for Spanish and English material dealing specifically 
with Anglo-Spanish relations. 
In so doing, I have put myself under a great obligation 
to a large number of people, especially to the members of 
the Seminar of International History in the Eighteenth 
Century (Institute of Historical Researches, London), but 
I wish 'in particular to mention Dr. R.H. Batton, to whom 
I owe not so much thanks as apologies, since her 
unstinting help, encouragement, and enormous patience 
during a number of years, deserve a better result than 
this. 
I also acknowledge financial help from the British 
Council and the Central Research Fund. 
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PART I 
Spain, France, and Britain after the Seven Years 
War: Their objectives and diplomatic position. 
1. Carlos III and the Family Compact: The Treaty of 
Paris of 1763. 
10 
Carlos III succeeded bis half-brother, Fernando VI, 
as King of Spain on 10 August 1759.1 He arrived in Madrid 
on December 9th, and as soon as he took over the respon-
sibili ties of his new office" he had to concern himself 
with the difficult task of preserving Spanish neutrality 
in the Seven Years War and planning for the future in the 
unsettled situation of Europe. Spain's position, in the 
face of one of the periodic outbursts of AnsBW-French 
colonial rivalry, was fraught with risks. 
1759 was Britain's annus mirabilia, the turning-point 
of the war. The conquest of Quebec in September of that 
year presented France with the unpalatable truth of the 
triumph of the British in America. This victory meant the 
loss of New France and eventually the disruption of France's 
empire in North America. 
1. Carlos III was the son of Philip V and his second 
wife, Isabel Farneae. When he went to Spain, he 
had already governed as duke of Parma (1732-8) aDd 
as King of the Two 8ic11ies (1738-59). 
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The consequences of such an event were of major 
importance to Spain, for if France were ousted from her 
possessions in North America it would become incumbent on 
Spain-alone to face the expansion of the British. 
From his predecessor, Carlos III inherited a policy 
of passive neutrality which coupled with the poor state of 
Spanish defences and finances left the American possessions 
exposed to the possible incidences of the Anglo-French 
colonial conflict. For the sake of Spain's internal 
reconstruction and to arr~t the economic decline of his 
territories, Carlos III was inclined to peace; however, he 
was alive to the need of taking a more active interest in 
the fortunes of the war in America. 
The news of the conquest of Quebec by the English made 
him realize the seriousness of the situation. Whatever the 
outcome of the Anglo-French contest, it would affect the 
future of Spanish America. The presence of France on the 
northern border of Britain's colonies and in Louisiana had 
been up to this time a restraint on Britain; without France, 
it was up to Spain to keep in check the expansive policies 
of the British nation. 
Carlos III therefore accepted Choiseul's requests for 
Spanish mediation in the conflict. Through his mediation 
Carlos III hoped to halt Britain's progress in New France 
and to prevent her from becoming too powerful in the 
northern hemisphere. He believed that by bolstering up 
the shaking French empire he was preserving his own. To 
achieve this goal he adopted Choiseul's suggestion to 
12 
establish a balance of power in America comparable to that 
which had been established at Utrecht for Europe. He 
submitted his plan to Britain in November, 1759.1 
But the chances of Britain accepting such a proposal, 
in view of her victories over France, were remote. Pitt's 
evasive attitude, together with his acceptance of similar 
proposals from Prussia for a congeess for the establishment 
of a general peace, offended Carlos III personally. Further-
more, Spanish claims concerning merchant ships taken as 
prizes by Britain, Spani~h fishing rights in the Newfoundland 
waters and English encroachments in Central America, whiCh 
Carlos III demanded as a reward for his mediation, were 
contemptuously ignored. These circumstances, taken together 
with France's constant efforts to engage Spain in the 
contest, finally brought Carlos III to join France in the 
1. 
Family Compact of 1761. 1 
The negotiations for the Franco-Spanish alliance took 
place in Paris between Choiseul and Grimaldi, the Spanish 
ambass~dor to the French Court. Carlos 111 wanted it to be 
a maritime alliance to cover colonial possessions only, and 
13 
a guarantee to secure his relatives' territories in Italy, 
especially, Piacenza which Sardinia was now claiming from the 
Duke of Parma, Felipe, CarIos Ill's brother. Spain also hoped 
that the alliance would have a restraining effect on Austria 
in respect of Prus8ia and thus help to maintain peace in 
, , 
Germany; CarIos Ill, like Choiseul, did not want a powerful 
Austria at the expense of Prussia, for she might then become 
dangerous to the Spanish interests in Italy.2 
1. Z.E. Rasbed, The Peace of Paris 1~63, pp. 32-63 ~assim; 
Palacio, pp. $1-7; Pares, pp. 5~1- 9 passim. Cp. V.Palacio 
Atard, Las Emba"adas de Abreu Fuentes en Londres 1 -
1761, passim; ., r1 una es br tan cos y presas e 
barcos durante la guerra de 108 Siete Afies tt , R.A.B.M., LX (1954), pp. 105-110; V.L.Brown, "Spanish claims to a share 
in the Newfound~and fisheries in the Eighteenth Century", 
Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report (1925), pp. 
64-82; J.O.McLachlan, *The Uneasy Neutrality"', Oambridge 
Historical Journal, VI (1938), pp. 55-77; and R. Pares, 
0010nia1 Blockade and neutral r1 hts 1 -1 6 t pp. 285-
su sequent y C1 e as Pares, 0 on oc &de). 
2. Gaetan de Raxis de Flassan, Histoire Generale et 
raisonnee de la Diplomatie Franc81se, Vf, pp.l~1-2; 
t. Biart, tea Rapports de la France et de 1 tEspagne, pp. 
5-6; and F. Rpusseau, :algne de Charles tIt d 'ispagne, 
1759-1788, I, pp. 38, 44. 
-
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This is in fact one of the points that Choiseul 
emphasized for the purpose of persuading the Spaniards that 
the Family Compact was based on mutual interests. But 
Choiseul wished to widen the alliance to include wars in 
Germany. Carlos III had to give way; nevertheless, he 
succeeded in incorporating some provisos, which diminished 
Spain's risk of war in Germany quite considerably.l 
On 15 August 1761 the treaty was signed as a defensive 
alliance, to take effect after the present war, to guarantee 
the two partners' territories in all parts of the world (art. 
2). Article 8 excluded from the scope of the alliance the 
wars that France might enter into as a consequence of her 
alliances in Germany and in the North, or as a guarantor of 
the Treaty of Westphalia. In these wars France would have a 
claim on Spain's support only when a maritime power was 
involved in them or if the fortunes of such wars were so un-
favourable to France that her own metropolitan territories 
should be threatened. The stipulated naval aid was twelve 
ships of the line and six frigates (art. 5). As to 
territorial forces, Spain undertook to supply France with 
1. Palacio, pp. 124-37, 165-75, for the last stages 
of the negotiation between Choiseul and GrimaIdi. 
10,000 foot-soldiers and 2,000 cavalry, while the 
corresponding figures for the French forces would be 
18,000 and 6,000 (art. 6). In the two cases established 
in article 8 Spain would increase her aid to the French 
figures. 
In respect of Italy, the signatories agreed to 
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guarantee the possessions of Carlos Ill's third son and 
heir to the Neapolitan Crown, Fernando IV, and those of his 
brother Felipe, the Duke of Parma (art. 3). Furthermore, 
Carlos III undertook to promote the Neapolitan accession 
to the Family Compact (art. 19). 
By the Secret Convention drawn up to make provisions 
for Spain's entry into the Anglo-French colonial conflict 
and signed on the same day as the Family Compact, France 
agreed to cooperate with Carlos III to obtain Sardinia's 
approval for a settlement in Piacenza on the basis of a 
monetary compensation in return for Charles Emmanuel Ill's 
1 reversionary rights (art. 10). 
Minorca, which had been conquered by the Fren~h in 
1756 to be used as a counter in their future negotiations 
with Britain, was given to Spain on deposit until the peace 
at her own request. During the negotiations Ohoiseul, 
though reluctant to part with the island, had agreed to 
hand it over to Carlos III on condition tbat be could use 
1. Both the Family Compact and the Secret Oonvention are 
printed in"'Palacl0, pp~ 336-52. 
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it as a bargaining-counter. Should France not use it as a 
compensation to ensure return of her own lost territories, 
the cession would become definitive (art. 6). However, 
Carlos III ~ould not entertain the prospect of paying for 
its defence during the war, and the island remained in 
France's hands until 1763, when it went back to Britain. l 
As to Portugal, the two parties agreed to make every 
effort to bring her into the war on their side (art. 7). 
Portugal was a very valuable ally to Britain; by weaning 
her away, the Bourbon powers would strike a heavy blow at 
Britain's main source of strength, commerce. 2 
In respect of Anglo-Spanish affairs, France undertook 
to ensure that Carlos III obtained satisfaction in the 
following matters: disputed prizes, participation in the 
Newfoundland fisheries, and Spain's claim to the settle-
ments of the British logwood cutters in Oentral America 
(art. 2).3 
1. Palacio, pp. 128-167 passim; Rashed, pp. 12-3. 
2. Palacio, pp. 216-217; Rashed, pp. 119-120. 
,. The immediate solution of Siain's grievances does not 
seem to have been Oarlos III s main concern, since be 
was prepared to forge article 2, if these i.~uea were 
the only obstacle in the 'way of a pacification between 
Britain and ~rance; aee Pal.cio, p. 172 • 
• 
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Thus committed to France, Carlos III could not remain 
neutral for very long. Five months elapsed, however, before 
hostilities between England and Spain broke out. Carlos III 
used them to make military and naval preparations and also 
to attempt to pin onto Britain the responsibility for the 
forthcoming conflict. This is the main reason why the 
definitive Franco-Spanish Convention bears the date 
4 February 1762; the document of 15 August 1761 was altered 
to imply that the alliance of the Bourbon powers was the 
consequence, and not the cause, of Britain's declaration of 
war on Spain on 2 January 1762. spain followed suit on 
the l6th. l 
The ensuing war proved that Carlos III and his 
advisers had seriously misjudged the resources and deter-
mination of Great Britain. The war in Portugal showed also 
the state of unpreparedness of Spain. The joint ultimatum 
of France and Spain to the Portuguese government in March, 
1762, failed to scare Liabon into joiniag the Bourbon powera, 
and the military operations which followed at the end of May 
to enforce their threat, laid bare the weaknesses of the 
1. Palaeio, pp.l04-9, 175, 197, 209-10, and ~? Cp. A.S. 
ilten, "A neglected intrigue of the Family Compact-, 
H.A.H.R., XI (1931), pp. 38?-93. For BriUItD's decision 
to declare war on Kpain, see Pares, pp. 583-90. 
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Spanish army, especially the artillery. Successive delays 
in the summer and autumn of 1762 due to the illness of the 
Spanish .commanding officer, Aranda, and to autumn rains, 
hindered the action of the Spanish troops and the war was 
confined to encounters of little consequence until the 
Peace of Paris. l 
In addition to the poor performance of her army, Spain's 
chances of future advantages in Portugal were further under-
mined by Choiseul who feared that Carlos Ill's territorial 
ambitions might be a stumbling-block in the peace 
negotiations with Britain. Choiseul realized that Carloa 
III woul~ not come out of the war unless he had some gains 
with which to bargain. Indeed, Portugal was the only area 
where Spain might reasonably expect to achieve some 
bargaining-counter with which to offset her likely losses 
elsewhere and to obtain satisfaction tor outstanding claims. 
Fully aware of this, Choise~ went as tar aa recommending 
the Britisb to send troops to Portugal with the utmoat speed 
to stop the progress of the Spanish army.2 IUrthermore, 
1. Palacio, pp. 216-23, 243-4; Gil M!tUla. pp. '66-9; and 
L Bourguet, -Le Due de Ch9iseul'e iil1liance eSl>agDo1e. 
Un ultimatum franco-espa~ol au Portugal (1761-25)-, 
R.H.D., JJIV (1910), pp. 25-38. 
2. Raahed ~ pp. 139 and 150. 
, 
19 
news of the English conquest of Havana reached London on 
September 29th, and Paris on October 2nd. This remarkable 
achievement of the British sapped Carlos Ill's confidence. l 
The loss of Havana proved to what an extent Spain had 
been defeated. Carlos III was now willing to make peace, 
and Choieeul, to obtain some concessions for France, took 
upon himself the task of persuading him to accept British 
terms. He played a very successful part in the last stage 
of the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris and was 
instrumental in sparing France at the expense of Spain. 2 
Carlos Ill, though conscious of the sacrifices be bad to 
make for the sake of his ally, was compelled to give in to 
Britain's terms. The Preliminary articles were signed in 
Paris o~' 3 November 1762. 
Tbe definitive Treaty of Paris of 10 ~ebruary 1763 
stipulated that Carlos III had to give up hope of regaining 
Minorca (art. 12); in Jmerica, in return for Havana. which 
was restored to Spain, he lost Florida, St. Augustin, 
Penzacola and all territories east of the Mi8sissippi (art. 
20). He also had to relinquish the small conquesta made in 
1. Bashed, pp. 176-7; Palacio, pp. 255-8; and B.Y.Ruasell, 
"The reaction in England and America to tbe capture of 
Havana, 1762", R.A.H.R., IX (1929), pp. 3'03-16. 
2. Rashed, pp. 170-83, 208-11. See also Pares, pp. 596-610. 
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Fortugal as well as the colony of Sacramento and the 
territories taken by Cevallos in the River Plate (art. 21).1 
The Ang10-Spanish disputes were not solved to Carlos 
Ill's satisfaction. Prizes were still to be judged in 
English courts (art. 16). Spain had to renounce her right a 
to fish in Newfoundland waters (art. 18) and had also to 
recognize the settlements of British logwood cutters in 
Central America (art. 17). She furthermore had to grant 
Britain free navigation in the MisSissippi River (art. 7). 
In respect of commerce Carlos III was compelled to give 
in to Britain's demand for the renewal of the existing 
treaties which were an obstacle to Spain's hopes of economic 
recovery (art. 2).2 
.. 
Against such losses the cession of the French 
Louisiana, west of the Mississippi River, to Spain in 
November 1762 was but small compensation, for it was weakened 
from the beginning by France's cession to Britain of the 
1. The places conquered in Portugal were Almeida, Alcantara, 
Chaves and the province of Tr¥os-Montes in the North, 
and several places in Beira ~a. 
2. Original Text of the Treaty, printe4 by Rashed, pp. 212-229. 
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Louisiana, east of the Mississippi River, despite solemn 
promises to Spain that Britain would not be allowed to 
expand to the Gulf of Mexico, and by the concession to the 
British to navigate the Mississippi River. France gave up 
this land to England in order to regain the sugar island of 
Santa Lucia. It was the lesser of two evils. Choiseul 
tried to impress Spanish circles with a show of magnanimity 
in order to undo the bad impression caused by the results 
of the war. But Carlos III was not deceived; he accepted 
the territory fully aware of the burden that it would be 
upon Spain and for no other reason than to prevent another 
country, Britain, from possessing all Louisiana. l 
A second attempt on the part of Choiseul to gain 
.. 
Spain's confidence during the war and, after 1762, to dispel 
the suspicions of the Spanish government, was successfully 
used by Carlos III to bring about a settlement in Italy 
favourable to his family. 
1. A.S. Aiten, "The diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession", 
A.H.R., XXXVI (1930-1), pp. 701-720; Bashed, pp. 181-2. 
For Spain's views on Louisiana, see Vill1ers du Terrage, 
Les dernieres annees de la Louisiane francaise, pp. 155 
and 246; v. Rodrfguez Casade, PrIieros &tios de la 
dominacion espano1a en la Luisiana, chapters X, Ill, 
VIII, passim. 
Carlos III of Spain had married Mar!a Amalia of 
Saxony, a daughter of J iICiik Augustus III of Poland, 
on 9 May 1738. Of this marriage thirteen children were 
born, but only seven lived: Felipe, Carlos, Fernando, 
Antonio Pascual, Francisco Javier, Maria Josefa and Marla 
Luisa. l 
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Their first son, Felipe, was an imbecile; the second 
one, CarIos Amton10, therefore became the heir to the 
Spanish throne with the title of Prince of Asturias; the 
third son, Fernando, inherited the Crown of the Two 
Sicilies. Carlos Ill's brother, Don Felipe, continued in 
possession of the Duchies of Farma, Piacenza and Guastalla, 
which had been acquired by lsabel Farnese, Felipe V's wife, 
.. 
and ceded to Don Felipe by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle of 
~ 
1748. The cedipg powers, Austria in respect of Farma and 
Guastalla and Sardinia in respect of Piacenza, had agreed _ 
',-
to it on condition that Spain, Naptes, and Parma should 
never come under the same monarch, disrupting the balance 
of power in Italy; but while the former had consented to a 
very specific pledge to forge her reversionary rights to 
Farma and Guastalla as long as Don Eelipe and his 
successors did not come into new territories, the instrument 
1. M.T. Oliveros de Castro, Mar!a Amalia de Sajon1a, 
esposa de Carlos Ill, pp. 25, ~?=44. 
-
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of cession of the latter provided that her reversionary 
rights to Piacenza were to be realized "luego que su 
Majestad el rey de las Dos Sicilias (the future Carlos III 
of Spain) pasare a la Corona de Espana, 0 llegare a morir 
sin hijos varones el referido infante" (Don Felipe).l 
When Carlos III became King of Spain in 1759, Austria, 
who was against any further strengthening of Sardinia that 
might endanger Milan, signed a treaty with Naples on 3 
October 1759 to acknowledge and guarantee Fernando IV's 
accession to the Neapolitan throne and to renounce her 
reversionary rights to Farma and Guastalla in return for 
the surrender of Tuscany to Joseph's brother, Leopold. 2 
But Charles Emmanuel III of Sardinia seized the 
.. 
opportunity of Carlos' succession to the Spanish Crown to 
stress the validity of his claims, and took measures to 
recover Piacenza which he had held since the Treaty of 
1. Article 7 of the Spanish Accession to the Definitive 
Treaty of Aix-1a-Chape1le of 18 October 1748, printed 
in A del Cantillo, Tratados convenios dec1araciones 
de az de comercio •• es 0 es ••• es e e ano asta 
e 1&; pp. 
2. Text of this treaty printed in Canti110, pp. 461-3, and 
F.A.G. Wenck, Codex juris ~ent1u. recenti.siai, pp. 206-
11. Cp_ articles XV and:XV I of the Franco-Instrian 
Treaty of 30 December 1758, in Wenck, IIIl pp. 185-201 
and the Austro-Spanish-Sardinian Treaty 0 14 June 1752, 
in Canti110, pp. 412-5. 
-
24 
Worms of 1743 until 1748. For a while war loomed large. 
France prevented it by promising Sardinia to support Charles 
Emmanuel's claims to Piacenza as soon as the Seven Years War 
was finished. This pledge remained a stumbling-bloCk in the 
way of a pacific solution. 
However, France's desire to bring Spain into the war in 
1761 led her to adopt a more favourable attitude"towards her 
ally. Choiseul agreed to support Carlos Ill's case provided 
he paid some monetary compensation to Sardinia. As for 
Britain, from whom Charles Emmanue1 had expected some 
support, she was also in favour of a pacific solution on the 
basis of compensation; the speed with which Britain agreed to 
comply with Choiseul's request to stay out of the question 
proved the English lack of real interest in the matter. 
Charles Emmanuel III consequently had to give in to the 
proposals put forward by Choiseul, conforming to Carlos Ill's 
wishes in respect of Piacenza. l 
Two Conventions were signed on 10 June 1763. It was 
agreed that a monetary compensation of 8,200,000 French 
1. 
-
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livres, half to be paid by Spain, half by France, was to 
be placed in Turin and its yield to be used as an equival-
ent of the rent that Piacenza would produce if Sardinia 
had it. This capital should be returned to its depositors 
if the reversion of Piacenza to Sardinia took place on 
account of the death of Don Felipe, Duke of Farma, without 
issue. l Britain was among those who welcomed the outcome, 
and entered these arrangements as guarantor of the two 
Conventions. 2 
The pacific settlement of the Piacenza succession 
filled Carlos III with joy, most of all because it was the 
resu~t of Austro-Spanish co-operation. 3 His own experience 
1. Te~s of the two Conventions printed in Cant1llo, pp. 
497-501, and Wenck, Ill, pp. 446-54. 
2. Her guarantee, dated 27 November 1763, was enclosed 
in Carrion's dispatch of the same day; A.G.B., Estado, 
leg O 6954 •. Carrion was the secretary to the Spanish 
embassy in London, and in charge of affairs until 
Masserano's arrival on November 26th; A.H.N., Eatado, 
1egO 3439, A.G.S., Eatado, lege 6954, and S.F. 94/165. 
3. Carlos III to Tanucci, 2 August 1763; quoted b1 
Danvi1a, IV, p. 88. Cp. Masserano's instructions 
of 9 August 176;, A.H.N., E8ta~>, 1egO 34;6/1. 
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of past years had been one of repeated struggles for Italy 
against Austrian expansion. The Austro-Neapolitan Treaty 
of 1759 and successive marriages between the Austrian and 
Bourbon families gave him reasons to believe that the 
arrangement in Italy as established in the Conventions of 
Turin was to become a permanent settlement, marking the end 
of friction with Austria in Europe and the beginning of "a 
possible diversion of Spanish attention and resources to 
other quarters. l 
However, Carlos Ill's desire to promote good relations 
with Austria in Italy did not stop there. With France's' 
loss of New France to Britain and her cession of Louisiana 
to Spain, Carlos III felt himself alone in facing a British 
expansion Which he and his subjects tended to regard as 
'inevitable'; this threat was the more pressing since 
Spain had just suffered a complete military defeat in 
America. A thorough economic and military reorganization 
of the possessions overseas was urgently needed. Further-
1. Joseph, King of the Romans, bad married Isabel of Parma, 
Don Felipe's daughter, in 1760, and Luisa, the Spanish 
princess, was to mar.ry Maria ~heresa' s second son, 
Leopold; Carlos III even contemplated marrying bis beir, 
Carlos, and j'ernando IV of Naples to .Austrian, princesses. 
H. Bedarida, Lea Premiers Bourbons de Parme et l'Bs1:lne, 
p. 62; Danvila, IV, pp. 87:a; Paiaclo, p. 278- and •• 
von Am.th, Maria Theresia und aer Sleben "hr e uie , 
1?56:1S63, I ,pp. -. 
.. 
more, Carlos III was aware of the use that Choiseul had 
made of the Family Compact, to lighten the losses of 
France at the expense of Spain, during the negotiations 
that led to the Treaty of Paris. l 
Hence he sought to form an alliance with Austria, from 
which he expected, first, to re-affirm the status quo in 
Italy and to preserve peace in Europe and, secondly, to win 
an ally which would make Spain less dependent upon France 
for diplomatic and moral support. Carlos Ill's attempt to 
add a second string to Spain's bow will be discussed at a 
later stage. 
1. Palacio, p. 232; Hashed, p. 92. 
2. La secretarla de estado y del despacho universal 
(The Spanish ministry of foreign affairs). 
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In line with a general tendency in Europe towar& a 
greater administrative efficiency,l Spain evolved during 
the second half of the eighteenth century a specialized 
ministry of foreign affairs or first secretary-ship of state. 
This evolution formed part of a general development in 
Spain towards rationalization and centralization of the 
functions of the state, which reached its final stage with 
the establishment of the Junta de Estado in 1787. This is 
the embryo of a council of ministers or cabinet, which meets 
re~ularly and coordinates the work of the various ministers 
under the presidency of the first secretary of state. 2 
Carlos III was to some extent following tracks laid by his 
predecessors, but it was during his reign (1759-1788) that 
the reform of the Spanish administration gathered momentum: 
the King and his close advisers embarked upon a vast 
programme of reforms with almost 'revolutionary' zeal.~ 
1. D.B.Hern, The British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1289, p.1. 
2. "Gobierno del Sefior Rey Don Carlos III 0 Instruccion 
reservada para la direccion de la JUnta de Eatado~, 
8 July 1788; printed in B.A.E., vol. 59. 
J, 
3. V. Rodr!guez C.sado, ~La 'revolucion b~~ue •• ' del 
sigl. XVnI eSPaDol~, jrb¥r, DIll (1951), DO. 61, pp. 5-
29. Ibid., L olitica 0 olit C 8 en e • ' 4. 
Carlos Ill, pp. . e e er c aa •• o. • 
also H. famen, "Melchor de' Macanaz and the OUD atlona 
of Bo~rbon~ower in Spain", E.B.R., LIJ% (1965)1 pp. 699-
716; M. Artola,~Camp1110 y 188 reform~ de Oar oa Ill·, 
!h!., XII (1952), pp'. 685-714. 
29 
At the beginning of the century government had been 
carried out by Councils named after the territories which 
fell under their jurisdiction - Castile, the Indies, Italy, 
etc. - or designated by the work done in them - State, War, 
Marine, etc. - and whose number varied from time to time. 
They were legislative bodies with administrative functions, 
and acted also as courts of appeal. The councillors were 
appointed by, and were collectively responsible to the 
king, to whom they reported in writing. For the consider-
ation of foreign affairs the heads of each council, with 
the title of president or secretary, met to form the 
Despacho Universal, which held its meetings without the king 
bu~ made recommendations to him through the first or 
principal secretary of state, the 'primer secretario de 
estado y del despacho universal,.l 
With Carlos III the functions of the secretarie8 or 
ministers were gradually enlarged at the e~ense of the 
Councils. The badly-defined spheres of action and lumbering 
procedure of the Councils hindered the progres8 of govern-
mental work and Carlos Ill, conscious of the grow~g t~k ~f 
the administration, aimed at a more flexible system ot 
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government more directly dependent on him. The centre of 
policy-making shifts from the cumbrous Councils to the 
secretaries, who are now becoming the king's servants. 
Very little remains of their original status as represent-
atives of the Councils. l 
At the head of the government stood the first 
secretary, whose special responsibility was the conduct of 
foreign affairs. In so far as he advised the king on 
matters of war ane peace, he might give coherent and 
unified direction to other departments of public 
administration, like war, marine, finances, Indies. But 
this depended largely on the person in charge. 
Immediately after the Seven Years War a permanent 
Junta interministerial was set up to coordinate government 
work; the objective was to bring' the ministers together 
every Thursday for the discussions of their respective 
activities, with a view to coordinating their decisions 
on matters of defence, and revenue. It consisted of 
Grimaldi, in cbarge of foreign affairs, Eaquilache, 
minister of finance~and war, and Arriaga, iD charge of 
,-~ 
1. V. Rodr!guez Gasado, La administraClon KUb11ca en e1 
reinado deQ~lOs Ill, pp. 24-31. cp. eadevIse, du 
Dezert; pp. -7, for the relegation of the Oounclla 
to the mere function of consultative bodies or hODorar7 
institutions to reward ~ervices to the Grown. 
~ to 
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naval and colonial affairs. These three were instructed by 
Carlos III to report to him about the best means to improve 
his leadership in every branch of the administration. l 
The Genoese Jeronimo Grimaldi was the head of the tri-
umvirate. He was born in 1720, and after a short period as 
minister of Genoa in Madrid, entered the Spanish service in 
1746. His first mission as a diplomat was to Austria, and 
from there he went to Sweden in 1749; later he represented 
Spain at the Hague and in Paris. In the latter capital, he 
played a very important part in the last stage of the Seven 
Years War and helped to bring about the Hispano-French 
alliance of 1761. After the Peace of Paris, he returned to 
Spain to succeed Wall as first secretary of state, a post 
that he held until 1776, when he was driven to resign by 
the strong criticism levelled against him after the failure 
of the Spanish expedition to Algiers in 1775.2 He was then 
1. 
2. Cp. below p. 
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sent as ambassador to Rome, retiring in 1784. In 1777 a 
dukedom was conferred on him and he was made a grandee of 
the realm; he was a member of the Order of Carlos III since 
its inception in 1772.1 
Grimaldi was sincerely attached to the French 
alliance. 2 But he strove during his period of office to 
impress upon France the colonial importance that Carlos III 
attached to the Family Compact. He worked for peace in 
Europe and usually sided with the minister of marine, 
Arriaga, in adopting pacific policies towards Britain, 
which would enable Spain to strengthen her empire. Be 
generally limite~ his activities to his own department. 
His lack of connexion with internal matters (for foreign 
affairs were not likely to arouse as much opposition in 
Spanish circles as e.g. tax reforms) as well as Carlos Ill's 
unstinted support to those who served him well, enabled him 
to survive the insurrection which brought about the fall of 
1. A.H.N., Estado, LegO 3421/a (Grimaldi's dossier), and 
Order of Carlos Ill, Libro 114 (C), no. 202. 
2. The standard histories for the period judge Grimaldi 
as too much of a Francopbile and reiard his appointment 
as primarily due to Carlos Ill's desire to make it clear 
that the official polic~ of Spain was friendship with 
France, see Casado, pp. 93-4, Gil Munilla, , p. 87, 
Rousseau, 11, p. 33,' and Blart, pp. 75-6. 
the other foreigner in the ministry, Esquilache, in 1766. 1 
Don Leopoldo de Gregorio, marquis de Esquilache, was 
of Sicilian stock and low birth, but he was indefatigable 
in business and an expert on financial questions~ His 
political career started in Naples as surveyor to the 
Neapolitan army; in 1746 he was transferred to the Customs 
department and by 1755, he was minister of finances, war 
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and marine of Naples. 2 He followed Carlos III to Spain and 
became minister of Finance; four years later in 1763, be was 
1. Father Olaechea has informed me by letter that he is 
trying to piece tosether what looks like a nmotin contra 
Grimaldi" in 1776 (simi1ur to the one against Esquilache 
in 1766) led by Aranda, the strong man of the military 
aristocracy, who accused him of being pusillanimous over 
the Ealkland Islands question, responsible for the defeat 
in Algiers, and inept in handling the Portuguese issue. 
Aranda, however, miSfired in his struggle for Grimaldi's 
position, for Carlos III rather than reward him with the 
first secretaryship of state preferred to follow Grimaldi'a 
advice and appointed Florldablanca. Aranda had to wait 
until 1792, four years after Carlos Ill's death, befo.re 
he could taste supreme power and then he kept his post 
only for a few months for he had to make way for CarIos 
IV's favourite, Godoy. For Aranda, his nAragenese party", 
and his intrigues against Grimaldi, see Cutado, pp. 215-
224, and R. Olaechea, "En torno al ex-jesu ta Gregor10 
Iriarte. Hermano del conde de Aranda n, Arch1 vum 
H1storicum Societatis Iesu, Extractum e vol. iilIII (1964), 
passim. 
2. H. Acton, The Bourbons of Naples (1734-1825), pp.72-3, 
87; and Schipa, pp. 469-73. 
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appointed minister of War. These posts he held until March, 
1766, when he had to be sacrificed to popular clamour. l 
During his tenure of office his influence was noticeable in 
all fields of the administration. He was the foremost 
exponent of Carlos Ill's reform plans; his energetic pace, 
however, gained him the enmity of certain reactionary 
Spanish groups who~posed Carlos Ill's fiscal and adminis-
trative measures directed to instituting a universal tax and 
freedom of commerce. His efficiency in raising money to 
further Carlos Ill's military and naval reforms and his 
skilful handling of commercial affairs in his dealings with 
France, bear witness to his great abilities. His out-
standing services to the Crown, however, were of no avail 
when the Spanish population revolted against the reforms. 
Scarcity of wheat due to a persistent drought for six years 
running, 1760-6, set the mob in a propitious mood for a 
revolt. Behind this, the privileged bodies of the country 
were waiting to air their complaints against reforms. Their 
target was not the king but Esquilache, who was the moat 
conspicuous of Carlos Ill's te~) of reformers and happened 
to be a foreigner. Moreover, his wife's ostentatious living 
, , 
1. M.G. Bernard, "Liste des secretaires d'Etat eapagnola 
de l'avenement des Bourbons jusqu'en 1808", R.A.B.M., 
LXII (1956), no. 2, pp. 387-94. Cp. DtrVi1a, It, pp. 88-9, 
and Coxe, Ill, p. 290. Eaquilache re~red to Naples until 
1772 when he was appointed Spaniah ambassador to Venice: 
he died in 1785. . 
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in a period of dearth was a good enough reason to stir 
up discontent within the lower layers of the Spanish 
population. Among those who opposed Carlos Ill's policies 
were, first, the aristocracy who feared the universal tax 
and resented the opening up of the administration to the 
lower ranks of the nobility and the middle c~asses; 
secondly, the five guilds of Madrid whose monopoly of 
essential commodities was put in jeopardy by the freedom 
of commerce in grain decreed in 1765; and, finally, the 
high clergy whose exemption from taxes was coming to an 
end. 
All these circumstances brought about a conspiracy 
in 1766 to head Carlos II~ away from reform. The revolt 
made the King reconsider his policies and althougb be 
did not change his long-term plans, he was forced to take 
measures to pacify his rebellious subjects. Eaquilache 
was dismissed on March 3rd, 1766, and his fall marks tbe' 
opening of a second stage of Carlos Ill's reign. Tbe 
King was from now on cautious; he achieved most of bis 
aims by carefully tiJjd.ng his decisions and gradually 
36 
making progress without arousing too much criticism. l 
The third power in the inner councils of the Spanish 
administration was Don JUlian de Arriaga y Rivero, minister 
of marine from July, 1754, and of the Indies from August of 
the same year until his death on January 28th, 1776. He 
was sincerely attached to Carlos Ill's pacific aims and 
believed that only peace could enable Spain to strengthen 
her possessions. However, his over-cautiousness and 
conservative instincts made his office colourless and 
caused him to delay many needed reforms. He came from the 
lower ranks of the nobility and was held in high esteem by 
all in Spain. 2 
1. The historical significance of the revolt of 1766 and its 
social and political implications are now undergoing a 
thorough re-examination. It is as yet too early to 
attempt a comprehensive account of the causes of the 
revolt, to clarify the part taken in it by the privileged 
bodies ot the country in their fight against the growing 
power of new classes. Nor are the links between the 
revolt and the subsequent expulsion of the Jesuits in 
-
1767, and the measures adopted in the 1770's to break the 
nonopoly of their colegios mayores as the training colleges 
where the nobility prepared for the main posts of the 
administration, fully established. The most recent account 
is by Casado: but Father Olaechea goes deeper into the 
problem and is mapping out the interplay of the various 
groups and interests, see his L s relaciones his ano-
rom as en la se unda mitad de ' encia 
e preces, an ar 
2. Oasado, pp. 88-9. The strengthening of the American 
Northern frontier and the advance of the Spanish border 
along the coastal line of the Pacific (Upper California) 
were achievements to his credit, according to V.L.Brown, 
"Anglo-Spanish relations in America in the cloaing lears 
of the Colonial Era, 1763-1774", R.A.H.R., '-'1: (1922), 
pp.- 338-44. 
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As a complement to the weekly meetings of these three 
ministers, Grimaldi, Esquilache and Arriaga, a committee of 
five experts, the Junta Tecnica, was created in 1764 to 
report on commercial matters. It was in the meetings of 
these councils that numberless memorials were drawn up to 
reform the Spanish administration, to give the country more 
modern political and commercial institutions and to set the 
pace for economic recovery.l 
The Junta Interministerial does not seem to have met 
as regularly as was planned. One may find occasional 
references to ministerial meetings in periods of crisis, e.g. 
the Falkland Islands flare-up in 1770-1771. 2 But on the 
whole the process of policy-making took place outside tbese 
gatherings in which the issues at stake were only suggested. 
Tbe various ministers concerned would then submit their 
views in writing to the first secretary, who in turn would 
weigh the evidence before him and discuss the matter with 
the sovereign himself.' From these private meetings 
1. V.Rodr!guel Casado, "La 1abor de gobierno de Carlos III 
en Indias", (La Rabida lectures, unpublished, 1945)(cit. 
in Gil Munilla, pp. 89-90) Cp. also his -Comentarios al 
Decreto 1 Real Instruccion de 1765", Aquario de Bistoria 
de Derecbo Eap~ol, XIII (1936-41), p. 101, footnote 2. 
2. M.-Hidalgo Niete, La cuestion de 1" ~lVin~ pp.233-5; 
O. Gil Munilla, Malv1nas, p.98. ape l~.s.,~ tado, legaj08 
6974 and 6980, tor two meetings, one in October 1769 and 
tbe other in May 1771, on the entry in Spanish ports ot 
British warships. 
3. Cp. below pp. 103-5. 
-
Grimaldi, the first secretary of state, would leave with 
definite instructions which the ministers would have to 
carry out in their respective departments. This personal 
contact with the King gave the first secretary the 
opportunity to further his own views rather than those of 
his colleagues. 
His successor, Floridablanca, went to great lengths 
to push forward the centralizing tendencies that had 
developed during Grimaldi's administration. His Spanish 
origins made him bolder; unlike Grimaldi, he was not 
cautious by temperament and, conscious of Carlos lIlts 
support, was less deterred by criticism levelled against 
him. Furthermore, Aranda, who intrigued against Florida-
blanca as he had done against Grimaldi, was far less 
dangerous for he was removed from Madrid as ambassador to 
Paris. Finally, there was a wider agreement on the part 
of the ministers and the country as a whole for the need 
to introduce a more effective administrative machine; 
Floridablanca referred to the Junta interministerial of 
1763 as a precedent to forestall his critics. l 
~8 
Seen after taking over the first secret&r,Jship of 
state, Floridablanea's manner grew ... rbearing and author-
1. See his ·Observacione.", pp. 297-8, and "Memorial", pp •. 
743-6, in B.A.E., Vol. 59. There is an English version of 
the "Memorial' in Coxe (2nd edition), V, appendix 1. 
-
... 
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itarian: he was said to desire absolute power.l In 1787, 
he established the Junta de Estado, which under his 
presidency was to regulate the life of the country as a 
legislative and executive body, and drafted the Instruccion 
reservada as a blue-print for the guidance of its members. 
The Junta de Estado, however, was very ahort-~ived, for when 
Floridablanca fell in 1792 - Carlos IV having succeeded his 
father, Carlos Ill, in 1788 - Aranda's first step was to 
dissolve it and bring Floridablanca to trial, accused among 
other things of nepotism and of having arrogated to himself 
absolute power.2 
Carlos III personally revised the Instruccion reservada, 
and though the document itself is by Floridablanca, the 
policies embodied in it, when seen against the background 
of Carlos Ill's reign as a whole, show that consistent 
political and social aims of reform predominated in Spain 
ever since his accession to the Spanish throne. This being 
the case, it has been argued with considerable justification 
1. 
2. For his fall, see Casado, pp. 240-,. Cp. Floridablanc.'s 
two legal defences in B.A.E., vol. 59, pp. ,59-508. 
--
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that only the King could have made this possible, for he 
remained while his ministers came and went. It is often held 
that Carlos III had a large share in formulating domestic and 
foreign policy.l There is no doubt that the argument is 
plausible, but it is not generally accepted in full. It 
has been shown recently that Carlos III was almost morbid in 
his regard for routine and methodical habits; qualities which 
do not constitute the makings of a dynamic great ruler. He 
seems to have had no imagination of his own. 2 Therefore it 
seems safer to look upon him as a reformer, an enlightened 
king, who supported ministers likely to go in the direction 
of reform. For Oarlos III was quite firm, not to say 
stubborn, once he had subscribed to a policy in its broad 
and general lines, though he had no part in shaping the 
various stages of putting it into practice. The ministers 
were therefore free to follow their own minds, provided they 
acted within the prevalent framework of ideas supported by 
Carlos Ill. 
1. De.devises du »ezert, pp. 14-19, 56-7; see also Casado, 
R.I., V (1944), pp. 231-2. Cp. more recently J. Lynch, 
Spanish Colonial Administration, p. 3; and N.M.Farriaa, 
hEcclesiastical immunity iD New Spain, 1760-1815", 
pp. 35-6. 
2. E. de Tapia Ocariz, Carlos III 1 IU iP'9a, pp. 197, 248-53; P. Voltes Bou, Carios III y au tempo, pp. 176-87. 
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In foreign policy one can clea~ly see during his reign 
a system firmly established with the signature of the 
Family Compact - friendship with France against the common 
enemy, Britain, and peace in Europe. A succession of first 
secretaries and under-secretaries of state and Spanish 
representatives abroad supported the French alliance as a 
means to preserve peace in Europe while strengthening the 
defences of the country and its overseas possessions against 
the expansive aims of Britain. In the sphere of foreign 
affairs the King's own share in decisions must be 
recognized. 
When he succeeded to the Spanish throne, he found the 
Anglophile Wall in charge of foreign affairs, but he soon 
evolved a French policy which culminated in the Family 
Compact of 1761; it laid the foundations of Carlos Ill's 
diplomacy. The negotiator of this allianye, Grimaldi, was 
called upon to succeed Wall immediately after the Treaty of 
Paris that brought to a close the Seven Years War; and when 
he resigned in 1776, be managed to persuade CarIos III to 
appoint Floridablanca as his successor. 
The latter had not only acquired a well-deserved 
prestige as a diplomatist during the negotiations in Roae 
for tbe suppression of tbe Jesuits but be also bad the 
backing of a powerful group in the diplomatic service, 
whose influence in the ministry of foreign ,affairs during 
42 
the late 1760's and 1770's proved decisive. This league 
of covachuelistas, who derived their name from the fact 
that they had served under Grimaldi in the foreign office,l 
was a means of self-protection for manteistas and goli118S, 
that is, burgueses ilustrades,2 against the powerful ring 
of Jesuits and colegiales mayores (scions of the nobility 
educated by the Jesuits in these colleges), which in 1765 
controlled 80 per cent of all important posts in the church 
and in the state. The burgueses ilustrades had the 
support of the sovereign, who by reforming the colleges and 
creating new ways - such as the Order of Carlos III - to 
reward their services publicly did much to break the 
monopoly of the co1egiales mayores, though these were 
still powerful at the end of the century.3 
The situation in the foreign service, if compared with 
the strong position held by the colegiales mayores in all 
1. Desdevises du Dezert, p. 23. Covachuela was the name for 
the secretaries' offices; the first secretary being the 
grand-mattre of this bureaucracy. 
2. For these terms, see M.Herrero, nNotas sobre la ideolos!a 
del burgues esp~ol del sigle XVIII", A.E.A., IX (1952), 
pp. 297-326, and A. Morel-Fatio,"La Igo!l!!.' et ltbabit 
militaire", Bulletin hispanigue, 1904, pp. 60ff. ' 
3. L.Sala Balust, Visita. !areformas de 10s co18gi08 merorea 
de Salamanca en e1 reIn 0 de Carlos Ill. jor the rder 
. of Car10s Ill, see Fernan-Runez, I, p.2;5, and cagado, pp. 
114-8, 221-2. lather Olaechea will shortly publls 
"Thom1stas y jeBu1tas, mante1stas y colegiale8 mayores en 
el reinado de Carlos Ill", see his art1~le on "Ir1arte·, 
pp. 164-8, 185-6, 192. 
other branches of the administration, especially in the 
Councils and in the Church, was quite different. This 
situation is partly explained by the reluctance of the 
colegiales mayores to serve abroad as private secretary to 
some ambassador or minister, or at home in the secretaries' 
offices;l but undoubtedly the rising burgueses ilustrades 
had also been particularly encouraged by Grimaldi with 
Carlos Ill's support. 
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In 1773, there were ten officials in the foreign office. 
Their names in order of the importance of their posts were: 
Bernardo del Campo, Bernardo de Iriarte, i&mon de las Casas, 
Eugenio de Llaguno, Miguel de atamendi, Andres de Llaguno, 
Domingo de Iriarte, Francisco Escarano, Ignacio de Heredla, 
and Jose de Anduaga y Garimberty.2 Of these, five are 
believed to be covachuellstas: Campo, Casas, E. and .A. 
de Llaguno, and Escarano. The Iriarte brothers, Bernado 
(oticlal mayor menos antiguo) and Domingo (ofici.l sexto), 
1. Olaechea, "Iriarte", pp. 164-5. 
2. A.H.N., Estado, l_gajos }449/1, 3422/1-2. 
-
1 were very probably members of the group. Anduaga joined 
the foreign office in November 1773; Grima1di appointed 
him oficia1 de partes for his satisfactory services in Rome 
under F1oridab1anca, who was also a member of the group.2 
Otamendi was a colegia1;3 and Heredia, though Aranda's man, 
, 4 
was a burgues. 
1. Olaechea has identified so far seven covachuelistas; 
"Iriarte", passim. For Bernardo Iriarte and his friendship 
with Azara colegia1 m~yor who joined the group, see 
C.Corona, Jose Nicolas de Azara, pp. 71-2 and Olaechea, 
"Iriarte" p.165, note 48. tlano, who joined the first 
secretaryfs office in 1742, was the first official during 
Grima1di's first years in office, and died in 1794 as 
ambassador to Vienna (A.H.N., Estado, leg~ 3433/1). Casas, 
whose father was an official in the foreign office, joined it in 1760 and ended up as ambassador to Naples 
-
and Venice (A.H.N., Estado, leg O 3455, no.19). Francisco 
Esc~ano y Triviffo was secretary to the Spanish embassy 
in London from 1767 to 1780, when he returned to the first 
secretaryship of state; in 1783 he was appointed to the 
Postmastership General (A.H.N., Estado, legO 3414i2). 
Eugenio Llaguno joined the foreign office in 1763, and 
succeeded Campo as first under-secretary in 1783; in 1787 
he was made secretary of the newly-created Junta de EStado. 
His brother, Andres, joined him in 1765 and was second 
under-secretary in 1787 (A.H.N., Estado, legajos 3433/1 
and 3449/2). 
2. A.H.N.Estado, 1egajos 3422/1 and 3427/2. 
3. 01aechea, "Iriarte", p.192. Otamendi joined the first 
secretary's office in 1764 and was sent to London in 
November of the same year to succeed Carrion as secretary 
to tbe Spanisb embassy; there be remained until 1?6? 
Back in Madrid, he was second under-secretary of state in 
1787, when he was transferred to the Post Office, then a 
department of the first secretary of state (A.H.N., 
Estado, leg 3446/2; A.G.S., Estado, le gO 6956; cp. 
Floridab1anca, ·Observaciones", B.A.E., vol.59, p.294. 
4. Olaechea, "Iriarte", p. 197. 
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Three covachuelistas were abroad: Jose Nicolas de 
Azara (Rome), Jose Augustin de Llano (Parma), and Fernando 
Magallon (Paris). The pride of the new men in their work as 
well as in their posts is well demonstrated in this letter 
from Llano to Azara on July 25th, 1772:1 
"Simon de las Casas is to be left in charge of 
affairs in Vienna this winter... Thus the three 
most important embassies and the mission to 
Parma will be under the care of four covachas 
de Estado, and four dukes could not do it 
better. h2 
If we turn to one of the covachuelistas serving at home, 
Bernardo del Campo, the first under-secretary of state during 
the l770's, and look a little closer into his career, we may 
get some insight into the way foreign affairs were conducted 
and the close relationship between the men who formulated 
policy in Madrid and those whose job was to execute it, a. 
well as into the increasing professionalism of a permanent 
diplomatic corps now being fashioned. 
1. Quoted in Ibid., p. 185, note 176. 
2. In liome, there were Floridablanca as ambassador from 
April 1772 and Azara as agente de preces from 1766; Spain 
sent two representatives to Rome, one from Head to Head 
of State and anotber one from tbe Head of a Catholic 
country to the Head of the Cathelic Church; see Olaecbea, 
I, pp. 337-9, 373-6. London could be added to this list 
for Escarano was in cbarge of a~fa1rs since ~ugust 1??2 
for nearly three years while Masserano was absent. 
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Don Bernardo del Campo, of known Castilian parentage 
from the province of Burgos and what may be called a country 
gentleman,l first came into sight as private secretary to 
Fernando VI's minister in London, Don Felix de Abreu. From 
London he joined the first secretary's office in 1757, 
probably through Abreu's recommendation. He worked his way 
up quite rapidly. By 1773, he was the first under-secretary 
of state (oficial mayor mas antiguo), and it is probable, 
to judge from the large amount of correspondence that he 
docketed and drafted previous to that date, that he had 
reached the top of the ladder a few years earlier. 2 
There he remained until 1783. During those years be 
was a close collaborator of Grimaldi's and in charge of the 
English correspondence. There seems to have been some 
specialization in the distribution of work which normally 
led to appointments to countries with which one was moat 
familiar.' Del Campo's influence with Grimaldi helped him 
to further Floridablanca's career when the former retired to 
1. A.H.N., Estado, legO 3416/1. Be was given the Order of 
Carlos III in 1772 and was its first secretary; A.H.N., 
Carlos Ill, Libre 114(B), ff. 9 and 24. 
2. He appears as first under-secretary in a list of officials 
of 1773, A.H.N., Estado, leg· 3449/1. 
3. Floridablanca, when accused of nepotism in respect of 
foreign appointments, argued that Jose Agustin de Llano's 
mission to Vienna as ambassador was wise, for be had 
been for several years in charge of the Austrian 
correspondence; "Observaciones-, B.A,.E., vol. 59, p. 291. 
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Rome in 1776.1 
Campo was also the secretary to the Council of State 
since 1776.2 The Council of State had declined considerably 
and its influence in public matters was practically neglig-
ible. Indeed, the fact that the first under-secretary of 
state held the secretaryship to the Council as well, bears 
out the increasing power of the minister at ttie expense of 
the Council, which remained as a source of patronage to drop 
out of sight when the Junta de Estado was established in 
1787; the first under-secretary of state, Eugenio de Llagune, 
was also appointed secretary to the newly-created Junta.' 
The Council of State reappeared in 1792, and during the 
intervening five years councillors continued to be 
apPointed. 4 
1. Campo first tried to get Floridablanca the Presidency of 
the Council of Castile when Arandavacated it in 1773, 
and later on successfully persuaded Grimaldi that 
Floridablanca would be the best successor for the first 
secretaryship of state; Olaechea, "Iriarte", pp.196-7, 
223-6. 
o 2. Grimaldi to Aranda, 7 October 1776, A.H.N., Estado, leg 
4168. 
,. See above p. Ii, note f.. 
4. For instance, Sebastian de Llano y la Quadra, who 
represented Spain in Vienna, Denmark, Sweden and Amsterdam, 
was made councillor of state in 1789, A.H.N., Estado, 
legO 3416/2. 
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In 1783, Campo was sent to London as minister 
plenipotentiary; and Floridablanca, who did not forget 
Campo's services in 1776, obtained for him ambassadorial 
rank in 1787. 1 From London he was sent to Vienna in 1795, 
and a few months later to Paris, where he died in 1800 
after 43 years of uninterrupted diplomatic service. 2 
Campo was a good example of the career diplomatist in 
eighteenth century Spain. His exhaustive training in the 
first secretary's office and his long service abroad can 
be parallelled if not equalled by others, and this helps to 
explain the sense of continuity in Spain's foreign policy 
during Carlos Ill's reign and the increasing professionalism 
of her foreign service. It seems clear that these officials 
as a class supported, and even inspired in part, Carlos lIlts 
social and administrative reforms. 
Unlike Campo, who was promoted to the rank of first 
under-secretary in a relatively short time, most of his 
colleagues in the 'covacha de Estado' took over twenty years 
1. For their friendly relations, see Egerton Mss. ~73 
(private correspondence, 1786-7); B.A.E~, vol. 59, 
pp. 291-2. 
2. A.H.N., E~tado, legO~l6/1. 
-
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to reach higher posts in the first secretary's office from 
the moment they joined it as oficiales de_~art~~.l 
Generally speaking, these officials combined service at home 
with stays abroad of varied length as embassy secretaries, 
especial envoys or ministers. Time in the service seems to 
have been the main criterion for advancement OD the 
diplomatic ladder. 2 
The recruitment of these men does not seem to have been 
done in accordance with any established system of selection. 
On the whole, they were recommended to the foreign secretary. 
It is perhaps possible to notice some preference for those 
who had already had some diplomatic experience abroad as 
private secretaries to diplomats; but university teachers 
became more and more frequent by the 1780's. 
1. The rungs of the foreign office were oficial dealartes, 
eighth to second official, and two first offici s 
(under-secretaries), junior and senior. 
2. Those that were posted abroad were replaced in the 
foreign office, but their names figured in the 
official list for purposes of promotion; Floridablanca 
to Zambrano, ;0 December 1787, A.H.N., Estado, legO 
3449/2. 
50 
For the social background of the diplomatic officials, 
some tentative conclusion may be gathered from the large 
proportion of 'covachuelistas' in the foreign office tu 
~le ~fr,zg~ 911i~~ in the 1770's. Most of them belonged 
to that enlightened section of the population, the 
'burgueses ilustrados', composed of lawyers, adminis-
trators, men of letters, who had taken their degrees at 
state universities (as opposed to the colegios mayores run 
b~ the Jesuits), or joined them after having studied in 
these colleges, like Azara or his nephew, Bardaxi. l 
It seems probable, to judge from the power held by 
Floridablanca, himself a most illustrious lawyer from a 
modest family background, and from the establishment of the 
Junta de Estado with its strong emphasis on talent, 
experience and duty to serve the state to the best of one's 
ability whenever called upon,2 that this trend was 
accentuated in the 1780's.3 
1. Olaechea, "Iriarte", p.165, note 48, 232. 
2. "Instruccion Reservada" (B.A.E., vol.59), paragraphs 
XLIV-XLVI, XCVI. 
,. Much more needs to be knGWn about the educational and 
social background of those joining the foreign service 
before the development that is outlined here may be 
conclusively proved. Floridablanca lists (filA.Ei~ 
vol. 59, pp. 304-5) the candidates that he lIS-.:r 
admitted into the foreign office while he was in power; 
his list is not very useful for our purpose, since he 
simply says that there were two uDivers~ty teachera, 
one academician, four sons of army officers, two of 
state councillors, one recommended by Carlos IV, while 
still the heir apparent, one of hi~ own following, and 
two more. 
-
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Prior to 1783 there seems to have been no official 
attempt to establish any scheme to educate and train 
diplomatists. l SUch applicants as were admitted into the 
foreign service during the eighteenth century had not had a 
specialized education, and hardly any diplomatic experience; 
there were some who had travelled abroad or come into 
contact with the diplomatic world as private secretaries to 
diplomatists, but by and large they learned their trade in 
the minor posts in the first secretary's office and were 
only slowly promoted. 
Acquiring foreign languages was deemed to be essential 
for anyone who hoped to join the foreign service. However, 
it was not until 1783 that a group of young men in their 
early and middle twenties applied to be sent abroad as 
javenes de lenguas to study foreign languages and learn the 
essentials of diplomatic practice with a view to joining 
the foreign service after their apprenticeship.2 Their 
training was to last three years, during which they would 
1. ~he need tor planned education and training of 
diplomatists was generally held in Europe in the 
ei.hteenth century; Horn, pp. 12,-,0. 
2. A.H.N., Estado, legajos 3449/1, 3422/2, and 3427/2. 
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be closely supervised by the heads of the missions to 
which they were attached. These attaches were to be 
boarded and lodged by the heads of the missions, and some 
salary was to be allocated to them. l After three years, 
they would either be given posts at home or abroad, or be 
retired if they were not promising or no suitable posts 
were vacant. 2 
The system did not operate for any length of time. 
Of the young men who applied to go abroad as jevenes de 
lenguas in 1783, nothing else is ,heard in later years. 
Indeed, only of one of them can it be proved for certain 
that he succeeded in being sent abroad: Jose Martinez Bevia 
who went to Turkey in 1784.3 
1. These details come from the personal record of one 
of these young men, Jose Mart!nez Hevia; A.H.N., Estado, 
legO 3427/2. 
2. D. Iriarte to F1oridablanca, Vienna, 12 May 1785, 
A.H.N., Estado~ legO 3433/1. 
-
New features in Spain's diplomatic service in the 
later part of the eighteenth century were, firstly, the 
establishment of the secretarla de interpretacion de 
lenguas under the direction of a "general translator". 
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It came into being before 1772 and its task was to trans-
late authoritatively from and into nine languages - Latin, 
French, Italian, Portuguese, Limousin, English, Flemish, 
Dutch, and German. In 1790 the status of this ancillary 
service was raised to the rank of the secretaryship to the 
Councils and High Tribunals. l Secondly, the appointment 
took place of a specialist archivist, first mentioned in 
the late 1780's, who kept the records with the help ot two 
assistants. 2 Finally, an introducer of foreign ambassadors 
appeared in the l790's.3 
There were also in the foreign office, several 
porteros (administrative officials), the first of whom was 
in charge of the budget, allocation of funds and payment of 
1. A.H.N., Estado legaJos 3427/1, 3447, 3449/2, and 3477. 
2. Ibid., legO 3449/2. 
3. Antonio de Casti1la y Casasus (A.H.N., Eatado, legO 
3417); he is still in office in 1808, shari~g his 
functions with Ventura Ortiz de Guinea (Anton 
del Olmet, II, p. l47~. 
salaries. Most of the money seems to have come from the 
Post Office, which was a department of the first secretary-
ship of state. The Treasury contributed towards 
stationery expenditure. l 
To sum up: one may see during the period studied here 
how the foundations were laid for a professional class of 
diplomatists and foreign office officials. Despite the 
reversal to nepotism which has been judged typical of 
Godey's term of office in the 1790's and 1800's,2 these 
were the bases on which to build in the future. They were 
part and parcel of the Enlightenment in Spain with its 
emphasis on .ocial mobility in the recruiting of 
diplomatists and ministers, and increasing specialization 
in the fo~n office. 
1. A..H.N., Estado, legajos 3458/1, 3413/1-2. 
2. Anton del Olmet, I, pp. 311-332. 
.. 
3. Hispano-French relations after the Treaty of Paris 
of 1763. 
a) Co-operation within the framework of a different 
system of priorities: Commercial differences. 
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Although the losses of France in the Seven Years War 
could have been worse, the defeat weighed heavily upon 
Choiseul. The last peace had stripped her of New France and 
the loss of her prestige, together with the growth of 
British power and the rise of Russia and Prussia, had brought 
about a decline in European estimation. 
But Choiseul did not lose heart. France was able to 
recover from the heavy blows inflicted by Britain; her 
metropolitan territories remained intact, and the solid 
formation of her territories presented a formidable aspect 
to contemporaries. Furthermore, France was left in 1763 
with bases in every important area - Goree, the West 
Indies, trade settlements in India, and a share in the 
fisheries of Newfoundland - from which advances could be 
planned. 1 
The French minister had realized by now that the 
Continental phase of the Seven Years War had handicapped 
; 
1. F.P. Renaut, Le Pacte de Famille et l'AmeriBue, pp.53-9. 
See also C.H.B.E., It p."685; Rashed, p. 20 • 
.. 
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France's performance overseas to the advantage of Britain. 
In future, he intended to keep Germany at peace in order to 
concentrate French resources on a war of revenge on Britain 
as aeon as France was ready to engage herself in war, which 
he reckoned would be in five years' time. Choiseul was now 
reconsidering the Austrian alliance and was minded not to 
be swayed by requirements from Vienna, which had in the 
past diverted France from "la guerre de mer et d'Amerique 
qui etait la veritable guerre lf • l 
Peace in Central Europe was relatively secure; PruBsia 
was in possession of Silesia, and Choiseul had no intention 
of encouraging Austria to regain it. Noreover, the Austrian 
alliance was quite safe, since the Prusso-Russianxapprochement 
of 1763 led Vienna to adhere more strongly to the French. 
This, however, did not mean that Austria might be persuaded 
to support France outside Europe; in fact, Austria was 
determined also to spare Central Europe the heavy burden ot, 
a war to suit Choiseul's colonial schemes. Spain therefore 
became the mainstay of Choiseul's struggle witb Britain. 
The French minister looked OD tbe Family Compact as 
the means of bringing about the prosperity of France and the 
1. E. Daub~gny, CQoiseul et la France d'outre-
mer apres le Traite de Paris, p. 28. 
-
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decline of Britain. Although he did not think much of 
present Spanish military resources, the support of the 
Spanish navy was essential to overcome Britain's naval 
superiority, and the existence of a flourishing commerce 
with Spain and her extensive American markets would give 
France the means to regain the lost strength and to enter-
tain new colonial adventures. 
In the first place, Choiseul contemplate. waging war 
against Britain without Spain. France's ally, with her 
extensive liabilities and inadequate military resources, was 
more of a hindrance than a help. If France failed to defeat 
Britain, Choiseul would then use Spain, as be had done in 
the last stage of the Seven Years War, to spare France; 
Spain would qe used to foot the bill. There was, however, 
a military diversion that Choiseul believed Spain might make 
effectively; an attack on metropolitan Portugal would reduce 
Britain's striking power overseas, which might enable France 
to make an attempt on Jamaica. An attack on Portugal would 
furthermore enable Spain to obtain compensation for losses 
likely to occur elsewhere. Finally, Portugal was the only 
area where Spain was able to be of any real help in the war 
effort against Britain. 
But Choiseul was opposed to any idea of permanent 
occupation of either metropolitan or colonial Portugal; in 
this he disagreed with Beliardi, his commercial agent in 
Spain, who envisaged the eventual partition of Portugal and 
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Brazil between Spain and France. Choiseul expected as 
suitable compensation for France the Spanish part of Santo 
Domingo and the two Louisianas, while Spain would gain 
Gibraltar in Europe, and Jamaica and the two Floridas in 
America. 
In the second place, Choiseul understood that ]'rance 
would feel herself obliged to Join Spain, should she be 
engaged first in war with Britain. To help her become a 
less vulnerable ally, Choiseul began immediately after the 
Treaty of Paris to hasten military and naval reforms in 
Spain. And under guise of strengthening her overseas 
possessions against the British threat, he also suggested 
that France should be allowed the use of strategic points 
in America: the Falkland Islands and Juan Fernandez Island 
at either side of the Magellan Straits, and the Philippine 
Islands. 
In return for this protection, Choiseul wanted a 
considerable improvement in France's trading position in 
Spain and a share in the trade with the Spanish Indies. 
Article 24 of the Family Compact of 1761 stipulated 
reciprocity between the two contracting powers in commercial 
matters and most-favoured-nation treatment. The French 
looked on this article as the means of clearing up 
commercial difficulties between the two allies and of sub-
stituting France for Britain as Spain's main trading partner. 
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Furthermore, the French, had in sight a two-nation economy, 
dividing French and SP.anish exports to America. France, 
with a more advanced industrial system, was to supply the 
colonies with manufactures, while Spain should concentrate 
on the production of raw materials. By pooling their 
resources, France expected, Britain could be excluded from 
trade with S~ain and Spanish America. l 
The channels of French influence were, firstly, the 
French ambassador extraordinary to the Spanish Court, 
Marquis d'Ossun. He had already represented France in 
Naples since 1752, and when Carlos III succeeded Fernando 
VI to the Spanish Crown in 1759, Ossun followed him to 
Madrid, at Carlos Ill's request, where he remained until 
l777. There appears to have existed a close friendship 
between the French diplomat and the Spanish King. 2 
1. Recueil, XII bis (Espagne), pp.~5~-7; Memoires du »uc de 
Choiseul, pp. ~87-9. Cp. DaUbi~Y, pp. 1-29; Blart, pp. 
78-84; J.F. Ramsey, Anglo-Frenc relations, 1763-72, pp. 146-50, 162-4; A. Christel1ow, ·French interests n the 
Spanish empire during the ministry of the Duc ot Choiseu1, 
1759-1771", H.A.H.R., XII (1941), pp. 520-~O; Gil Munill., 
pp. 92-4. For France's own military preparations and the 
evolution of her plans for a descent on Britain, see 
A.T. Patterson, The other Armada, chapte~s I and II. 
2. Recueil, X (Naples et Parme), pp.75-6; XIIbis (~p.gne), 
pp. 337-48. See also Cas!dO, pp. 98-9; Blart, pp.13-4, 
47-8 and note 2. Carlos If made him a grandee in 1765; 
A.H.N., Estado, 1eg O 2510, no. 5. . 
.. 
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Choiseul, not trusting him, preferred to cou~unicate 
directly with Grimaldi or to hold discussions in Paris. He 
had a close associate and a reliable helper in the abbe 
Beliardi, general Frencb agent of Marine and Trade in Spain 
from 1757 to 1771, who furthered his commercial scbemes. l 
On the Spanish side, he also had Carlos Ill's ambassador in 
Paris, Fuentes, whom his contemporaries considered a man of 
no great abilities and rather gullible where Cboiseul was 
concerned. 2 
Joaquln Atanasio Pignatelli de Aragon, tbe sixteentb 
Conde de Fuentes, was one of the prominent members of the 
aristocratic "Aragonese party", beaded by Aranda and closely 
knit together by various marriages. 3 He arrived in Paris on 
21 February and remained there until 10 September 1772, when 
1. For Beliardi, see P .r-luret ,"Les papiers de l' abbe 
Beliardi et les relations commerciales de la France et 
de l'Espagne au milieu du XVllle siacle", R.R.M.r., IV (1902-3), pp. 657-72; Blart, pp. 47-8; and R. Bi ton, 
Four Studies in Franco-Spanish relations, pp. 51-7. 
2. A. Morel-Fatio, Etudes sur l'Eapagne (»euxia.e .erie), 
pp. 133-5. For Choiseui's poor opinion of him, aee 
A. Jourguet, Le Due de Choiseul et l'Alliance Eapagnole, 
p. 91; and aecueli, XI! bis (Espagne), pp. 443=4. 
3. L. Co1oma, Retratea de antano, p ... iII. 
-
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he left for Spain at his own request. l 
Through these men Choiseul helped the transference of 
French naval and military experts to Spanish service, and 
sought to influence Spanish counsels in the appointment of 
individuals of French sympathies for the advancement of his 
policies. 2 
But Carlos Ill, though welcoming French technical 
assistance in strengthening the Spanish empire and in 
fos&ring Spain's economic recovery, intended to act with 
exclusively Spanish interests in mind. The energetic 
period of close co-operation between France and Spain that 
has been judged typical of the middle 1760's is, therefore, 
to be understood within the framework of the different 
system of priorities.; 
The unfortunate results of the last war aroused 
censure in Madrid, but Carlos III and his advisers remained 
convinced that the Bourbon alliance was irreplaceable as 
1. A.H.N., Estado, legO 3450/2; Magallon to Grimald1 l 11 September 1772, no. 254, A.G.S., Estado, le gO 458b. ~he 
able Fernando Magallon was the aecret&r,1 of the French 
embassy, and was left in charge of affairs until 
Aranda's arrival a year later; for his dossier, see 
A.B.N., Eatado, 1egO 3427/1. Cp_ llammermont, f!Pport, 
pp. 458-9; Ai ton, Bipanic • .A.IIlerican Eaays, p _ 1 • 
2. Aiton, H.A.H.R., XII (1932), pp.269-80. See also Renaut, 
pp. 117-21. 
3. Cp. Christe11ow, H.A.H.R., XXI (1941), pp. 520-3. 
--
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protection ana support in any undertaking against Britain. 
Furthermore, France as an enemy could be a very serious 
threat to Spain's territorial integrity.l In respect of 
Britain, the Family Compact was therefore a mutually useful 
alliance and, hence, a secure one. But whereas France was 
able to stress its offensive character in a war of revenge 
on Britain, the main obstacle to French prestige and pow.er, 
Spain, with an overgrown empire extremely vulnerable to 
Britain's expansive aims, emphasized the defensive needs of 
her territories. Indeed, the whole ambitious plan to 
reform from above all the branches of the Spanish 
administration, colonial as well as domestiC, on which 
Carlos III embarked after 1763, was motivated by military 
needs rather than by a socially constructive outlook. Like-
wise, Carlos Ill's economic policies were, in the first 
place, means of raising revenue to finance defence 
expenditure. 2 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 17 January 1764; A.H.N., Eatado, legO 
3457/2, no. 39. Cp. CODOIN, CVIII, p. 465; B.A.E., LIX, 
pp. 258-63. 
2. Cp. N.C.M.H., VIII (R.A.Humphreys), pp. 398, 400; 
J. Lynch, Spanish Colonial Aaministration, 1782-1810, 
p. ,. 
-
With the help of French technical advice and French 
experts, the Spanish army was modernized according to 
Prussian principles, the American forces were reinforced 
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by creating native milicias to spare the expense of sending 
troops from the peninsula, and Juan Fernandez Island, 
Chiloe and several other ports along the Pacific Coast 
were strengthened. l The navy was provided with four new 
frigates and six .hips of the line built under the super-
vision of a French naval engineer in the Spanish service, 
Gaut1er. 2 
Beyond this technical co-operation, however, there 
was Carlos Ill's determination to prevent France from 
reaping the benefits of his reforming policies. The 
measures adopted by Spain to secure control of the South 
Seas were prompted in part by Choiseul's expressed desire 
to be allowed the use of strategic points in America. 
Carlos III was no better disposed to allow .rance's 
1. Brown, R.A.R.R., V (1922), pp. 338-50; Aiton, i.A.B.R., 
XII (19'2), pp. 269-80; L.N •• cAlister, "The reorganiz-
ation of the Army in New Spain, 176,-6", R.A.R.R., 
XXXIII (195'), pp. 1-'2; V. Rodr!guez Oaaado, "El 
E~ercito y la Marina en e1 reinado de Carlos Ill", 
Bo1etip del Instituto RiV8 Aguero, III (~956-?), pp. 
129-56; and V. Rodrlguez asado and F. Perez Bmbid 
Construcciones militares del virrel "at, e.peci;i!7 
ch. II. 
2. Be was appointed general director to the Naval BDs1De.ra 
in the Spanish Navy in 1769 and awart.4 the Order of . 
Carlos III in 1772; see vel-t9uel' pe' 74; Gr1aaldi to 
Fuentes, 24 April 1769, l.a: .,atado, leEr 4570; A.B.II., 
Eatado, Libro 114(0), no. 79. ' 
-
presence in the nerve centres of the Spanish Indies than 
he was towards the existing English colonies and their 
expansive aims. 
As regards commerce, the same determination became 
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apparent soon after the Peace of 1763. The following year 
a royal ordinance was sent to America to instruct officials 
that the Family Compact did not imply that the French were 
to enjoy privileges denied to other foreisn traders. l 
Spain's economic aims were the elimination of foreign 
competition as a means of achieving self-sufficiency by 
way of new industries and improvements in the old ones. In 
the short run, however, Carlos III still had to connive at 
foreigners trading with Spain, as she could not provide 
America with enough manufactures; but he sought to 
canalize these European imports so as to be able to control 
them and suppress those which might hinder the advance of 
Spanish products. Contraband trade was, therefore, 
particularly dangerous to his plans, for it escaped control_ 
In the early 1760's rough estimates of the large amount of 
goods smuggled into Spain and Spanish America became known 
in Madrid. 2 
1. Real Orden of 13 December 1764; Gi1 Muni11a, pp. 105-6. 
2. For these estimates, see Casado, A.H.D.E., XIII (19,6-
41), p. 112; Gi1 Munil1a, p. 103; ft.E.S. Hisher, -Ang1o-
Portuguese Trade, 1700-1770·, pp. 65-6. 
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Carlos Ill's measures to halt foreign competition were 
the liberalization of trade within the empire as a means of 
lowering prices to reduce incentives to foreign trade, en-
forcing the right of search of foreign ships and improving 
the coast-guard system, ending preferential tariffs, and 
preventing the unauthorized export of bullion and coin. 
Although much was achieved, the results were not as 
satisfactory as had been hoped. l 
As regards Britain, her commercial strength rested on 
treaty privileges which Spain was in no position to challenge 
openly; furthermore, it was impossible to prohibit export of 
bullion and gold and silver coins when the balance of pay-
ments was always against Spain. British and Spanish 
economies were, to a great extent, complementary, and Spain 
could not help admitting manufactures which she herself was 
unable to produce to satisfy American demand. 2 Anglo-
Spanish trade soon got back to its state prior to Spain's 
entry in the Seven Years War;3 and, despite Carlos Ill's 
1. For Spanish commercial theories and policies, during Carlos 
Ill's reign, see J. Munez Perez, -Ideas sobre comercio en 
el aiglo XVIII espanel", ~., XIX (1960), pp.47-66; J.B. 
Parry, The Spanish Seaborne empire, chapter XVI; and 
J.C. La Force, The Develoiment of the Spanish Textile 
Industry, 1750-1800, ch. Ill. 
2. A.Cbristellow, "Great Britain and the Trades from Cadiz 
and Lisbon to S~anish America and Brazil, 1759-1783·, 
B.A.B.R., XXVII(1947), pp.9-23. 
;. F.Spencer, The Fourth Earl of Sandwich: diplomatiC 
correspondence, 1763-5, p.16, note 3. 
economic policies, the Anglo-Spanish trade was still 
important to both countries in the middle 1780's.1 
French trade, on the other hand, was severely hit. 
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From the moment of his accession to the Spanish throne, 
Carlos III made no bones of his determination to halt 
French economic infiltration. 2 The French had held the lead 
in the Spanish trade until the middle of the eighteenth 
century, when they lost it to British superior techniques 
and financial resources, and a widespread and more flexible 
market. Their inability to compete with the English was 
rendered still worse by Carlos Ill's efforts to improve 
Spain's own economy, for Spanish and French economies were 
competitive, and French products were therefore more 
seriously affectea. Furthermore, France, bound to Spain 
by principles of political necessity, could not use the 
vigorous methods of Britain in Spanish and American waters.~ 
1. See the reports from consuls Munro (Cad1z) and Katencamp 
(Coruna) in 1785, F.O. 72/6. Cp. Ehrman, pp. 17-18. 
2. Fuentes' instructions, 17 January 1764, A.H.N., Estado, 
legO 3457(2). Cp. C.Rambert, "La France et la politique 
commerciale de l'~spagne au XYllle siacle w, R.H.M.C., 
VI (1959), p.282, note 1; B.A.E., vol.LII, paragrapb 305 
(p. 258). 
3. Christel10w t H.A.H.R., XXI (1941), pp.519-520, 535; and XXVII (1947), pp. 2-8, 18-20. 
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France's only hope of fostering trade with Spain, 
therefore, was to obtain commercial concessions by treaty. 
For six years (1762-1768), the French strove for this 
commercial treaty which would restore them to their favour-
able position in the past, but they failed to procure any 
commercial concessions from Spain. A Convention was signed 
on 2 January 1768 to settle the disputes arising from the 
interpretation of art. 24 of the Family Compact of 1761. It 
stipulated that Spain's right of visit should be compulsory 
for all French ships entering Spanish ports in Europe and 
discretionary for ships under 100 tons. l That the Spaniards 
used this treaty from now on to cope with the persistent 
attempts on the part of French merchants entering Spanish 
ports and, conversely, that the French invoked previous 
treaties to avoid complying with the regulations laid down 
in 1768, demonstrates the measure of Carlos Ill's success. 2 
However arduous it was to implement these regulations against 
a greatly needed ally, 0arlos III had there a legal tool 
which helped him to tighten up control of goods from France. 
1. For ~ account of the strained relations between the two 
countries, see Blart, pp. 45-70. Cp. Rambert, R.B.M.C.~ 
VI (1959), pp.281-288; Christellow, B.A.H.R., XX! (194l) 
pp. 536-7. 
2. Fuentes to Grima1di, 8 July 1771, no. 879; Grimaldi to 
Fuentes, 22 July 1771; A.G.S., Estado, 1eg~ 4579. 
Grima1di to Fuentes, 4 December 1771, 1eg~ 4581. 
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This resulted in further decline of French trade in Spain; 
Vergennes, the French minister of foreign affairs, complained 
in 1786 that the Family Compact, as regards commerce, had 
not given France any privileges which Britain did not 
en~oy.l 
b) The enlargement of the Family Compact: the question of 
the Neapolitan accession. 
An indirect source of friction between Spain and France 
in the middle 1760's was the latter's attempts to rally the 
former to her support in persuading the Neapolitan branch of 
the Bourbon family to join the Compact of 1761, as anti-
cipated in art. 19. 2 
Choiseul made the first attempt to enlist Spanish 
support soon after the signature of the Franco-Spanish 
alliance. He was mainly prompted by commercial consider-
ations. ~rance was now engaged in a prosperous trade, licit 
1. Recueil, III (Portugal), p. 401. Cp. tbe Conventions of 
1774 and 1786 between Spain and France in Cantillo, pp. 
523-6, 617-21 respectively. 
2. The accession of the fourth Bourbon branch, Farma, was 
also mmoted, but no serious attempt was made to bring 
it about, owing to Parma's political and commercial 
insignificance. 
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-- I I as well as illicit, with ~ap es. Her favourable position 
rested largely on art. 10 of the Treaty of Madrid of 1667 
which, as in the case of Britain, exempted French ships from 
search by the Customs. 2 Like Spain, since the late 1750's, 
Naples sought to enforce the right of visitation of small 
ships (one deck) used by smugglers, arguing that subsequent 
changes of sovereignty had invalidated French exemption; the 
Treaty of Madrid included Naples, for she was at the time a 
possession of the Spanish Sovereign, signatory to the 
Treaty. The French disputed this argument, but preferred 
a different and, it was hoped, a more profitable line of 
approach. Choiseul's view was that the best way to reac~ 
an understanding with ~aples on commercial matters was to 
persuade Carlos III to prevail upon his son, Ferdinand IV, 
to join the ]'amily Compact, which atipulated (art. 24) 
reciprocity between the contracting powers and most-
favoured-nation treatment. In return for the political 
alliance, Choiseul expected from Naples similar commercial 
concessions to those hoped for from Spain. 
In principle, Carlos III was willing to enlarge the 
1. R. Romano, Le Commerce du Royaume de Ba¥les avec la France 
et les payS de I'Jdriatique au IVIII. 8 Ic18, part t. 
2. The text of the Treaty of Madrid is in Jean Du Mont, 
Corps Universel Diplomatique ••• , Vol. VII, part I, 
pp. 27-33. 
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Family Compact to include the Neapolitan branch of the 
Bourbon family as a means of securing his relatives' 
territories in Italy. In fact, he put his signature to 
article 19 of the Treaty of 1761, whereby he undertook to 
promote Naples' accession, and made a formal request to her 
at the beginning of 1762. However, he was in no haste to 
press for an answer at this early stage and in view of the 
Seven Years War still @oing on. l 
Naples for her part was against joining the Franco-
Spanish alliance from the very beginning. Tanucci, the 
head of the Regency Council during the minority of 
Ferdinand IV, 2 saw no need for the ~'rench alliance, for 
Austria had agreed to guarantee the status quo in Italy as 
established after Carlos Ill's departure from Naples.~ 
Furthermore, he was fully aware of the anti-British 
character of the Bourbon league, and ~no intention of 
exposing his country to the guns of the British !'ledi terranean 
f1eet. 4 Indeed, no sooner had the subject of the accession 
1. Palacio, pp. 281-2. 
2. The Neapolitan King was wight years of age when he 
succeeded his father Carlos III to the throne in 1759. 
3. Cp. E. Viviani delli Robbia, Bernard Tanucci ed 11 suo 
piu importante carteggio, I, p.l13; ~ctont pp.IOB-IO. 
4. Tanucc1 no doubt bad in mind 1742, when Britisb ships 
pointing their guns at Naples compelled Carlos Ill, the 
then King of the Two SC111es, to remain neutral in the 
war of the Austrian succession; for this incident, see 
Danvila, I, pp.21B-24 and N.C.M.H., VII, p. 426. 
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been broached to him, than ~anucci proceeded to assure 
Britain of his determination not to join the Family Compact 
or take any step inconsistent with British friendship.l 
As regards commerce, Tanucci was equally determined not to 
grant French trade any concessions. 2 
While the Seven Years War was going on, ~anucci was 
able to prqcrastinate with the connivance of Carlos Ill, who 
did not wish to make things difficult for Naples. But on the 
eve of the Peace of 1763, he had to be more positive to ward 
off French pressure. In April, 1763, Choiseul complained of 
Tanucci's delaying tactics and urged Grimaldi, still 
Spanish ambassador in Paris, to remind Carlos III of the 
desirability of the Neapolitan accession and of his promise 
to promote it. 3 
When Tanucci was approached by Spain, he sought to 
weaken Carlos Ill's interest in the accession by accusing 
Choiseul of having lost Spanish Florida, to Britain to provide 
1. Gray to Egremont, Naples, 18 April, and 16 November 1762 
(both in cipher), S.P. 93/19. 
2. Cp. Fausto Nicolini, Amici e corriapondenti francesi 
ae11'abate Galiani, I, pp. 30-1. 
3. Masserano to Wall, Paris, 30 September 1763, no. 1, 
A.G.S., Estado, le~ 6956; Palacio, pp. 282-;. 
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France with a better peace. Aware of Spain's own campaign 
against French contraband trade, he also contended that the 
accession would bring a source of disputes into the Family 
Compact if ]rranco-Neapoli tan altercation over Naples' right 
of visitation of French ships was not settled first. Carlos 
III gave his consent to settle this question before pro-
ceeding with that of the accession. l 
Choiseul did not like the new delay implied in Tanucci's 
move; he suspected some kind of agreement between Naples and 
Madrid. In his talks with Fuentes in June and July, 1764, 
the Ifrench minister alleged that Spain was using Tanucci' s 
dilatoriness to bring pressure to bear on France with a view 
to promoting Spain's own accession to the Franco-Austrian 
&lliance. 2 
This allegation, which Fuentes emphatically denied, may 
well have some foundation but, since it was Choiseul himself 
who linked the two issues, it is more probable, as Fuentes 
argued, that the :h'rench minister hinted at it in the hope of 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, Pardo, 17 January 1764, A.H.N., 
Estado, leg O 3457(2), no. 39; Gray to Egremont, Naples, 
30 November 1762 (cipher), S.P. 9~/l9; Falacio, p. 283; 
Danvila, 11, p. 212 and IV, pp. 84-5. 
2. FueDtes to Grimaldi, 18 June 17&4, A.G.S., Estado, leg O 
4559, and 16 July 1764, leg O 4555. 
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prevailing upon Spain to press Naples. 
By this time, however, the famine of Naples put a new 
obstacle in the way of the Neapolitan accession to the 
Family Compact. Tanucci had to buy wheat from France, Spain, 
Austria and Britain. when the crisis was over, Tanucci 
complained of the quality of French wheat and refused to 
pay the high prices demanded by the merchants of Marseilles. l 
Carlos III had to mediate in the dispute and the question 
was deferred to the Spanish Junta de Comercio for consider-
ation. The Spaniards tried to avoid suspicion of bias 
towards any of the contestants, but they only succeeded in 
disappointing them both. 2 Franco-Neapolitan relations were 
strained still further, and the accession issue was shelved, 
despite Choiseul's frequent entreaties to resume it,3 
until the spring of 1766, when Carlos Ill, anxious about the 
state of relations with Britain over the Manila ransom 
t " 4 ques loon, decided to raise the matter with Tanucci with the 
1. F~r the famine and subsequent dispute between ~aples and 
French merchants, see Viviani della Robbi8, I, pp. 114-
34; C.P. Espagne, 545, passim. 
2. Two new judges were appointed to look into the matter; 
Grimaldi to Esqu1lache, Cattolica and Ossun, Pardo, la 
January 1766, A.G.S., ~stado, leg- 6099. 
3. Choiseul's instructions to Ossun, 1765-1766, in C.P., 
Espagne 544-546, passim. 
4. Cp. below, pp. l~ff. 
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view of securing French, as well as heapolitan, support 
for Spain's case. Carlos III had also need of support in 
view of the failure to reach some kind of understanding on 
policy with Austria. 
]Irom the Spanish pOint of view, the Neapolitan 
accession would help to preserve the Italian status quo, 
it might advance Carlos Ill's influence in Bourbon counsels, 
and it would deprive Britain of any assistance in ~eapolitan 
ports. There was no intention on the part of Carlos Ill, 
nor indeed of France, to suggest that Naples should give 
them monetary or military assistance in case of war. It 
was her neutrality, in addition to commercial advantages 
where France was concerned, that was expected in return 
for political support. 
In his communication to Tanucci of 29 April 1766,1 
Grimaldi, who seemed less keen on the Neapolitan accession 
than Carlos 111,2 stressed that Naples should commit her-
1. A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 6099, ff. 197-199. 
2. On several occasions throughout 1766, Grima1di reminded 
Tanucci that it was but in fulfilment of Car10s Ill's 
specific requests that he intervened; A.G.S., Estado, 
leg o 6099, ff. 14-15, 105-109, 197-199. For Carlos Ill's 
interest in the accession, see his correspondence with 
Tanucci in A.G.S., Libro 331 (Letterbook), passim. 
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self as little as possible. ~o propitiate tbe Neapolitan 
minister as regards commercial disputes with ~rance, 
Grimaldi added that ~arlos III agreed with Naples on the 
question of the right of visitation of French ships in her 
ports, and was prepared to say so to Choiseul;1 and to 
persuade Choiseul of Spain's sincere wishes to promote the 
accession, Grimaldi wrote to Ossun, the French represent-
ative in Madrid, that only his full powers were wanting 
to reach a conclusion. 2 
But Tanucci was not to be convinced. To mollify 
Carlos Ill, he consented to negotiate a commercial treaty 
with ~rance, though he remained suspicious of France and 
made no bones of his desire to avoid political commit-
ments. 3 
1. Grima1di to 'anucci, 13 May 1766, A.G.S., Estado, leg· 
6099. Cp. Grimaldi to ~·lagal1on \,Paris), 18 November 
1765, A.G.B., Bstado, legO 4560. 
2. 10 May 1766, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6099, f. 188. 
3. Tanucci to Grimaldi, 19 August 1766 (confidential), 
A.G.S., Estado, leg O 6099, ff. 103-104. Also 
Tanucci to Prince della Cattolica (Naples' 
ambassador in Nadrid), 29 April 1766, quoted in 
Palacio, p. 284, footnote 37. 
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Grimaldi retorted that neither Upain nor lrance 
wished to entangle Naples in wars with Britain. In view, 
however, of Tanucci's determined opposition to accede to 
the Eamily Compact, Carlos III decided not to insist on it. 
In respect of commercial differences between France and 
Naples, on the other hand, Spain continued to insist on 
the need for a settlement. Grimaldi now referred to the 
hardship meted out to i'rench ships in Neapolitan ports, 
and hinted that only Tanucci's unfriendly behaviour was 
responsible for the failure to reach an amicable agreement. l 
The change in Spain's attitude is to be explained in 
the light of her own relations with britain in the summer 
of 1766. The ~aoila ransom affair was in a critical stage, 
and the English establishment in the Falkland Islands 
added further complications to the already strained 
situation. 2 Carlos III stood in need of active sapport 
from France and he hoped to obtain it by pressing Tanucci 
on the commercial treaty, which might satisfy Choiseul and 
thereby maintain the array of Bourbon forces in good order. 
1. Grimaldi to Tanucci, 9 September 1766, A.G.S., Estado, 
leg· 6099, ff. 105-109; Grimaldi to Fuentes, 21 October 
1766, fol. 70. 
2. Carlos III again reminded Tanucci of his desire to 
have Naples in the Family Compact on the eve of the 
Falkland Islands crisis; 27 July 17?O, 4.G.S., Estado, 
Libro ~~9. 
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But the Spaniards were to find that Tanucci had 
already moved further away from an amicable adjustment with 
France. 'l'he l'eapoli tan minister was now arguing that 
article 24 of the Family Compact, the very basis of 
Choiseul's hopes for a favourable commercial understanding 
with Naples, was offensive to the interests of his country. 
His manner left no dogbt as to his resolute attitude; he 
wrote to Grimaldi on October 28th that it was up to the 
government of Naples to look after Neapolitan affairs. The 
Spanish minister argued that the principle of reciprocity 
as stipulated in article 24 of the Family Compact was not 
meant to be detrimental to anyone of the signatory powers. 
But Tanucci refused to consider the,matter any further. l 
Carlos III still insisted on the desirability of the 
accession of the Neapolitan branch into the Bourbon Compact 
of 1761 and, hoping to regain Tanucci's confidence, he 
explained that if the Spanish government had insisted on 
the commercial treaty with j'rance it was only at Choiseul' s 
request. 2 But to no avail, for as far as Naples was 
1. TaDucci to Grimaldi, 28 October 1766; Grim.ldi to 
Tanucci, November 18th; Tanucc1 to Grimaldi, December 
9th; A.G.S., Estado, lego 6099, ff. 41-2, 43-4, 13, 
respectively. 
2. Grimaldi to Tanucci, 30 December 1766, A.G.S., 
Eatado, legO 6099, ff. 14-5; Carloa III to Tanucc1, 
;0 December 1766, A.G.S., Estado, Libro ,,1. 
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concerned by the end of 1766 both the subject of her 
accession to the Family Compact of 1761 and the subject of 
a new commercial arrangement with France were closed. 
Choiseul was disappointed and somewhat suspicious 
that Carlos III had not promated the accession of Naples as 
he had promised to do in 1761.1 To some extent, Choiseul 
was quite correct, for it would seem that Naples' deter-
mined opposition was made possible by the realization on 
the part of ~anucci that Carlos III was not interested in 
furthering Choiseul's commercial schemes. In addition to 
this, Carlos Ill's willingness to let Naples settle her 
commercial disputes with ~rance on the subject of the right 
of visit before proceeding with the question of the 
accession, must have led Tanucci to believe that the 
0panish King did not mean to press him hard. 
But the main reason for the failure of these protracted 
and tentative talks is to be found in Naples' determination 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 23 ~ovember 1766, A.G.S., Estado, 
lege 5880, f. 95; Choiseul insists that Neapolitan 
neutrality might have been stip~lated in a secret 
article, if Tanucci had agreed to accede. Cp. 
Recueil, X (Naples et Parme), pp. 94-104, for 
Choiseul's feeling that Carloa III should have been 
able to press Tanucci into joining, if he had really 
tried. 
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not to become attached, however loosely, to a system that 
was first and foremost an anti-British league. Britain 
took no steps to warn the Neapolitan government, but her 
sensibility to anything that might be regarded as a threat 
to her trading position in Neapolitan ports or in favour 
of French trade made Tanucci cautious; he did not want to 
risk enmity with Britain. Besides, Tanucci was also trying 
to enforce the right to visit British ships in port, using 
similar arguments to those used in respect of France; it 
was therefore politic to remain uncommitted in order not 
to be caught up in Anglo-French commercial antagonism, 
and probably war; as long as his commercial policies were 
generally applied, he was in a better position to implement 
them. l 
1. In the case of Britain it was Naples who wanted a new 
commercial treaty on the model of the Methuen ~*,.aty 
with Portugal to replace the Treaty of 1667, and 
Britain herself who defended the validity of that treaty 
and her exemption from the right of visit a8 established 
in art. 10; see s.P. 93/20-24, passim. Cp. Ehrman, pp. 
156-67, for Anglo-Neapolitan negotiations for a 
commercial treaty in the 1780's. 
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4. Britain and bpain after the Seven Years War. 
a) British views on foreign policy. 
On the resignation of Bute on 8 April 1763, a new 
ministry took over to cope with the situation left by the 
recent war. The head of the new administration was 
Grenville, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. From the beginning of his tenure he set himself 
the task of reducing expenses to the British tax-payer. 
His reluctance to spend money for fear of inflation led 
him to ignore vital commitments of English foreign policy; 
he alienated prospective friends, Prussia and Russia, and 
failed to realize the importance of maintaining a strong 
Navy, a two-power naval standard to secure Britain 
supremacy at sea. Un the whole, Grenville adopted an 
attitude of self-sufficiency which was not expedient in 
view of the isolated state of Britain after the Peace of 
1763. 1 
Apart from holding the purse-strings, Grenville did 
not seek to control foreign policy and made no claim to be 
1. J.S. Watson, George Ill, pp. 96-8, 103-4; L. Namier, 
Crossroads of power, pp. 103-4; Spencer, pp. 60-1. 
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heard on purely foreign measures. Sandwich (Northern 
department) was the dominant partner in the direction of 
foreign policy; Halifax, his colleague in the douthern 
department, did not resent it when greater ability made 
Sandwich the deciding minister on foreign issues. During 
his tenure of office ~andwich had a free hand in the daily 
routine and, provided that he acted within the limits 
forced upon him by Grenville's economy, he was able to 
1 pursue his own system. 
Sandwich carried with him into the administration the 
Cumberland attachment to the "old system", established by 
the Barrier Treaty of 1715; he wished to bring Russia into 
the alliance of Britain, Austria and the States General. 2 
1. Spencer, pp. 62-5. 
2. O.A.Sherrard, Lord Chatham and America, p. 114. George 
III was also in favour of the "old system" (The Corres-
pondence of George Ill, ed. J.W. Fortescue, II, p. 204). 
As for Newcastle, he did not hanker after the "old 
system", as Watson has it (p. 107); he was rather 
inclined towards Prussia as the only power "who at 
present, can be of any use to us" (Newcastle to 
Hardwicke Claremont, August 2, 176~, copy, Add. 32950, 
fols 16-9), since Austro-Bourbon contacts made Frederick 
lithe least connected with France" (Newcastle to Devon-
shire, Holte Forest, July 20, 176}, copy, Add. 32429, 
fols 379-82). He also favoured the alliance with the 
Stadtholder (Newcastle to Brunswick, January 25, 1?64, 
copy, Add. 32955, fols 261-2) and Russia (Newcastle to 
,itt, April 19, 1?64, copy, Add. 32958, fol. 166). 
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Irhe first steps taken by Sandwich to revive the "old 
system" at the Hague proved futile; but he was not dis-
couraged and believed optimistically that time would bring 
Russia, Austria and Britain together. 
The alliance with Russia and the ~olish succession 
issue were intimately related. ~he Grenville ministry 
failed to see that the Polish succession was the most 
important issue in Eastern Europe in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. London looked upon it as a mere 
counter in~s bargaining with Russia, while Catherine 
looked upon the British alliance as a means to obtain 
support for Russian policy in Sweden and Turkey. Britain's 
refusal to accept the "Turkish clause" and subsidize 
Catherine's Polish ambitions, together with Frederick II's 
attempts to prevent an Anglo-Russian alliance which would 
have strengthened Russia to his own disadvantage, diminished 
the chances of a Russo-British rapprochement. Eventually, 
Russia got support from Prussia in 1764 by way of a full 
alliance with territorial guarantees for eight years; the 
treaty was signed on April 11th, and it gave Russia the 
necessary support to carry out her plans for Foland. The 
Russo-British commercial treaty of 1766 did not improve 
the chances of an agreement on the "Turkish clause"; and 
relations between the two countries continued uncommitted 
83 
until the Armed ~eutrality of 1780.1 
Outside the ministry, but with influence upon it, 
Chatham entertained the idea of a "Northern system" to keep 
in check the Austro-Bourbon alliance; he wished for the 
formation of a solid compact consisting of Britain, Frussia 
and Russia, to be joined later by the United Provinces, 
Bweden, Denmark-Norway, and possibly some of the German 
states. In ~ecember 1762 Chatham had publicly anno~ced in 
Parliament his system of alliances and put it forward as an 
indispensable condition whenever he was called upon to form 
a government. 2 ~l'he Grenville ministry did not take to 
Chatham's plan and, apart from the lip-service paid to his 
principles by the Rockingham administration in 1765 and in 
spite of Newcastle's support,3 he had to wait until he 
became head of the government in 1766 to attempt the 
1. For Anglo-Russian relations and the Polish question, see 
Spencer, pp.20-2, 25, 31-60. See also M.S.Anderson, 
"British Diplomatic Relations with the Mediterranean, 
1763-1778", pp. 70-7. 
2. B. Williams, The life of William Pitt, pp. 1'7, 224; 
Sherrard, pp. 164-6. 
3. Watson, p.108. For Newcastle's insistence upon 
Rockingham to take up Pitt's foreign policy in order 
to gain his support, without which no administration 
could last, Add. 32967, fols 69-391 pass1m, Add. 32968, 
fols 166-7, Add. 32971, fols 3l7-~22; cp~ Spencer, pp. 
9-10, note 1. See also Add. 32952, f. 135, for Sew-
castle's attempts in November, 1763, to get Pitt 
committed to the Grenville ministry. 
implementation of his ideas. The alliance with Prussia 
was, anyhow, not feasible at this time since Frederick 11 
saw no advantage in a connection with Britain. An Anglo-
Prussian compact had to be anti-Bourbon and the king of 
Prussia desired to be neutral in any Anglo-French wars. 
Frederick obviously preferred Russia's friendship as the 
best ally to keep Austria, his main enemy, in check. l 
b) Resumption of diplomatic relations with Spain. 
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William Henry Nassau de Zuylestein, fourth Earl of 
Rochford, arrived in Madrid on 6 December 176, as Englis~ 
ambassador to the Spanish Court. 2 Madrid was obviously not 
a capital that he would have chosen for himself. ~o sooner 
had he arrived, than he started writing to Sandwich lamenting 
lithe dreadful dullness" of the place and asking to be 
remembered when Faris was free.' 
He was equipped with his particular and private 
instructions, dated September 9th, and a copy of those 
issued to his counterpart in Faris, Hertford. 4 
1. Spencer, pp.22-4, 95-8; "Anderson", pp. 77-8. 
2. B.D.R., 1689-1789, pp.135-6. Before his arrival, Colonel 
Edward Ligenier was in charge of affairs. 
3. Spencer, pp.125-6. 
4. S.P. ~/165. Gp. Christellow, H.A.H.R., XXVII (1947), pp. 
13-4, for Rochford's instructions a8 regards commerce. 
For Hertford, see B.D.R., p.22; SDencer, p.65; B.D.I., 
France, IV, p.84. HIs separate an~ prIvate instructions 
of 29 September 1763, printed in Ibid, pp. 85-90. 
The main political point of these instructions was a 
general recommendation to keep a good watch on Austro-
Bourbon contacts and on the consequences of the Austro-
Spanish marriages for the balance of power in Italy. 
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British 'southern' policy was based on the premise that the 
Bourbon powers would fight Britain as soon as they were 
ready to do it successfully. Consequently, it was fe~ed in 
London that the compact formation of France and Spain might 
be strengthened by Austria. The exhausted state of the 
German States of the Empire, the neutral policy of the 
United Provinces and the weakness or partiality to France 
of the Northern powers reinforced such fears. 
Rochford was instructed to sound Carlos III and his 
court as to his disposition towards France, to assess the 
chances of weaning him from the Family Compact and to work, 
eventually, for bringing Spain into closer relations with 
Britain. 
But such expressions were of little substance. Britain 
was far more anxious about the commercial advantages that 
, . 
might accrue to France as a result of the family alliance, 
and quite determined to protect hers. Rochford was to 
watch any steps that Spain and France might take detrimental 
to the interests of British subjects, for the commercial 
treaties favourable to English trade in Spain had been re-
newed in Paris and Carlos III had expressly contracted in 
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article 2 of the Peace of 1763 to respect this renewal. 
Commercial jealousies between European nations played a very 
important part in a world where trade was la~'gely regulated 
by mercantilist principles. 
In fulfilment of London's request for general inform-
ation, rtochford wrote on 13 January 1764 stressing his 
belief in Carlos Ill's independent personal policy and his 
desire to carry it out aided by his ministers, but not pre-
vailed upon by them. Rochford thought highly of Carlos Ill's 
talents and indeed his reports helped to create a favourable 
attitude towards the opanish Sovereign in London. The 
appointment of Grimaldi, the negotiator of the Family 
Compact, to the first secretaryship of state led London to 
believe for a time in Spain's subservience to France, but 
Rochford's opinion that the appointment was only a sign of 
Carlos Ill's awareness of Grimaldi's abilities in foreign 
affairs and of the King's intention to keep his minister's 
~'rench inclinations in check, reassured the English govern-
ment. l 
Furthermore, Rochford believed that he might use 
Esquilache, minister for both war and finance, as an opposing 
1. See Rochford's "most secret" dispatch to Halifax (printed 
in Coxe, IV, pp.,OO-9) and his dispatch to Sandwich of the 
same date (printed in saencer, pp.125-6). Cp. two extracts 
on the Spanish Court an gov.rnment (in French), January 
1764, in Add. 33024, ff. 158-162. 
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force in the i::;)panish ministry. His confidential manner 
with the English ambassador and his comments on the King's 
caution with regard to Grimaldi's pro-French bias, 
together with his attempts to curtail French commercial 
privileges, which Rochford construed as a hopeful .ign of 
a possible improvement in Anglo-Spanish relations, led 
Hochford to believe that Esquilache's apparently friendly 
disposition migbt be turned to good account. With this in 
view he recommended his principal that Masserano, the 
Spanish ambassador to St. James's since August 1763, be 
kept ignorant of his connection with Esquilache, for he 
was one of Grimaldi's devoted friends. l 
Felipe Ferrero Freschi, Prince of Masserano and 
Grandee of Spain of the First Class, was not only Grimaldi's 
devoted friend but also a close supporter of the alliance 
with ~rance. He arrived in London on 26 November 1763 and, 
like Rochford, he seems to have preferred the French 
embassy. However, he was kept there till September 1777 
(when he returned to Spain to die on October 26th) for he 
1. Rochford to Halifax, February 13th (cipher) and 20 March 
1764, S.P. 94/166; 23 Ju11 1764 (cipher), S.P. 94/167. 
Cp. Brown, H.A.H.R., V (1922), p. 338, note 4; 
Rousseau, II, p. 34, for Rochford's attempts to use 
Beliardi's leaves of absence to offset Frencb 
influence. 
was liked and respected by the ~nglish; his original 
appointment was recommended by Egremont, who had known 
him in laris. l 
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~ochford was too optimistic in his early dispatches, 
but he did not have to wait long before he realized the 
impracticability of a closer contact with Bpain. Britain 
could not offer acceptable terms to Carlos Ill. Indeed, 
by the beginning of the summer of 1764 Britain was 
adopting a very stern attitude in her dealings with 
Spanish attempts to expel British subjects from their 
settlements in Honduras Bay;2 this event underlined 
1. Egremont to bedford, 3 June 1763, S.P. 78/257; see 
also Rochford to Grantham, St. James's, 16 June 1775, 
no. 13, S.P. 94/198, and ~scarano to Floridablanca, 
London, 3 February 1778, no. 83, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
7000; cp. H. Walpole, Journal of George Ill, 11. pp.9-l0, 
who writes that Masserano was the only minister who did 
not speculate in the stock-market. He was born in 
Madrid in 1713, son of an Italian diplomatist in the 
Spanish service, and was a soldier by profession. His 
appointment to the London embassy (10 August 1763), in 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6833 and his instructions in 
A.H.N., Estado, legO 3456~1). In 1772 he was rewarded 
with the Order of Car1cs Ill; A.H.N., CarIos Ill, Exp.3. 
2. See below, pp. 1)~3. 
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Spain's dependence upon her French ally for support. 
Rochford wrote in ~eptember that he was unable to check the 
"torrent of French influence", especially since Esquilache 
was now giving general support to Grimaldi. There remained 
however a "jalousie of metier" between the two ministers, 
which he still hoped to use to counteract pro-French 
1 . 1 ean~ngs. 
In the meantime, Austria loomed large in the 
diplomatic picture since both Britain and Spain desired to 
get into closer relations with the Hapsburg power; the 
former to correct her isolated position and to weaken 
France's links with Austria, and the latter to ensure peace 
in Italy and to reduce her dependence on France. 
1. RocbCord to Halifax, Segovia, 17 September 1764, 
s.p. 94/168. Cp. Renaut, pp. 147-51. 
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5. In quest of Austria, 1763-1765. 
In December 1763 Sandwich made the first move to restore 
the old connection with Austria. He used the Anglo-Prussian 
dispute over payments of English debts from the German war 
as an opening for negotiations; probably exaggerating the 
importance of the dispute, the English minister asked 
Seilern, the Austrian ambassador in London, whether Maria 
Theresa would be willing to aid Britain should Frederick 1I 
attack Hanover.l 
Kaunitz, the Austrian chancellor, though well disposed 
towards the Grenyille ministry (for he feared that the pro-
~xt. Prussian Pitt be brought back into power) did not 
contemplate exchanging the Brench alliance for an English 
one, for his policy was determined by enmity to Prussia and 
only France could help him to restore the ground lost to 
Austria in the Seven Years War. Britain, on the other hand, 
could not offer any viable alternative, for the foundation-
stone of her foreign policy was the destruction of the 
Bourbon power, and its continuance was vital for Austria in 
her struggle with Prussia. The Austrian chancellor was well 
aware that France was not anxious to support Austria's 
1. For the renewal of diplomatic relations after the 
Seven Years War, see Spencer, pp. 102-3. 
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commitments; nevertheless, the French alliance was needed, 
especially since Austria had just failed to restore her 
~OItM"~ 
abei.~ intimacy with Russia and there was the prospect of 
a Russo-Prussian treaty. Kaunitz did not hide from Britain 
that he intended to adhere to the French alliance as a 
strictly defensive measure designed to preserve the peace 
of Europe, and in February, 1764, he wrote that Sandwich 
was mistaken if he thought that Austria would ever agree to 
renew the "old systemlt, not even if Britain made it plain 
that she would keep away from Frussia.1 
The English government did not press the matter, but 
hoped to be able to resume talks. No risks were taken which 
might offend Vienna; e.g. when Frederick of Brunswick came 
to London at the beginning of 1764 for his marriage to 
Princess Augusta, George Ill's eldest sister, he was not 
encouraged to stay after the wedding, for it was feared that 
his presence might strengthen the "Prussian party· and 
diminish the chances of a rapprochement with Austr1a. 2 
While Sandwich made his first move towards Austria, the 
ambassador o·f this power in Madrid, Count Rosenberg, had a 
1. Spencer, pp. 119-24, 128-~1. 
2. The Jenkinson Papers, 1760-1766, edited by N.Jucker, 
pp. 258-9. 
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preliminary talk with Grimaldi for the purpose of exploring 
the possibilities of a closer connection between the two 
countries. There had already been tentative exchanges 
during the last stage of the Seven Years War, in which 
both countries were fighting on the side of France, and 
although they did not go beyond general expressions of 
willingness to draw together, they prepared the ground for 
a possible resumption of talks after the war. l 
After the Peace of 1763 Kaunitz failed to reach 
agreement with Russia because Oatherine's ambitions in 
Poland conflicted with Austria's support for the Saxon 
candidate to the Polish throne (Saxony was a client state, 
and necessary as an ally against Prussia) and, in addition, 
Kaunitz waS not willing to endorse Russia's plans of 
aggrandizement in Turkey. Russia, on the other hand, drew 
closer to Frussia because only Frederick 11 was willing to 
back Russia in Poland and Turkey. Austria's realization of 
this, together with English dallying with the Northern 
powers, made Kaunitz anxious to strengthen relations with 
the Bourbon powers.2 
1. Palacio, pp. 227-8, 276-8;Rashed, p.138, note 7; Bourguet, 
R.H.D., XXIV(19l0), pp.30-3. Various marriages between 
the Austrian and Carlos Ill's families as well as Austro-
Spanish consensus of opinion on Italy added to the favour-
able climate for a connection between the two countries; 
see above p.26. 
2. H.H.Kaplan, The First Partition of ~oland,pp.l2-2l; 
Spencer, pp.28-31. 
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The Austrian chancellor was minded to make up for 
France's reluctance to support Austria's interests by bring-
ing Spain into the defensive alliance of the first Treaty of 
Versailles of 1756. The chances of success were very slim, 
for Grimaldi had already expressed Spain's aversion to 
support Austria in Germany; however, Kaunitz hoped to curry 
favour in Madrid by co-operating with Spain in Italy. In 
his instructions to Rosenberg (16 January 1764) Xaunitz 
referred to Britain as the power against whom Spain stood 
most in need of assistance, but the reasons he gave for 
preferring Spain's accession to the Treaty of Versailles 
rather than a new tripartite arrangement or, needless to say, 
Austria's accession to the Family Compact, bear out that he 
I 
was intent on obtaining Spanish support in Frusaia and Turkey, 
while avoiding anything that might entangle Austria in Anglo-
Bourbon conflicts or lead Britain to seek a connection with 
Frederick II or Catherine. 1 
Considering that Spain's conflicts with Britain would be 
maritime and that peace in Italy was relatively secure, 
Kaunitz was not offering much in return for Spain's aapport. 
It rather seems that the Austrian chancellor was playing upon 
1. A Spanish version of Rosenberg's instructions 
is printed in Velazguez, pp. 32-6. 
Spain's fears that Vienna might cause trouble in Italy or 
that it might entertain Britain's proposal to restore her 
old alliance with Austria, if the Spaniards were not amen-
able. 
Indeed Grimaldi, who was also desirous to improve 
Spain's alliance with France by means of an Austrian 
t . 1 connec 10n, was spurred to make a formal overture when 
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Rosenberg informed him in March that Austria had refused to 
accept English advances for a rapprochement. 2 The Spanish 
minister was apprehensive that Austria might reconsider her 
rebuff to Britain, especially in view of the fact, reported 
by Masserano from London, that Frederick of Brunswick had 
spoken to the French ambassador to St. James's Court, 
Guerchy, of the desirability of resuming Franco-Prussian 
diplomatic relations.~ Furthermore, Joseph's wife, Isabella, 
1. ~asserano's instructions, 9 August 176~, A.H.N., Estado, 
le~ ~456(l); Fuentes's instructions, 17 January 1764, 
legO ;457(2), no. ~9. 
2. Ve1azguez, pp. 20-2, ~9. 
3. Masserano to Grima1di, 28 February 1?64, no. 81 (cipher), 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6956. For Charles-Louis-Francois 
Regnier, comte de Guerchy (1815-1?67), see ~Coque11 •• 
"Le Comte de Guercby, ambassadeur de France a Londres1 176~-1767·, Revue des Etudes Historigues, September 1~08, 
pp. 4~~-?2; Recueil, iiV-2, Angleterre, III (16~9-1?91), 
pp. 405-25. 
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daughter of the Duke of Parma, had died in 1763;1 a prompt 
alliance with Austria, it was hoped iu Madrid, would in-
crease the chances of Vienna choosing a bride for the King 
of the Romans within the Bourbon family. The possibility 
of the future Emperor marrying in Portugal was, in effect, 
causing some apprehension in Spain. 2 
On 16 April 1764 Grimaldi sent the Spanish represent-
ative in Paris, Fuentes, a project of accession to the 
~reaty of Versailles of 1756; as it stood it was a 'pure 
and simple' accession, a defensive agreement to guarantee 
the territorial integrity of the three powers concerned 
(article 2). 
In article 3 of the project the Spanish government 
proposed as regards aid that France and Spain would provide 
it as stipulated in the Family Compact. Maria Theresa and 
Carlos III were to succour each other with 10,000 foot-
soldiers and 9,000 cavalry or the equivalent amount of 
money; the latter to be evaluated in accordance with 
articles 5 and 7 of the Treaty of 1756. 
Italy was to be preserved as settled at Aix-la-
Chapelle, in the Convention of Turin of 176; and by the 
1. Bedarida, pp. 69-70. 
2. Fuentes' instructions, 17 January 1764, A.H.N., 
Estado, lego ;457(2), no. ;9. 
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Pragmatic Sanction of Carlos III for the kingdom of 
Naples (art. 4). There was also a mutual undertaking to 
maintain the engagement of Leopold of Tuscany to Mar{a 
Luisa of Spain. 
As resards aid in the event of war on the Hungarian 
border with Turkey, which Rosenberg had tried to include 
in his conversations with Grimaldi preceding the drafting 
of the project of Spanish accession, the Spanish govern-
ment would not consider it. Carlos III did not want to be 
diverted to Eastern affairs. Further, he envisaged a 
treaty with the Porte, which would end the traditional 
hostility between the Turks and their nominal subjects in 
North Africa, the Barbary States, and Spain. Carlos III 
was minded not to impair relations with either of the two 
countries on account of the other. l 
Like Kaunitz, Carlos III preferred accession to the 
1. See below pp. 215ff. One may add Carlos Ill's 
detachment as regards the Polisp election; on 
family grounds, his deceased wife was ~e.e,tck 
Augustus Ill's daughter, he supported the Saxon 
candidate but would do nothing to become involved 
in this issue; Grimaldi tg Masserano, 6 February 
1764, A.G.S., Estado, leg 6966; to M.boni (in 
Vienna), 62 October 1764, leg 6500, and 2 March 
1765, leg 6501. 
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Treaty of Versailles rather than an Austro-Spanish defensive 
agreement or Austria's own accession to the ]'amily Compact. 
This last solution was not only unacceptable to the 
Austrians, but also of little benefit to the Spaniards, who 
wanted peace in Europe in order to use the Family Compact 
against English expansionist aims overseas; Austrian in-
volvement would make it difficult to separate colonial from 
European conflicts. As for an Austro-Spanish defensive 
agreement, Garlos III was not willing to encourage Maria 
Theresa against Prussia. Spanish accession to the Treaty 
of 1756, with Spain supporting Austria in Germany in return 
for Austrian aid to Spain in her maritime wars in Europe 
(except for those against the North African powers), suited 
Spanish interests. For, first, by reviving the Austro-
French connection it would ensure peace in Germany on the 
basis of the rivalry on equal terms of Austria and Prussia; 
it was suspected that France might envisage moving a little 
towards Prussia to keep Austria's ambitions in check, which 
would upset the balance of power and might easily prompt 
Austria to listen to British proposals and to create 
disturbances in Italy. Secondly, Spain hoped to strengthen 
her hand inside the 'system of the south'; as matters stood, 
through the Treaty of Versailles and the Family Oompact, 
France was the contact between Austria and Spain. Madrid 
would prefer more direct links with Vienna. 
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Grimaldi tried to get Choiseul to promote the Spanish 
accession. To give the impression of subservience to 
France and thus flatter the French minister, Fuentes was 
instructed to pretend that nothing had been drafted in 
Madrid and that Choiseul was meant to take part in shaping 
the agreement in the discussions to be held in Paris. l 
Choiseul did not look upon the project of accession 
with much sympathy. From the French point of view, the 
Spanish and Austrian alliances fulfilled two different 
functions and were, therefore, to be kept separate. The 
Treaty of 1756 was precarious and far less important than 
the fundamental connection with Spain, for Vienna had no 
engagement with France against Britain, "la veritable ennemie 
de la monarchie". 2 Choiseul aimed to maintain German equil-
ibrium as a means of keeping peace in Central Europe. In 
this respect, Austria was used to restrain Frederick II; but 
Choiseul was also aware that, should Pruss1a weaken, and in 
view of Turkey's decline, Austria, bent on regaining Silesia, 
1. See Grimaldi's two dispatches to Fuentes, 16 April 1764, 
enclosing draft of the project of Spanish accession to 
the Treaty of Versailles of 1756 and Grimaldi's remarks 
on it; A.G.S. Estado, legO 4555. 
2. Choiseul to Ossun, 26 January 1762; quoted in A.Bourguet, 
"Le Due de Choiseul et l'Alliance espagnole", Revue 
d'Histoire diplomatique, XXIV (1910), pp. ~~-4. 
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would have to be prevented from destroying the new balance 
in Germany and thus playing into the hands of Britain who 
would welcome the chance to call forth plans for an alliance 
in the North. Austria herself might be pushed towards 
Britain by France's desire to preserve the balance. Further-
more, Austria with no rivals to fear on her German and 
Hungarian borders might turn to France and Italy to satisfy 
her territorial ambitions. l 
But despite his intention to take care that Austria 
did not strengthen her position, Choiseul readily agreed 
to co-operate with Fuentes in promoting Spanish accession 
to the Treaty of Versailles. The French minister was fully 
aware of the insurmountable ob.stacles that lay in the way, 
and it was surely this very awareness which made him willing 
to discuss the issue with the Austrian ambassador in Paris, 
Count Starhemberg. Before meeting him, Choiseul stressed 
to Fuentes that Austria would never cqnsent to aid Spain 
in a maritime war in Europe, even in the event of a British 
landing in Carlos Ill's metropoli~an territories; assistance 
in Turkey would be the only way to persuade Austria to come 
into the agreement, though Choiseul also argued that Austria 
only wanted to secure Spanish help in Germany.2 
1. Memoires du Duc de. Choiseul, .PP. 389-94. 
2. Fuentes to Grima1di, 28 April 1765, enclosing'Choiaeul's 
"Reflections sur le Projet d'accession de S.M. 
Catholique au Trait. deiensif de 1756-, ? April 1764; 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 4559. 
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As Choiseul had forecast, the three-cornered tentative 
talks in Paris during May were of no avail. Nor did 
Grimaldi get any further in his conversatioms with Rosen-
berg in Madrid along similar lines. l 
At the end of May the negotiators in Paris were 
diverted from the subject of the Spanish accession to that 
of the Austrian. plans for the remarriage of Joseph, the 
King of the Romans. Choiseul was pleased with the delay 
that this entailed, for he was suggesting at the time that 
the negotiation for the Austro-Bourbon alliance be post-
poned in expectation of events in Poland. Choiseul wanted 
to avoid Continental conflicts; the strengthening of the 
Treaty of Versailles in the midst of the crisis of the 
Polish succession might encourage Austria to take a more 
active part in support of her own candidate, which in turn 
could endanger peace. 2 
Maria Theresa first envisaged remarrying Joseph in 
Madrid; Mar!a Luisa, Carlos Ill's fifth child, was her 
1. ]'uebtes' dispatches of May; l.G.S., Estado, legO 4559. 
Grimaldi to Fuentes, 21 May 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4559, and May 28th,legO 4555. 
2. Choiseul's satisfaction at the delay might a1ao be a 
means to press Spain on the question of the Neapolitan 
accession; cp.above pp.7~-'. In respect of Joseph's 
remarriage Choiseul, while suggesting S.-oDY or Bavaria, 
said to Starhemberg that he did Dot intend to interiere 
as long as the choice did not fall upon thePDDtusu ••• 
princess; earlier on he had proposed MIle de Orleans but 
Maria Theresa rejected 8uch 8uggestion on account of her 
disreputable mother. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 11 May 1764, 
A.G.S., Estado, 1eef4555; 25th May and 18th JUDe, legO 
4559. 
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choice. But Joseph was opposed to marry a princess older 
than himself. This opposition left the Empress with Naria 
Benedetta of Portugal and Elizabeth of Brunswick as likely 
to meet Joseph's wishes. 
But Maria Theresa, suspecting that Carlos III would 
not welcome either choice, suggested Maria Luisa of Parma; 
Joseph would surely approve of his beloved first wife's 
sister. There was, however, an obstacle to such a marriage: 
the princess of Parma was already thought of in Spain as 
the prospective wife of the Prince of Asturias, Felipe 
Carlos. But Maria Theresa, with Joseph's consent, decided 
to sound Car10s III about it. She wrote to that monarch 
on 2 May 1764. 
The Spanish government were concerned lest Austria 
should choose a Portuguese bride; for such a marriage would 
not only throw new obstacles in the way of the Spanish 
accession to the Treaty of Versailles, but it would also 
hamper Spain's Portuguese policies. 1 
1. Grima1di to Fuentes, 28 May 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4555: alo qual puede, en efecto, estorbar el Projecto 
de la union, 0 hacerla de mala 0 de tibia ejecucion en 10 
futuro. Como subministrara e1 Rey de Romanos (mana u 
otro dla Soverano de todos los dominios austcoi ) tropas 
o subsidios pa atacar la Casa de au Esposa? Y aun en 
vida de la presente Emperatriz, ea preciso le repugne 
causar semejante disgusto a su Primogenito. n See a180 
his instruction of 21 May 1764, legO 4559. 
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Such apprehensions subsided as soon as Maria 
Theresa's letter of May 2nd reached Madrid at the end of 
the mOQth. The Farma proposal, together with Starhemberg's 
hints to Fuentes that Maria Theresa meant to avoid giving 
umbrage to the Bourbon powers, relieved the Spanish govern-
ment. Austria and Spain had successfully concluded several 
marriages; Grimaldi thought that yet another marriage 
negotiation might contribute towards improving the chances 
of a political understanding. l Nevertheless Carlos III 
would not agree to Maria Theresa's suggestion. On June 
2nd he wrote to her refusing to give up his plan to marry 
the prince of Asturias, Felipe Carlos, to Maria Luisa of 
Farma; he explained that this marriage was his late wife's 
ardent wish. To soften his refusal and to keep the marriage 
nego$iations going, Carlos III hinted that Spain might go 
back on her promise to Leopold and give Mar!a Luisa, the 
Spanish princess, to Joseph. Maria Theresa's first impulse 
was to accept Carlos Ill's offer as the Spanish princess 
had been from the beginning the candidate favoured by the 
Empress, but Josepb, disappointed with Carlos III over the 
Parma marriage, refused to pursue the Spanish offer. The 
Portuguese candidature now came to the fore &&ain, the 
1. Gr~maldi to Fuentes, 11 June 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4559; also his instruction of June 7th, and Fuentes to 
Grimaldi, 15 June 1764, legO 4555. 
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Portuguese princess being preferred by Maria Theresa on 
account of her age and beauty to the other two prospective 
brides, Bavaria and Saxony.l 
In the meantime, Fuentes, following Grimaldi's 
instructions, attempted to link the political and dynastic 
issues in his conversations with Starhemberg; but the 
latter insisted that they were to discuss the marriage of 
Joseph only. Choiseul was not very helpful; he said to 
Starhemberg that he looked upon the marriage negotiation 
as a purely dynastic problem and, while recommending the 
Spaniards not to weaken their position by showing excessive 
desire to reach a conclusion, the French minister was also 
stressing to Starhemberg that the Spanish accession to the 
Treaty of Versailles would not be of any significance to 
Spain if maritime wars in Europe were to be excluded. 
But Choiseul, although correct in diagnosing the 
impossibility of bringing about the Austro-Spanlsh rapproch-
ement, was not the cause of the failure to make any progress 
in Paris. By the middle of July, Starhemberg received full-
powers to proceed in the political negotiation and to sign 
1. A.R.Arneth, Maria Theresl,'s letze Beglerungzelt, 
l763-la80, It pp. 88-98; A. Wandruszia t Leopol 11, It pp. 81-2. 
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the alliance on Austrian terms: that is, an alliance which 
would strengthen Vienna in the light of the Prusso-Russian 
Treaty of April 11, 1764,1 without committing it to Anglo-
Bourbon conflicts. As a sop to Carlos III and with an eye 
to keeping the door open to Spain, Starhemberg referred to 
the desirability of the Farma marriage and .added that 
Vienna would have been willing to consider Spanish terms 
if Carlos III had consented to the marriage of Joseph with 
Maria Benedetta of Portugal. 2 
The real reason, in addition to the realization that 
no advantage could be derived from drawing towards Portugal 
and irritating Spain, is to be found in Austria's determin-
ation not to become Britain's enemy; Kaunitz never suggested 
the Portuguese marriage on account of their links with 
Britain. Kaunitz stressed that Bavaria was a wiser choice, 
for it could mean the recovery of certain Bavarian states 
in Bohemia for the Habsburgs which would help Austria to 
offset increased Prussian and Russian strength. But Maria 
1. This was a treaty of defence for a period of eight years, 
whereby Catherine got support for her Folish policy and 
Frederick obtained a public guarantee for Silesia. Text 
printed in G.F. de Martens, Recueil, I, pp. 89-94. 
2. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 15 June 1764, A.G.S., Est.do, legO 
4555; also his dispatches of July 16th and August 24th, 
and Grimaldi to Fuentes, 1, August 1764, legO 4559. 
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'rheresa still attempted to choose a candidate favourable to 
the Bourbons and thought of marrying Joseph to Princess 
Cundegonda of baxony, as suggested by l"iahoni, the .spanish 
ambassador in Vienna. l It was Joseph, however, who after 
having seen both princesses decided on Josepha of Bavaria; 
the marriage took place,on 22 January 1765. 2 
Austria's desire not to alienate Britain was made 
explicit in mid-June, 1764, News of the Russo-Prussian 
treaty had come out. It was feared that Britain, aware of 
the negotiations between Austria and the Bourbon powers, 
migtt join the Russo-Prussian combination. The Austrian 
representative in London, Count Sei1ern, approached Sandwich 
with assurances as from himself that no treaty was formed 
wi th ]'rance and Spain. 
If Austria was anxious, Britain was equally concerned, 
for she feared that the former might be inclined to make new 
engagements with the Bourbon powers in the hope of getting 
1. We shall return to this suggestion in a moment. Demetrio 
Mahoni, soldier of Irish extraction, was born in France. 
Under the protection of his compatriot Wall, the Spanish 
first secretary of state, served in Switzerland and later 
on, in 1758, he was sent to Vienna as minister pleni-
potentiary; in 1760 he was given ambassadorial rank, and 
remained in Vienna until his death on 25 November 1777; 
~H.N., Estado, legO ,427(1), and 4430, no.1; cp. Morel-
Fatio, p.108, note 2. 
2. Arneth, I, pp.98-10,; Spencer, pp.38, 280. Cp. N.C.M.H., VIII (M.S.Anderson), pp.269-72, for the Austro-Prusslan 
war (1778-9) over the Bavarian succession. 
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support in Germany. Britain, therefore, proceeded to bring 
pressure to bear on both Austria and Spain by threatening 
to join the Husso-Prussian league. Britain had no 
intention to become involved in the issues absorbing the 
central powers; she was rather seeking to prevent the 
Bourbon powers from strengthening their alliances, 
especially in view of the recurrence of the Honduras 
dispute with Spain. 
This no doubt is the reason why the English, in their 
sounding of Spain, referred to Austria acceding to the 
Family Compact, and not to Spain entering into the Treaty 
of Versailles. The manner in which the sounding was made, 
however, enabled Grimaldi, in conversation with Rochford 
on 24 June 1764, to say specifically that neither France 
nor Spain would admit Vienna to the Bourbon compact. 
The reaction of Vienna to British soundings was much 
more explicit and reassuring. At the beginning of August, 
~eilern declared in London and Kaunitz confirmed to the 
British ambassador, Stormont, that Austria would never 
enter into any engagement against Britain, unless forced 
into it by Britain entering into closer connections with 
Prussia and Russia, whose views Austria must always regard 
as hostile; any engagement with Spain would only be in the 
form of her accession to the defensive alliance between 
France and Austria in the simplest and plainest terms. l 
1. Spencer, pp. 137-208 passim. 
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When Austria's measures to keep clear of Anglo-
Bourbon conflicts became known in hadrid, the Spanish 
government realized the bad effect on their bargaining 
position in the Honduras dispute with Britain. l What the 
Spanish government resented most was Austrian silence. 
Kaunitz had tried to excuse himself by saying to Mahoni 
in mid-August that Choiseul had been told of the exchanges 
beforehand and was expected to acquaint Spain; but 
Grimaldi replied on September 9, 1764, that Spain should 
have been informed directly.2 The Spanish minister, 
however, did not mention the subject of the Spanish 
accession to the ~reaty of Versailles. It was beginning 
to dawn on him that Austria would never agree to give 
Spain support where she most needed it; indeed, France 
herself did not seem at all keen to promote an Austro-
Spanish connection. 
But Maria Theresa, for her part, was still prepared 
to humour Carlos III for the sake of a connection on 
Austrian terms. As 1 have mentioned earlier on, Maria 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 7 August 1764, no.237 (cipher), 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6956; Grimaldi to Fuentes, 3 
September 1764, A.G.S., Estado, lego 4559. 
2. Grimaldi to Mahoni, 9 September 1764, A.G.S., 
Estado~ legO 6502. 
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Theresa wanted to arrange a marriage for Joseph without 
straining her relations with Carlos Ill. At the same time 
she was anxious to minimize the effect on Spain of the 
Austrian demarche in respect of Britain. She therefore sent 
her personal secretary, Puchler,l to Mahoni at the beginning 
of September to ask him to put in writing the Spanish 
objections to Joseph marrying in Portugal. In view of 
Vienna's dislike of a marriage alliance with that country, 
this approach might be regarded as an attempt to give Carlos 
III hopes that Austria might heed these objections. 
Mahoni had no instructions on the subject of the 
marriage but, anxious not to risk displeasure, consented to 
give Puchler an unsigned note on condition that it should be 
regarded as private. In this note Mahoni returned to 
Spain's arguments against a Portuguese marriage, and 
suggested Cundegenda of Saxony as a choice agreeable to the 
Spanish King, who was the deceased King of Po~~and's son-
in-law. Mahoni hoped by such a dynastic alliance to 
strengthen the chances of the Saxon candidate, Prince 
Xavier, to the Polish crown. 
1. He was one of several private secretaries through 
whom Maria Theresa kept secret correspondence with 
foreign diplomatists in Vienna and Austrian 
representatives in foreign courts; Arneth, It pp. 32?, 
434-5, 514. 
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Mahoni also seized the occasion to raise the question 
of the Spanish accession to the Treaty of Versailles. He 
argued that Vienna's desire to exclude European maritime 
wars was unrealistic, as in wartime there would always be 
the risk of an English landing in Spain. 
Puchler did not take up the Saxon, hint but contented 
himself with reporting, not quite truthfully, that the 
negotiations to marry the King of the Romans in Portugal 
were making good progress. As regards the accession treaty 
he objected that the distance between the two countries and 
the climatic differences were circumstances that made the 
sending of troops from one country to the other very 
difficult; monetary aid would be more appropriate. He 
further explained that Maria Theresa was willing to consent 
to the exclusion of Turkish wars in return for her being 
allowed to keep out of the struggle between Britain and the 
Bourbon powers. l 
When Grimaldi received Mahoni's reports of these talks, 
he was willing to believe that there was still a glimmer of 
hope. On October 9th, Grimaldi sent Mahoni fresh instruct-
ions, stressing Carlos Ill's peaceful inclinations. 2 Neither 
1. Mahoni to Grimaldi, 10 September 1764 (cipher); there is 
also a second dispatch of the same date, enclosing 
Mahoni's and Puchler's notes; A.G.B., Estado, legO 6500. 
2. Grimaldi to Mahoni, 9 October 1764, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6500. 
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France nor Spain, Grimaldi stated, wanted to expand their 
territories. Provided Austria had no ambitious schemes, 
nothing would serve their peaceful aims better than the 
alliance of the three powers. The marriage of the King of 
the Romans within the Bourbon family, to someone "whom we 
could look upon as one of our party", would be the best 
start for a happy understanding between the three countries; 
the Portuguese princess could disrupt such a prospect. 
Grimaldi also sent Mahoni a copy of the project of the 
accession treaty that had been drafted early in the year and 
argued that now that the danger of a war with Britain had 
subsided, the prospect for an Austro-Spanish alliance ought 
to be improved. As to the objections of Maria Theresa to 
send troops to Spain, Grimaldi answered that German troops 
had already experienced the Spanish climate on previous 
occasions. Grimaldi, however, agreed to stipulate only 
monetary aid should Austria wish it. But he insisted that 
any war that Britain might declare on Spain should be 
included in the treaty on grounds of reCiprocity. Aa an 
alternative to the accession treaty, Grimaldi proposed a 
system of subsidies in the event of either power being 
attacked by any other European country. 
The •• new proposals from Madrid elicited very little 
response from Vienna. Six months, in fact, elapsed before 
~aria ~heresa decided to resume talks on the accession 
question. The delay indicates that Maria Theresa was by 
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now not optimistic about the possibility of obtaining a 
treaty on her own terms. Maria Theresa's approach to Mahoni 
in March, 1765, may be seen as a testing on the royal level, 
as Carlos III had done, of Spain's intentions, for the 
ministers' views had already been considered in Vienna as 
unacceptable. But it was prompted by growing rumours that 
an Anglo-Russian alliance was in train, and that France and 
Prussia might resume their diplomatic relations and might 
even renew their old connection. Vienna's diplomatic 
activity in the winter of 1765, was designed, in the first 
place, to keep alive the prospect of a possible return to 
the former Anglo-Austrian connection and, in the second 
place, for Vienna was well aware of its need for French 
support in Germany, to stir up French commitment to Austria. 
In this respect, friendly relations with Spain were expected 
to help to invigorate the Treaty of Versailles. 
The first move to resume diplomatic relations between 
France and Frussia originated with Frederick I1 soon after 
the general peace of 176;. The Prussian ruler was well 
satisfied with the Russian connection, for be was conscious 
that the three maritime powers were not anxious to become 
involved in the issues absorbing the central powers. The 
tentative Anglo-Austrian contacts gave him no cause for 
apprehension, as he was convinced that they were not likely 
to materialize into closer links on account of Austria's 
need of French support in Germany. However, while the 
Treaty of Versailles remained in force, it might still 
encourage Vienna to entertain some hopes of regaining 
Silesia if Prussia had to risk war against iurkey over 
the Folish election, and his own relations with Britain 
were very badly strained. He did not wish to be proved 
over-confident and sought to weaken the ]'ranco-Austrian 
alliance of 1756. 1 
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Frederick seized upon the expiration of the commercial 
treaty with France of 1753 (it had been concluded for a 
period of ten years) as the opportunity to sound the FrencQ 
ministry about resuming diplomatic relations. 2 A private 
envoy, Pinto, was sent to Paris early in 1764, to test the 
ground for a renewal of the commercial treaty and 
resumption of diplomatic relations; while Frederick of 
Brunswick, on his trip to London to marry f'rincess August., 
approached Guerchy. Choiseul welcomed Prussia's overtures, 
1. Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, XXIII, 
pp. 287-8; XXIV, pp. 2, 367-9 (henceforth cited as 
Pol. Corr.). Cp. Spencer, p. 53. 
2. Text of the commercial treaty of 1753 in Wenck, lI, 
pp. 722-5. 
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and recommended Louis XV in February, 1765, to resume 
diplomatic relations with Berlin, but he stressed that 
Frederick II would have to make the first move. l 
Choiseul welcomed these tentative advances because, 
firstly, he was minded to prevent Austria from upsetting 
the balance of power in Germany; secondly, they would 
render more unlikely the improbable Anglo-Prussian 
rapprochement that some sectors of English political life, 
especially Pitt, wished for. Finally, an improvement in 
Franco-Spanish relations might weaken the Russo-Prussian 
league; this could help to restrain Russia in Poland, 
Turkey and bweden. 2 
However, Choiseul was intent on letting Frederick II 
show his hand first, for he might otherwise risk French 
connections to the advantage of Prussia. When in the spring 
1765, the Jrussian ruler made a second attempt' to sound 
French opinion about resuming relations, Choieeul replied 
that an official opening was required. Frederick 11, who 
had already taken care to assure Catherine that there was 
1. R. Hammond, "Le Retablissement des relations diplo-
matiques entre la France et la Pru88e apr~. la guerre 
de Sept Ans", S&., XXV (1884), pp. ?0;1; •• e alao 
above p. '9!i. 
2. Cp. above pp. 9'.8.-9. 
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notbing to fear from tbese unofficial exchanges, retorted 
bluntly that at no time had he insinuated exchanging 
ministers between Prussia and France. 
Neither side expected much from these tentative 
contacts. With an eye to the shifting international scene, 
these countries were simply trying to hint that they might, 
if they so wished, find some ,way for agreement between the 
two countries. But neither of them would want to make a 
false move that might weaken their existing connections, 
and for the time being these tentative exchanges came to a 
halt. l 
The Franco-Prussian contacts, bowever tentative, added 
to Austria's alarm at the prospect of a Russo-Turkisb war 
over the election of ~niatowski to tbe Polisb throne, with 
France instigating the Turks to declare war on Russia and 
Frussia expecting territorial gaiss.from supporting Catberine 
in Poland. Austria was prepared to gratify Catherine on the 
subject of the election as long as there was no partition of 
Poland, for this would strengthen Prussia in tee East and 
1. Magallon's reports from Paris to Grimaldi, July 8th and 2~ 
August 1765, A.G.S., Estado, legO 4560; Hammond, R.H., 
XXV (1884), pp. 72-5. See also Pol. Corr., XXIV, pp. 170-2, 
200, for Frederick II's explanations to Catherine that the 
contacts witb France were only for the purpose of-renewing 
their commercial treaty of 1753. 
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thus upset the balance of power in Germany. Austria 
decided to approach Britain as a warning against ]'rance' s 
debbling with Prussia. 
At the beginning of 1765 Vienna reaffirmed the 
assurances given to Britain in August, 1764, and gave her 
to understand that the renewal of the "old system" was still 
'" possible. In return Vienna expected similar assurances that 
Britain would not entertain supporting Russia in Poland or 
Turkey, and would keep away from closer ties with Prussia. 
This the English government promised, adding that they were 
also prepared to do everything that prudence required to 
pave the way for an eventual agreement on policy with 
Austria on the basis of their former alliance. The Gren-
ville ministry continued to believe that an alliance with 
Russia and Austria, leaving Frussia to return to the French 
connection, might in tim~ be reached. l However, neither 
Britain nor Austria w~ really considering becoming involved 
in each other's interests. During the period of the 
Grenville ministry there was in London a general aversion to 
make alliances that might entail paying subsidies; further-
more, Britain had no wish to be diverted from the colonial 
1. Spencer, pp. 264-88, passim; see also pp. 25-61 for an 
excellent survey of the diplomacy of the three central 
powers during the Polish election of 1764 and Anglo-
Russian relations between 1763 and 1766. 
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struggle and preferred to meet the ]'rench menace in Europe 
by a firm polity towards the Bourbon powers. 1"!asserano and 
Frederick II saw no cause for apprehension in Anglo-
Austrian exchanges; the former wrote to his principal on 
several occasions that the Grenville administration pre-
ferred to arouse jealousy between Austria and France that 
did not cost any money.l 
Necessity, on the other hand, kept Vienna firmly linked 
to the French alliance for support in Germany, and the 
Austrian Court, once Britain had been reassured that Austria 
would not enter upon any engagement contrary to British 
interests, decided to reply to Grimaldi's proposals of 
October, 1764, as a means of strengthening the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
It was Nuia Theresa who reopened talks on the subject 
of the Spanish accession to the Treaty of Versailles with 
the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, Mahoni, in March, 1765; 
she wished to spare her chancellor the task of discussing an 
issue which was not to his liking. Kaunitz believed that 
there was no sphere of possible co-operation between 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 15 January 1765, no. 365 (cipher), 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6959; February 15th, no. 388, legO 
6935; July 12th, no. 494, and October 19th, no. 562, 1egO 
6958. l!'rederick II to Hitche11, 9 July 1764, inter-
cepted and deciphered copy in S.P. 107/101. Bp. 
Spencer, p. 65. 
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Austria and Spain, except Italy. ]'urthermore, he reckoned 
on CarIos III remaining on good terms with Austria on 
account of Parma's and Naples's security; thus there was 
no need for a formal engagement with a country which 
politically as well as geographically lay at such a distance 
from Austria and whose support, either monetary or military, 
would be negligible in view of Spain's lack of resources. 
The Austrian chancellor agreed with Maria Theresa that 
Spain's accession to the Treaty of Versailles might turn 
]'rance into a more willing ally; but it could also arouse 
suspicions in Faris that Austria was trying to push herself 
between the partners of the Family Compact. l 
Maria Theresa, for her part, continued to believe 
that the Spanish alliance, on her own terms, was a useful 
accession of strength to the Treaty of Versailles, and 
consequently proceeded to instruct Starhemberg in Faris and 
Rosenberg in Madrid to negotiate it. On the manner of 
alliance, she was willing to accept Spain's proposal for a 
subsidy treaty; but on the casus foederis, there was no 
change. Both Turkish and English wars were to be exclu4ed. 2 
1. Arneth, IV, pp.262-5; Spencer, p.278. 
2. Mahoni to Grimaldi, 28 March 1765 (cipher), and 10 April 
1765 (cipher), A.G.S., Estado, lego 6501. 
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In effect, Maria Theresa wanted support in Germany in 
return for security in Italy_ But Italy was already 
relatively secure; furthermore, any threat against the 
Italian status quo would probably eome from Austria herself. 
From the Spanish point of view, Austrian terms were un-
acceptable, for they did not include the only war likely to 
involve Spain. The Spanish gove~nment had hoped to obtain 
some kind of support from Vienna to strengthen her diplo-
matic position within the Family Compact and thus to 
promote her own staniing in London. Vienna's aversion to 
becoming involved outside Europe, and even to opposing 
Britain in Europe, was underestimated. As Mahoni remarked, 
Grimaldi had been too optimistic. Vienna's aversion was 
not due to fear of an imminent Anglo-Bourbon war; rather it 
was a firmly established line of policy with. the Austrian 
Court. However, Mahoni concluded, Austria still wanted to 
remain on friendly terms with Spain. l 
And so did Spain. Although Carlos III decided that 
the game was not worth it, and did not bring up the issue 
1. Mahoni's remarks on Grimaldi's project of Spanish 
accession to the Treaty of Versailles of October, 1764 
(undated, but probably written in April, 1765), A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6503. 
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again, friendly relations with Austria continued to be 
regarded as a means of ensuring the possessions of the 
Italian branches of the House of Bourbon and of maintain-
~ ing general peace in Europe. In this respect, we shall 
see how henceforth Spain was to make it her policy to 
raise objections whenever France showed signs of wanting 
to reinstate Prussian relations on a friendly basis. 
1. GriLa1di to Aranda, 7 February 1774, no. 1, A.G.S., 
Estado, L1bro 156. 
PART II 
Anglo-Spanish colonial disputes from 1763 to 1775 and 
the role of the Family Compact. 
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Despite her political instability and diplomatic 
isolation, Britain, quickly developing at home and superior 
to her competitors at sea, found herself after the Seven 
Years War in a good position to challenge the joint efforts 
of the Bourbon powers in the struggle for colonial suprem-
acy. Her energies as a world-power and the freeing of 
British resources from Indian and European commitments 
enabled the English to question Spanish monopolistic claims. 
Further, the British nation, after having won victories 
over France and disclosed the weaknesses of the Spanish 
dominions in America, was confident of her strength. 
Finally, the Thirteen Colonies were seething with dis-
content. All these factors spurred the English on to lay 
the foundations of a new imperial conception. 
This was a period of activity unparalleled since 
the days of the Tudor seamen in naval achievements. There 
was a conscious attempt to open up new fields of enterprise 
in the Pacific and the South China Seas. But English 
sailors were not looking for new territories; the days were 
past when Britain sent her seamen to search the Oceans to 
occupy new territories or to accept political responsibil-
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ities. The aim now was to create a network of commercial 
key-points and to establish trade settlements; eventually 
these would be protected by naval bases. Markets, new 
fields of commerce, were the objectives of the British 
people. 
The British government planned the occupation of the 
Falkland Islands as a basis for future operations, commercial 
and naval, in the South Seas, and as a link with the new 
fields of enterprise in the South China Seas. There was a 
"swing to the East" in search of a system of Far Eastern 
trade, and attempts were made to establish a permanent 
commercial entrepot in the Malayan Archipelago. The 
English also envisaged the quest of the North-West passage 
and the discovery of the Terra Australis Incognita, and 
were minded to increase their share in Central American 
trade .1 
The wider implications of British post-war expansion 
aroused the fears of the Spanish government. Carlos III 
embarked on a plan to strengthen his own dominions and to 
develop their resources. Measures were taken to keep a 
1. The best comprehensive account of this stage of British 
colonial policy is V.T.Harlow, The Founding offine 
Second British Em ire 1 6 - ,I, chapters I- .. 
subsequent y c~te as ar ow • Cp. also G.Williams, The 
British Search for the Northwest Passage in the Eighteenth 
Century. 
-
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close watch on foreign encroachments and competitive 
enterprises in the South Seas. The impetus of the British 
met with the determination of the Spaniards to enforce 
their exclusive claims to the South Seas. The result was 
an endless succession of diplomatic crises, and throughout 
the period between the Seven Years War and the American 
War of Independence the prospect of war loomed large. l 
After the Treaty of 1763 Central America became the 
first object of serious dispute between Britain and Spain, 
when the activities, on an ever-growing scale, of the 
English cutters of logwood in Yucatan and Honduras Bay 
met with Spain's attempt to limit their presence within 
fixed areas. 
1. Pitt called the Treaty of Paris of 1763 the ten years 
armed truce; Pares, p. 611. 
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1. The Honduras Bay dispute. 
One hundred years had elapsed since British subjects 
had secured permanent footholds in Yucatan and Honduras 
Bay.l In the early seventeenth century many Englishmen 
had made a living as buccaneers attacking Spanish ships 
~",~\ .. "d. in these waters; but the conciliatory attitude of ~£talQ 
towards Spain in the treaties of 1667 and 1670, and the 
measures taken by the colonial authorities of both 
countries to stop contraband trade, forced the majority 
of these buccaneers to go ashore to make a living. Some 
of them turned pirates, others were attracted by the log-
wood trade and the English authorities encouraged them to 
take it up as a means to keep them under control and 
available for the service of the Crown in times of war. 
This, together with the difficult nature of the coastline 
round the peninsula of Yucatan and Honduras Bay (which 
offered safe refuge to privateers and cutters when pursued 
by the Spanish guardacostas), induced them to move and 
settle there. 2 
1. The exact beginnings of British preaence in these areas 
are not yet known, but some tentative dates may be 
gathered from J.A.Burdon, Archives of British Hondur,s, I, 
pp.2-3, (henceforth cited a8 4.B.H.), and J.I.Calderon 
Quijano, Beliee, 1663(?)-1821, pp.42, 46-9. 
2. C.H.Haring, The Buccaneers in the ~8t Indi •• in the XVII 
century, pp.208 ft.; J.McLelsh,*!rltlah Ictlvitlea in 
Yucatan and on the Moakite Shore in the eighteenth 
century", pp.6-18, passim (cited below aa -McLe1abB ). 
-
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The activities of the intruders centred on four 
different areas: Laguna de Terminos and the Isle of Triste 
in the Bay of Campeachy, on the western side of the peninsula 
of Yucatan; Cape Cateche, on the north-eastern coast of the 
same peninsula; Honduras Bay, on the strip of shore which is 
confined within the River Belize and the River Hondo; and, 
finally, Mosquito Shore, the coast land from Cape Honduras 
to the Rivep San Juan, on both sides of the Cape Gracias a 
Dies. 
The first two establishments are hardly mentioned in 
the documents for the second half of the eighteenth century 
and very little is known of their development. Campeachy 
Bay had been the main centre of the British cutters; but in 
1717 a successful expedition from Spain dislodged them. 
Some scattered references are found regarding Mosquito 
Shore. Though in December, 1763, Halifax (Secretary of 
state for the southern department) wrote that this territory 
belonged to Britain, as granted to her by the Indians, who 
had always been independent of the Spanish monarchy, no open 
support was given to the settlers and they bad to struggle 
for their existence until 1786, when Britain agreed to 
evacuate Mosquito Shore. 
The British establishment in Honduras Bay (Belize), 
on the other hand, endured and expanded as no other 
establishment did. It became the central post to wbich tbe 
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settlers retired when they were chased away from other 
parts of the coast. When the Convention of July 14th, 
1786, was signed in London to settle the future of British 
presence in Central America, Belize was the only British 
settlement left in the zone, and it developed into, and 
was later called, British Honduras. l 
The staple export of Honduras and Yucatan was logwood. 
The importance of this vegetable dye in the textile 
industries explains its place in the diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. It was looked upon as "the 
fundamental fixing dye to almost every other colour and 
therefore absolutely essential to the British woollen 
manufactures". 2 While Spain maintained an effective 
monopoly of this commodity, logwood was sold at £90 to 
£110 per ton. When the government of London began to dis-
courage buccaneering in the late seventeenth century, the 
buccaneers, quite by accident, discovered that the English 
were prepared to pay a price high enough to entice them to 
1. Brown, H.A.H.R., V (1922), pp.353-8; "McLe1ah", pp. 
208-12 and app. C. 
2. Hodgson to Adworth,.Jamaica, 21 April 1?5l, calendared 
in A.B.H., It pp. ??-8. 
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begin cutting logwood regularly. Prices fell in the last 
years of the century as a result of this competition, but 
the logwood trade maintained its importance until the middle 
of the eighteenth century. In the 1760's the logwood t~ade 
lost its first place in the list of exports from Central 
America to England. This was due both to the overstocking 
of logwood in European markets and to the great development 
from the time of Queen ADne onwards of furniture-making in 
Europe with its consequent de3and for mahogany from over-
seas. By 1771 mahogany had replaced logwood as the 
principal British import from Central America; but logwood 
continued to be shipped to cover the cargo of mahogany, since 
permission to cut it was not granted by Spain until 1786.1 
The period between 1670 and the Seven Years War was a 
continued effort on the part of Spain to prevent privateers 
from cutting and carrying 10gwood, preying upon British 
1. In 1714, 4878 tons were imported into England; the 
cash value of the logwood trade in 1717 was £60,000; 
and in 1772 the price was so low that it did not pay 
for the freight and expenses incurred in putting it 
on the European markets. See "McLeish", pp.42-6, A.B.H., 
I, pp.5-6, 64-6, 183, and A.M.Wi1son, "The Logwood Trade 
in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries"t ESS!iS in 
the History of Modern Europe (ed. by D.McKay), pp. -$, 
13-5. 
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ships in Honduras and Yucatan, launching successive attacks 
on the British settlements in Central America, and always 
refusing to consider British proposals to negotiate the 
issue. The mere possibility of a negotiation was regarded 
as inappropriate, for fear that the British, who sought to 
legitimize their trade, should use it to build up the 
shadow of a claim. But despite this consistency of purpose, 
Spain could not manage the means to expel the English from 
these areas. l 
During the Seven Years War Spain tried, first, to get 
Britain to evacuate her settlements in Central America -
this was one of the main Spanish grievances against 
Britain at the time - in exchange for Spanish neutrality 
in the Anglo-French war, but when this failed, she drew 
towards France in the hope of obtaining it by use of arms. 2 
1. Pares, pp.41-3, 102-4, 540-51; Calderon, pp.69-l74. 
See also J.O.McLachlan 1 "The Seven Years Peace and the West Indian Policy_of varvajal and Wall", E.H.R., 53 
(1938), pp. 457-77; and L.H.Gipson, "Britisb Diplomacy 
in the light of Anslo-Spanish New World issues, 1750-
1756", A.H.R., 51 (1946), pp. 632-44. 
2. For the great importance put upon this issue by the 
Spanish, cp. "McLeish", pp. 105-6, and Palacio, pp. 
103-4 and 149, n. 9. 
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But the war did not improve Spain's chances. When the 
peace negotiations began in Paris in April, 1762, the 
English government offered the evacuation of the British 
establishments in Honduras on condition that they were 
guaranteed permission to cut logwood. Spain tried to 
obtain unconditional evacuation on a mere promise of future 
negotiation on permission for cutting; but Choiseul brought 
pressure to bear on her and, by August, Spain was prepared 
to allow the English to cut logwood in the River Belize and 
the River Hondo in return for the evacuation of other 
British establishments and the undertaking not to form new 
ones. l 
Having been prevailed upon to grant this concession, 
Spain now wished to confine the British cutters within known 
limits. The Minister of Indies, Arriaga, took the view that 
the government ought to press the British to accept a precise 
description of the places where the right to cut logwood was 
to be exercised and of the establishments which were to be 
evacuated; he made a special point of Rio Tinto (the 
Mosquito shore) which he inaccurately described as the 
biggest establishment on those coasts and the most dangerous 
1. Palacio, pp. 230-41 passim. 
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on account of its fortifications and its proximity to the 
Indian Mosquitos. l 
In line with this view, the Spanish government 
drafted its proposal to be discussed in Earis between the 
Spanish negotiator, Grimaldi, and his English counterpart, 
recently arrived from London, Bedford. On 16 September 
1762 Grimaldi submitted these terms for a compromise 
settlement of the Honduras dispute: 
"L'Anglaterre evacuera lea Etabliasementa, et tous 
les Forts, qui peuvent avoir 3te eleves dans la 
Baye, et sur la C6te de H09duras, le Royaume de 
Goathemala, et nommement l'Etablissement de Rio 
Tibto; Et Sa Majeste Catholique en cette 
Consideration permettra que les Anglois Coupent 
et Chargent le bois de Campeche dans la riviere 
Wallis, et la Riviere Nueva, ou Rio Nuevo, jusqu'a 
ca que par un arrangement 1 faire l il leur soit 
assure sans blesser la Souverainte de sa Majeste 
Catholique." (!!£).2 
Bedford did not accept this precise wording and 
suggested a new version deliberately vaguer in order to 
1. Arr~aga~s report, probably written in August, 1762; A.H.N. 
Estado, legO 4551, ff. 107-8. Belize, which the 
Spaniards called Wallis, was the centre of British 
activity in the zone and not R!o Tinto as was generally 
believed in Madrid: cp. Palacio, p. 103. 
2. Enclosure C in Bedford's dispatch to Egremont (Secret-
ary of state in the Bute ministry), 19 September 1?62, 
S.P. ?8/253. See also his separate instructions of 
September 4th, 1762, S.P. 78/253 (a180 printed 1n 
B.D.I., VII, France, Part IV, 1745-1789, p. 63). 
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give the cutters room for further expansion without viol-
ating the treaty; he also demanded that a personal guarantee 
of permission to cut logwood from Carlos III be incorpor-
ated in the instrument of agreement. With some support 
from Choiseul, who wished to get a better peace for France, 
Bedford brought Grimaldi to acquiesce to the drafting 
, desired by Britain: 
nEt Sa Majeste Catholique, en Consideration de 
cette evacuation assurera aux Sujets de Sa Majeste 
Britannique la liberte entiere de couper, charger, 
et transporter le Bois de Teinture, ou· de Camp~che, 
dans les Terreins ou ils on Coutume ~e le couper, 
charger et transporter. Cette liberte sera assuree 
pour le present, sur la Parole Royale de Sa Majeste 
Catholique; Et les deux Cours se reservent de iaire 
un arrangement plus particulier entr'Elles sur cet 
objet, qui, en assurant la Liberte susdite, main-
tiendra la Souverainete de la Couronne d'Espagne 
dans ce Pais la." (sic) 1. 
This draft, however, was seen to be altered. At the 
end of September news of the British conquest of Havana 
reached Europe. The English government decided to raise 
the terms of the logwood clause a little higher. In a 
Cabinet meeting held on October 22nd it was agreed that 
names of places or fortifications were to be avoided. 2 
1. Enclosure B. Cp. Palacio, pp. 250-1. 
2. Cabinet Minute, S.P. 78/25~. See also Bedford, Ill, pp. 
96, 114-122, for Egremont's bellicose views and Bute's 
lukewarm support for Bedford's pacific inclinations. 
Cp. Palacio, pp. 256-7. 
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Bedford was accordingly instructed not to make any concession 
and to avoid any phrase which might be used to check the 
expansionist aims of the logwood cutters; even the phrase 
"ou ils ont coutume de le couper", which appeared in 
Bedford's first draft, was dropped lest it should be made 
to serve the Spanish view by stressing 'custom' as opposed 
,to 'right'. I 
Grimaldi still persisted in his attempt to confine 
British permission to cut logwood within clear and well-
defined limits, but France's desire to reach an early peace 
undermined his position. He refused, however, to sign the 
preliminary treaty unless Bedford agreed to the addition 
of these words, "et autres lieux du Territoire d'Espagne, 
dans cette partie du monde n , after the British promise to 
demolish all fortifications in the Bay of Honduras. It was 
hoped that this sentence, taken with the one previously 
quoted, "ou ils on coutume de le couper", would give Spain 
the necessary handle to confine the cutters within strict 
limits in one place. To hasten peace, Choiseu1 supported 
GrimaIdi. And Bedford, who like his principal Bute was also 
1. Egremont to Bedford, 26 October 1762, s.P. 78/25~. 
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keen on making peace, accepted this additional sentence; 
he had been given to understand that the British government 
intended to demolish all unlawful encroachments on the 
Spanish territory. Grimaldi still managed to add a further 
phrase, "dans les dits lieux", after the Preliminary 
Treaty. 1 Thus the logwood clause found its way into the 
. 
Definitive Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1763 (art. 17): 
"his Catholic Majesty shall not permit his 
Britannic Majesty's subjects, or their work-
men, to be disturbed or molested under any 
pretence whatsoever in the said places, in 
their occupation of cutting, loading, and 
carrying away logwood: and for this purpose, 
they may build, without hindrance, and occupy, 
without interruption, the houses and magazines 
necessary for them, for their families, and for 
their effects: and his Catholic Majesty assures 
to them, by this article, the full enjoyment of 
those advantages and powers on the Spanish 
coasts and territories, as above stipulated, 
immediately after the ratification of the 
present Treaty"; 
his British Majesty in return 
"shall cause to be demolished all the fortif-
ications which his subjects shall have erected 
in the Bay of Honduras, and other places of 
the territory of Spain in that part of the 
world four months after the ratification of 
the present Treaty." 2 
1. Bedford to Egremont, 3 November 1762, printed in Bedford, 
Ill, pp.144-9; Rochford to Halifax, 27 July 1764 (extract), 
Lyell Ms., empt. 37, Bodley Library; Grim.ldi to 
Masserano, 13 August 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6956. 
Cp.Palacio, p. 267. 
2. ·Charles Jenkinson, A Collection of all the Treaties ••• 
between Great Britain and Other Powers ••• , Ill, pp.lS6-7. 
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Britain could at last claim a right, a legal status, 
to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras and other places of 
that area, and was now in a position to expand the area 
of cutting, availing herself of the loose wording of 
article 17. The Spanish government, on the other hand, 
had to accept the article as the result of an unfortunate 
, 
war, hoping to alter the position by putting into effect 
their own interpretation of the phrases which Grimaldi had 
managed to insert. l 
Arriaga, the Colonial Secretary, set himself to lessen 
the effects of the Bnglish presence in Central America 
immediately after the Treaty of Paris. He feared that the 
British cutters would engage in illicit trade and breed 
discontent among the Indians. The newly-appointed governor 
of Yucatan, Felipe Ramirez de Estenez, was instructed to 
keep a careful watch on their movements and to avoid any 
contact with them. More important, Estenoz was to limit 
the application of article 17 in accordance with Arriaga's 
restrictive interpretation that the British cutters should 
confine the use of their concession to the territory within 
the River Belize (or Wallis) and the New river because it 
was there that the previous cutting of logwood by the 
English could be proved by the existence of fortification8~ 
l.-In no other part of the world, concludes Pares, p. 603, 
was the Feace of Paris less conclusive. 
2. Arriaga to Estenoz, 29 February, and 29 April 1763; 
quoted in Calderon, p. 197. 
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Estenoz discovered that since April, 1763, British 
subjects had been cutting logwood in the River Hondo, five 
leagues from the Spanish garrison of Bacalar. There was an 
opportunity to apply Arriaga's interpretation. Accordingly, 
on 4 February 1774 a corporal and three soldiers from the 
garrison of Bacalar were sent to the River Hondo to ask the 
I 
cutters to withdraw to Belize until they could produce 
either a cedula from Carlos III or a licence from His 
British Majesty to prove their permission to cut logwood in 
the River Bondo. The cutters, realizing that force would be 
used against them, speedily complied with the request, but 
acquainted the governor of Jamaica, Lyttelton, and the 
Naval Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Burnaby, who 
attempted to help the settlers. They claimed that article 
17 of the Treaty of Paris did not stipulate that such 
"instruments lt were required. Estenoz, for his part, argued 
that the cutters had no right to cut logwood in the River 
Bondo, for the sense of article 17 was that this right was 
to be recognized only in places where fortifications had 
previously been erected; the fortifications were the 
evidence of settlements having been established with a 
1 " t "to 1 c a~m 0 recogn1 1on. 
1. Brown, H.A.H.R., V (1922), pp.359-61; "MeLeish", pp. 118-
~; Calderbn, pp. 183-6. 
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As their representations to Estenoz did not meet with 
a conciliatory answer, Lyttelton and Burnaby referred the 
matter to the government in London. Halifax, the Secretary 
of State for the Southern Department, instructed Rochford 
on June 15 to secure prompt and positive instructions to 
restore the cutters' rights, and on July 3 to demand dis-
avowal and compensation. l 
Acting on Halifax's instructions of June 15, Rochford 
sent a written note to Grimaldi on July 4th. The Spanish 
minister answered three days later that he had not yet 
received any information from Yucatan and could not there-
fore proceed in the matter. Grimaldi also reaffirmed 
Carlos Ill's desire to define the places where the cutters 
could exercise their rights; His Catholic Majesty, 
Grimaldi expressed, was minded to allow no interference with 
the cutters' rights "in the stipulated places".2 Arriaga 
approved Grimaldi's answer; he personally would have liked 
to see specific mention of each individual place where the 
English would be permitted to cut logwood so as to make 
any extension of logwood cutting activities impossible.' 
1. S.P. 94/167. 
2. Rochford to Halifax, 8 July 1764, S.P. 94/167. See 
also Calderon, pp. 205-6. 
,. Arriaga to Grimaldi, 6 July 1765; printed in Calderon, 
p. 206. 
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But even Grimaldi's broad hint aroused suspicions in 
London. Grenville, who was as anxious to leave the areas 
unspecified as the Bpaniards were to fix them, pointed out 
to Halifax that the phrase "stipulated places" could be 
later used for a future dispute about what these stipul-
ated places were. Halifax then wrote to Rochford on July 
24 to demand again immediate redress and reparation, and 
that the Governor of Yucatan be punished. l 
Before these instructions reached Madrid, Rochford 
had had sever'al conferences with Grimaldi on the basis of 
Halifax's earlier instructions of July 4th. Rochford was 
confident that Carlos III would give the satisfaction that 
was expected in London in return for a clear definition of 
the places where the cutters could go on exercising their 
rights. He believed that the Spaniards would do anything 
to avoid quarrelling with Britain, and suggested that 
Grimaldi's offer to reach a compromise settlement on the 
basis of granting rights to cut logwood in specified places 
with great quantities of this wood, should be taken into 
consideration. He personally believed that this was a 
good opportunity of ending disputes likely to arise from 
the Spanish ministers' conviction that the cutting of log-
wood was only an excuse to carry on an illicit trade in the 
1. Grenville to Halifax, 2; July 1764; Grenville Papers, II, 
p. 409. Halifax to Rochford, 24 July 1764, s.p. 94/167. 
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River Hondo. l 
Grimaldi was in reality less forthcoming than Rochford 
thought him to be. It is accurate that the Spanish minister 
was not prepared to risk a serious quarrel; however, he 
intended to test the British government as to the possi-
bility of spinning out the negotiation for satisfaction, 
with a view to drawing them into talks on the subject of 
interpretation of article 17 of the Treaty of Faris. The 
first step was to transfer the discussion to London, for 
Rochford had already spoken of this issue having been the 
occasion of more than one war between the two countries. 
It was hoped that Masserano might be able to create a more 
favourable atmosphere in London. As for Rochford's 
protests against delay, Grimaldi pretended to cast the 
blame upon Arriaga's dilatoriness. 2 
On 13 August 1764, Masserano was instructed to re-
open the negotiation on the meaning of the phrase "dans 1es 
dits lieux" of article 17. Grimaldi alleged that in Paris 
Bedford seemed to have agreed that the phrase referred to 
1. See his dispatches of July 30th, 1764, in S.P. 94/167, 
and those of August, in S.P. 94/168. 
2. Rochford to Halifax, 6 August (cipher), and 13 August 
1764, S.P. 94/168. Cp. Gil Munilla, p. 94, n. 20. 
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the River Belize and the New River, the only places where 
previous establishments or fortified places had existed. 
There was no establishment or fortification in the River 
Hondo before the Peace of Paris; Estenoz's action was 
therefore justified. The cutters might argue, Grimaldi 
advanced, that logwood was scarce in the River Belize and 
the New River: but this was not so. They, therefore, had 
gone to the River Hondo, which was only five leagues from 
the Spanish garrison of Bacalar, because they could also 
carry on smuggling. 
If the English were to insist on their demands to the 
point of war, Carloa III would have to permit them to cut 
logwood in the River Hondo also, and would even agree to 
give satisfaction for Estenoz's action; but in return the 
Spanish wanted clearly defined cutting areas within the 
River Hondo and the New River (the River Belize stands in 
between), and the withdrawal of British subjects from all 
territories apart from the three rivers. 1 
On hearing of Grimaldi's intention to transfer talks 
to London and to reopen the negotiation on article 17, 
1. Grimaldi to Masserano, 13 August 1764, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6956. For Grimaldi "a allegation, see Bedford 
Correspondence, Ill, pp. 145-6; cp. Rashed, p. 167, and 
Spencer, p. 18;. 
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Halifax instructed Rochford on August 30 to warn Grimaldi 
that should the Spanish either refuse or delay immediate 
redress and reparation, His British Majesty would be 
obliged to take proper measures to reinstate and protect 
his subjects' in their rights, as coneeded to them by the 
Treaty of 1763.1 Three days later, the cabinet decided un-
animously to "take this up highly; & absolutely refuse to 
treat upon a Point, which we consider as being already 
settled by Treaty ll;2 and on the 5th a new meeting was 
held, in which it was agreed that Sir William Burnaby, 
Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's squadron on the 
Jamaica station, should be sent four ships of the line 
to reinforce his squadron and instructions to be prepared 
to take effectual measures to restore the logwood cutters 
in case a conciliatory answer from Spain should not 
arrive.' 
1. Halifax to Rochford, 30 August 1764, S.F. 94/168. Cp. 
K.L.Ellis, "British Communications and Diplomacy in 
the Eighteenth Century", B.I.H.R., 31 (1958), pp. 159-
67, for London's reluctance to conduct negotiations 
at home. 
2. H.V.Jones (Newcastle's secretary) to Hardwicke, 2 
September 1764, enclosing minute of the cabinet held 
on that day; Add. 35425, ff. 62-3. 
,. Cabinet minute printed in Spencer, pp.209-210; cp. also 
p. 183. 
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Britain's firm policy was due to Grenville's stern 
attitude towards the Bourbon powers. Unlike his lack of 
initiative in the Polish question, Grenville held the view 
that a strong line against France and Spain was the best 
means to preserve peace as established in the Treaty of 
1763. Disregarding the pacific counsel of Bedford (Lord 
President), who was prepared to make concessions to France 
for the sake of peace, Halifax's compromising attitude, and 
Sandwich's apprehensions over the unpreparedness of the 
navy, Grenville brought them to adopt his views. Tbe 
memory of recent triumphs over the Bourbon allies, still 
fresb in British minds, was on bis side. 
Indeed, Grenville's firm and steady conduct had 
already proved successful on the occasion of the French 
attack made on British saltrakers (the Bermudians began 
the salt-raking industry in the,1670's) on the Turk's 
Islands, a small group to the north of St. Domingue and in 
the southern extremity of the Bahamas, by the governor-
general of the French Antilles, comte d'Estaign, on June 
1st, 1764.1 
1. For this and other Franco-British disputes arising from 
the last war (the Canada Bills, claims for prisoners of 
war, France's failure to destroy the fortifications and 
'cunette' at Dunkirk as undertaken in the Treaty of Paris 
and the Newfoundland fisheries), see Spencer, pp.l?8-229 
passim; cp. also Recueil, XIV-2, Angleterre, Ill, pp. 
405-425. 
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This group of islands was an important trade route, 
with good harbours, between the Thirteen Colonies and 
Jamaica, in which 200 ships were employed. Furthermore, 
the islands lay in the zone through which French vessels 
passed on their way from Haiti to Europe; they thus 
offered a convenient station to keep a watch on French 
shipping and might be used in wartime as a bridgehead to 
threaten Haiti. l 
The French for their part feared the formation of a 
British military establishment on the islands and, to 
prevent it, they wished to settle them themselves. But 
they had no title; so the French claimed that they were 
acting on behalf of Spain, whose rights to the islands had 
been acknowledged by Britain when France launched an 
attack on them in 1753.2 
But the question of right did not arise, for Britain 
demanded immediate restoration of the islands, reparation 
of the damage and punishment of tee officers involved, and 
1. Admiralty to Conway, 17 July 1765; calendared in 
CHOP 1760-1765, pp. 577-8. 
2. Renaut, p. 123. For the French attack in 1753, see 
J.C.T.P. 1749-1753, p. 4?2, and 1754-1758, pp. 37-8. 
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Choiseul gave way a few days later, on 2 September 1764, 
except on the question of punishment, which the English 
decided not to press. l The issue, however, did not end 
here. D'Estaign's action bad repercussions in London; it 
was feared that the ]'rench might try to settle the islands 
and tbis provoked counter-schemes; in November, 1766, an 
agent was appointed to look after the commercial interests 
of the settlers, with a view to strengthening Britain's 
bold over the islands. 2 These measures in turn alarmed 
Choiseul, who in 1768 protested to London that an English 
military establishment had been made in the Turk's 
Islands. The fate of this protest we shall have occasion 
to discuss later.' 
Choiseul's readiness to comply with BritiBh demands 
also seems to have had repercussions in Spain. Halifax's 
instructions of August 30th had not yet reached Madrid when 
Grimaldi decided on September 16th to re-establish the 
cutters in their places and to restore them to the full 
and free enjoyment of tbeir rights without being disturbed 
1. Spencer, pp. 200, 208. 
2. J.C.T.P. 1764-1767 and J.C.T.P. l768-l7f5, see their 
indices under the heading the Turk's Is ands. Cp. M. 
Craton, A History of the Bahamas, pp. 143-8. 
,. Below pp. 24.; 5-6. 
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under any pretence whatever. l Grimaldi did not wait to 
know whether London had altered in any way its original 
terms; his decision rather followed the arrival in Madrid 
of news from Paris that the Ifrench government had given way 
to the English on the Turk's Islands incident. The Spanish 
government could not procrastinate, and thus risk a serious 
show-down with Britain, now that France had shown her 
aversion to quarrelling with the English. 2 
Grimaldi still tried to involve the English in further 
discussions. In his instructions of 13 August to Masserano, 
Grimaldi had envisaged making a merit of his concession to 
British subjects in the River Hondo for the purpose of 
obliging Britain to resume talks on the question of fixed 
limits in return. Masserano had been led to believe that 
Britain might be willing to consider Spain'a, proposals, once 
Spanish satisfaction on the question of the act against the 
logwood cutters had been conveyed to London.' 
1. "McLeish", pp. 119-22; Brown, H.A.H.R., V (1922), pp. 
364-6; Calderon, pp. 186-7, 206-7. 
2. Grima1di to Fuentes, 13 August 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4565; Fuentes to Grimaldi, 3 September 1764, legO 4681; 
Grimald1 to Fuentes, 17 September 1764, legO 4565. 
3. Masserano to Grimaldi, 9 September 1764, no. 271, A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 6956. Cp. Halifax to Rochford, 30 August, 
and 25 September (cipher), 1764, S.P. 94/168. 
But now that satisfaction had been given, Grimaldi 
reminded Rochford on October 19th, the English government 
seemed reluctant to consider Spain's wishes for a negotiated 
interpretation of article 17. The Spanish minister, however, 
was not in a position to press this point, for he had to 
counter British demands for reparation of damages against 
the British cutters in the River Rondo. Grulaldi had to 
concentrate on trying to evade these demands; recognition 
of the need to make amends would strengthen the cutters' 
position and encourage expansion still further; and yet, 
Spain's satisfaction to Britain had prejudiced the question 
of reparation. Consequently, Grimaldi was quite prepared 
to drop the discussion of article 17 in the hope of a more 
favourable occasion to fix the cutting areas. l 
Likewise, Rochford was in a congenial frame of mind. 
His view was that the Spanish ministry had granted much 
more than they intended, and it would not be wise to press 
them further. He suggested the waiving of reparation as 
a means to ward off Grimaldi's request for negotiating an 
1. Rochford to Halifax, 27 October 1764, S.P. 94/168. 
See also Halifax to Rochford, 5 October, and 23 
November 1764, S.P. 94/168; and Grima1di to Fuentes, 
17 September 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 4565. The 
reparation for the losses amounted to £27,097. 8s. 5d. 
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agreed interpretation of article 17 of the Treaty of Paris. 
His principals in London, who preferred to leave the areas 
for cutting 10gwood unspecified, seemed to subscribe to 
this tacit compromise. Reparation was never given. l 
The English government seemed conscious of their 
victory.2 In 1766, on the occasion of the cutters' 
petition to London to be allowed some system of civil 
government (article 17 acknowledged Spanish sovereignty over 
these territories), the Advocate General, James Narriot,' 
reported to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 
that article 17 granted them permission to cut 10gwood, 
tlon the Spanish coast and Territories without 
any express limitations or demonstration of place: 
so that under these terms other & saId places the 
Bay of Campeachy is not excepted; nor any other 
territories of Spain where Logwood may happen to 
grow. fI 
It also entitled them to 
"an usufructuary right of produce of the soil 
where the logwood grows in the Bay of Honduras 
and in other places of the territory of Spain"; 
1. Rochford to Sandwich, 17 September 1764 (printed in 
s~encer, pp. 221-2)~ Rochford to Halifax, 27 October, and 
1 December (cipher), 1764, 8.p,941l68; Masserano to 
Grima1di, 19 November 1764, no.,26, A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 
6956. 
2. Halifax to Rochford, 28 September 1764, S.P. 94/168; 
Grenvi11e Papers, 11, pp. 516-7. 
,. J.~arriot to John Powna1, Secretary of the R.H. of the 
Lords Commissioners, 21 ~pril 1766, 0.0.122/1, ff.116-128. 
Cp. J.O.T.P. 1764-1767, p.271. 70r Marriot ( 1730-1803) 
and hIs connectIon wIth Sandwich, see Additional Grenville 
Papers, pp. 1,6-7, 148-9. 
and as a consequence of this right, 
I1there is some sort of territorial Right in a 
certain degree & of a useful and solid nature 
acquired by Great Britain sufficient to main-
tain and exercise a civil jurisdiction over 
its own subjects in the Bay of Honduras." 
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However, despite Marriot's ambitious interpretation, 
the British government were not prepared to risk a con-
flict with Spain over this issue and did not afford 
protection to the colony, nor did they take measures to 
give the settlement a system of civil organization. 
Consequently, the cutters under the close watch of the 
Spaniards from the garrison of Bacalar in the North and 
that of Peten in the South-West, were left helpless until 
it finally fell an easy prey to the Spanish expedition 
of Rivas Betancourt in the autumn of 1779. They were 
restored, however, by the opportune arrival of two 
frigates from Jamaica. l 
In the meantime, Spain waited for the best possible 
opportunity to throw the British settlers out of Belize 
and the Mosquito shore. Spanish officials kept a close 
watch to prevent expansion, and made the settlers' life 
as uncomfortable as possible, e.g. by enticing their 
1. For this expedition, see Calderon, pp. 246-8. 
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slaves to run away.l The Spanish government also avoided 
negotiations with London on the issue of the settlers 
after 1764, as discussions at diplomatic level might compel 
the British government to stand firmly by them, thus 
strengthening the British claim and reducing the chances 
of Spain eventually clearing the territory.2 
As relations between the two countries worsened in 
the late 1760's, the Spanish- government hoped that the 
impending Falkland Islands crisis might give them the 
1. From 1768 to 1773 this issue, not only in Honduras Bay 
and Mosquito Shore but also in the Caribbean Islands, 
was the endless cause of friction between English and 
Spanish. The government in London sought to negotiate 
an agreement for exchange of runaway slaves in the 
manner of the Hispano-Danish Cartel of 21 July 1767 
(printed in Cantillo, pp. 507-9), but they always met 
with Grimaldi's flippant reply that since the number 
of those gone to the Spaniards was much higher, the 
agreement would not be reciprocal; A.B.H., I, pp.111-24; 
"McLeish", pp.123-7; Brown, H.A.H.R., V (1922), pp. 
356-75, passim. 
2. That a le.son had been learnt from the Belize issue 
is also borne out by the attitude of the Spanish 
government towards British presence in Mosquito Shore: 
this pOint had never been raised in diplomatic 
discussions and the Spanish government acted as if 
London had no interest in it, while waiting for an 
opportunity to disband the settlement as an encroachment 
on Spanish territory before the British government had 
a chance to lay claim to some authority in the area. 
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hoped for opportunity of clearing the settlers out. The 
dispute of 1770, however, failed to produce the expected 
gain. Nothing more was said in Spanish circles until 1775, 
when British involvement in the revolt of the American 
colonies inspired the government with new hopes. Grimaldi 
stressed the dangers of British presence in Mosquito Share 
to his colleagues, and ordered complete reports on the 
situation in all areas concerped. These were presented to 
the King, together with plans for the expUlsion of the 
British settlers. l The time proved not yet ripe for a 
forcible solution; Britain was not so heavily involved that 
she could be successfully challenged. Furthermore, the 
Spaniards who were at the time occupied with their dispute 
with Portugal did not wish to antagonize their ppponent's 
ally. 
There was another attempt in 1778-1779 to obtain 
evacuation in return for mediation between France and 
Britain. The Spanish offer of mediation was rejected, but 
the subsequent Anglo-Spanish war brought some satisfaction. 
The Peace of f'aris of 3 September 1783 confirmed the rights 
of the settlers to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras, but 
1. See Grimaldi-Masserano correspondence during the last 
quarter of 1775, A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 7016, and that of 
Grimaldi with the ministers of War, Indies, and Marine, 
and with the authorities in Yucatan, A.B.S., Estado, 
legO 8133, ff. 9-16. 
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stipulated (article 6) that the English were to evacuate 
all their establishments in 'the Spanish Continent' except 
for a stretch of land between the Hiver Belize and the 
River Hondo, where they were to operate; the Spanish 
sovereignty over these territories was also confirmed. l 
Spain believed that the concession of the River Hondo 
as the northern boundary for the territory in ~hich the 
settlers might operate, was in return for Eritish with-
drawal from their establishments on the Mosquito Shore -
as envisaged by Grimaldi in August 1764.~ Indeed, during 
the first stage of the negotiations between the Bourbon 
powers and Britain (the autumn of 1782), the Spanish 
representative in Paris, Aranda, had been given to under-
stand that Britain was prepared to relinquish her settle-
ments on that coast, provided that the logwood cutters were 
1.Printed in Cantillo, pp. 586-590, and Martens, II, pp. 
484-496. 
2. Jose Galvez (Minister of Indies since 1776 to Bernardo 
del Campo, 8 February 1783, A.G.S., Estado, legO 8162; 
Aranda to Campo, 30 July 1783, A.G.S., Estado, legO 8183; 
Calderon, p. 265; for Galvez's views on the strategic 
significance of the Mosquito Shore and the Honduras Ba7 
in the defence of the Gulf of Mexico, see his report on 
the subject when he went to New Spain as Visitor-General 
in 1766, quoted in Calderon, p. 209, note 49. 
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secured an adequate area in Honduras Bay to exercise their 
rights; both Shelburne (the chief minister) and Grantham 
(the foreign secretary) looked on this concession as part 
of the price they were inclined to pay to make Spain drop 
her extravagant claim to Gibraltar, which was near to 
causing a rupture of the negotiations. l On this under-
standing, Spain and Britain signed the Preliminary Treaty 
on 20 January 1783. 2 
However, when the Fox-North coalition succeeded the 
She1burne ministry in February, 1783, Grantham's undertaking 
was deliberately ignored, and the new foreign secretary, 
Fox, instructed his representative in Paris, Manchester, 
on July 2nd to defer the issue until six months after the 
general pacification (as suggested in art. 4 of the 
Preliminary Treaty) or to alter article 6 of the draft for 
the definitive treaty so as not to imply any intention of 
evacuating the Mosquito Shore. Fox suggested the addition 
of some such sentence as "qui reconnoiasent la domination 
1. ~~antham to Aranda, 26 December 1782 (copy), P.R.O. 30/ 
15L9/Part I (no.945); Fitzherbert (British Minister in 
Paris during Shelburne's administration) to Aranda, 2 
February 1783, enclosed in Manchester to Fox, 6 July 
1783, no. 21 (extracts), Add. 47652, f£.80-3; B.D.I., 
VII, France, Part IV, pp. 196, 212-3. For a total view 
of these negotiations, see Harlow, I, pp. 342-361. 
2. Oantillo, p. 575; Martens, 11, pp. 32'-7. 
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espagnole" or "ou la domination espagnole est reconnue tl 
or to insert the word "Espagnol" after "Continent", which 
would leave sufficient ground to argue later that the 
Mosquito Indians did not acknowledge themselves as Spanish 
subjects and the British presence on their coast, therefore, 
was not contrary to article 6 of the treaty. Manchester, 
with Vergennes' support, did manage to get Aranda to 
consent to the addition of "J:;he word "Espagnol" to "Contin-
ent", but no progress was made in regard to Fox's desire 
to prevail upon the Spanish m~er to give some indication 
which might be later construed as an admission of the 
British restrictive interpretation of article 6. Aranda 
refused to discuss this point any further and simply 
returned to Grantham's note of 26 December 1782 as having 
settled that point. Manchester, too, insisted on the 
difficulty of extricating themselves from Grantham's 
undertaking. 1 
But Fox was not deterred; nor indeed his dominant 
partner in the coalition, North, who wrote to the governor 
of Jamaica, Archibald Campbell, a month after the signature 
of the Paris Peace, that the Mosquito Shore was not to be 
1. Manchester-Fox correspondence (July 178,), Add. 47559, 
ff. 87-92, and Add. 47562, ff. 72-5, 80-105; P.R.O. 
30/15/9-10, passim; B.D~I., VII, France, Part IV, pp. 
239-244. 
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evacuated, for it had never been acknowledged to belong 
to the Crown of Spain, and was therefore not included 
under the phrase the "Spanish Continent".l 
With Pitt in power at the end of 1783 the situation 
improved a little. The new administration adhered to 
their predecessors' restrictive interpretation of the 
phrase "the Spanish Continent", but they were inclined to 
reach a compromise solution. Although aware of the un-
fairness of the method, Carmarthen, the new foreign 
secretary, was minded to uphold the views of Fox and 
Manchester in order to obtain some compensation in Belize 
for the evacuation of British establishments on the 
Mosquito Shore. 
The Spanish government, for their part, were 
seriously disappointed and tempted to use force to expel 
the settlers. But they were not in a position to 
entertain strong policies, for no support was expected 
from ]'rance. However, the affairs of Holland quite un-
expectedly enabled Spain to obtain a settlement not very 
different from what Grimaldi had wished. In November, 1785, 
France strengthened her influence in Holland through the 
pro-French 'Patriot' or Republican party by means of a 
1. Secret and confidential; P.R.O. 30/8/349. North to 
Fox, 27 September 1783, Add. 47561, ft. 19-20. 
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treaty of mutual guarantee. Britain, who wished to destroy 
French influence by restoring the former authority of the 
stadtholder (supported by herself and Prussia), feared that 
Spain might be persuaded to join her Bourbon ally in Holland. 
This resulted in the English giving way on the question of 
the Mosquito Shore as a means to keep Spain away from 
Dutch affairs. l 
A Convention was signed in London on 14 July 1786, 
whereby the British agreed to avacuate within six months all 
establishments in that part of the world and withdraw to the 
area between the River Hondo and the River Sibun, south of 
Belize. In return for the evacuation of the Mosquito Shore, 
the Spanish government allowed the logwood cutters to expand 
southwards to include the area between the River Belize and 
the River Sibun - some sixty square leagues more than 
Grimaldi had originally envisaged in 1764.2 
Spain's consistent policy in that part of the world had 
borne fruit. It is true that Spain did not succeed completely, 
for Britain kept Belize and continued to benefit from the 
1. For these negotiations from the British end, see F.O. 721 3-
7 and 185/1-2, passim; the Spanish side may be seen in 
A.H.N., Estado, legajos 4227/4232 and A.G.S., Estado, 
leg.jos 8134/8141, passim. 
2. The original text in F.O. 93/99/3. Also printed by 
Cagillo, pp.6l4-7, and F.G.Davenport, European Treaties 
.'1 t bearin on the Histor of the United States , IV t pp.162-4 
ereafter c~te as venport. ee map n A.B.H. t I, p. 154. The British claim to some authority on the Mosquito 
Shore was not finally renounced until the Bulwer-Clayton 
TreatY,of 1850; as,f?r Belize, it ~as not formally 
recognl.zed as a Brl.tJ_sh colony unt~l 1862 (A.B.H. ,III,p.24?). 
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logwood business. ~everthe1ess it was a triumph to get 
the English to acknowledge by treaty the limits of their 
prescriptive rights to cut logwood, and thus to invalidate 
Marriot's ambitious interpretation of the settlement of 
1764. The preparatory work for this success was laid in 
the period here discussed. 
155 
2. The Manila ransom issue. 
On 6 October 1762 Manila was conquered by a British 
expeditionary force under the command of Colonel Draper and 
Vice-admiral Cornish. The undertaking had been supported 
by the East India Company as part of a plan to establish a 
permanent commercial entrepot in the Archipelago, which 
would avoid dependence up~n the expensive markets of spices 
of Canton and would provide a basis for commerce with China 
and contraband trade with the Spanish and Dutch colonies. 
NO/permanent success, however, followed; the Treaty of Paris 
was signed before news of the event reached Europe, 
stipulating that all conquests, except for those specifically 
mentioned, should be restored to their former possessors.l 
Yet the conquest was significant, for it gave rise to 
protracted negotiations between Britain and Spain. When 
Manila surrendered to the British expeditionary force, the 
archbishop of the town (acting in place of its governor who 
had died) agreed two days later to pay a ransom of four 
million dollars to spare the town being pillaged. Half the 
money was to be paid in cash and the rest was to be drawn on 
the Spanish Treasury. It was also agreed that all the 
effects and possessions of the inhabitants of Manila and its 
1. c. Fernandez Duro, Armada espanola, VII, ch.IV; Harlow, 
I, pp. 68-80. 
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dependencies were to be secured to them, and that the 
inhabitants might carry on all sorts of commerce as 
British subjects. Freedom of trade was also stipulated, 
and it was, finally, mentioned that the ship "Philippi~a", 
which belonged to the inhabitants of Manila and was at 
that time homeward bound, might be taken as a lawful prize 
to be offset against the ransom money. 
Twenty three days after the capitulation had been 
signed, on 30 October 1762, the English seized the galleon 
"Santisima Trinidad" (property of the Spanish Crown) in 
place of the nphilippina", which had eluded them. The 
galleon, carrying a cotton cargo belonging to Manila 
merchants, was taken 60 or 76 miles away from Manila. 
As for the two million dollars to be paid in cash, 
the English received 515,802 from public funds and private 
collections. Spanish losses to the British captors, which 
amounted to 1,200,000 dollars, tOBether with 26,623 dollars 
admittedly plundered before the Minila Capitulation, were 
also taken into account. The British captors presented a 
balance to their credit of 257,574 dollars (about 
1 £50,000). 
1. The English side of these events in S.P. 94/253 ff.86-
102; the Spanish account in A.G.S., Eatado, leg& 6958, 
gassim. See also R.~orts of Oases determined bi the High 
ourt of the Admira ty, pp. 162-3 (hereafter c tea as 
Reports of the HeA). 
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The half that was to be drawn on the Spanish Treasury 
became the bone of contention in Anglo-Spanish relations 
during the middle 1760's. The English government had a 
stake in it, for only a third of it would go to the East 
India Company; the rest was for the forces of the Crown. l 
When the Spanish government was first approached in 
the autumn of 1763, the chief minister, urimaldi, refused 
bluntly to honour the arqhbishop's promise and added iron-
ically that the authorities of "'!anila might as well have 
drawn upon the Spanish King to deliver Granada to the 
English. The archbishop, he argued, was not competent to 
draw on the Spanish Treasury, nor did international treaties 
or custom authorize such practice. Furthermore, the arch-
bishop of Manila had entered into the capitulation under 
pressure, and in any case the British, on their side, had 
not respected the stipulation signed, for the town had been 
plundered for fort, hours. As for the prize of the 
"Santlsima Trinidad", which the High Court of the Admiralty 
had declared lawful on November 14, 1763, the Spanish 
Court maintained that the galleon had been unlawfully 
gained because the t-lanila Capitulation had stipulated freedom 
1. Extract of a letter from ~raper to Egremont, 
Manila, 2 November 1762; enclosed in Conway to 
Roch!ord, St. James's, 16 August 1765, S.P. 
94/171. 
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of commerce and tbe ship had been taken twenty three days 
after the signature of the agreement. l 
Grimaldi's assertive mood was not conducive to a 
negotiated settlement of the issue. On the other hand, 
the English who were equally prepared to stake out taeir 
claim, would negotiate from strength, for they had both the 
prize "Santisima Trinidad" and the bills of exchange for the 
two million dollars. The Spanish representative in London, 
Masserano, aware of the use Britain might make of her 
position in the future, attempted to improve Spain's hand 
by giving way on the question of the ship in the hope of 
recovering the bills of exchange. When Masserano put 
Grimaldi's arguments against payment to Sandwich and Halifax 
early in 1764, quite opti~istically he gathered from their 
replies that they intended to avail tpemselves of the prize 
to compensate the captors for the money that Grimaldi refused 
to pay. Further, he presumed that Britain would be satisfied 
with either the ransom money or the ship and cargo; it would 
appear, Masserano believed, that the ship would hardly be 
released by an English Court of Appeal, whose impartiality 
he doubted. It was therefore advisable to concede to them 
1. Rochford to Halifax, 12 December 1763, Separate (cipher), 
s.P. 94/165; Masserano to Grimaldi, 27 January, no. 55, 
and 31 January, no. 57, 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6956; 
Re~orts of the HC~, p.162. Cp. J.Goebe1, The struggle for 
the Falkland Islands, pp.224-5 (henceforth cited as 
Goebel); Renaut, pp. 133-5. 
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what the High Court of the Admiralty had already declared 
lawful. Two Spanish ships taken by the English in the last 
war and some other monetary grievances against Britain may 
be added to the "Santlsima Trinidad" to be put against the 
Manila ransom money. 
Apprehensive that the decision of the High Court of 
the Admiralty might prejudice any attempt to use the prize 
as ~quid pro quo, hasse~ano suggested a second course. He 
pretended to separate the two issues in order to deprive 
the captors of Manila of government support; he approached 
Draper, the English officer in command of the expedition, 
with hints of monetary compensation in return for the 
bills of exchange. As for the prize he hoped to appeal 
personally to George 111.1 
But neither Draper nor his government were agreeable 
to Masserano's suggestions. The former insisted on payment 
of the ransom money, denying that Manila had been plundered 
for forty hours after the capitulation, for he had taken 
strong measures to stop it a few hours after it started; 
while the secretary of state for the southern department, 
Halifax, declared to Masserano that the Superior Court of 
Appeals was the only course left to the Spanish government 
1. See Masserano's dispatches to Grimaldi, ]'ebruary to 
April, 1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6958. 
160 
if it wanted to contest the legal validity of the sentence 
passed on the ship by the High Court of the Admiralty.l 
Grimaldi, for his part, did not believe that the two 
issues could be separated. Moreover, his hands were 
already tied, for he had absolutely refused to honour the 
drafts for two million dollars. Short of reaffirming his 
intention not to pay the two million dollars, which was 
bound to irritate the English to no apparent purpose, 
the Spanish minister preferred to take the only course 
which according to Halifax was open to Spain~ On 25 June 
1764 hasserano was instructed to lodge an appeal with the 
Court of Appeals in accordance with English procedure. 
Masserano reluctantly proceeded to gather the 
evidence for the defence, not without first having reminded 
Grimaldi of his, as it proved, justified fears that once 
the prize had been declared lawful the English government 
would still be in possession of the drafts signed py the 
archbishop of Manila, which might be used in the future to 
offset Spanish claims. He also made a last attempt to 
stop legal proceedings by claiming that only the King was 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 17 April, no. 122, and 5 June, 
no. 169, 1764, A.G.S. Estado, lego 6958. Halifax 
to Rochford, 15 June 1764, S.P. 94/167. 
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competent to decide the case (he expected better treatment 
outside the Court of Appeals); but Halifax rebuked him. 
Whereupon, his brief having been completed by the beginning 
of November, he proceeded on the 13th to lodge an appeal 
with the Lores against the verdict of the High Court of the 
Admiralty. 1 
Masserano presented the appeal on behalf of the 
inhabitants of Manila. Since they were interested only in 
the cargo, which was theirs, and not in the ship herself, 
which belonged to the Crown, the appeal thus stressed that 
the "Sant!sima Trinidad" could not fall under the juris-
diction of the British courts. The sentence of the High 
Court of the Admiralty, therefore, did not bind the ship; 
this issue would have to be settled between sovereigns. 
The appelants based their case for the cargo on the 
grounds that the Manila Capitulation had stipulated freedom 
of trade. As for the arrangement to make the "Philippina" 
a lawful prize, should she be taken after the Capitulation, 
the claimants argued that such provision did not include 
the cargo on board that galleon, for the citizens of Manila 
could not dispose of effects and possessions in other parts 
of the world to free their own town from being pillaged, 
but only of the ship which did belong to them. 
1. Masserano's dispatches from July to November, 1764, A.G.B., 
~stado, 1egO 6958, passim. 
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The owners of the cargo thus had a good case for its 
resti tution, but the arguments put forward by l"iasserano 
were not altogether consistent. For while he defended the 
cargo on the basis of the stipulated freedom of commerce, 
he maintained that the document containing it was invalid 
because, first, it had been entered into by force; 
secondly, there had been a breach of the Capitulation -
the town had been plundered for forty hours; and finally, 
the inhabitants of Manila were not able to draw on the 
~panish Treasury or dispose of Crown property.l 
According to British law, as interpreted by the 
Advocate General, James Marriot, in his report of 2} 
October 1764, the "Sant1sima Trinidad" was an ordinary 
maritime prize; the different proprietors of ship and cargo 
did not invalidate that fact. Therefore, both the sentence 
passed by the High Court of the Admiralty and the eventual 
decision on the appeal to the Lords, though brought only 
by the owners of the cargo, were equally binding on ship 
and cargo. And His British Majesty, once ha had passed 
over to the captors his inherent right to the prize, had 
no power to interfere with the courts' findings. 
1. Masserano to Grima1di, 6 March, no.89, 21 September, 
no. 281, and 27 November- 1764, no. 333; 3 January 1765, 
no. 373; A.G.S., Estado, legO 6958. 
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As for the lVlanila Capitulation, iJ!arriot argued, it had 
no bearing on the question of the prize, for if there had 
been no breach of it, the "Fhilippina" and not the ",santisima 
Trinidad" was the object of it. And even if there had been 
a breach of the Capitulation, it would not affect either 
ship for it would make void the demand that lVlasserano 
founded upon a construction of that document. The breach 
of the Capitulation, if the plundering were proved, would 
only affect the demand of the British commanders for the 
two million dollars to be drawn on the Spanish Treasury and 
which was to be settled between the two Sovereigns, not by 
1 
courts of law. 
While the legal process took its time, the question of 
the ransom money fell also into abeyance during the first 
half of 1765 as a result of one of those domestic crises so 
frequent in British politics in the 1760's. After two years 
in power the Grenville administration gained the opposition 
of George III with the chief minister's criticisms of the 
costly budget of Buckingham Palace. When the conflict 
between the King and Grenvi11e broke into the open on the 
occasion of the former's illness and the Regency Bill, 
George III proceeded to dismiss him on 10 July 1765. 
1. Halifax to Rochiord, 23 November 1764, enclosing Marriot's 
report and other documents relating to the prize and the 
Manila ransom money; S.P. 94/168. 
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The British King now followed Cumberland's advice 
that the only practicable team was a combination of 1-i tt 
and Newcastle's friends, now led by Rockingham, and 
approached Pitt, who would not accept office except on 
his own terms, not yet to be granted. Rockingham was then 
called upon to head a new ministry, and became the first 
. lord of the treasury. The new administration included 
Grafton as secretary of state for the northern department 
and Conway for the sou'thern department; Newcastle received 
the privy seal. 
This administration lasted for a year. Its hold on 
the Commons was precarious. Newcastle and Grafton were in 
the Lords, and Conway, the southern secretary, alone in 
the Lower House, was not a competent enough speaker to 
stand up to Pitt; Grenville and Bute. Furthermore, the 
ministry did not hang together; Grafton and Conway (related 
to him by marriage) served only in the hope of Pitt's 
entry into the leadership; while Newcastle also favoured 
Pitt as the only way to strengthen the administration. l 
The instability of English politics during these 
years was carefully watched by the Spanish government. It 
1. 
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was generally believed that ministerial changes in London 
might bring about changes of policy~l The return to power 
of Pitt, the successful leader of the 8even Years War, and 
the restoration of his "northern system" (alliance with 
Prussia and Russia) were especially feared. On the whole, 
however, Masserano was inclined to believe that British 
political instability would enable Spain to delay all out-
standing matters until she was in a position to hold her 
ground; the ransom issue, Masserano optimistically hoped, 
might sink into oblivion. 2 
But he soon discovered that the new secretaries of 
state, Grafton and Oonway, although inexperienced, had 
spirit and a determined manner. On 14 August 1765, the 
Lords of Appeal upheld the verdict given by the High Court 
1. Grimaldi to Masserano, 9 August 1763, A.H.N., Estado, 
legO 3456(1): ''-Siempre ha de ha*er un partido que 
gobierne, y otro que aspire a governar. Si aquel 
sostiene la paz, este otro ha de (illegible) para 
la guerra y la habra el d!a que sea mas fuerte la 
oposicion." 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 25 March 1765, no.423, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6959; 16 June, no. 473, 28 June, no. 486, 
and July 12th, no. 494, and 18th, no. 501, legO 6958. 
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of Admiralty. The Lords considered that the stipulation for 
the surrender of fvlanila had established :freedom of trade as 
long as the inhabitants of that town carried on their 
business "as British subjects". ~'his, however, did not 
apply to the IISantisima Trinidad", for it belonged to the 
Spanish Crown and all transactions in respect of the cargo 
by the inhabitants of Manila had taken place when they weDe 
Spanish subjects and long before the city waS attacked. 
Furthermore, the stipulation over the "Philippinaa proved 
expressly that both parties understood that a ship then at 
sea might be taken as lawful prize. l 
Before informing Grimaldi, Masserano tried to dispute 
the validity of the Lords' deCision, as he had tried to st~ 
proceedings before, but Conway refused to discuss it. He 
instructed Rochford on August 20th to inform Madrid that the 
prize had been fairly and definitively settled. As for the 
ransom money, he was to remind Grimaldi that Britain did not 
intend to forgo that claim. 2 
1. Conway to Rochford, 16 August 1765, enclosing documentary 
evidence from the process (S.P. 94/171). Masserano to 
Grimaldi, 16 August 1765, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6958. 
a. S.P. 94/171. 
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~hen Rochford approached Grimaldi at the beginning of 
September, he found him determined to avoid payment of the 
Manila ransom money, but was quite satisfied that Britain 
should be able to scare Grimaldi into settling the issue 
to her satisfaction. It was essential, however, to know 
whether ~pain would receive support from her ally, France, 
before turning the screw on Grimaldi. His own belief was 
that France was bent on war, and Spain had to be prevented 
from being pushed int~ it by Choiseul. l 
At the beginning of October Rochford sounded GrimaIdi 
on the Family Compact and tried to undermine the Bourbon 
alliance by goading the Spaniards with taunts of sub-
servience to France. GrimaIdi, resenting the slight, 
responded in general terms that he looked upon the Family 
Compact as "a child of his own", and maintained Spain's 
independence of France; he also said that the pact was not 
aggressive and that if ever France entertained any idea of 
offensive undertakings, Choiseul would find that Spain made 
up her own mind. 2 
1. Rochford's dispatches to Conway, September 1765, S.P. 94/ 
171. Rochford sent during this month detailed and 
accurate reports on the Spanish forces and finances (see 
also his dispatch of 14 October 1?65, S.P. 94/1?2). ' 
According to these reports Spain had 6,0 ships of the line 
but could man only 30 at the most; the situation of the 
'army and the finances was no better; she could not 
possibly risk a w~. 
2. Rochford to Conway, ; October 1?65 (two dispatches, one 
en clair and the other one in cipher), S.P. 94/172. For 
Esqui1ache's similar ~ressions, Rochford to Conway, 
27 January 1?66 (cipher), S.P. 94/1?3_ 
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Masserano, for his part, was also sounded by the 
English ministers on the question of the ]'amily Compact. 
Although the Spanish representative in London seemed quite 
persistent in his endeavours to throw doubts on the legality 
of the prize for the purpose of offsetting the pressure on 
the Spanish government in respect of the ransom money, when 
it came to British references to the Family Compact he, like 
Grimaldi, failed to make the best use of the French alliance 
as a way to moderate Britain's claim on Spain. Masserano 
stressed the conventional and dynastic aspects of the 
alliance and its defensive nature. l 
This language, together with Rochford's reports on 
Spain's weak state, France's apparent lack of interest in 
the issue, and the interception of Grimaldi's instructions, 
hoping for further delay to take preventive and defensive 
measures for the next conflict with Britain, made the 
English government confident that Spain might be bullied 
into paying the ransom money.2 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 19 October, nos 562 and 56~, and 
28 November 1765, no. 598,A.G.S., Estado, legO 6958. To judge from Rochfordts own remarks, a hint of strong union 
between the two Bourbon powers might bave relieved some ~ 
the pressure which London was bringing to bear on Spain. 
2. Grimaldi to Masserano, 31 August 1?65,intercepted and 
deciphered; Add. 32300, ff.82-3. For Cboiseults complaint 
because the English had alluded to the Family Compact in . 
Rochfordts last memorial to Grimaldi on the Manila ransom 
question (25 December 1765) as if France bad no rigbt to 
bave allies, see dispatches from Paris in late January, 
1766, S.P. 78/269. 
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Conway accordingly wrote to Rochford on 31 January 1766 
that the existing links between France and Spain "neither 
alarm us beyond a prudent caution nor deter us in anyone 
instance from insisting with a becoming firmness upon our 
just demands from either court".l Elated five days later 
by fresh reports from Hochford, insisting that Spain was 
not prepared to risk a quarrel with Britain and would give 
way,2 he proceeded on February 11th to enjoin Rochford to 
make it clear to Grimaldi that the English government was 
determined to obtain satisfaction; should the Spanish 
Court "take so idle an imagination as to suppose we could 
bear to be put off", he added, they would have to beware 
of the consequences that might follow. 3 
The Spanish government were now driven into a corner. 
The Manila ransom money was no longer a minor diplomatic 
1. Conway to Rochford, 31 January 1766 (cipher), S.P. 
94/173. And his instructions to Richmond (in Paris), 
of the same date (S.P. 78/269). 
2. Rochford to Conway, 16 January 1766 (cipher), Private; 
cp. also his dispatches of the 22nd, and of the 27th 
(cipher); S.P. 94/173. 
3. Instructions in cipher, S.P. 94/173. 
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squabble, and British demands could not be warded off, nor 
a negative answer, which might easily precipitate a crisis, 
be given to the English government after the stern language 
used by both secretaries of state in their conversations 
with Masserano on the occasion of the latter's persistent 
attempts"to question the validity of the sentence passed on 
the "Sant!sima Trinidad 11 .1 
To escape from this difficult position Spain needed 
Frenoh support. On 3 March 1766 Grimaldi instructed 
Magallon, in charge of affairs in Paris, to present to 
Choiseul the harsh tone of Britain's last communication on 
the Manila ransom money and to convey his fears that 
Spain's refusal to comply might force the English government 
to insist on payment and, eventually, push matters to war. 
Grimaldi argued that even submission would not avoid war in 
the long run, since Britain would increase her demands as 
long as Spain proved unable to enforce her rights. 2 
Trusting to French support, the Spanish chief minister 
raised again the question of the "Sant1sima Trinidad" in the 
1. Though more temperate in his language than Grafton, 
Conway was equally adamant in his determination to 
look on the prize as settled; Masserano to Grimaldi, 
19 October 1765, no.562, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6958. 
2. Ramsey, p. 168. 
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hope of offsetting the payment of the ransom money. On 
March 11th, he suggested to Rochford that both the prize and 
the ransom money should be deferred to arbitration. l 
Grimaldi did not expect success for this move; he was simply 
trying to gain time while France made her position clear. 
He had reasons to believe that Choiseul would be forth-
coming. 2 ]'or the French minister was, in fact, urging 
Spain to speed up military and naval preparations. Further-
more, Choiseul was confident that britain was not likely to 
adopt a firm attitude on the question of the Manila ransom 
money; her finances were too weak and the Rockingham 
administration was finding it increasingly difficult to 
manage the parliamentary opposition. Choiseul had actually 
advised Grimaldi to refuse paying the ransom money, hoping 
that if a new party came into power a workable solution could 
be found. 3 But when the British government seemed decided 
on a vigorous stand, Choiseul had second thoughts. 
1. Rochford to Conway, 12 March 1766, enclosing Grimaldi's 
note to kochford of March 11th; S.P. 94/173. 
2. Ossun to Choiseu1, 5 September 1765, C.P., Espagne 544, 
if. 34-6; Nagallon to Grimaldi, 28 l!'ebruary 1766, 
docketed by Grimaldi, A.G.S., Estado, legO 4563. 
3. See Choiseu1-0ssun correspondence from September to 
December, 1765, in C.P., Espagne 544; Choiseu1 to Ossun 
14 January 1766, no. 2, and 11 February 1766, no. 6, 
C.P., Espagne 545, ff. 28-9 and 100 respectively. Cp. 
Rousseau, II, pp. 57-58; Ramsey, p. 255, n. 3. 
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On March 21, Choiseul replied to Gri~aldi that he 
supported Spain wholeheartedly but they had to be cautious; 
"11 est vrai que les deux couronnes, je parle surtout de la 
France, ne sont pas pretes comme elles le seront dans trois 
ans"; they needed time "et un temps tres long, qui nous 
donnera l'avantage". If war broke out, Choiseul continued, 
"je ne d'serterai pas certainement, mais je dirai que je 
serais fort inutile dans une guerre qui ••• deshonorerait la 
couronne". For the time being, Choiseul thought it far more 
sensible to go ahead with Grimaldi's proposal to ~fer the 
~anila ransom question to arbitration. 
On the following day he wrote to Ossun, but for himself 
alone, that Spain would have to pay the Manila ransom money 
to put an end to the dispute. In order to prepare Grimald! 
for some kind of concession to the English, Choiseul inatrue~­
ed Ossun to stress to Grimaldi that Pitt might return to 
power, which would increase the danger of a premature rupture 
between Britain and the Family Compact. l 
1. Choiseul to 06sun, 18 March 1766, no. 10. C.P., Espagne 
545, ff. 208-9; Choiseul to Griaaldi, 21 March 1766 
(quoted by B1art, pp. 85-6; Choiseul to Ossun, 22 March 
1766 (~uoted by Blart, p. 86, and Ramsey, p. 25Q, n. 9); 
Magallon to Grimaldi, 28 March 1766, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4563. 
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When Choiseul heard from Guerchy at the beginning of 
April that London was not agreeable to arbitration, he 
tried to dissuade Spain from pursuing the arbitration 
proposal and to prevail upon her to give way to the English. 
Choiseul did not approach Grimaldi directly; he preferred to 
work on Masserano, again stressing the danger of Pitt's 
return to power as likely to produce some such drastic 
measure as an expeditionary force to retake Manila. By 
this devious way of getting through to Grimaldi, Choiseul 
no doubt purported to convey the feeling that Britain's 
refusal to consider arbitration was a sign of her deter-
mination to have her way, which had caused him to inter-
vene in London to prevent the issue getting out of hand. l 
Despite Choiseul's move, Masserano still believed that 
the arbitration proposal had brought Spain some relief; a 
brief respite in which to decide on the next move. As he 
saw it, the English ministers' strong attitude was due to 
the fact that they wished to strengthen their position in 
Parliament by obtaining the ransom money f~om Spain; there 
was no real desire to resort to force. 2 
1. Rousseau, 11, p.58. Cp. Renaut, p.137. 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 26 March 1766, nO.671; 18 April, 
no. 691 (cipher); and 2 May, no.701 ~cipher); A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6960. 
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Masserano was quite correct. Indeed, the English govern-
ment, somewhat embarrassed by the arbitration proposal and 
aware of the relief it had brought Spain,l decided to press 
Grimaldi for a monetary settlement. ~ockingham's ministry 
was deteriorating rapidly; a quick triumph was required. 
Furthermore, news of social disturbances a~ this time in 
Spain led the English to expect some complaisance on the 
part of the Spaniards. 2 However, Conway seemed willing to 
compromise on the question of amount; while he wrote to 
Rochford on 16 May that the government was prepared to 
consider a round figure of £500,000 in settlement of the 
Manila ransom money, instead of £563,000 due to the captors 
(according to the British estimate), he gave him permission 
to accept £300,000 as the lowest terms to which Britain 
would agree. 3 
Grimaldi was encouraged by Masserano's assessment of 
the situation. On 30 May, he gave De Visme, the English 
charge, to understand that though Conway's initial figure 
was excessive, he might be willing to reach a monetary 
1. Masserano's dispatch of May 2nd, no.701, was intercepted 
and deciphered (Add. 32300, ff. 23-4). 
2. Rochford's account of these disturbances (aee above 
pp.3~") in his dispatches of March and. April, S.P. 94/173. 
3. Conway to Rochford, 16 May 1766, S.P. 94/174. 
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settlement but only by way of armitration and provided the 
question of the prize was brought into the picture once 
I 
more. 
He was still playing for time; there was no choice, 
short of paying the Manila ransom money outright, but to 
continue with the arbitration proposal, and bring the prize 
issue to the fore, for this again served to delay matters, 
to use up time. As Britain had been embarrassed by the 
arbitration suggestion, he thought of improving it by 
further suggesting a likely candidate as arbitrator. 
Britain's refusal would then be likely to offend another 
country, which consequently might strengthen Spain's 
position. 
Grimaldi turned to Prussia. ]'rederick 11 appeared to 
him as the obvious choice. Since 1763 the Bourbon powers 
had been apprehensive that the northern powers, under 
British leadership, might come together in order to counter-
balance Austro-Bourbon ties. The involvement of Frederick 
11 in a measure repugnant to Britain was hoped to render the 
1. De Visme to Conway, 2 June 1766, S.P. 94/174. Lewis De 
Visme (1720-1776), of Huguenot descent, was secretary to 
the English embassy in Madrid from 1765 to 1767, and in 
charge of affairs after Rochford's departure in the middle 
of May, 1766. For his appointment, see Spencer, p.221; 
see also B.D.R., 1689-1789, p. 136. 
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prospect of a "northern system 11 more unlikely. J!'urthermore, 
li'rederick II had expressed at the end of 1765 his willing-
ness to sign a commercial treaty with Spain; Grimaldi would 
want to use this as a good opportunity to win a favourable 
arbitrator. 1 His decision to turn to Prussia came 
precisely at a time when Dritain seemed more inclined to 
the Prussian alliance than during the Grenville adminis-
tration. This move for arbitration might help to diminish 
the chances of a connection in the North. 
The Rockingham administration did, in fact, try to 
convey the feeling that a Prusso-English rapprochement was 
a possibility. When persistent rumours reached London in 
the summer of 1765, of contacts between Prussian envoys and 
French ministers in Earis,2 the English government 
endeavoured to minimize the effect of such rumours by 
stressing their own inclination to ~itt's 'system of the 
north'. In an attempt to counteract Franco-Prussian 
1. See below, p. 181. 
2. ~asserano to Grimaldi, 12 July 1765, no. 494, A.G.B., 
Estado, legO 6958; New Letters of LavJf Bume, pp. 91-8. 
For these contacts, see above, pp.1 'E~. _ 1. 
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exchange's, the southern secretary, Conway, made in the 
summer of 1765 some tentative overtures to Prussia, and 
hinted to the Bourbon Courts at the end of the year that the 
agreement to resume diplomatic relations between Prussia and 
Britain might result in some kind of political understanding. l 
Whatever the real intention of the Rockingham administration 
in approaching Frederick 11, the chances of such a rapproche-
ment were very slim. Frederick II made it clear that he was 
quite happy with the Russian alliance of 1764; he now replied 
to the English that he needed no new friend. The exchange 
of diplomatic representatives did take place ip June, 1766, 
but j'rederick 11 saw to it that the resumption of diplomatic 
relations should not look as if he had wanted it. 2 
Before approaching Britain and Pru8sia with the 
arbitration proposal, Grimaldi communicated it to Kaunitz. 3 
1. Conway to Richmond and Rochford, 3 December 1765, 
S.P. 78/268. 
2. Sir ~ldrew Mitchell went to Berlin as minister 
plenipotentiary, while ~altzan was to r,present Frederick 
11 in London; they did not arrive at their respective 
posts until June, 1766; B.D.I. 168~-1789, p. 108, and 
Pol. Corr., XXIV, pp.260-1, 329-39 passim; XIV, pp. 31, 
68-73 and 132-9 passim. 
3. Grimaldi to Mahoni, 12 June 1766, A.G.S., EBtadq,legO 
6502. Cp. VelazgueB, pp. 59-60. 
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No diplomatic support was expected from Austria; however, 
by maintaining a friendly intercourse Spain hoped, at 
least, to prevent Britain from sowing discord between her 
and Austria. l Vienna welcomed the Spanish suggestion to 
tefer to Frederick 11 as arbitrator of their dispute with 
Britain. Unlike hasserano, the Austrians did not believe 
that Anglo-Prussian relations were very good, but they 
were still glad to hear of a suggestion that was likely to 
2 make them even worse. 
On June 15th, three days after his communication to 
Vienna, Grimaldi proceeded to convey to London his proposal 
to defer to the arbitration of Frederick II both the Manila 
ransom money and the "Santlsima Trinidad ll prize. His 
representative there, Masserano, following Grimaldi's 
directions, spoke first to Ma1tzan, the Prussian minister, 
1. Stormont, the English amaassador in Vienna, was in fact 
suggesting that Spain was acting aggressively and might 
cause another war, and De Visme was trying to persuade 
von Lebzeltern to oppose arbitration of the Manila ransom 
money. basserano to Grima1di, 12 July 1765, no. 494, 
A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 6958; 15 April 1766, no. 688, legO 
6960; Grafton to Stormont, 28 February 1766 (cipher), 
S.P. 80/20,; and Velazguez, p. 58. 
2. Mahoni to Grimaldi, July 15th and 25th, 1766, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6502. Von Lebze1tern (Austrian minister 
in Madrid) to Kaunitz, 24 July 1766; printed in 
Ve1izguez, p. 60. -
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so that Frederick II's disposition might be sounded un-
officially beforehand; and then, on the following day 
(June 30th), he opened negotiations with Richmond, the new 
southern secretary since May 23rd,1 who expressed most 
emphatically that Britain was opposed to arbitration, and 
insisted that a monetary settlement was the only solution 
acceptable to the English. The minister managed to draw 
Masserano into discussing the amount of money at stake, 
proposin~ a few days later a compromise formula on the 
basis of the lowest terms proposed by Conway in Hay, that 
2 is £300,000. 
But Grimaldi would not consider it, for Spain's 
position had improved a little, and he meant to sound how 
far Britain was prepared to go to ward off the arbitration 
proposal. The Spanish minister answered that His Catholic 
Majesty "was firmly resolved to pay nothing", for his 
objection was not to the largeness of the sum demanded but 
1. For Charles Lennox, third duke of Richmond (1735-1806), 
see A.G. Olson, The Radical Duke, pp. 1-16. 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 7 July, no. 741, and 14 July 
1766, no. 753; A.G.S., Estado, legO 6960. Richmond 
to De Visme, July 4th, and 20th, 1766; S.P. 94/174. 
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to any compromise short of one settled by arbitration; he 
again proposed ]'rederick II as arbiter, and showed his dis-
pleasure over Masserano's talk of the amount of money with 
Richmond. l 
Grimaldi's reply reacped a new administration in London, 
which initiated a new phase in Anglo-Spanish relations. 
~efore turning to it, however, I should examine the reper-
cussions of Grimaldi's arbitration proposal in Spain's 
relations with Prussia, Austria and France. 
lfirst, J:-'russia. As expected, the Spanish proposal 
caused some embarrassment between .Britain and ]'rederick 1I. 
Richmond, the English secretary for the south, felt obliged 
to explain to the ~russian ruler that, although the prospect-
ive arbitrator was well selected for the task, arbitration 
was beneath the dignity of the two Crowns. Conway, the 
northern secretary under Pitt, later apologized, for his 
principal was trying to win Frederick II to the idea of a 
'system of the north'. Frederick for his part remained 
silent. 2 Although he would not have wished to become involved 
1. De Visme to Richmond, 7 July 1766 (cipher); also 28 July 
1766; S.P. 94/174. Another solution envisaged by 
Rockingham and considered by Shelburne was to give up half 
the Manila ransom money in return for New Orleans; 
Masserano, alarmed, warned that Britain was showing too 
much interest in the right bank of the Mississippi; 
Masserano to Grimaldi, 15 September 1765, no.540 (cipher); 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 69;8; C.D.M., II, p.218; Rousseau, 
II, pp. 58-9. 
2. Pol. Oorr., XXV, pp. 159, 265. 
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in Anglo-Spanish disputes, he preferred to have Spain 
believe that the fault for the failure of the arbitration 
proposal did not lie at his door. l Thus he hoped to oblige 
Spain from whom he was soliciting a commercial treaty since 
the previous October. Frederick 11 avoided also any express-
ion that might lead France to suspect the strain in Anglo-
Prussian relations, for he meant to use the prospect of 
closer links between London and Berlin to prevent France from 
opposing his pro;j;ected' commercial treaty with Spain. France 
was apprehensive of the competition of Silesian cloth, which 
together with timber Frederick wished to import into Spain 
at reduced tariffs (Silesian cloth paid 75 per cent more 
than French), in addition to being allowed to export bullion 
and silver coin. Such terms were hardly acceptable to 
Spain, who might have been willing to enter into some kind 
of commercial arrangement, though much less advantageous to 
Frederick 11. The latter did not give up until September, 
1768, when he decided that there was little point in 
insisting on a treaty with Spain. 2 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, ,0 July 1766, no1772, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6960. 
2. He seems to have believed that the main obstacle to a 
commercial treaty between Prussia and Spain was the 
latter's inclination for Austria. For the Prussian end of 
this tentative commercial negotiation, which took place in 
The Hague between Thulemeier, the Prussian minister, and 
Marquis de Puente, the Spanish counterpart, see documents 
indexed under Spanien in Pol.Corr., XXIV-XXVII; the 
Spanish correspondence may be seen in A.G.S., Estado, legO 
6325-6328, passim, and the draft treaty proposed by Pru8a1a 
in A.G.S., Estado, legO 4563, enclosed in Fuentes' s 
dispatch to Grimaldi on 11 July 1766. 
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In respect of Austria, the Manila ransom incident 
confirmed that her main care was to keep at a respectful 
distance from any problem likely to renew the colonial 
struggle between the English and the Bourbon powers. As 
soon as she became aware that Anglo-Spanish relations had 
deteriorated dangerously, Kaunitz approached Britain, late 
in June, to arrange for the neutralisation of &ermany in an 
Anglo-Bourbon war. 
Before approaching Britain, however, Starhemberg, the 
Austrian minister in Paris informed Choiseul of the 
intended move. The French minister was not keen on the 
idea, but raised no strong objection because, he argued, 
British ministerial instability made success very unlikely; 
he only asked from Starhemberg that his colleague in 
London, Seilern, should not speak officially to Britisb 
ministers. This Starhemberg promised, but Seilern never-
theless approached them officially at the beginning of 
July.l 
In his first talk with Conway, Seilern referred to 
the desirability of a mutual agreement to preserve peace 
1. Choiseul to Kaunitz, 18 July 1766; printed by M.Boutry, 
IlL'alliance autrichienne et la diplomatie secrete (1766-
1772)"; R.H.D., XIX (1905), pp. 278-9~ 
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in Central Europe. He assured the English secretary that 
Vienna would not improve her present connection with France 
if Great Britain was willing to give similar assurances as 
to her dealings with Prussia. Conway was prepared to do so; 
but he qualified his stand by explaining that Britain felt 
at a disadvantage in exchanging such assurances, for the 
Austro-Bol,lrbon alliance was still standing while Britain 
remained alone and separate from Prussia. Conway no doubt 
saw that what Austria'wanted was to obtain from Britain a 
public declaration of her desire to remain aloof from Prussia, 
which would benefit her diplomatically. The English 
secretary indicated that Austria would have to give a clear 
statement of her links with France and the Family Compact 
in return. l 
But Austria did not want to be specific on this point, 
lest she should endanger her alliance with France. Further-
more, a new administration in London headed by Pitt turned 
its back on Conway's readiness to engage into some mutual 
1. Conway to Langlois, 2 July 1766 (cipher), S.P. 
801203. Langlois was the secretary to the 
English embassy in Vienna from 1763 to 1771 and 
in charge of affairs in Stormont's absences; see 
BeD.R. 1689-1789, p. 39. 
l~ 
declaration of policy with A~stria.l The negotiations for 
an Anglo-Austrian declaration for the preservation of peace 
in Central Europe were interrupted. 
In addition to the main reason for approaching 
Britain, e.g. to neutralize Germany, the Austrian move seemed 
designed to warn Choiseul against moving, or seeming to move, 
closer to Prussia. Austria was quite confident of the Treaty 
of Versailles; nevertheless, it was felt in Vienna that the 
Franco-Prussian exchanges of 1765 had to be watched and 
France should be made to realize that Austria was aware of 
them. As Kaunitz wrote to Choiseul on 8th July, 1766, a 
few days after Seilern's talk with Conway, Austria knew of 
the rumours going on in Paris that "lorsque tot ou tard le 
Roi de Prusse actuellement regnant viendra 1 manquer, il 
sera de l'interet de la France de ne pas persister dans son 
systeme d'alliance avec la Maison d'Autriche"; Kaunitz 
asked in this connection about interviews held on the 
occasion of a visit of the Prince of Brunswick to Paris. 2 
l 
1. See below p.l94 and note~. Before Conway's period in the 
northern department, Grafton had occasionally approached 
the Austrian government to raise suspicions against Spain 
(above p.1Q8, note t) and to dispel Austria's possible jealousy over the exchange of diplomatic representations 
between Russia and Britain in 1765 (GraftoD to Stormont, 
19 November 1765 (cipher), S.P. 80/202). 
2. Boutry, R.H.D., XIX (1905), p.277. Fu~te. reports Kaunitz 
as saying that the intelligence came from an undisclosed 
source from Paris (25 July 1766. no.2, A.G.S., Estado,legO 
4563). These were the feelings that Choiseul had e~ressed 
in his "Memoire justifieatit- of 1765; above pPf~·98-9. 
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This veil ea. recrimination Ch"oiseul counteracted by 
referring to Austria's move in London. On July 18th, the 
French minister alleged that Austria herself had not been 
quite consistent with her existing associations with France. 
,He roundly denied having entertained plans of attachment to 
Prussia, and explained that Brunswick had only seen him 
twice and in the presence of Starhemberg. l 
Kaunitz, for his part, replied that the Austrian measure 
was only meant to avoid war in Germany and to hinder 'the 
system of the north'. he even tried to persuade the Brench 
minister that such a step would make Britain confident, thus 
playing into the hands of France, who was striving for time 
to get ready for war.2 These mutual explanations seemed to 
have satisfied the countries concerned; their exchanges with 
each other's main enemy were only precautionary measures, 
for on the whole they rested quite assured of the expediency 
of their connection.' 
-----------------------
1. 
2. 
,. 
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In fact, it would seem as if France herself were not 
entirely displeased with Austria's move to preserve peace in 
Germany as a means of softening Grimaldi's determined 
attitude not to pay the M~ila ransom money. Choiseul 
objected to the method in which it was done, but would not 
have mentioned it to Kaunitz if the latter had not brought 
up the question of Franco-Prussian contacts. l 
This was what Masserano suspected. The fact that neither 
he nor Fuentes, Masserano argued in his letter to Grimaldi 
on August 8th, had been informed beforehand of Austria's plan 
for the neutralization of Germany made him think that 
Choiseul let Austria go on with her plan in the hope that 
Spain, realizing that her bargaining power and diplomatic 
standing would be consequently impaired, might be persuaded 
to give in to British demands. Durand, in charge of affairs 
when Guerchy left London on June 25th,2 tried to assuage 
.Masserano's suspicions by taking the blame for failing to 
inform him earlier. But Masserano remained unconvinced, since 
Durand himself said that he had been ibformed by Seilern on 
1. In his letter of July 18th Choiseul ~te to Kaunitz: 
"J'aurais ~aru ignorer ce fait si je ne trouvais occasion 
de vous l'ecrire." . 
2. J.E.Martin-Allanic, Bougainville nav1gateur et les de-
couvertes de son tem s, I, pp. 309-16 and p. 315, note 34 
hereafter cited as lartin-A11anic). GuerCP1 used to spend 
his summers in France; he returned to London in October, 
and finally left it on 20 Jujy 1767; Recuei1, XXV, 2, 
Angleterre Ill, pp. 423-5. 
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July 23rd. Seilern also said t~ Masserano that Guerchy had 
not been advised by Choiseul or by himself by the time he 
left London on June 25th. Seilern's conduct seems to have 
given Masserano no cause for concern. Therefore, it was 
Choiseul, IlIlasserano stressed, who was at fault, for he knew 
beforehand and must have realized that Spain ought to have 
been told; Choiseul's failure to realize this, Masserano 
underlined, linked with his ~nsinuation that Spain should 
climb down on the issue of the Manila ransom money made him 
suspect a Franco-Austrian intrigue. l 
From Vienna, Mahoni reported that Kaunitz had explained 
to him that Austria had acted fairly, for the plan had been 
communicated to Choiseul and it was assumed that the French 
minister would have communicated it to Madrid. 2 Kaunitz's 
explanations coincided with Naria Theresa's overtures to re-
open the subject of a dynastic alliance between Austria and 
Spain in conjunction with the negotiations for a ~arriage of 
the King of Naples, Ferdinand IV, to an Austrian princess. 
Maria Thereaa put it to Mahoni that the two issues should be 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 8 August l766~no.776, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6961. The gullible Fuentes, for his part, 
saw nothing irregular in the fact that Choiseul hinted to 
him on July 19th that Austria had already approached 
Britain with some proposal to neutralize Germany; see his 
dispatches to Grimaldi of 21st and 25th July, 1766, legO 
4563. 
2. Mahoni to Fuentes, 15 August 1766, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4563. 
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dealt with in private correspondence by the monarchs so as 
to avoid the use of secretarie; and ministers. l 
From these reports, it was clear, first of all, that 
Austria was consistently and carefully avoiding involvement 
against Britain. As in 1764,2 Spain was unable to avail 
herself of the alleged friendship with Austria as a means 
to improve her position in London. The very excuse given 
by Kaunitz to Mahoni for his failure to inform Spain direct-
ly of the Austrian plan to neutralize Germany, indicated 
that Spain was regarded as an adjunct to France; this was 
indeed what Spain most resented, especially at a time when 
she was trying to resist Britain on an issue which France 
was inclined to resolve to Britain1s satisfaction. 
However, Grimaldi was not in a position to make a 
protest; for Spain had neither a treaty or engagement on 
which to base her complaint against Austria, nor was she 
prepared to diminish her chances, however slim, of ever 
attaining some kind of support from Austria outs~de Italy. 
Therefore, Grimaldi instructed Mahoni on September 9th to 
express in moderate terms Spain's disappointment in 
----------------------------------------~~~~, -----------------------
1. Mahoni to Grimaldi, 16 August 1766, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6502. 
2. Above, pp.l0~-8. 
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Austria's reserved attitude towards Spain, while pursuing 
, 
Maria Theresa's invitation to reopen the subject of the 
alliance. l 
There seems to have been no Austrian reply to 
Grimaldi's instructions of September 9th. It is very 
probable that the overtures of Maria Theresa were only 
meant to conciliate Carlos Ill. Indeed, Mahoni summed up 
at the end of September, as he had done in 1765,2 that 
the alliance was not feasible since it was generally held 
in Austrian circles "that ever since the House of Austria 
existed, even in her alliances with naval powers, she had 
excluded maritime wars, and this system prevailing", he 
failed to understand "when and how a treaty of alliance 
between the two Courts can be of any use to us, notwith-
standing the fact that Maria Theresa probably wishes it."~ 
1. Grimaldi to Mahoni, 9 September 1766, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6502. See also Grimaldi to Masserano, 3 September 
1766, legO 6961. 
2. Above, p.ltS. 
,. Mahoni to Grimaldi, ,0 September 1766, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6502. See also Fuentes to Grima1di, 23 September 
1766, A.G.S., Estado, legO 4563; Ma~erano to Grimaldi, 
2, September, no. 810, legO 6961. 
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After this, talk of an alliance died down, but the two 
~ 
countries still remained on reasonably friendly terms and 
the marriage negotiations continued. The failure to get 
some kind of support from Austria shows how dependent 
Spain was on the Family Compact and the good will of France. 
This is borne out by Grimaldi's reaction to Masserano's 
suspicions of the part played by Choiseul in Austria's 
approach to Britain. 
The Spanish minister expressed on September 3rd that 
he was willing to forget Choiseul's silence as "unintention-
al negligence". He preferred to blame Durand for failing 
to take Masserano into his confidence, and instructed 
Fuentes to request to Choiseul that Durand should be 
reprimanded. Grimaldi's main concern was to avoid giving 
the impression in London that the Bourbon representative 
to St. James's had not acted in concert. Via Fuentes he 
tried to get Choiseul to instruct Durand to act in 
conjunction with the Spanish ambassador in future. l 
Choiseul wished to take the blame and apologized to 
both Fuentes and Masserano. His explanation was that he 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 3 September 1766, A.G.B., 
Estado, 1egO 4563; to Masserano, legO 6961. 
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did not expect Seilern to make a declaration to the English 
government at the very time that Guerchy, the French 
ambassador, was away on leave. Choiseul said that he had ~ 
not been told of Seilern's advances to the English until 
after Guerchy's arrival in Paris. l 
The Spanish government seemed to rest content with 
this explanation. Howeyer improbable Choiseul's excuse 
may have seemed to Masserano,2 Grimaldi took Choiseul's 
apologetic expressions at their face value. The Family 
Compact was too important at the time to Disk irritating 
Choiseul. The Manila ransom money had by now given way 
to the more discordant issue of the Falkland Islands 
which became the main source of friction between Spain 
and Britain. 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 23 September,1?66, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4563; Choiseul to Durand, Comp1egne, 15 September 
1766, no. 233, C.P., Angleterre 471, ft. 136-144; 
C.D.M., I, pp. 331-4. 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 23 September 1766, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6961. 
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3. The struggle for the Falklapd Islands and the Manila 
ransom issue. 
Before taking up the thread of Anglo-Spanish 
relations, I ought to consider briefly the bearings on 
British foreign policy of the change in administration at 
the beginning of the summer of 1766. The ministerial 
difficulties of the middle 1760's enabled Pitt to come to 
power on his own terms; he, 'who now became the earl of 
Chatham, could pursue his Prussian inclinations and his 
schemes to gather strength in view of the prospect of 
conflict with the Bourbon powers. His ~lose follower, 
Shelburne, was appointed secretary of state for the 
southern department; and Conway, one of Rockingham's 
friends, was persuaded to remain in charge of the northern 
1 department. 
Pitt's main objectives were the strengthening of the 
navy and the quest for allies to counteract the Austro-
Bourbon league. The standards of the British navy had 
fallen behind since the glorious days of Quebec and Manila. 
Egmont, the first lord of the admiralty since 1763, had 
1. Watson, pp. 117-122. Conway was transferred to the 
northern department when Richmond was promoted to 
the southern department on May 23rd. 
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found the navy in a poor state but he did very little to 
amend it. Fitt managec to force Egmont's resignation and 
then proceeded to revive the naval forces, gathering sailors 
and men of business at the admiralty.l 
In Europe Pitt laid plans for a comprehensive alliance 
system of the North to counteract "the system of the South". 
These plans were discussed in a Cabinet meeting held on 
August 4th, hardly a week after he had taken office as Lord 
Privy 8eal. 2 Sir Andrew Mitchell, the English minister in 
Berlin, was ordered to sound Frederick 11 on the system 
before Hans Stanley should be sent to St. Petersburg to 
open negotiations. But Frederick 11, if shortly after the 
Seven Years War he had shown some desire to see Pitt back 
in power in the hope of establishing closer connections 
with Britain, now put an. end to Pitt's expectations by 
making very clear that he did not intend to involve Germany 
in Britain's struggle with the Bourbon powers. He put 
1. For the poor state of the British peacetime fleet after 
17';, see Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1283, 
pp. 165-70. See also Brooke, pp. 15=16, 65; Sherrard, 
pp. 223, 229-30. 
2. He took office on July 30th; Shelburne joined him on 
August 2nd. 
forward Britain's ministerial instability, Chatham's 
peerage, and Britain's defection in 1762, to excuse his 
refusal, but behind these reasons was the fact that 
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Frederick 11 had his eyes ~n Poland and in this direction 
he could only expect support from his ally, Hussia. Nor 
would Catherine consider a treaty with Great Britain that 
was not to include the Turkish war as a CaSUS belli. l 
Before the Prussian rebuff was known in London and 
somewhat encouraged by their expectation of a possible 
rapprochement with Prussia, Pitt and Shelburne made it 
clear, from the start of their contacts with French and 
Spanish representatives to the English Court, that the 
present administration would not scruple to further its 
aims against those of the southern powers by all means, 
even war. 
1. Pol. Corr., ~V, pp.70-1, 217-9, 316-8; A. von Ruville, 
William Fitt, Earl of Chatham, Ill, pp. l88-l98~ s, 
.... 1", gel'. , #&}::; Brooke, p. 50, quoting Conway to Pi tt, 29 
July 1766 (Chatham Correspondence, Ill, pp.15-9), states 
that Conway, together with Egmont, had rightly criticized 
Chatham for having neglected the possibility of a 
rapprochement with Austria by having attempted the 
alliance with Prussia and Russia; but it seems rather 
that Conway, in his letter to Pltt, only recommends to 
keep the advances to the northern courts as private as 
possible to take advantage of a friendly intercourse with 
Austria until "the prospect of success (with Berlin and 
st. Fetersburg) ••• should make it proper to de'clare our-
selves· (cp.pp.8-9); further, Conway for personal reasons 
wanted some few days of delay to save his face, for he had 
very recently assured Seilern that no negotiation was on 
foot (see above pp. l'~). 
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On August 14th, Shelburne remarked in conversation with 
Masserano that Britain's claim to the Manila ransom money 
would not be relinquished, nor interference by third powers 
be permitted. The English also refused to bring the "Sant-
isima Trinidad" into the discussion, thus putting an end to 
Masserano's old hopes that the prize, together with several 
other monetary complaints, might be taken into account to 
achieve a more favourable settlement of outstanding disputes 
between the two countries. l 
Indeed, the attitude of the Pitt ministry towards 
Byron's establishment in the Falkland Islands, Port Egmont, 
founded in January, 1765, bears out their determination not 
to compromise with the Spanish government. The idea of an 
establishment in the Falkland Islands had first been mooted 
in London in 1748 as a result of Anson's expedition to 
America (1740-4). He saw that Britain could not undertake 
a long campaign against the Spanish dominions south of the 
Equator without a naval base near the Spanish Main; further-
more, commercial penetration would thus be considerably 
intensified. These points were taken up and an expedition 
was planned to be sent, allegedly on a voyage of discovery 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 15 August 1766, no. 783, A.G.S., 
Estado, 1egO 6951; Shelburne to De Visme, 22 August 
1766 (cipher), S.P. 94/175. 
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to improve nautical knowledge. Spain opposed the project, 
, 
and the English government, wbliwas at the time after a 
commercial treaty, dropped it in 1750 in deference to her 
representations, thus implicitly recognizing the Spanish 
right to forbid navigation in these areas. l 
But after 1763 the English, elated by their performance 
in the last war, decided to challenge Spanish monopolistic 
claims, establishing a permanent basis in the neighbourhood 
of the markets of the River Piate and Peru, and the Strait of 
Magellan. An expedition under the command of Byron left 
England in June, 1764, to put into effect Anson's original 
project. Five months after founding Port Egmont in the 
West Falkland, Byron put before the English government the 
need to reinforce the establishment. London, spurred on by 
rumours of the enterprise of Bougainville in the same region, 
decided to lose no time in pursuing Byron's recommendations, 
and a second expedition was sent to complete the settlement 
and survey the Falklands in September, 1765. 
But the British had, in fact, been forestalled. Nine 
months before the arrival of Byron, Bougainville after 
visiting the harbour which was later to be named Port Egmont 
in the West Falkland, founded Port St. Louis (Berkely Sound) 
1. Goebel, pp. 194-202; W.e.Down, liThe Occupation of the 
Falkland Islands", pp. 8-12; J.O.McLach1an, Trade and 
Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750, pp. 136-9. 
197 
in the East Falkland (or I-ialouiq,es as these islands were 
called by the ]'rench) on April 5, 1764. Louis XV ratified 
the possession for France five months later. In his return 
to the islands, on 27 January 1765, Bougainville sighted 
Byron, who had taken possession of Port Egmont five days 
before. The two colonies remained ignorant of the exact 
location of each other until December 4th, 1766, when the 
English visited the French es~ablishment to claim possession 
of the islands and bade the :E'rench to leave; the latter 
refused to comply and the two establishments co-existed 
unmolested. 
Meantime the Spanish government had been warned from 
Montevideo that Bougainville had touched at that port on 
28 December 1763, requesting certain supplies and some 
repairs, and invoking the Family Compact to justify his 
presence in the area. Bougainville alleged that he was on 
his way to the East Indies, but the governor of Montevideo, 
Jose Joaquin de Viana, while providing Bougainville with the 
help requested, pointed out to Madrid that the presence of 
foreign ships in American waters and ships represented the 
threat of contraband trade. On arrival of this information 
in June, 1764, the Spanish government requested an explanation 
as to the real intentions behind Bougainville's presence in 
Montevideo; his allegation was suspected, for French 
navigators had not formally used the Spanish trade-route 
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round the Horn to get to the East Indies. The French were 
also reminded that the ]'amily Compact did not justify their 
presence in Spanish American waters and ports. l 
When soon afterwards the Spanish government was 
apprised of the fact that the French were about to establish 
a colony in the Malouines, the first secretary, Grimaldi, 
instructed his representative in Paris, Fuentes, on 3 
September 1764, to make a formal request that the project 
be abandoned. These islands, the Spanish argument ran, 
belonged to the Crown of Spain by virtue of the theory of 
propinquity, and the French themselves had supported Spain 
when the latter opposed Britain's attempt to establish a 
footing in the Falklands in 1750. Furthermore, a French 
colony in the area would encourage English penetration. 2 
At first Choiseul seemed resolved to go ahead with the 
project, whose strategic and commercial considerations 
1. Above p. 6~. 
2. Fernandez Duro, VII, p.134, mentions that Spain planned 
an expedition to settle the Falkland Islands in 1763, 
but this was dropped for lack of funds. I have not 
been able to find corroboration for this statement; 
the plan, however, might well have been entertained 
(cp. Gil ~unilla, Malvinas, p. 9). 
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Bourgainville was persuasively ~mphasizing. Like the 
English, the French were embarked upon an ambitious scheme 
to establish regular trade with China, to further discover-
ies in the South Seas in the hope of finding the Terra 
Australis Incognita, and to gain a share in the Spanish 
American markets. Spurred by English advances, they 
attempted to avail themselves of their alliance with Spain 
to steal a march on Britain. The Falkland Islands, Juan 
Fernandez, and the Philippine Islands were the pOints along 
the trade-route round the Horn, which the French sought to 
occupy. Choiseul contended that Spain alone could not make 
control of the South Seas effective, and stressed the danger 
of war arising from the Manila ransom dispute and Pitt's 
expected return to power, with the view of convincing the 
Spanish government that France only wished to share the 
burden of defending the Spanish empire against the common 
B Ot ° 1 enemy, r~ a~n. But Spain, whose determination to maintain 
her monopolistic conception of empire was directed against 
France as well as against Britain, refused to listen to 
Choiseul's argument, stressing for her part that a French 
colony in the vicinity of the Spanish Main would encourage 
the British and would result in contraband trade. Choiseul 
eventually agreed at the beginning of May, 1766, to surrender 
1. Cp. above p • ••• 
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the French establishment in the Malouines to Spain in return 
4 
for a monetary compensation for Bougainville. The colony 
was taken over by the Spaniards in April, 1767, and was then 
put under the jurisdiction of the governor of Buenos Aires. 
News of the French cession to Spain reached London at 
the beginning of June. The English charge in Madrid, De 
Visme, pointed out that France had admitted the illegal 
character of the establishment founded by Bougainville in 
the Malouines and had agreed to renounce all her claims to 
the islands. l Meanwhile the English admiralty was arriving 
at the conclusion that the Falklands and the Malouines 
were the same group of islands. The first lord, Egmont, was 
urging that a revictualling expedition should be sent to Port 
Egmont to reinforce the establishment against all claimants 
and to proceed upon further discoveries. With the co-
operation of the southern secretary, Conway, the first lord 
managed to get the preparations well under way, and when 
the news of the French cession reached him, the expedition 
was almost ready to set sail. On June 26th, Egmont received 
definite news from st. Malo of the existence of the 
Bougainville colony in the Jalkland Islands. 2 
1. De Visme to Conway, 19 May 1766, S.P. 94/175. 
2. Correspondence of George Ill, I, pp. 357-361. 
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But the revictualling expedition did not set sail. 
The ministerial crisis of the beginning of the summer of 
1766 delayed its departure. Egmont had already had 
political difficulties. During the outgoing Kockingham 
administration, Grafton objected to his plans on the 
grounds that they were costly and might result in war with 
the Bourbon powers. Egmont continued as first lord in the 
Pitt-Grafton ministry, and on August 13th a cabinet meeting 
was held in which he was to argue the desirability of going 
ahead with his plans for future operations in the South 
Seas. tie seems to have been encouraged by Pitt, but when 
the cabinet met he found no support. Grafton raised his 
former objections and added that the French cession had 
improved Spain's legal position; it would be difficult for 
Britain, he argued, to assert a claim to the adjoining 
West Falkland Island once France had explicitly acknow-
ledged Spain's sovereignty over East Falkland Island. 
Grafton at the Treasury doubted that Britain was strong 
enough to face the joint forces of France and Spain. The 
Chancellor Camden, Chatham's personal friend, supPQrted 
Grafton's opinion. The two secretaries of state, Conway 
and Shelburne, were also afraid of a precipitate rupture 
with the Bourbon powers and suggested a delay of eight 
days for consideration. Egmont insisted that no time should 
be wasted; he called upon Pitt to support his cODnsel but 
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the latter, though eventually willing to contest Spanish 
monopolistic claims, did not come to his rescue, and Egmont 
had to resign. litt tried to conciliate Egmont, but the 
latter refused to attend the following meeting on August 
19th, when Pitt broke his silence and decided in favour of 
sending the revictualling expedition. It left Britain on 
22 August 1766. 
The English government thus seemed decided to stand 
their ground against all comers; and yet, the Aamiralty 
clerk who informed Durand, the French charge, of the British 
Cabinet meetings in August,l suggested that Britain might 
be willing to withdraw their establishment in return for a 
Bourbon promise not to occupy the Falkland Islands. A 
1. The reports of the Admiralty clerk, Davis, seem 
to be the only available record of the August meetings; 
they are printed in C.D.M., I, pp. 223-6, 236. Cp. 
Martin-Allanic, I, pp. 335-7, 407-410. The study by 
Martin-Allanic, I, first mentioned on p. 1 •• , note 2, 
is the latest and most comprehensive account of French 
and English activities round the Strait of Magellan 
in the middle l760's and of their international 
implications. But J.Goebel, The struggle for the 
Falkland Islands, and M.H1dalgo, La CuestI6n de las 
Malvinas, are still useful, especially on the question 
of right in the light of international law and practice, 
which they cover fully, and decide in favour of Spain; 
see pp. 1-173, 261-70, and pp. 93-173 respectively. 
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mutual withdrawal might well have been entertained at the 
time by Pitt, for at a later date he referred to such an 
arrangement but claiming to receive in return the Manila 
ransom money as well, and safeguarding Britain's freedom 
to navigate the South Seas. 
The Spanish representative in London, for his part, 
was not in a conciliatory frame of mind. ~hen Durand drew 
his attention to the suggestion contained in the report 
from the admiralty clerk, l'las'serano showed no desire to 
temporize. In his reports to Madrid on the British 
decision to go ahead with their plans to establish them-
selves quite firmly on the Falkland Islands, Masserano 
stressed that the British were confident, for France's 
withdrawal from the Malouines-Bougainville and the Bourbon 
representatives in London were quite convinced that the 
Falklands and the Malouines were the same group- presented 
them with only one opponent, Spain, weaker and slower than 
France, and counselled effectual and speedy action to 
destroy the ~nglish colony before the English government 
had time to strengthen the settlement. l 
On receiving this alarming news Grimaldi consulted 
his ministers about the course to be followed. He hinted 
at war as a risk which ought to be considered for the sake 
1. Masserano's reports are printed in C.D.M., I, pp. 228-9 
and 244-5. 
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of Spanish claims to exclusive navigation in those seas. 
Peaceful representations were to be explored first, but 
if they had no effect action would be the only course left 
to Spain; he requested the ministers' advice in preparing 
for this eventuality.l 
The foremost exponent of the war party was the 
president of the Council of Castile, Aranda. His views 
had not changed since 1764 when he had resisted French 
attempts to settle the islands on the ground that article 
8 of the ~reaty of Utrecht gave Spain sole rights. 2 He 
believed that the heart of the matter was the development 
of the route round the Horn. Until then, the chief route 
to the Spanish Main had been by crossing the isthmus of 
Panama, the famous Carrera de Indias, and this had resulted 
in neglect of the southern regions which were unpopulated 
and unprotected, and therefore open to foreign infiltration. 
If the British succeeded in getting a stronghold in southern 
latitudes, their infiltration in badly protected areas, the 
threat to C~pe Horn and, finally, the disruption of the 
1. Grimaldi to Arriaga, Muniain and Muzquiz, 25 August 1766; 
Grimaldi's reply to Muniain's report, 30 August 1766; 
C.D.M., I, pp. 240-2 and 247-8. 
2. Martin-Allanic, I, pp. 223-9. 
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strategic and defensive system of South America would follow. 
Like Masserano, he advocated strong and effective measures. 
Even if war should break out, Aranda remarked optimistically, 
Spain had never been in such a favourable position, since 
she could rely on France's support and Austria's favour-
able neutrality. 
The minister of Indies, Arriaga, more cautious and 
less confident than Aranda, opposed war or any action that 
might lead to it. Spain was not ready to wage a war, least 
of all a naval war against Britain for possessions 2,000 
leagues away from Europe. Such a war, he contended, 
amounted to presenting Britain with a victory and further 
. 1 ga~ns. 
While his colleagues' reports were reaching him, 
Grimaldi proceeded with the first part of the programme 
outlined in his communication to the ministers. On 3 
September he instructed Masserano to draw the attention of 
the English government to Byron's voyage round the world via 
Cape Horn and his alleged foundation of a British establish-
ment near the Strait of Magellan, by means of a written 
1. All reports are printed in C.D.R., It pp. 240-318 passim. 
Cp. Gil Munilla, Malvinas, pp. 32-7. 
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memorandum of which Grimaldi enclosed the draft. If Byron 
had in fact formed a colony, Grimaldi cautioned, Britain 
seemed to have overlooked Spanish rights as established by 
article 8 of the 'l're.aty of Utrecht, which Britain had 
furthered at the time to prevent .France from gaining advan-
~ges in clpanish America as a consequence of the crowning 
of a Bourbon, Felipe V, as King of Spain, and which she had 
hitherto acknowledged when Russia attempted in 1741 to 
explore the Eastern Pacific and when she herself planned to 
settle the Falkland Islands in 1750. Furthermore, France's 
recent surrender to Spain of her establishment in the 
Malouines, Grimaldi argued, substantiated Spain's claim to 
adjacent islands and surrounding waters. Should Britain 
pay no attention to amicable representations, Masserano 
was to deliver his written declaration in which Carlos III 
declared that he "ne consentira a de pareile etablissements 
et les empechera a tout prix de subsister". To this 
effect, Spain was preparing an armament with which to 
enforce her rights. l 
These instructions were sent to Fuentes under flying 
seal for him to show Choiseul before forwarding them to 
Masserano, together with a letter of the same date in which 
1. Martin-Allanic, I, pp.,60-1; C.D.M., I, pp.258-9. 
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Grimaldi suggested that lrrance should support Spain, in 
accordance with the :b'amily Compact, by means of a memorial 
to the English government to the effect that France would 
not consent to a British establishment in the South Seas 
on either side of the Strait of llilagellan. l 
Despite the firmness of his demand, Grimaldi seems to 
have wanted only to test how far France would support Nadrid 
and to that purpose he tried to be as firm as possible; 
further, he pretended to lay on' Britain the anus probandi. 
Indeed, French legal backing was needed, since Grimaldi 
himself had his doubts as to whether article 8 of the Treaty 
of Utrecht gave Spain a firm basis to claim newly-occupied 
islands in the South Seas. It might be argued that article 
8 smaranteed only those territories which were already 
occupied by the Spaniards in 1700 or that it referred only 
to the South Pacific and not to the South Atlantic; in which 
case the fact that the first occupant of the Ma10uines in 
the Atlantic, France, had surrendered her establishment in 
st. Louis was a sounder basis for Spain's claim to adjacent 
islands and territorial waters on either side of tbe Horn. 2 
1. C.D.M.,I,pp.233-5; Cp. Martin-Allanic,I,p. 369. 
2. Grimaldi's "Principes, que selon mon aviS, conviennent aux 
interets de la Monarquie, et que j~ trouve fonqes en 
droit, et necessaires pour la conservation de ses Etats, 
et de ses richesses", 1766; C,D.M." 11, I'P.2l9-23. The 
first undersecretary of state, Jose Agustln de Llano, 
held the same point of view; Gil Munilla, Malvinas, p. 43. 
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Grimaldi had had some indications of Choiseul's dis-
. 
position, but they were not quite consistent. On the one 
hand, in July and ~gain in August Choiseul had urged Spain 
to send three or four ships to the South Seas to stop Byron's 
progress. On the other hand, however, Choiseul sounded much 
more concerned about vague rumours of a possible British 
expedition to retake the Philippine Islands than he was 
about the alleged British establishment near the Strait of 
Magellan. In fact, Choiseul was at the time testing Spain's 
feelings regarding the possible cession of these islands to 
France, allegedly in order to help Spain defend her overseas 
possessions against Britain. There was some truth in 
Choiseul's contention, for it was in the French interest not 
less than in that of Spain that Britain should be prevented 
from controlling the Pacific. But Choiseul's interest in the 
Philippine Islands as well as Bougainville's projected 
voyage of discovery round the world, via Cape Horn, which 
the French were asking the Spaniards to consent to, seemed 
to show a consistent effort to effect France's colonial 
recovery at the expense of Spain. In a letter to Ossun on 
25th August, 1766, Choiseul sounded as if he resented 
France's loss of her establishment in the Malouines as a 
result of Spain's exclusivism rather than Britain's 
infiltration in the area. When Choiseul wrote that France 
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should operate in the 00uth Seas if Britain was permitted to 
go ahead with her thr'ust into the Pacific, Grimaldi no doubt 
realized that Choiseul was complaining against France's 
initial disadvantage placed in her way by her inhibiting 
friendship with Spain. l 
For this reason Grimaldi was attracted by the suggestion 
contained in Durand's intelligence from the Admtralty clerk 
that the English minister might be willing to give up Port 
Egmont in return for a promise b'y Spain that she would not 
settle the Falkland Islands in the future. Grimaldi 
instructed Masserano to test Britain's feelings about such 
mutual withdrawal, for Spain would like to avoid the presence 
of all foreign settlers in the South Seas more than anything 
else. 2 Indeed, both France and Britain were using each 
other's enterprises in the area to justify their own, and 
Spain wished to deter either country for much the same reaSOD. 
1. Martin-Allanic, I, pp.32l-363, passim, and p. 448. 
2. Grimaldi's adoption of this plan of mutual withdrawal 
does not appear in his instructions to Masserano and 
Fuentes on September 3rd; there must be some other 
instruction of that or similar date, which I have not 
been able to find, for both Masserano and Fuentes 
mentioD it, and Grimaldi himself insists OD it on 
October 6th as conveyed in his instruction of the 3rd 
(see below p. 1"). 
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Choiseul, however disappointed over the ]'rencb 
establishment in the Malouines a~d Grimaldi's disregard of 
his bid for the Philippine Islands, was certainly willing 
to support Spain's protest in London but not to the extent 
envisaged by Grimaldi in his note to Fuentes of September 
3rd. When Cboiseul discussed this with Fuentes on the 15th, 
he said that the intended declaration to the English govern-
ment amounted to an ultimatum. Chatham might welcome the 
opportunity of such a declaration, as a war could regain him 
the popularity that he had lost by taking a peerage on coming 
into power. France and Spain, the French minister counselled, 
should bide their time and prepare for a successful war, for 
which at least eighteen months were needed, rather than 
jumping headlong into a bitter argument that might easily 
lead into a precipitate rupture. In complete agreement with 
Fuentes, Choiseul proceeded to instruct his representative 
in London, Durand, for the purpose of ensuring that 
Masserano adopted a moderate tone in his conversations with 
the English ministers. Choiseul took care to explain, for 
the benefit of the excitable Masserano, that his advice had 
been requested by Fuentes and that he had given it in good 
stead. It was, first of all, essential to discover the 
exact location of the British establishment to see, whether 
article 8 of the Treaty of Utrecht could be safely invoked. 
Masserano should therefore demand an explanation from the 
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English ministers, stressing that Britain had acted in 
. 
compliance with Anglo-Spanish treaties in the past, and 
ask amicably the purpose of Byronts and wallists voyages 
through the Strait of f>'lagellan. If the English then denied 
that they were violating existing treaties, Masserano should 
be able to refer to article 8 of the Treaty of Utrecht and 
Bougainville's evacuation of Fort Bt. Louis for the purpose 
of establishing that Britain was violating that treaty. 
Durand for his part would endorse in writing or verbally -
as Masserano decided - that Bougainvillets withdrawal was 
occasioned by J!lrance' s desire to honour it. whatever the 
answer from London, Spain's prestige would not suffer, the 
English would not be able to accuse the Bourbon powers of 
aggressive designs, and the time thus gained could be 
profitably used to make military and naval preparations. l 
In case Durand and Fuentes should not succeed in 
bringing Masserano to tone down his representations to the 
English ministers while further consultations went on in 
Madrid, on September 17th Choiseul approached Lennox, the 
English representative in Paris, in order to mitigate the 
1. Choiseu1 to Durand, 15 September 1766, no.223; C.P., 
Angleterre 471, ff. 136-44. Fuentes to ~asserano, 
15 September 1766; C.D ••• , I, pp. 279-81, see also 
pp. 323-35. cp. Martin-Al1anic, I, pp. 368-73. 
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first impact of the Spanish protest. He told Lennox that 
~ 
France supported the justice of Spain's claim, and gave 
Bougainville's withdrawal and Britain's attitude in 1750, 
dropping Anson's project to settle the Falklands, as proof 
of the correctness of the Spanish interpretation of article 
8. He also said, however, that he personally would not 
"take alarm till matters were more explained & should give 
the same Advice to the Spanish ftlinister (Grimaldi) whom he 
thought too hasty on the occasion."l 
On the following day Grimaldi's instructions of 
September 3rd, together with Choiseu1's to Durand of the 
15th and Fuentes' letter to Masserano of the same date, 
reached London. After several meetings with Durand, in 
which the French diplomatist argued that time was on their 
side because it would enable them to benefit from increasing 
difficulties in London,2 Masserano agreed to tone down his 
1. G.H.Lennox to Shelburne, 17 September 1766, '.l?jr.~' I, 
p. 283. Lord George Henry Lennox (1737-1805 , e ghth 
child of the 2nd Duke of Richmond, went to Paris with 
his brother, the 3rd Duke of Richmond, as secretary in 
1765. In July 1766 he was appointed minister pleni-
potentiary but on October 4th gave way to Rochford, 
who arrived on the 28th; D.N.B. and B.D.R., p. 23. 
2. Discontent in the American colonies, Chathaw's plan 
to use the revenue of the East India Company for the 
purpose of relieving the devts of the Crown, and the 
effects of a bad harvest. 
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representation to the English government and to deal with 
the matter of the English expedition to the South Seas to 
reinforce their rumoured establishment verbally in the 
first instance. In their first talk, on September 22nd, 
Shelburne denied any knowledge of any such British 
establishment; whereupon Masserano requested Durand to let 
the English know that France was concerned as well. Tbe 
French representative, bowever, answered tbat be was only 
authorized to say to the English that Bougainville's witb-
drawal was occasioned by Spain's protest. Masserano 
insisted that Durand should see tihelburne and give bim 
some indication of ]'rencb support for the Spanish protest. 
Durand agreed to see Sbelburne, wbich be did on the 25th. 
The English minister rebuked bim for interfering between 
Britain and Spain, but, fearing tbat by antagonizing France 
sbe would only draw closer to Spain, Sbelburne permitted 
the conversation to go on. He sidestepped by stressing 
that the Manila ransom question was a far more important 
source of disputes than a Britisb colony in the Soutb Seas. 
Durand bad to desist as he had no instructions regarding 
this issue. 
Dur~d tben reported tbis conversation to Masserano, 
with the hint, as from himself, that the settlement of the 
Manila ransom question migbt perauade tbe Englisb to give 
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way regarding their establishment in the South Seas. 
On the same day Masserano went to see Shelburne. The 
English minister sounded more confident and resolute than 
on the 22nd, probably owing to the uncertain tone of 
Durand's intervention. Shelburne dismissed Spain's 
exclusive claim to the navigation of the Atlantic and the 
Pacific seas as absurd. As for the alleged establishment 
he admitted simply that a ship had been in the area for a 
year. He brought up the Manila ransom problem, and ended 
by asking Masserano to put his complaint in writing. The 
Spanish ambassador refused to do this for, on the one hand, 
he was not so sure about France's attitude and, on the 
other hand, it would have meant the loss of the initial 
advantage of laying with Britain the onus probandi. 
Masserano did not mention either to Shelburne or 
Durand that Grimaldi was prepared to consider the suggestion 
of a mutual withdrawal contained in the intelligence 
received from the admiralty clerk. Like Fuentes,l he 
believed that it would weaken Spain's bargaining position 
if it became known that Spain might be willing to compromise 
in this manner. Masserano, however, was aware of the need 
to refrain from harsh words. He was beginning to realize 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 15 September 1766, enclosing 
copy of his letter to Masserano of the same date; 
C.D.M., I, pp.278-81. See also Ibid, 11, p.112. 
215 
how preposterous his earlier counsel (August) for firm and 
speedy action against the British in the South Seas had 
been. Spain could not press her point in London unless 
France was openly behind her. On Cctober 2nd, Masserano 
wrote to Grimaldi that it might be preferable "to give some 
money to compound both disputes (the l?alkland Islands 
question and the Manila ransom issue) so as to avoid the 
uncertain results of a war", provided Britain proposed it 
as it was essential not to let it appear that the payment 
of the Manila ransom money was in any way in compensation 
for the evacuation of the British establishment in the 
Falklands. He had the impression that the English were 
hinting at such a compromise but recommended that it should 
be left to them to make the first move. l 
While Masserano reported to his principals, Durand 
hastened to inform his that Britain would rather go to war 
than give up the establishment in the Falklands or be de-
barred from navigating the Pacific or the Atlantic freely.2 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 2 October 1766, no.823; C.D ••• , 11, 
pp. 38-41. See also Masserano to Grimaldi, 23 September, 
no. 806, and 26 September 1766, no. 817; C.D.M., I, pp. 
320-3, and II, pp. 7-14. There is also a mInute of the 
Shelburne-Masserano talk of the 25th, dated 26 September, 
in P.R.O. 30/8/94, ff. 220-2. Cp. Fitzmaurice, Lite of 
Wi1.1iam, Earl of Shelburne, I, p. 287. 
2. Durand to Choiseul, 25 and 26 September 1766, C.D.M., I, 
pp. 338-42. 
216 
Prompted by these reports, Choiseul sent a direct 
communication to Grimaldi with more explicit recommendations 
for peace than those sent through Fuentes on September 15th. 
He wrote on October 2nd that "Salva dignitate, il faut en 
politique faire I'impossible pour eviter l'eclat de la 
rupture d'iei a dix-huit mOis".l Two days later Choiseul 
wrote toOssun: "Le premier de tous les Soins est done de 
temporiser, s'il est encore temps".2 
Shelburne'8 emphasis on the Manila ransom question 
suggested that Britain was going to utilise it as a diversion 
or as a possible compensation. 3 At any rate, Choiseul no 
doubt believed that the two issues under discussion with 
Britain were now linked as far as the British government was 
concerned. In order to prepare Grimaldi for a compromise 
along these lines, Choiseul explained that they were to be 
examined together. His counsel seems to imply that he 
wanted the Spaniards to let the English know of their willing-
ness to consider Shelburne's reference to the ransom money; 
1. C.D.M., I, pp. 342-5. See also 11, pp. 28-31. 
2. C.D.M.,II, pp. 53-4. See also,II, pp. 337-8. 
3. According to Ruville, Ill, p.205, there was a cabinet 
meeting on October 15th in which it was decided that 
the two issues under discussion could be linked to 
Britain's advantage. 
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the normal procedure being that Spain should wait for 
Britain's answer to Spain's original proposal of arbit-
ration by the King of Prussia'in June. He agreed that this 
was the wisest course and ought to be pursued, but insisted 
that they should try to overcome Britain's objections to the 
method or to the person. 
In respect of the English colony, Choiseul reiterated 
that it was, first of all, necessary to discover its exact 
location; for if it was in the South Seas (the Pacific), he 
still believed, as he did four months before, that the 
Spaniards should send four ships of the line to look for the 
British and destroy their colony. If the British establish-
ment, on the other hand, was found to be in the Falklands, 
that is on this side of the Strait of Magellan (the 
Atlantic), Spain would not be able to invoke article 8 of 
the Treaty of Utrecht unless she could show that the 
Spaniards were there at the time of Carlos II's death. 
Should Spain be unable to prove it, the Spanish government 
would have to weigh carefully whether the threat of an 
English establishment was worth the risks of a war. 
Choiseul requested Grimaldi to decide on the course to 
be followed. They could either send a strong complaint to 
London, Choiseul was reluctant to do this, or send an 
expedition to the South Seas to expel the English if their 
establishment was in "La Mer du Bud, et non pas les Isles 
Falkland", the French minister emphasized in a postscript. 
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If the second course was followed, verbal negotiations 
could be initiated in London while, in Madrid, the govern-
ment should attempt to estimate the seriousness of the , 
British threat if their establishment was in the Atlantic. 
In the meantime, Choiseul informed Grimaldi that 
Guerchy was to be sent to London with instructions to 
assure the English ministers that the French government was 
obliged by treaty to join Spain if Britain gave occasion to 
a war. Guerchy should also say that the French were 
inclined to peace, and prepared to discuss every issue 
likely to be the cause of war between Spain and Britain - a 
clear allusion to the Manila ransom question - but expected 
Britain to meet half-way the Bourbon powers' readiness to 
make some sacrifice for the sake of peace. 
Grimaldi for his part seemed well aware of the need 
to temporize in London to avoid a premature war, and 
readily agreed to accommodate Masserano's conduct in London 
to Choiseul's temperate counsel. However, he was not so 
positive regarding possible solutions to the issues at 
stake. On the one hand, the tirst secretary of state 
insisted on October 6th and again on the 2l.t on the 
settlement of the dispute over the British establishment 
on the basis of mutual withdrawal. Rejecting Masserano's 
and Fuentes' objections, Grimaldi held to the view that 
the important point to Spain was to avoid the presence of 
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foreign settlers in Spanish American waters. Considering 
the doubtfulness of article 8 as a,guarantee for Spain's 
claim to the Falklands, mutual withdrawal seemed as much 
as they could hope for; furthermore, Spain had no need to 
settle them herself, for the defences of the Continent and 
those of the Juan Fernandez Island were enough to watch the 
Strait of Magellan. 
On the other hand, Grimaldi appeared quite determined 
to go ahead with preparations to send six frigates to 
search not only the I'acific but also the Atlantic, and 
dislodge the English; the operation, he ordered Fuentes 
to explain to Choiseul on October 21st, would be planned so 
as to ensure that war, if such were the outcome, would not 
occur before 1768. 
In respect of the Manila ransom issue, Grimaldi alleged 
that it was up to britain to answer his June proposal to 
submit the issue to the arbitration of Prussia; to give 
proof to Britain of his pacific intentions, however, he 
had again referred to his proposal of arbitration in a note 
to the English representative in Madrid, De Visme, 
purporting to answer the latter's offer of lower terms in 
July.l 
1. C.D.M., 14 pp.a~5-6i 11, pp.?O-l, 115-121. Cp. Martin-
Illanic, 11, pp. 92~-5. 
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Before Grimaldi's instructions to Fuentes of October 
21st reached Paris (they arrived on ~ovember 4th) Choiseul, 
availing himself of the presence in Paris as a visitor of 
the former British ambassador, Lord Hertford, decided to test 
the British government's attitude regarding his plan for 
linking the two issues under discussion. Choiseul was, in 
fact, building on what he thought, to judge from Durand's 
reports, had been hinted by Shelburne. As for his suggestion 
to deal with the Manila ransom issue as one between individ-
uals, he adopted it from the secretary to the Spanish 
embassy in Paris, Magallon, in the hope of currying Spanish 
favour for his plan. 
The French minister was no doubt trying to arrange some 
kind of preliminary understanding which Grin.aldi should find 
difficult to extricate himself from. He already had a fair 
idea of the Spanish minister's reaction; further, Grimaldi's 
inclination for mutual withdrawal was not likely to meet with 
British approval. Choiseul, therefore, preferred to further 
his own plan in London before Grimaldi had a chance to voice 
his opposition. He was cautious, however, to sound Masserano 
beforehand; as for Fuentes, Choiseul expected to gain him to 
his views as usual. l 
1. Choiseul had a first talk with Hertford on October 19th, 
but did not mention his plan (Chatham Correspondence, Ill, 
pp. 117-20). 
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Guerchy was instructed to put it to Masserano whether 
Britain might agree to leave her se~tlement in the Falklands, 
recognizing the cipanish interpretation of article 8 of the 
Treaty of Utrecht, if Spain was prepared to come to a 
compromise agreeable to Britain on the Manila ransom issue. 
Masserano was already aware that Britain seemed that way 
inclined and had said so to his principal on October 2nd, 
but he believed that it should be looked upon as the last 
resort to avoid war, emphasizing that the two questions 
should be kept separate so as not to imply that the one 
was in compensation for the other. Masserano stressed this 
point, he explained to Guerchy, because Durand had given 
him the impression that France was making light of the 
°1 t' 1 Man~ a ransom ques ~on. 
Thus somewhat encouraged, Cboiseul requested Hertford 
on November 2nd to transmit to the English government his 
offer to arbitrate the ransom instead of Prussia. It was a 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 24 October 1766; C.D.M., 11, pp. 
121-3. Durand himself said to Choiseul when he returned 
to Paris soon afterwards that the abandonment of Port 
Egmont should precede the payment of the Manila ~ansom 
money, for it was absurd to make Spain pay if the 
question of the establishment was to be solved by 
means of war; Martin-Allan1c, 11, p. 927. 
private issue, he argued, which could be solved before 
April or even January between individuals under the , 
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arbitration of France. Britain for her part would agree 
first to leave Port Egmont and to desist from making any 
settlements in the future on either side of the Strait of 
Magellan in fulfilment of article 8 of the Treaty of 
Utrecht. 
Choiseul then informed Fuentes of his conversation 
with Hertford, explaining to him in respect of Masserano's 
impression of Durand's attitude that it was due to a mis-
understanding of his instructions in which he only said 
that the Manila ransom issue, as a question between 
individuals, was relatively easy to settle, if Spain agreed 
on as short a term as possible for the arbitration. 
Fuentes was quite satisfied that Choiseul meant to obtain 
British recognition for the Spanish interpretation of 
article 8 before discussing the payment of the ransom. 
The French minister then told him that Guerchy was to be 
ordered to go ahead discussing the plan with the British 
ministers, and that he himself was to inform shortly the 
new British ambassador to the French Court, Rochford, who 
had arrived in Paris on October 28th. 1 
1. Fuentes to GrimaIdi, 3 November l?,66, enclosing 
Fuentes to Masserano, 2 November 1?66; C.D.M., 
II, pp. 128-;1. 
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Choiseul, however, did not instruct Guerchy until 
three days later, on November 5th; the day after Fuentes 
communicated him Grimaldi's post of October 21st. l Which 
seems to indicate that the French minister was still try-
ing to get some kind of encouragement for his plan from 
Madrid. He may have taken Grimaldi's note to De Visme on 
the subject of the Manila ransom as suc~. But his pre-
caution was in vain, for the English government rejected 
both the terms and the method of his offer. 
As to the former the Chat ham ministry, although 
prepared to accept payment in full of the ransom money as 
a return for abandoning the British establishment in the 
Falkland Islands, would not accept the Spanish argument 
in favour of their monepolistic interpretation of article 
8 of the Treaty of Utrecht. The evacuation of Port Egmont, 
if agreed upon, would be done in the same way as Anson's 
project had been dropped in 1750, without in any way 
implying that Britain was relinquishing her clear and 
undoubted rights to navigate both the Atlantic and the 
Pacific. Regarding the procedure by which the settlement 
1. Choiseul to Guerchy, 5 November 1766, C.P., 
Angleterre 471, ff. 294-300. 
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might be effected, that is France's arbitration of the 
Manila ransom issue, the English stressed t~at there could 
r 
be no arbitration, for only payment in full would be accept-
able; even Choiseul' s plan, if accepted by clpain as .the 
basis for discussion, was not to be handled by ]'rance; her 
sole contribution was to be that of bringing pressure to 
bear on the Spanish government and of putting the plan 
forward to them. Great Britain did not wish to strengthen 
the Bourbon alliance by allowing France to take possession 
of the negotiation under the pretence of mediation or any 
other name. Finally, the English concluded, the onus 
probandi as regards the Falklands lay with Spain who have 
to open the neg«tiation, for they were not willing to take 
the initiative. l 
On November 25th Rochford told Choiseul of the British 
position regarding his offer of mediation. The latter still 
tried to persuade the English ambassador, alleging that he 
had always meant that the amount and not the payment it-
self was to be the subject of a~ration. Sensing some 
willingness on the part of Rochford to listen to his plan 
for the sake of an early adjustment, Choiseul returned to 
the idea that the arbitration should be dealt with as a 
1. Shelburne to Rochford, 17 November 1766, secret and 
confidential, Add. 9242, ft. 1-5; P.R.O. 30/8/94, ff. 
220-2; Masserano's reports from November 21st to 26th, 
printed in C.D.M., 11, pp. 158-69 and 187-92. 
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matter between individuals, a Spanish deputy on behalf of 
Manila and Draper on behalf of its conquerors. Choiseul 
d;d t t f 1 • no ge very are 
Guerchy was told in London as he put out similar 
feelings,2 and Shelburne most emphatically insisted on 
Rochford throughout January, 1767, that payment in full was 
expected and that not even the shadow of a negotiation 
should be allowed in this adjustment. 3 
In the meantime in Madrid, Grimaldi, in planning his 
policy, was influenced by his doubts of Choiseul's sincere 
support for Spain,4 Masserano's reports on Britain's 
political, financial and agricultural difficulties, and the 
apparent decrease of British pressure for a settlement. 
1. Rochford to Chatham, 28 November 1766, private, Chatham 
Oorrespondence, Ill, pp. 131-4; same to Shelburne, 4 
December 1766, private and secret, S.P. 109/77. 
2. Shelburne to Rochford, 12 December 1766, secret, S.P. 
78/281. Cp. Fitzmaurice, I, p. 291. 
3. Add. 9452, ff.10-4; C.D.M., 11, pp. 232-3. See also 
Shelburne to De Visme, 16 January 1767 (cipher), 
S.F. 94/176. 
4. Grimaldi was inclined to believe that there was 
something in Masserano's suspicions, since, he 
put it to France, neither Durand's nor Guerchy's 
instructions conveying Cboiseul's plan were 
imparted to him fully. 
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When he was apprised of Choiseul's intended proposals to 
Britain, Grimaldi ordered Fuentes on 17 November to remind 
him of his pledges to Nadrid, and indicated that he was 
still hopeful that his plan of mutual withdrawal could be 
attempted, and even this only if it were proposed by 
Britain and as the last resort to avoid war. His hopes of 
success cannot have been high, however, for he also referred 
to Choiseul's plan, which although repellent to Spain she 
was prepared to consider, stressing that it ought to be 
clearly understood that Britain's recognition of Spain's 
claim to the Falkland Islands had to precede any discussion 
over the foIlanila ransom question. l On the same day Grimaldi 
wrote in a similar vein to l1asserano, but directing him to 
, , t' 2 rema~n ~nac ~ve. 
Grimaldi believed that if matters were delayed for a 
while France might be brought to support Spain more fully. 
He embarked upon a policy of procrastination that he hoped 
would last until 1768, when Spain could count on France to 
obtain satisfaction from Britain by force. 
1. C.D.M., 11, pp. 156-7. 
2. A.G.S., Estado, legO 6961. 
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Acting on this assumption, on November 28th, he sent 
Fuentes a voluminous report on the'state of the Spanish 
forces and a comprehensive scheme of operations in a 
future war against Britain. An immediate plan was also 
outlined in accordance with the advice of the minister of 
Marine and Indies, Arriaga, who, doubting whether the joint 
navies of the Bourbon powers could compete with the superior 
naval force of the British, counselled that the expedition~ 
ary force to be sent to the South Seas should only try to 
find out the exact location of the British establishment, 
while the government could concentrate on making prepar-
t ' 1 a 10ns. In addition to this, the governor of Buenos Aires, 
Bucareli, and the Chilean and Peruvian authorities, were 
directed to search the seas: should the British establishment 
be located, they were to remonstrate against their illegal 
presence, taking good notice of the strength of their 
forces, and to report back home. 2 
Masserano was not so confident that matters could be 
delayed. Alarmed by Britain's seemingly uncompromising 
1. Arriaga to Grima1di, 19 October 1766; C.D.M., 11, pp. 
106-11. Cp. Gi1 ~uni11a, pp. 99-100; Blart, p. 91. 
2. Gil Munilla, Ma1vinas, pp. 53-5. 
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attitude, he was prepared to admit by the end of November, 
confirming his vague fears of Octo~er 2nd, that they would 
have to sacrifice some money if they wished to avoid war. 
To spare the Spanish Crown the humiliation of yielding to 
the Manila capitulation, the ambassador agreed with 
Magallon's suggestion, which Choiseul had made his, that 
the issue might be dealt with as a matter between individ-
uals. He himself suggested that the "Santlsima Trinidad" 
problem could be raised once more in order to lower the 
amount due to the English, and that the value of the 
military effects taken by the English in Havana and Manila 
which were yet to be returned to those towns as stipulated 
in 1763, should be similarly subtracted from the sum due. 
The rest of the money might even be paid in kind. The 
"Philipino" ship, which escaped seizure when Manila was 
taken, could ~e surrendered in settlement for the Manila 
ransom and since she belonged to the traders of Manila, 
this arrangement would not entail Carlos Ill's honouring 
the Archbishop's drafts. l 
Arriaga and Muzquiz, the minister of Finance, fully 
accepted the expedients of Magallon and Masserano, as war 
could only result in new losses for Spain. 2 But Grimaldi, 
1. Masserano to Grima1di, 26 November 1766, no. 875; C.D.M., 
11, pp. 192-5· 
2. C.D.M., 11, pp. 208-213. 
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who did not think war imminent, was not anxious to yield 
to the English unless it became abaolutely necessary. 
On 12 January 1767 Grimaldi told Ossun of the 
instructions that were to be sent to Masserano. Sp~in 
could not entertain war until 1768. Until then she was 
going to insist on arbitration, if pressed for an answer, 
but would adopt a conciliatory attitude at the slightest 
sign of war preparations on the part of Britain. Grimaldi 
sensibly wished to put an end to the direct negotiations 
between the French government and the English so as to be 
able to give the impression in London that Spain had France 
solidly behind her. Grimaldi told Ossun that he infinitely 
wished France would do him the favour of leavins the 
principal care of the negotiation to him.l 
Bougainville's projected voyage to the East Inuies via 
Cape Horn throws light on the predicament of the Spanish 
government in relation to France. As a sop to her when the 
French navigator surrendered Port st. Louis to the 
Spaniards, he was permitted to navigate the Strait of 
Magellan and make his way into the South Seas. Grimaldi 
now suggested that the French should make their voyage on 
• Spanish ship. When his instructions of January 20th 
reached Fuentes, however, Bougainville had already started 
1. C.D.M., 11, p. 229; Ramsey, p. 179. 
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his voyage and the Spanish ambassador in Paris decided not to 
irritate Choiseul at a time when t~e Spaniards needed French 
support. 1 Spain had always advanced as an argument against 
French presence in Spanish America that it would encourage 
British infiltration. Spain could rely for ]'rench support 
on the fact that they were just as interested in preventing 
Britain's thrust into the Pacific.2 On this oocasion, 
however, a concession had to be made to France, which the 
English would be eager to utilize. 3 
As for Masserano's future conduct in London, he was 
sent detailed instructions on January 20th. On the question 
1. C.D.M., II, pp.197-9, 235-6, and 289-90. Cp. Martin-
Allanic, I, pp. 474-84, and II, pp. 930-1. 
2. Choiseul was recommending at the time, on the occasion 
of an alleged British settlement in San Bernardo Bay 
(Gulf of Mexico) in July 1766, that the British should 
be expelled without a preliminary complaint to London; 
Fuentes to Grimald!, January 19th, and Grimaldi to 
Fuentes, February 2nd and March 9th, 1767; A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 4558. 
3. Masserano reported at the end of 1766 that the English 
were spreading rumours that Spain intended to cede the 
Spanish part of Santo Domingo to France in return for 
Louisiana, with a view to covering their own infiltration 
in the South Seas with France's acquisition of territories 
despite article 8. 30 December 1766, no. 900 (A.G.B., 
Estado, legO 6961); also January 2nd, no. 933, and June 
10, no. 1030, 1767 (legO 6964). 
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of the British establishment in the Falklands, he should 
from time to time remind the English ministers of Spain's 
rights to those islands and to the exclusive navi@ation of 
the seas on both sides of the Strait of Magellan, taking 
care not to become involved in a heated argument which 
might lead to war before 1768. On the question of the 
Manila ransom Grimaldi did not think the English would 
fight on account of it, but he agreed that the present 
circumstances might force him to consider paying the ransom 
money, as the only alternative to war before that date. 
If war seemed imminent, Masserano was permitted to 
suggest that the ransom question should be deferred to the 
judgment of either the Council of Indies or War, which 
would try the issue as a private matter between individuals. 
The English Court must abide by the sentence of that tri-
bunal, and the Spanish Court would reciprocate by 
acknowledging the sentence passed on the galleon 
"Santlsima Trinidad" by the High Court of the Admiralty 
in 1?6;. If this scheme were accepted, Spain would proceed 
to settle the ransom in the way suggested by Masserano on 
November 26th. Even so Grimaldi expected that the 
Spaniards would have to their debit a considerable sum of 
money; a further reason, he insisted, for not ,proposing 
this plan unless it was absolutely necessary: that 1s 
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unless war was imminent. 
In return for such a settlement, Grimaldi expected the 
evacuation of Port Egmont, provided that it should in no 
way appear that the one was in compensation for the other; 
for Spain's claim would then be irretrievably impaired. 
The Spanish minister also hoped to obtain the evacuation of 
the British establishments in Rio Tinto and the Mosquito 
Shore. l , 
To complement these instructions, Grimaldi explained to 
Masserano that the different attitudes of the Bourbon powers 
in their relations with Britain did not indicate a differ-
ent policy, but only a different approach. mhoiseul's 
attempt to reach a settlement on the basis of the payment 
of the ransom money, Grimaldi argued, was in fact Spain's 
line of conduct with the except'Dn that the Spaniards would 
agree to it only if driven to extremity. Where their 
policies were at variance was in Choiseul's belief that the 
Manila ransom issue could cause war; that was why the French 
pressed the Spanish government to pay the ransom. Grimaldi 
himself held that the English would not go to the length of 
war to obtain the payment; he therefore did not intend to 
2 pay. 
1. Grimaldi to Masserano, 20 January 1767, nO.l; C.D.M.,II, 
pp.238-45. Masserano had informed him from London on 25 
July 1766 (C.D.M.,I,pp.208-9) that according to British 
reports their settlements in R!o Tinto and Mosquito Shore 
were flourishing. Grimaldi enlarged on this topic in his 
letters nos. 2 and 3 of the 20th, which I have not been 
able to find~ 
2. Grimaldi to Masserano, 20 January 1767, no.4; C.D.M.,11 
pp. 236~8. 
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Since the first rumours of Chatham's likely return to 
power were heard in the spring of 1766 Choiseul feared that 
he might start a war using the Nanila ransom as a pretext, 
and frequently reverted to this danger in order to deter 
Spain from measures or language that might actuate him. The 
Bourbon powers were not ready to fight a successful war. By 
the end of 1766, however, his fears had been somewhat allayed 
by Britain's reaction to his ~ration proposal. Although 
it was rejected, Britain did not press for an answer from 
Spain, and both the Spanish and the French representatives 
in London believed that Britain had neither the means nor 
the inclination to engage in war. Furthermore, Chatham was 
disabled by a stroke of gout in January, 1767, which removed 
any immediate danger in Choiseul's eyes. l 
On the other hand, Choiseul was already committed, for 
he had given assurances that ]'rance would stand by the 
Family Compact in 1768, and Grimaldi had planned his policies 
accordingly. Indeed, the Spanish minister informed Ossun at 
the beginning of harch that his instructions to the American 
authorities regarding the British establishment in the 
Falklanta were confined to finding its exact location, and 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 24 February 1767, no. 945, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6964; C.D.M., 11, pp. 25,8-65, 286-7. 
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that no force would be used against them without first 
seeking Choiseul's approval. Furthermore, France did not 
wish to encourage the British. Although ~rance should be 
as reluctant as Britain to accept Spain's monopolistic 
interpretation of article 8 of the Treaty of Utrecht, 
Chatham kept pointing out to Choiseul, the concession to 
Bougainville showed some favour towards France, and 
Choiseul, in any case, would support France's ally rather 
than indirectly help Britain to press forward with her 
American and Pacific ventures. 
Accordingly, the French minister agreed to withdraw 
from the talks between the Spaniards and the English, and 
leave the care of Spain's affairs to Grimaldi alone. l The 
French minister, however, continued to press upon Spain that 
France was not prepared yet to go to war with Britain. On 
January 27th he declared that France would not be ready 
until 1769 - his previous date had been 1768 - and, two 
months later (March 24th) he suggested 1770 as a better 
date: France would fight for Spain whenever she was called 
upon, he ordered Ossun to say to Grimaldi, but it could not 
be denied that in 1770 the two Courts would be in a better 
1. Ramsey, p. 181; C.D.M., 11, pp. 258-65. 
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shape than in 1769.1 Choiseul's further postponement was 
primarily due to his aversion to involve France in a war 
which under the present circumstances would only serve 
Spain's exclusive interests in America. It was for this 
reason that he regarded Grimaldi's war project of November 
28th, 1766, as worthless from the French point of view; 
France's colonial and European objectives had been ignored. 2 
Meantime in London, l"iasserano found no difficulty in 
carrying out Grimaldi's dilatory tactics. The English 
government showed no desire to pursue the line of policy 
that sounded so alarming in November 1766. From time to 
time, as Grimaldi suggested, Masserano raised the subject 
of the British establishment in the Falkland Islands to 
prevent the assumption that Spain was tacitly admitting 
British claim to them. The English ministers in their turn 
countered Masserano's reminders by referring to the Manila 
ransom money which Spain had refused to pay. Masserano 
grew more and more convinced that Britain looked upon the 
Manila ransom question as a mere bargaining counter in her 
negotiations with the Bourbon powers. The English govern-
ment would not fight over it; Britain's political instability 
1. C.D.M.,II, pp. 252-3; Blart, p. 90; Goebel, I;>p.259-60 • 
• 
2. Gil Munilla, p. 119. 
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and the growing unrest in the Thirteen Colonies convinced 
him that the Manila ransom money need not be paid. It was 
only the need to improve the standing of the Chatham 
administration in the eyes of the p~blic that forced the 
ministers for prestige reasons to keep the issue alive. 
Masserano's assessment of the British position was accurate. 
The English government seemed resigned to let the Manila 
ransom issue drop out of sight into the list of unsatisfied 
claims, except for the occasional reference to it as a 
counter in exchanges with France and Spain. l 
What were the reasons for this at a time when Britain 
might have pressed Spain to give in to her demands? The 
state of unpreparedness of the Bourbon powers and France's 
reluctance to be rushed into war had been duly reported. 
After January 1767 the Spanish and French representatives 
in London were acting in concert, but it was nonetheless 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 12 February 1767; no. 929, 
C.D.M.,II, pp. 258-65; 24 February, no. 945, 17 March, 
no. 956, and 22 June, no. 1040, A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 
6964; 12 August 1767, no. 1081, 1egO 6965. The new 
ambassador to the Spanish Court, Sir James Gray, 
mentioned the subject only once in conversation with 
Grima1di; Gray to She1burne, 28 February 1768, no. 22, 
secret, S.P. 94/179. Gray who had already represented 
Britain with Carlos III in Naples, was in Madrid from 
October 1767 to August 1769; B.D.R. 1689-lt89, pp. 76 and 136, and D.N.B. For his appointmen , cp. Brooke, 
pp. 35-7 and Horn, pp. 21, 87, 103 and 168. 
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clear that there had been an initial rift in Franco-Spanish 
understanding over the issues under discussion. Rochford 
advised h~s government to make good use of the favourable 
conjuncture, for as seen as the Bourbon allies were prepared 
they would be less accommodating. l Furthermore, the English 
ministers were privy, through Grimaldi's intercepted 
instructions to Masserano, to the.Spanish minister's 
designs to procrastinate and bide his time as the only way 
to avoid payment of the Manila ransom money and in order to 
speed up preparations to resist Britain's encroachments in 
America effectively.2 
When Rochford informed She1burne on 24 December 1766 
that Choiseu1 was now reluctant to continue discussing his 
arbitration proposal and appeared to support Spain,3 the 
secretary of state answered (on 2 January 1767) that the 
Manila ransom question could wait until some bappier moment 
1. Rocbford to She1burne, Paris, 7 February 1767 (secret), 
S.P. 78/272; Cbatham Correspondence,III, pp. 131-4. 
2. Add. 32300, ff.41-91, passim. For the interception and 
deciphering of foreign correspondence in London, see 
K.E11is, Tbe Post office in the Eighteenth Century, 
pp. 65-71. 
3. Choiseu1 to Guerchy, 24 December 1766, no. 230, C.P., 
Ang1eterre 471, ff. 375-80. 
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to obtain justice, for in the meantime, the considerable 
gain would accrue that the establishment in Port Egmont· 
remained open as a station in the vicinity of the Strait 
of Magellan which the passing of time could only strengthen, 
and as an effective wedge in Spain's exclusive claim to 
navigation on both sides of it. l This wasA~reat importance 
to Britain and here we find one explanation for the English 
attitude. The English government realized that to sacrifice 
the claim to the Falkland Islands for the Manila ransom 
money was shDrtsighted. They preferred to play Grimaldi's 
game of waiting. 
Another reason is that the French handing over to 
the Spaniards of Bougainville's establishment (Port St. 
Louis) in the East Falkland weakened the British case. 2 
Finally, the fundamental reason for Britain's weak 
attitude towards Spain in 1767, as towards France in 1768 
on the occasion of the j'rench annexation of Corsica, seems 
to lie in her political instability, financial difficulties, 
1. Add. 9452, ff. 10-4. 
2. Goebel, pp. 257-8. 
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and the worsening of the colonial dispute which required 
constant attention and ever-increasing resources. At the 
beginning of 1767 Chatham had his serious relapse of gout, 
which caused him to retire to Bath and to take to his bed. 
Qonway and Townshend jointly shared the lead of the Commons, 
but di£fered over the Charter for the East India Company. 
The measures adopted by Townshend regarding the Thirteen 
Colonies sharpened the attacks of the Opposition. The 
weakening of the Chatham administration resulted in the 
growing importance of the peace-loving Bedfordites, who 
wished to preserve peace in Europe in order to carry out 
their chosen American policies; by January, 1768, they had 
practically gained control of the ministry. Since December 
1767, and following upon Townshend's death in the late 
summer of that year, North was in charge of the exchequer 
and he also proved conciliatory in his attitude towards the 
Bourbon powers. The Bedfordite Weymouth succeeded Conway 
to the northern department on 20 January 1768 and later on, 
when Shelburne and Chatham resigned in October, he succeeded 
She1burne to the southern department, while Rochford replaced 
him in the northern department. l 
1. Sherrard, pp. 270-82; Watson, pp. 120-30. 
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All this explains why the British government did not act 
forcefully or exploit their advantages in the first Falkland 
Islands crisis; but the way in which Grimaldi had been able 
to rally Choiseul behind the Family Compact should not be 
forgotten. This gave Grimaldi the courage to stand firm and 
also influenced the situation when the second, and deCisive, 
Falkland Islands crisis blew up in 1770. 
The Spanish government was also encouraged to stand 
firm by reports from London of British continuing infil-
tration overseas. In the summer of 1767 the French and 
Spanish representatives to the English Court sent alarming 
information regarding the objectives of the English in Port 
Egmont; it was rumoured that they intended to enter first 
into commercial relations with the Patagonians and the 
T1erra de Fuego Indians, and eventually to form a colony 
which would protect their trade, prevent others from carrying 
it on, and provide them with a good base of operations in 
wartime. Their main objective was, however, Paraguay, the 
door to Peru: the disputed territories between the Spaniards 
and the Portuguese. Port Egmont, Masserano warned, could 
easily become the Jamaica of the South: the whole area from 
Patagonia to Paraguay might then become as troublesome as the 
Mosquito Shore question. Indeed, the English were also giving 
him some cause for alarm on this score, for they were trying 
to expand the territories granted to them for cutting 
logwood in the settlement of 1764.1 
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Masserano also drew the attention of the Spanish 
government to a possible alliance between Jesuits and the 
British, which would facilitate the latter's infiltration 
into Paraguay. The missions of the Jesuits in that 
territory might rebel against Spain's rule to retaliate 
against Spain's campaign, which started in April, 1767, to 
expel them from her metropolitan and colonial territories. 2 
In addition to these dangers arising from British 
presence in the Falkland Islands, the period after 1767 saw 
the reopening of an issue which had been a minor source of 
friction between Britain and Spain for a long time} that of 
illicit entry of British ships in the European and colonial 
harbours of Spain in the hope of forcing, eventually, 
recognition of such trade, and to gather in the meantime 
intelligence about Spain's defensive system in case war 
should break out between Spain and Britain. 
As ~e have already seen, the arrival of Carlos III in 
Spain marked the beginning of a conscious campaign to put 
1. A.G.S., Estado, le~o 81", ff. 1-8; also legajos 6968/6969, 
passim; cp. Calderon, pp. 189-190. 
2. Martin-Allanic, 11, pp.931-4l. 
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an end to illicit trade as part of a whole system of reforms 
which was quickening the economic tempo of the Spanish 
empire. The result was that the number of incddents 
between British ships and Spanish port authorities increased 
in the late 1760's. These quarrels receded into the back-
ground from 1773 to 1775, when Britain's increasing 
difficulties with her American colonies gave a new turn to 
trade relations between the two countries. Such friction 
did not perhaps constitute a cause for war; but it 
contributed very largely to maintain an atmosphere of 
hostility. On the eve of the second Falkland Islands crisis, 
the Spanish government was incensed by Britain's attempts to 
force her way into Spanish American trade. l 
But the Spanish government saw no reason to engage in 
discussions which might increase the danger of war. The 
time thus gained could be material to ensure eventual 
success. 
To this effect, Grimaldi wanted to make sure that the 
exp~lsion of the Jesuits was completed; he did not give much 
credit to reports from London of an Anglo-Jesuitical plot in 
1. Grimaldi to Masserano , 31 August 1767, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
6966. See also Arriaga to Grim.ldi and Grimaldi to 
Arriaga, 3 October 1769, A.G.S., Estado, legQ 6974. For 
a survey of this background of tension over trade and 
navigation, see Brown, H.A.H.R., V, pp.375-86, 449-64. 
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Spanish America, but he did not want to run any risks. l 
Secondly, Spain was engaged in negotiations with Portugal 
for a settlement of their dispute over boundaries in the 
River Plate. Grimaldi hoped that the settlement of this 
issue might resu~t in some political understanding on the 
Iberian peninsula. Portugal could play an important part 
in any future conflict between Britain and Spain. Grimaldi 
waited to see what came out of his exchanges with portugal. 2 
Thirdly, Grimaldi was fully conscious that Choiseul had 
suggested 1770 as a more suitable date for the show-down 
over the Falkland Islands.~ Finally, however certain 
everybody concerned was about the British establishment in 
the Falkland Islands or Halouines, the exact location had 
not yet been conclusively established in Madrid, nor was 
1. Grimaldi to Nasserano, 8 November 1767, A.G.S., Bstado, 
legO 6965; 28 }\larch 1768, legO 6968; 4 July 1768, legO 
6969. 
2. See below p. 419. 
3. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 2 March 1768, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4565, ordering Fuentes to stress to Choiseul that 
Arriaga's instructions of 22 February for the 
expulsion of the English from Port Egmont was not 
likely to lead to a grapple with Britain before 
1770. 
its strength known; nor indeed had Spain taken possession of 
the French establishment in the East Falkland. 
It was not until January, 1768, that the Bourbon 
powers were fully apprised of events in the Falklands up 
to April, 1767: the exact location of the British in the 
West Falkland, their visit to the French establishment in 
December, 1766, and the handing over of Port St. Louis to 
the Spaniards by Bougainville on 20 April 1767. All fears 
were now confirmed; furthermore, it was rumoured that the 
English might have formed two other establishments; in the 
Island Madre de Dios (off the coast of Chile) and Port 
Famine (on the north-eastern coast of the Strait of Magellan). 
The Spanish government now decided to resist the 
British by force. On 22 February 1768 Arriaga drafted the 
instructions for the authorities of Buenos Aires, Chile and 
Peru, to take the necessary measures to expel the English 
from their establishment in the Falklands, if they did not 
abandon it after being warned to depart, and to prevent the 
formation of future establishments. They were urged to make 
sure of their success. 
These instructions, after CarIos Ill's approval on the 
25th, were transmitted to the French Court. They arrived 
in Paris on 15 March, and were submitted to the French King 
for his approval, which he gave in the most explicit manner 
on the same day. 
They were not dispatched to America, however, until 
June, and the expedition that was fitted out in Spain to 
help the American authorities carry them out did not sail 
from Cadiz until October 15th. The expedition reached 
Montevideo on 3 January 1769, and the e~pulsion of the 
English from Fort Egmont took place on 10 June 1770. 1 
In the first place, France's approval is to be viewed 
as the expression of her opposition to British aggrandise-
ment anywhere. Indeed, in the summer of 1767, the French 
were informed by the governor of Santo Domingo, Ro,an, that 
the English had erected a fort in the turk's Islands which 
threatened French navigation in these waters. Although 
Shelburne explained to France's satisfaction in March, 
1768, that the English had neither formed nor intended to 
form a civil or military establishment in these islands, 
Choiseul insisted that Britain was pushing her infiltration 
in America too far. 2 The French made fresh attempts in 
1783 and 1789 to make the British renounce any claim to 
1. Martin-Allanic, 11, pp. 944-1038, passim. Hidalgo Nieto, 
pp. 23-86, 175-88. 
2. Shelburne said that it was only an agent who had been 
sent to investigate salt conditions and disputes between 
fishermen; the agent, Symer, had in fact applied for 
cannons and troops but the English government had refused 
his request. Shelburne showed Chatalet, the French 
ambassador, his correspondence with Symer to leave no 
doubt as to Britain's sincerity. A.G.S., Estado,legajo8 
6968 and 4681; Add.9242, ££.29-31. Cp. Renaut,p.128. 
these islands, but failing to obtain encouragement from 
Spain, on whose behalf they alleged to act, the islands 
continued to be regarded by the British as part of the 
Bahamas; in fact, they were given representation in the 
Bahamas assembly in 1799. 1 
Secondly, the British reaction confirmed the belief 
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held by the Bourbon powers that Britain was not in a position 
to force her views on them. Furthermore, several English 
ministers (Conway, Bedford, Hillsborough, Shelburne and 
Chatham himself) had expressed their indifference towards 
Port Egmont to the Bourbon representatives on different 
occasions. 2 Choiseul therefore believed that the Spanish 
decision to use force against the British establishment may 
not result in war. 
Thirdly, Choiseul had by now embarked upon a plan for 
the annexation of Corsica, to which I shall return presently. 
He intended to carry it out as quickly and quietly as he 
could, making full use of the impotence and ineffectiveness 
of British policies in these years. However, he might need 
the help of the Family Compact if Britain's reaction was un-
expectedly firm and, therefore, he meant to keep Spain well-
disposed. 
1. A.G.S., Estado, legO 4681, vaaaim; Renaut, pp-.354-5; 
A. Burns, HistorY of the Br~tlsh West Indies, pp.5l4,532 
and 668. 
2. Martin-Allanic, 11, pp.941-55, passim. 
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4. Spain and the French annexation of Corsica. 
Genoa's cession of Corsica to France originated in 
the long struggle of the former to retain the island 
against the Corsicans who were fighting for independence. 
This struggle was a continuous drain of the country's 
money and troops, and France, as Genoa's ally, had contrib-
uted to the cost of it. In 1768 Genoa decided to bring 
this expensive and prolonged war to an end. On 15 May 
1768, France and Genoa signed the Treaty of Versailles, 
which stipulated that in return for the aid that Genoa had 
already received from France and the payment of a yearly 
sum of 200,000 livres for a period of ten years, Genoa 
would cede Corsica to France. 
The Treaty shocked contemporaries and was regarded as 
the most striking diplomatic victory won by Choiseul between 
the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence 
over Britain. Tae acquisition of Corsica gave France more 
effectual control of the Western Mediterranean. Choiseul's 
triumph also raised the prestige of France and increased 
his. personal influence and international standing. 
The annexation was achieved with little or no oppos-
ition from London. Choiseul made skilful use of Britain's 
lack of a firm policy regarding Corsica as well as of the 
increasing weakness and disunity of the British Cabinet, 
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and of the o.ifficulties that Britain was encountering in 
her American colonies. Choiseul helped to paralyse Britain 
by stressing in London France's alliances with Spain and 
Austria. ':£lhe ]'amily Compact especially improved his hand, 
for the pacific section within the British Cabinet feared 
that opposition to France's annexation of Corsica could 
bring Spain into active support of Choiseul's policies and 
consequently increase the risk of a rupture between Britain 
and the Bourbon powers. 'llhese factors resulted in Britain's 
lack of action and enabled Choiseul to present the Bnglish 
government with a fait accompli which they could only 
reverse by beginning warlike operations. 
However, the completion of the ]'ranco-Genoese Treaty 
brought about a more resolute attitude in England. The 
French military occupation of the island got under way in 
the summer. It stirred British public opinion, which in 
its turn forced the government into more positive policies 
towards France. But they were to prove belated; the 
chance of checking Choiseul's advances was gone with the 
signing of the Treaty. 
The then secretary of state for the southern depart-
ment, Shelburne, based his protests against French action 
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in Corsica on two main contentions. First, the government 
maintained that the annexation was a breach of the status 
quo in Italy as provided in art. XV of the Treaty of 1748. 
It was also argued that such a transfer of territory should 
not be made without due regard to the interests of third 
parties and that the all over European balance of power 
should be preserved. Shelburne reminded Choiseul, in 
partial justification, of France's objections to a British 
settlement in the Turk's Islands on the grounds that it 
would injure French trade. l 
Shelburne seems to have entertained hopes of some 
equivalent concession from France if the English govern-
ment were to acquiesce in the Corsican annexation, and the 
Turk's Islands were suggested. Three months before, France 
had told London that she would not permit a British military 
establishment in the neighbourhood of Santo Domihgo. New 
Shelburne gave France to understand that Britain would go 
ahead with the settlement of the Turk's Islands if Corsica 
t . 2 was no g~ven up. Shelburne tried to interest the 
1. For the question of Corsica as a Franco-English issue, 
see "Anderson", pp.228-70. Cp. also Carutti, IV, pp. 
452-64. 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 17 June 1768, no.1363, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6968. 
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Austrian ambassador, Seilern, in the issue; but in vain. 
He also thought of sounding Spanish feelings on France's 
aggrandizement in Italy and her increasing sway over the 
Western Mediterranean; but he did not pursue this line, 
for he rightly expected little support from this quarter 
in view of the existing closeness between the Bourbon 
+epresentatives to St. James's.l 
Shelburne's helplessness was not only due to lack of 
international support. The position of the English govern-
ment was seriously undermined in Paris by the increasing 
evidence of divisions in the British Cabinet over the 
Corsica affair which the ministers did nothing to hide from 
the Bourbon representatives. Reports from London made 
Choiseul more confident; he took little notice of Shel-
burne's protests. For while Grafton and Shelburne seemed 
prepared to use force to halt the French, Weymouth and the 
Bedford group were opposed. This was well known in Paris. 
Weymouth admitted to the French ambassador, Chatelet,2 as 
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early as May 28th, that he cared little about Corsica. 
Eventually the pacific party gained the upper hand, and by 
June 17th, Shelburne had to make it clear that Britain 
would not go to war over Corsica. A few days later, 
Chatelet felt sure that no violent action was to be 
expected from the British government and availed himself 
of the permission Choiseul had given him to pay a short 
visit to France. Shelburne also gave Rochford permission 
to return to London for a short time as the newly-
appointed charge d'affaires at Paris, Robert Walpole, had 
arrived there. It was inferred that Britain had accepted 
the French annexation of Corsica. l 
Spain's attitude towards the Corsican affair was one 
of apprehensive expectation. She was now making the last 
preparations to enable the Spanish AmericmJ authorities 
to ensure success against the British establishment in the 
Falklands. As suggested by Choiseul, Grimaldi planned this 
action so as to avoid war, if such were the outcome, before 
1770. Corsica might bring war earlier than expected, 
before Spain was ready to act in the South Seas, and might 
widen the conflict over the British establishment in Port 
Egmont to European issues. 2 In respect of the French 
1. Chatelet left London in early July, and Rochford left 
Paris on September 1st, eight days after Walpole's 
arrival; B.D.R., p. 23. 
2. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 20 June 1768, A.G.S., Estado, 
le gO 4565. 
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annexation itself, as Shelburne surmised Spain no doubt had 
her misgivings about France's control over that island, for 
such sway over the Western Mediterranean would make Spain 
dependent upon France's good will for her communications 
with Naples. 
Grimaldi was therefore not eager to encourage Ohoiseul; 
nor indeed did he wish to appear committed to France before 
Britain. His main concern after the news of the Franco-
Genoese Treaty of May 15th was to find whether Britain was 
likely to adopt positive measures to halt the French. 
Reports from Masserano and Fuentes conveyed the belief that 
the English did not mean to take any action. Grimaldi, who 
could corroborate this impression from his own experience 
with the English representative in Madrid, Gray, seemed well 
pleased with the British attitude, especially since the 
English had not mentioned this issue to the Spaniards. 
Spain need not be committed in any way, Grimaldi was glad to 
say to Masserano. l 
On June 27th, however, Fuentes reported a conversation 
he had had with Ohoiseul in which the French minister 
appeared not yet entirely certain of the pacific intentions 
1. Grimaldi-Masserano correspondence, July 1768, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6969 passim. 
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of Britain. He did not explicitly ask for Spanish support, 
but he referred to Spain's grievances against Britain in the 
hope of rousing his allies. Choiseul warned Fuentes that 
Britain was unremittingly encroaching on Spanish territories, 
and expressed his surprise that the expedition to expel the 
English from Port Egmont had not yet been dispatched. 
British infiltration in America, Choiseul urged, could bring 
war forward and therefore it was necessary to improve the 
state of the Spanish armed forces for such emergency. In 
respect of Portugal, Choiseul who had been informed by 
Fuentes of the break-down of the negotiations between Madrid 
and Lisbon, was aware that Spain might envisage using force 
against her neighbour as part and parcel of the general 
conflict with the British; Choiseul therefore sought to 
humour the Spanish government by his willingness to prepare 
a plan of operations along the lines suggested by Aranda. l 
Grimaldi replied by return of post that the instructions 
for tbe exp~lsion of the British from Port Egmont had already 
been sent in June, bu~ that the result of such orders was not 
expected before 1770. As for Portugal, Grimaldi explained 
that military preparations to put the army in good shape 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 27 June 1,68, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 4566. For Aranda s war plan 
see below pp. 4,,..;5. 
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were under way and the plan for joint action as outlined 
by Aranda should be sent in a few days. He hardly 
mentioned Corsica; despite continuing reports that it was 
not likely to be the cause of war, he was reluctant to 
commit himself. He was dragging his feet lest Corsica 
should anticipate events, and ordered Fuentes to remind 
Choiseul that the action against Port Egmont should not 
lead to a clash with Britain before 1770, as suggested by 
the ~~ench minister himself in January, 1767. 1 
Meanwhile, relations between London and Paris 
developed along more pacific lines. Choiseul wisely 
avoided unnecessary discussions that might prolong ill 
feelings in Britain. Only Chatham's return to activity 
could have stirred the government into more positive 
attitudes, and the :French government grew confident when 
reports from London reassured Choiseul that Chatham's ill-
ness was genuine and prevented him from taking part in 
politics. Moreover, at the beginning of September rumours 
of Shelburne's approaching fall were sent to Choiseul; the 
fall of Shelburne could only mean that the more pacific 
section of the government would be able to pursue their 
policies freely. 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 4 July 1768; see also his 
instructions of August 1st, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4566. 
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However, Shelburne, realizing that ~ica could not 
be saved, attempted to secure some sort of equivalent for 
Britain in return for her acquiescence in France's new 
acquisition. Re had hinted as early as June, when he 
mentioned the Turk's Islands, that the Manila ransom money 
would be an acceptable return for Corsica. He raised the 
subject afresh in conversation with Chatalet with a view 
to make Spain pay the compensation 'fee'. Shelburne 
proposed that if France managed to persuade Spain to pay 
the ransom money, Britain would say no more about the 
Corsican question. But the French ambassador gave an 
. 1 
evas~ve answer. 
Early in the autumn Shelburne approached France 
again, proposing the settlement of either the question 
of the fortifications of Dunkirk, which he claimed were 
built against the stipulations of the Treaty of 176;, or 
the Manila ransom issue as a satisfactory equivalent for 
Corsica. But the resignation of Shelburne on October 19th 
marked the end of these discussions for equivalents. 
Weymouth, since the 21st his successor in the southern 
department, did not pursue them. Indeed, the new ministry 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi, 8 July 1768, no. 1;80, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6969. 
appeared from the beginning more moderate and almost un-
animous in their condemnation of a forceful policy over 
Corsica. ~'he appointment of Harcourt to the .English 
b . P . 1 h f f 1 1 . em assy ~n ar~s - e was 0 peace u ean1ngs and 
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related to the wife of the former French ambassador to the 
English vourt, Guerchy - was taken as a further token of 
Britain's sincere wishes to avoid an argument; as it was 
the fact that Cumberland's voyage from Mahon to Lierna was 
suspended for fear that contrary winds might take him to 
Corsica and thus irritate the French. If any uneasiness was 
felt in Faris, it was due not to deliberate opposition on 
the part of the British government but to fears of popular 
reaction in Britain as in 1739, when popular clamour brought 
war against Spain. However, the resumption of Parliament on 
8 November and following sessions proved that the govern-
ment was not to be stampeded by popular or parliamentary 
pressure. All seemed to indicate that France's annexation 
of Corsica was an accepted fact. 2 
1. B.D.R., p. 24. His instructions are printed in B.D.I., 
France, IV, p.108. 
2. Masserano's reports October/November,1768, A.G.S.,Estado, 
legO 6969. Cp. tlAnderson",pp.254-8. After the fall of 
Shelburne, Hochford and Bedford, the most anti-French 
members of the government, did something to keep the tear 
of war alive and to sow discord between the Bourbon powers 
(Bedford proposed to Masserano to abandon Fort Egmont if 
France gave up CODsica);but with little success. Masserano 
to Grimaldi, 9 December l768,no. 1505, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6969; "Anderson", pp. 269-70. 
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In the meantime Grimaldi had remained quiet, welcoming 
British reluctance to mention the issue to Spain. After his 
expressions to Choiseul in July, the Spanish minister wished 
to appear uncommitted in the eyes of Britain for fear that 
any sign of encouragement to France might stir Britain's 
suspicions and thus increase the dangers of an early war. 
When asked for diplomatic support, however, Grimaldi 
readily complied in respect of Austria and Naples. On 
llecember 6th Fuentes reported that Choiseul had communicated 
to him that there was some uneasiness in those two 
countries over France's annexation of Corsica, and asked 
Spain to persuade Tanucci of the importance that Corsica 
had for the Bourbon powers.1 Grimaldi replied on December 
13th that there was no need to pay any attention to 
Austria's opposition. As for Naples, Grimaldi was to 
explain to Tanucci France's motives: the Spanish minister 
added that the annexation of Corsica ought to be upheld 
"por la templanza que (Choiseul) e por el de la activa 
guerra, si las circunstancias obligassen ya a preferir1e".2 
1. A.G.S., Estado, legO 4570. Cp. tlAnderson", p. 268, 
note 105. 
2. A.G.S., Estado, legO 4570. 
258 
The attitude of the Spanish minister, all the more 
surprising considering that only two months earlier he bad 
reminded Choiseul of the need to avoid giving Austria any 
reason for complaint,l seems to indicate that Grimaldi 
was showing a more bellicose mood as he became convinced 
that Britain did not deem Corsica a casus belli. The date 
originally envisaged for the impending crisis over the 
British establishment in the Falklands was drawing near. 
Some sign of encouragement to France might well bear fruit 
in French support for Spain in the future. 
1. See below p.26a. 
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5. The Falkland Islands Crisis. 
a) The international background: Spain and the Russo-
Turkish War. 
After 1768 the Corsican question was overshadowed by 
more important events in the East which required all the 
attention of the Western chanceries. 
A Rusao-Turkish war broke out in October, 1768, as a 
result of Turkey's objection to the growing influence of 
Russia upon Poland after the election of Poniatowski to 
the Polish throne, but also as a result of encouragement 
from France for a Turkish declaration of war. France desired 
to sustain and intensify Russo-Turkish antagonism in order 
to divert Russia, first, from Poland, and then, from Sweden. 
The first reaction of the Central powers to the out-
break of the Russo-Turkish war was non-committal. Both 
Prussia and Austria desired peace. But the clear superiority 
of Russia over Turkey shown in the first year of the war 
alarmed both courts. Austria reared that Russia might push 
Turkey too far back, and Prussia resented the disruption of 
the balance of power in the East. This similarity of views 
drew them together; they envisaged jOint action to neutralise 
the Empire and to pacify Eastern Europe. l 
1. See the letter of Nugent, the Austrian ambassador in 
Berlin, of 26 November 1768 with the account of his inter-
view of the 15th with Frederick 11, in Arneth,VIII,pp. 
562-4. 
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As for their respective allies, Frederick explained 
to Russia that his contacts with the Austrians would not 
damage Russo-Prussian relations; Russia had to rest con-
tent with the explanations of her only ally.l Kaunitz 
for his part availed himself of the Franco-Prussian contacts 
in 1768 in order to silence any objection from J!'rance. 
These contacts had begun in 1765, allegedly for the 
purpose of renewing the commercial treaty of 1753, which 
had expired in 1763; but both France and Prussia visualized 
certain political advantages being Sained by parading their 
friendship before Europe. Nothing came out of it. 2 
In June, 1768, a certain Prussian envoy, Meny,3 
approached Choiseul with a project for a commercial treaty 
and proposed the appointment of representatives to negotiate 
the agreement. Choiseul thereupon permitted discussions at 
the Hague between the French representative, Breteui1, and 
his Prussian counterpart, Thu1emeyer. Ge1tz was appointed 
minister plenipotentiary to Paris and Guines was designed 
as his French counterpart in Berlin. Four months elapsed, 
however, before they set off to their respective destinations.L 
1. Kaplan, pp.114-8. 
2. See above pp.' \!l~./. • 
3. For Many, see Corr.de Broglie,II,p.318, no.l. 
4. Hammond, R. H., XXY (1884), pp. 76-82. 
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The exchange of diplomatic representatives did not 
immediately bring about a change of attitude on the part 
of either Frederick 11 or Choiseul. Each side found them-
selves tied by their former treaties with Austria and 
Russia, and each hoped that the other country would commit 
herself first. When the first proposals from Prussia 
arrived in Paris, in June 1768, Choiseul was involved in 
the Corsican question and it is not difficult to detect 
some desire on the part of the French minister to make 
use of them in order to strengthen his position in respect 
of Britain, while appearing reluctant to come into any 
agreement with Prussia for the sake of the ]'rench alliance 
with Austria. l 
When the Spanish government was informed by Choiseul 
of the intended resumption of diplomatic relations between 
France and Prussia, Grimaldi expressed his uneasiness about 
a Franco-Prussian rapprochement, for it might impair 
Bourbon relations with Vienna. On 19 October 1768 he 
ordered Fuentes to remind Choiseul that Austro-Prussian 
1.Choiseul to Breteuil, 25 August 1768; Flammermont, 
Rapport, pp. 50-1; Breteuil's instructions of the 28th; 
Recueil, XXIII (Hollande), pp.290-8. Cp_ Corr. de 
Broglie, 11, pp.148-50; and R.Hammond, "La Mission du 
comte de Guines a Berlin", ~., XXXVII (1888),pp.;22-48. 
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antagonism was the best way of keeping Austria attached to 
France and that in the present state of affairs the friend-
ship of Austria was the more ir.portant to the Bourbon powers 
if they were to avoid complications in Italy while fighting 
Britain and Portugal. Grimaldi advised that the exchange 
of representatives between I'rance and Prussia should not 
take place unless Austria approved of it. l This is yet 
another example of how Grimaldi tried to strengthen the 
Austro-l!'rench alliance, and of his anxiety whenever ]'rance 
appeared to move closer to Prussia. 
Choiseul no doubt was also anxious about Austria's 
reaction and had already agreed with Fuentes to contact her 
ambassador in Paris, Mercy, to whom the French minister 
explained that the exchanges with Prussia were only a means 
to seek Prussian support against Britain's and Russia's 
ambitions in the North. The Austrian diplomatist seemed 
satisfied with the explanation. 2 
For a while it looked as if the exchange of ministers 
between Paris and Berlin might not take place; as Choiseul 
said to Fuentes at the end of October, Frederick II resented 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 19 October 1768, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4566. 
2, Fuentes to Grimaldi, 3 October 1768, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4566. 
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the publicity given to the matter in France and Choiseul's 
decision to acquaint Austria with the negotiations. A 
more important obstacle was Choiseul's condition that the 
negotiations for a commercial treaty would not continue if 
Prussia meant them to be of a political nature. l Grimaldi 
expressed his satisfaction over these difficulties;! but 
when the exchange of representatives took place at the 
be~inning of 1769 and negotiations started, Grimaldi did 
not protest since Mercy seemed at ease after Choiseul's 
assurances. He suggested on 6 February, however, probably 
as a counter move, the convenience of a marriage between 
Louis XV and an Austrian princess as a way to re-affirm 
Austro-]'rench links. 3 
Geltz and Guines arrived at their destinations at 
the beginning of February, 1769, but there seemed little 
hope of an early .uccess.4 Both Frederick II and Choiseul 
aimed at discovering each other's intentions. The mere 
resumption of diplomatic relations favoured the Prussian. 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 31 October 1768, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4570. 
2. Griillaldi to Fuentes, 14 November 1768, Ibid. 
3. Memoria de Amat, p. 77. 
4. Hammond, ~., XXV (1884), p.82; Flammermont, 
Rapport, pp.52-4. 
He did not wish to enter upon any negotiation of political 
significance with France, but the resumption of relations 
with Paris was enough to sow dissension between Austria and 
France and give Austria a pretext to disregard ]'rance's 
objections to Austria's desire to act with Prussia for the 
pacification of Eastern Europe. 
Frederick 11 and Joseph 1I accordingly met at Neisse, 
in Prussian Silesia, in August. They agreed to neutralize 
Germany, to work for a prompt pacification of Poland, and 
for the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war. Soon after 
this meeting, they found that they had to exert themselves 
to stop further expansion of the Russo-Turkish war. A 
Russian fleet had appeared in the Mediterranean at the end 
of the year and Frederick 11 felt that this might give 
Choiseul the means to engaSB Spain and to expand the con-
flict into a world war in view of the tense relations be-
tween Britain and the Family Compact countries. They 
fe~ed that a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean might 
help to establish Russia as the most influential and power-
ful nation of the East. Austria and Prussia therefore 
attempted to bring the war to an end through their mediation 
from the close of 1769 onwards. The first formal proposal 
came from Austria in June, 1770; she suggested as the basis 
for mediation the status quo ante belIum and Russia's· 
evacuation of Poland. 
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Britain at the time of the outbreak of the war and 
during its first year was reluctant to adopt a positive 
attitude. The Grafton administration, in view of the situ-
ation in the American colonies, was bent on peace, as they 
had shown over the Manila ransom issue and the Corsican 
question. Yet the prestige of Britain and her position in 
the East had to be considered, and the English government 
was forced to intervene at least diplomatically in the 
Eastern question. 
Since 1763 the English had sought the friendship and 
alliance of Russia but the latter had always given as a 
condition sine qua non for an alliance that English help 
should be forthcoming if Russia were involved in war with 
Turkey. Britain did not want to lose Turkish trade, and 
what came to be known as the'~urkish clause" stood in the 
way of an Anglo-Russian uIlderstanding. When war broke out 
in the East, Russia requested naval help. Britain tried to 
parry her by offering her services as mediator; mediation 
might enable her to maintain British prestige in the East 
and the balance of power without antagonizing either Turkey 
or Russia. But in these mediation efforts she had to 
compete with similar attempts on the part of Prussia, 
Austria and France. 
Throughout 1769 Russia grew more and more confident. 
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However, she still wished for British help, and to obtain 
it, was willing to give up the "Turkish clause" in return 
for subsidies to further Russo-British interests in 
Stockholm. Britain's parsimonious policies weakened her 
chances of an understanding with Russia still further. Yet 
Britain wanted the Russian alliance and hoped to regain 
their confidence by helping their fleet in its voyage from 
the Baltic to the Mediterranean at the end of 1769 S?d 
beginning of 1770. Britain was prompted not oLly by her 
desire to make Russia favour an alliance, but also by the 
hope of commercial advantages which she expected for the 
aid given, and by her hostility to France; the presence of 
the Russians in the Mediterranean might impair France's 
influence with Turkey. 
The aid given by Britain to the Russian fleet gave the 
French the opportunity to prejudice the Porte against 
London, and to suggest a Franco-Turkish treaty to guarantee 
the security of the Levant Seas. This advance was not 
welcomed in Constantinople, for although the Turks under-
stood the hostile implications of Britain's attitude, they 
would not do anything to antagonize her and were ready to 
consider Britain's mediation if necessary. Such a dis-
position on the part of the Porte led Choiseul to alter his 
policies. At the end of 1769, he instructed his ambassador 
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to the Porte, Saint-Priest, to stop encouraging the Turks 
to a more energetic prosecution of the war and ordered him 
to work for an alliance with Turkey for the time being. 
A change in Turkey's attitude came about as the 
result of the approach of the Russian fleet to Constantinople. 
In April, 1770, the Turks broached the idea of a treaty with 
France to Saint-Priest. The matter was discussed in France 
and on 16 June 1770 Choiseul wrote to Saint-Priest that he 
agreed to the conclusion of a treaty of guarantee in return 
for stipulations in favour of French trade in the Levant. 
Nevertheless, Choiseul did not show any immediate willing-
ness to send ships to the Levant to support the ~urks against 
the Russians. We shall return presently to Choiseul's 
attitude and his motives. 
In the meantime at Chesne (June 24th), the Turkish 
fleet was annihilated by the Russian one and the Turks, 
fearing a Russian attack on the capital, turned for help, 
especially naval, wherever it could be found, determined 
not to be hurried into a humiliating peace. l France, the 
country most likely to give such aid, cautiously answered 
that no help could be given before May 1771. The Porte now 
1. For the battle of Chesne and the relatively small 
rewards which accrued to the Russian side, see W.C. 
Cbapman, "Prelude to Cbesne", The Mariner 8 Mirror, 
LII (1966), pp. 61-76. 
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turned to Austria; her mediation was the only one likely to 
be accepted by both belligerants. Britain's mediation would 
cause France to want to be included, and France's mediation 
would never be acceptable to Russia. Furthermore, the fact 
that Prussia, Russia's ally, was acting in close concert 
with Austria to bring the war to an end, while France 
seemed to support the mediation of Austria, made it the more 
feasible. After the victorious advance of the Russians 
during the summer, the Porte made a formal request that 
Austria and Prussia should mediate. l 
The main consequence of Turkey's move was that the 
influence of Britain and France in the East decreased and 
that of the Central powers increased. The rivalries between 
the two countries had contributed to bring it about. 
Britain, neglected by Turkey, was now concentrating 
on limiting or destroying French influence in the 
Mediterranean. Half-unconsciously, the British government 
rendered the Russians an invaluable service by preventing 
France from interfering in the Mediterranean for fear of 
1. Pol. Corr., XXX, pp. 103-4, 132-5. 
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retaliatory British action. l 
It was chiefly this fear that made Choiseul cautious, 
but other factors also contributed to restrain the French 
minister. 
Choiseul's position was difficult. In the first place, 
he certainly had grounds which could help him to arouse the 
nation against Britain. First, the Russian fleet, aided by 
Britain, threatened France's plan for the Mediterranean, 
which Choiseul looked on as a Bourbon preserve. 2 Secondly, 
the English had acted against the French factory in Chander-
nagore, north of Calcutta in West Bengal. In 1768 the 
French had built a moat around this establisbment for the 
alleged purpose of draining the water. The English 
authorities in Calcutta, however, argued that the moat was 
a fortification and therefore a violation of article 11 of 
the Treaty of 1763. The French refused to fill in the moat, 
whereupon the Calcutta Council filled it in in May 1769. 3 
1. In June, 1770, a hint from Choiseul that France might send 
two ships to Morea elicited from Weymouth the response 
that this would be regarded as a threat to the peace of 
Europe. For the first two years of the Russo-Turkish war, 
see "Anderson",pp.78-l59; see also his article, "Great 
Britain and the Russian Fleet", Slavonic and East European 
Review,XXXI(1952),pp.148-63, and kaplan, pp.90-130. 
2. Fuentes to Gri~1di, 9 July 1?70,no.509,A.G.S.,Estado,legO 
4575J;~'Anderson" ,pp.336-8, points out that France was on 
the point of making the Mediterranean a French lake from 
the commercial point of view, and that only the outbreak 
of war in 1793 prevented this. 
3. I am indebted for the details of' this incident to ~~. 
Brian Kennedy, who is preparing a thesis on Anglo-
French rivalry in India. 
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Thirdly, Britain's thrust into the Facific, that is the 
occupation of the Falkland Islands, and her encroachments 
in Spanish America were also resented in Paris, especially 
since British activity overseas emphasized France's slow 
progress. l Last but not least, there were the pacific 
leanings of the GraftoD administration, interpreted by the 
French as the result of Britain's increasing difficulties in 
her American possessions, her political instability and the 
f h f ' 2 poor state 0 er ~nances. 
Furthermore, from a personal point of view, Choiseul 
may have entertained the idea of war as a means to render 
his political situation secure. From November, 1768, 
Choiseul began to feel the opposition of a clique gathered 
round Louis XV's new mistress, Madame Du Barry. Choiseul, 
hampered by the open dislike shown to the newcomer by his 
wife, his sister the Duchess of Gramont, who wanted the 
position for herself, and his ladyfriends, failed to win 
Du Barry's confidence. In June, 1769, he was thinking of 
1. Minor sources of friction between France and Britain, though 
still of some significance, were the question of French 
fortifications in Dunkirk and Britain's unfriendly be-
haviour towards French fishermen in Newfoundland. 
2. Early in 1769 Choiseul for the first time used the 
American struggle for independence as a counter in his 
relations with Britain over Corsica; he also advised 
Grimaldi to establish contacts with the American insurgents 
for the purpose of trade. Choiseu1 to Ossun, 7 February 
1769 (copy), A.G.S., Estado,legO 4571; "Anderson", pp. 
265-6. 
• 
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retiring rather than wait to be dismissed; and by the 
beginning of the summer of the following year, he pondered 
in conversation with the Austrian and the cipanish represent-
atives that only a war might secure his political future 
with the King. l 
But there were also weighty considerations against a 
full-scale war against Britain at this stage. First, 
France's navy was not as well-equipped as Choiseul would have 
liked; in 1763 he stated that France would need 80 men-of-war 
to fight Britain successfully; in 1771 she had only 64. 2 
As for the Spanish naval forces, Ossun reported in March 
that she had made good progress in her preparations, but 
three months later he did not sound so optimistic. 3 On the 
other hand, military and naval preparations in France, should 
Ohoiseul have envisaged war, required financial backing but 
it was not easily accessible to him, for in charge of the 
Treasury as controller general since December, 1769, was 
Terray, one of the main political figures of the Du Barry 
clique; he opposed Choiseul's defence expenditure, 
emphasizing the b$d state of France's credit. 
1. Corr. de Mercy,I,p.59; Flammermont,pp.139-55; Blart,pp. 
143-164. 
2. G.Lacour-Gayet, La Marine mi1itaire de la France sous le 
regne de Louis XV, pp.419-20. Cp.iiAnderson", p.281. 
3. Blart, p.l54; Rousseau,II,p.69 and note 1. 
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Secondly, late in June reports of a visit to Port 
Egmont by two Spanish frigates in February reached Paris. 
The English secretary of state, Weymouth, explained to the 
French representative that the SRaniards had only protested 
in a moderate manner against British presence in the 
Falklands, but the business world was alarmed by rumours of 
Spanish violence against the English establishment. Although 
it was generally believed in London that Port Egmont was not 
worth a war, it would be difficult for the English government 
to abandon it without losing face, especially if Spain 
adopted strong policies. l Choiseul realized the danger of 
war on this score at a time when it would benefit Spain more 
than France. He no doubt preferred to find out first whether 
Spain was wil]~~O consider France's interests elsewhere. 
Thirdly, Austria might object to a Franco-~urkish treaty. 
Choiseul speculated that it might be feasible to work out a 
maritime alliance which would not affect Austria's pre-
dominantly territorial interests. The French minister 
envisaged a treaty of guarantee of the ~urkish seas and 
islands in the Mediterranean in return for commercial 
advantages. Since Austria was not a maritime power, she 
would not - it was hoped - object to France's naval 
1. Martin-Allanic, 11, pp. 996-9. 
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engagements with the Porte. On the whole, however, 
Choiseul preferred to wait and see what Austria's next move 
would be and how the campaign would progress. 
Choiseul, therefore, seemed to have no warlike 
intention at this stage. The international situation was 
still too fluid. Choiseul now preceeded to sound the 
Spanish Court. On 19 June, three days after sending 
instructions to Saint-Priest to initiate preliminary talks 
for a treaty with the Porte, the French minister wrote to 
Fuentes a detailed memorandum offering to include Spain in 
the projected treaty of guarantee with the Turks. He 
argued that the fact that Turkey was in a difficult plight 
and needed help urgently would make her more agreeable to 
grant commercial adVantages in the Levant; he also explained 
how it was hoped that Austria would not object to such a 
treaty. If Carlos III agreed to join France, Choiseul 
suggested, France intended to go ahead with the negotiations 
in Constantinople on behalf of the two Bourbon powers. But 
the French minister did not mean to precipitate events; the 
treaty that he was referring to would not involve the 
Bourbon powers in the pre.ent Russo-Turkish war. l 
1. Copy of Choiseul's "Memoire" of 19 June 1770 enclosed 
in Fuentes to Grimaldi, 9 July, no. 509, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4575. See also Fuentes to Choiseul, 5 July 1770, 
C.P., Espagne 560, f.17. 
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un July 7th, Choiseul instructed Frances to lay before 
the English government a formal complaint at the use of 
force against the French at Chandernagore. The same day he 
instructed Ossun to find out from Griwaldi whether Spain 
would support France in the event of war with Britain over 
the Chandernagore incident; the time was perhaps ripe for a 
successful one, Choiseul added. Despite these expressions, 
Choiseul sounded anxious when he ordered Ossun to enquire in 
Madrid about the visit of the two Spanish frigates to Port 
1 Egmont. 
It seems therefore that the French minister was now 
trying to check Spain by bringing home to them that if she 
expected help from France in the event of a conflict over 
the Falkland Islands, the latter~i Indian and Nediterranean 
commitments would have to be recognized. Anticipating 
Choiseul's reaction to Grimaldi's reply, one might add that 
the French minister was perhaps adopting this attitude for 
the purpose of moderating the Spaniards in respect of the 
British establishment in the Falkland Islands. 
Choiseul's offer to include Spain in the projected 
treaty of guarantee with the Parte was welcomed by the 
Spanish government, who discussed it at great length. 
1. Flammernlont, pp.156-7; Blart, pp.164-5. 
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A commercial arrangement or treaty with the Porte and 
its nominal subjects the Dey of Algiers, the Bey of Tunis, 
the Pasha of Tripoli, and the Emperor of Morocco - had 
since 1718 been a cherished ambition of the Spaniards 
engaged in the Levant trade and of officials and ministers 
responsible for the advancement of the Spanish navy. 
In this way they hoped to put a stop to the irritating 
and costly piratical attacks on Spanish commerce of the 
Barbary corsairs. Despite the general decline of the naval 
power of the Muslim states during the eighteenth century, 
the Barbary States, particularly the strongest of them, 
Morocco and Algiers, could effectively impede or even 
destroy the trade of nations too weak or too distant to 
resist their raids. The growth of Britis~ and French naval 
power enabled these countries to protect their shipping, 
but Spain's trade had been exposed to attack and seizure 
by the pirates, which - in its turn - had restrained the 
development of her shipping and increased the difficulties 
of manning her navy. The French diplomat Favier wrote in 
1773 that Spanish shipping in the Mediterranean was rare due 
to fear of the Barbary corsairs. The Spaniards, he reported, 
put their trade under the protection of foreign flags. l 
1. -
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This state of affairs benefitted Britain's carrying 
trade; it also helped to prevent the development of 
Spanish naval power. Consequently, Britain tried to hinder 
any improvement in Hispano-Muslim relations, while herself 
maintaining good relations with the Barbary States, in 
order to safeguard also the adequate provisioning of 
Gibraltar and Minorca, the places on which the maintenance 
of British power in the ~lediterranean largely depended. 
France benefitted from bad Hispano-Muslim relations 
too. As a consequence of this hostility, she had a 
considerable share in Spain's coastal trade. Her position 
with the Barbary States was easier; her traditional 
alliance with the Turks was an initial advantage in any 
negotiations with North African rulers. Relations between 
the ~orte and E'rance increased in importance after the 
commercial treaty of 1740, which gave the French the 
treatment of most-favoured-nation, the assurance of support 
in any dealings with the Barbary States and the political 
advantage of a permanent representation with the Sultan. 
France also signed a commercial treaty with Morocco, 
on 28 May 1767, which improved her position still further. l 
1. For Franco-British commercial competition in tae Mediterr-
anean and a general survey of the Barbary States in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, see "Anderson", pp. 
23-5,42-61, and 284-334. See also P.Grillon,"La 
correspondence du consul ••• Chenier",R.H.M.C.,X(1963),p.?O; 
and J.Caille,"L'ambassade du comte de Breugnon a Marrakech 
en 1767",R.H.D., III,(1961), pp.245-74. 
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For commercial considerations as well as those of 
naval power and prestige, Spain was badly in need of some 
arrangement with Turkey and the Barbary States; a forcible 
solution was beyond the possibilities of the Spanish navy.l 
Many believed it was preferable to reach an understanding 
with the Porte on commercial matters with stipulations that 
the Turks would use their good offices to prevaiL upon their 
nominal subjects, Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, and the 
independent state of Morocco to arrange individual treaties 
with Madrid. 
However, progress in this direction was not easy. The 
difficulties that stood in the way during the first half of 
the eighteenth century were almost unsurmountable. 2 
First, there was the immemorial hostility between 
Christian and Moor, which Spain's territorial holdings in 
1. Even in 1775, after the naval reforms carried out during 
the early part of Carlos Ill's reign, a large-scale 
expedition sent against Algiers, the most pertinacious 
2. 
and dangerous of all, ended in complete failure; subsequent 
attempts to bring her to heel in 1784 and 1785 failed also; 
below, p.~58. 
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North Africa and the activities of the Barbary corsairs 
did nothing to alleviate. Spain had Ceuta, Melilla and 
V€dez - wanted by filorocco - and uran and Ners-el-Kebir -
wanted by Algiers. 
Secondly, the Turks, and in this respect they were not 
different from any Barbary ruler, sincerely believed that 
the Christian powers were in need of them and expected to 
be courted by them. This, apart from considerations of 
prestige, entailed considerable expense, for the Porte 
demanded presents and services for any treaty, alliance or 
concession that the Christian powers asked from her. Any 
negotiated agreement with Turkey, was a purchased agreement 
and as such "worth its weight in gold".l 
~hirdly, the naval power of Britain and France repres-
ented for Turkey a guarantee against the ambitions of Russia 
and Austria, whereas the weak state of Spain as a maritime 
power could not offer a desirable substitute, should the 
1. Fuentes' "Observaciones sabre un preyecto de alianza 
con el Gran Senor", A.G.S., Estado, legO 4575. Cp. 
"Anderson", pp. 327-32, who gives a bright account of 
the need to give presents as the "indespensable 
lubricant without which the wheels of diplomatic inter-
course could scarcely be made to turn". In this 
connection see also Grillon, R.H.M.C., X(lq6~), pp. 
75-6, for the cupidity of the Emperor of M.rocco. 
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Porte lose France's long-standing friendship or gain 
Britain's hostility. The Turks therefore took notice of 
their reactions and showed reluctan~to enter into any 
agreement that Britain might oppose or France find fault 
with. 
Despite these difficulties, by the middle of the 
century the hope of a treaty with the Porte and subsequent 
agreements of peace and commerce with the Barbary States 
had taken firm root, and Carlos Ill's arrival in Spain in 
1759 spelt the end of objections on moral grounds to a 
treaty with Muslims still held by some reactionary circles 
in Spain. "The nation, or at least the most sensible part 
of it - Fuentes observed - is sufficiently enlightened to 
be aware of the advantages of such an alliance (with 
Turkey) and knows that religious differences could never 
. 1 justify to live at war with any other power." 
As King of Naples, Carlos III had succeeded in signing 
a commercial treaty with the Porte in 1740, in spite of 
France's efforts to prevent it, and in spite of the initial 
1. Fuentes' "Observaciones ••• ". A similar view was 
held by Aranda, the leader of the "Aragonese" 
party, to which Fuentes belonged; Danvila, IV, 
p. 216. 
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distrust of Turkey, who feared that Naples might have 
acted on behalf of Spain. l When he came to Spain, one of 
his first tasks was to initiate negotiations with the 
Turks on the basis of the Neapolitan Treaty of 1740. 
Tanucci supported the Spanish case in Constantinople and 
lent Carlos III the services of the Neapolitan represent-
ative there, Ludolf, who was at the time preparing the 
renewal of the Neapolitan Treaty, due to expire in 1760. 
The Austro-French alliance of 1756 had aroused some 
uneasiness in Turkey, since France had hitherto stood in 
her eyes as the guarantor of the status quo against 
Austria's territorial ambitions. For a while 
Constantinople dallied with the idea of substituting 
Spain for France. CarIos III seized upon this chance to 
send a project of treaty of peace, navigation and commerce 
to Ludolf in the summer of 1760. 2 Nothing was achieved, 
however, since as the Seven Years War drew to an end, the 
Sultan decided to bring these preparatory talks to a close. 
1. Text of the treaty in Wenck, I, pp.519-28. For the 
negotiation of the treaty, see Lepore, pp.39-64. 
2. CarIos III to Ludolf, 26 August 1760, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4575. 
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The Turkish ruler alleged that he could not go ahead with 
the Spanish treaty because France had expressed her 
opposi tion and Turkey could not afford to lose ]'rance' s 
friendship. Britain's intrigues with the Porte also 
contributed to the failure; her influence was the more 
effective since the victories of the English navy in the 
war reminded Turkey of the power of Great Britain. Finally, 
the Spanish government failed to insist upon pursuing the 
treaty as the large sums of money that were required to 
oblige the 'l'urkish negotiators could not easily be spared. 
Ludolf did not help matters in this respect; according to 
Grimaldi, he squandered the money sent to him for the 
attainment of the treaty.l 
Spain then sought to arrange individual treaties with 
the Barbary States and succeeded in making peace with 
MoroccO in 1767 to the great discomfiture of Britain, 
whose representatives in Northern Africa struggled hard to 
prevent it. Spain also attempted to stimulate anti-
British feelings in Morocco in the hope that hostility 
might endanger the provisioning of Gibraltar and Minorca. 2 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 6 August 1770(confidential);Fuentes 
to Grimaldi,9 July 1770, enclosing his "Observaciones ••• "; 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 4575. Cp. Lepore, pp.88-159. 
2. V.Rodriguez Casado,La politica marrogu1 de Carlos Ill, 
pp.105-21,153-65;"Anderson·,pp.291-300;V.Palaci0 Atard, 
"Primeras negociaciones entre EspaBa y Marruece. en 
1765", H1spania, XI (1951), pp. 658-78. 
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A treaty with the Porte, however, remained as the 
best way to improve relations with the Barbary States. 
When Choiseul in June 1770 offered to include Spain in the 
projected treaty with the Porte, it was optimistically said 
in Madrid that the difficulties with which the Turks were 
faced would make them more agreeable to dealing with the 
Bourbon powers and less demanding in the question of 
bribes, presents and services. 
Important commercial and naval advantages were 
expected from a treaty. Friendship with the Porte would 
help to improve relations with the Barbary States, which 
would revive Spain's coastal trade and fisheries. l It 
would also enable Spanish merchants, free from the Barbary 
corsairs, to establish direct trade with the Forte and 
thus gain a sbare in the profitable carrying trade. 
Finally, peace with North Africa would allow Spain to 
import grain in years of bad harvests, which were frequent. 
1. Spain wanted to develop her own fisheries as a 
means to train sailors and to bring to an end the 
drain of specie caused by her dependence on English 
cod and salted fish; an added allurement, perfectly 
valid from a mercantilist point of view, was the idea 
of restricting English shipping. Cp. Grantham to 
Rochford, 11 March 1773,no.9 (~.P.94/l92),in which the 
English ambassador in Madrid derides Spain's attempts 
to control the consumption of fish from abroad by 
tampering with the catholic principles of fasting 
and abstinence. For Floridablanca's similar attempts 
in 1788, see Ehrman, pp.76-7. 
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In return for these advantages, Spain would join 
France to guarantee the islands and seas of Turkey against 
Russian aggression. Russia must be prevented from sending· 
naval reinforcements to the fiediterranean for should they 
succeed in reaching the Turkish coasts the fall of 
Constantinople would not be far off. It was generally 
assumed that Britain would co-operate in, and benefit from, 
such growth of Russian influence in the Mediterranean. 
The risk of war with Britain was borne in mind; the 
Spanish government admitted its fears that a treaty with 
the Porte might be regarded as a challenge to London. l 
But it was argued that Spain was, in any case, likely to 
be affected by British reaction if France signed a treaty 
with the Porte alone. Furthermore, it was hoped that it 
might be possible to act against Russian squadrons enter-
ing the Mediterranean without arousing Britain; no doubt 
Choiseul's explicit desire to avoid involvement in the 
present Russo-Turkish war reassured Spain in respect of 
Britain's reaction. If Spain could draw the same commercial 
benefi ts as ]'rance from a treaty with the Turks, Fuentes 
1. Masserano warned his principal on 29 June 1770, no.l897 
(A.G.S., Estado, legO 6976) about the explosive 
situation in the Mediterranean: the Danes, who had 
declared war on Algiers in late 1769, the Russians within 
striking distance of Constantinople, and the French 
armaments against Tripoli. 
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concluded in his "0bservaciones", the risk of a conflict 
with Britain would be well worth taking. 
But Choiseul was not so keen on sharing with Spain 
the commercial advantages ,that France had gained through 
years of hard bargaining with the Turks. ]'uentes noted 
that the project of treaty as envisaged by the Spanish 
government might annoy the French. Surely, he comforted 
himself, Choiseul could not take exception to the growth 
of Spanish shipping. Since France could not supply that 
part of the Mediterranean alone, he argued, it was prefer-
able that the Spaniards should enter markets that were now 
open to other countries. ~he Dutch were carrying goods, 
which came from America, to the Levant ports and the 
Archipelago; these goods could be supplied by Spain with 
no harm to .French trade. l 
Grimaldi endorsed ]'uentes' reasoning and instructed 
him, on 6 August 1770, to go ahead with the negotiations 
in Paris for a Bourbon alliance with the Porte. The Spanish 
minister stressed three main points as to the way to proceed. 
First, Spain would only sign a treaty that included 
commercial stipulations for her trade with the Porte and 
provided for peace with the Barbary States. Secondly, she 
1. Fuentes' "Observaciones". 
.. 
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should be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations 
in Constantinople. Article XXVI of the Family Compact 
specifically stipulated that both nations should acquaint 
each other with any contact, negotiation or alliance which 
they might enter upon and which was of common interest; if 
a maritime war with Britain followed, Spain would not feel 
bound to support France if the latter had not entered upon 
her engagements with the Porte with Spain's full particip-
ation in settling the terms. Lastly, Grimaldi emphasized 
once more that Spain was determined to maintain a friendly 
intercourse with Austria; her approval must be prior to any 
treaty with the Porte. Grimaldi believed that the Emperor 
Joseph, despite the marriage of Marie-Antoinette to the 
dauphin on 16 May 1770, was not so keen as his mother, Maria 
Theresa, on the "system of the south"; the present state of 
affairs in the East made friendship with Austria all the 
more important as a means to check Prussia and to maintain 
peace in Italy.l 
Although Spanish expressions to the effect that they 
were prepared to risk war with Britain for the sake of a 
treaty with the Porte may have been designed also to gain 
1. Grima1di to Fuentes, 6 August 1770 (two dispatches); 
Grima1di to Choiseu1, same date, A.G.B., Estado, 
legO 4575. 
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the full support of Choiseul in the event of a rupture in 
America, on the whole, Grimaldi was inclined to peace with 
Britain and prepared to some extent to preserve it; not only 
in respect of the Chandernagore incident, which might en-
danger the Family Compact's American emphasis intended by 
Spain, but also in respect of the impending crisis over the 
English establishment in the Falkland Islands. 
In reply to Choiseul's request early in July for his 
reaction to the Chandernagore incident, Grimaldi instructed 
Fuentes that the action taken by the English against the 
J!'rench moat must not be made a casus belli; the incident 
must be peacefully settled. The Spanish minister argued 
that }!'rance must recover her strength and her credit, and 
Choiseul's position with the King must also be strengthened 
before the Bourbon powers could face Britain with reasonable 
expectation of success. He also suggested ways for Choiseul 
to get rid of Terray, the controller general, and improve 
the financial situation of the country; though even if 
Terray's fall could be achieved and Choiseul's position 
consequently strengthened, he argued, the Bourbon powers 
were not yet ready for war against Britain. l 
1. Grimaldi to J!'uentes, 31 ,July 1770, two dispatches: one 
in LegO 4573, and the other in legO 4575, A.G.S., Estado. 
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Regarding Choiseul's enquiry about rumours in London 
of the visit of two Spanish frigates to Port Egmont, 
Grimaldi said to Ossun that they had behaved in accordance 
with the instructions of 25 February 1768, which Choiseul 
himself had approved. They contained directions, Grimaldi 
alleged, for the expulsion of the British establishment if 
it were found to be on the Pacific side of Cape Horn; if, 
on the other hand, the establishment was on the Atlantic 
side, the Spanish expeditionary force should only reconnoitre 
its location and deliver a protest to the British commander 
at Port Egmont, since Spain's claim to this side of Cape 
Horn was not well established. l 
The instructions of 1768 could not have been inter-
preted in America except as an injunction to act against 
the British, should they be on either side of Cape Horn. 2 
Grimaldi's attempt to interpret these instructions 
differently shows quite clearly his willingness to pres-
erve peace. His orders of 16 July to Masserano were also 
1. Ossun to Choiseul, 23 July 1770; Martin-Allanic, 11, 
pp. 999-1000. 
2. Above pp.~~-5. 
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pacific in tone and prepared to throw the blame on local 
officials in case the expulsion had taken place. l 
Choiseul had to agree with Grimaldi that the 
Chandernagore incident could be settled in London with 
ease; but he was disappointed at the coolness of Spain in 
the issue. He further resented Grimaldi's remarks about 
the state of France and his own position with the King. 
Choiseul retorted that it was Spain who was afraid of war, 
and boasted that France was always prepared for any 
eventuality.2 This combative spirit was to prove impolitic, 
for a few days later he received news from Spain that the 
expedition to expel the English from Port Egmont had set 
sail from Buenos Aires and that its objective might have 
been accomplished already. Choiseul would soon have to 
seek to moderate Spain rather than rouse her. But before 
proceeding with the main issue, I should bring to its 
close the first phase of the negotiations for a treaty with 
the Porte. 
1. Intercepted and deciphered, Add. 32300, ff.106-7. 
2. Choiseu1 to Ossun, 20 August 1770, no. 36, C.P., 
Espagne 560, ff. 213-4. 
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On August 26th, Choiseul, having given in to Grimaldi's 
condition that Austria should be kept informed, instructed 
Saint-Priest to request the Porte to submit a written draft 
of the p~oject for a Bourbon alliance for consideration in 
P . 1 arl.s. 
But the French minister did not push matters. He became 
less willing to help the Turks. Spain's dispute with 
Britain would increase the danger of a full-scale war over 
issues beyond France's control. He decided to take evasive 
action at Constantinople and, on 19 September, ordered Saint-
Priest to declare to the Turks that French aid in the shape 
of a sale of ships could not take place until May 1st, 1771, 
and that the treaty whereby this help was to be stipulated 
could not be signed unless the present Russo-Turkish war 
was specifically excluded: it would become effective only 
after the war. Saint-Priest was, however, to encourage 
Turkey to continue fighting. 2 
The Turks for their part were not keen on Spain's 
inclusion, nor indeed on the treaty with France. Their fear 
of British action and the prospect of finding in the Austro-
Prussian mediation a way out of their difficulties were' 
1. No. 19, C.P., Turquie 154. Choiseul to Fuentes, 24 August 
1770, C.P., Espagne 560, ff.250-2. 
2. No. 20, C.P., Turquie 155, ff.41-5. 
obstacles. The Turks were even more concerned when they 
knew that Spain, invited by Choiseul, had expressed her 
wish to join in the projected treaty; Britain was more 
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likely t? join the Russo-Turkish war, the Turks feared, if 
both France and Spain signed a defensive alliance with them. l 
Late in November, however, Choiseul returned to the 
idea of acting effectively in support of the Turks. 
Britain, Choiseul wrote to Saint-Priest on the aOth, 
appeared inclined to go to war in order to obtain satis-
faction from Spain over the Falkland Islands issue; France 
would have to defend Spain. The continuation of the Russo-
Turkish war and the alliance with the Porte were therefore 
desirable to further France's own interests. The French 
minister visualized sending a naval expedition to the Levant 
as well as helping financially the Bar confederates in Poland 
to divert Russia's forces from the Turkish front. 2 
During thefiDst stage of the negotiations with Britain 
over the expulsion from Port Egmont, Spain had no desire to 
discuss the question of an alliance with the Turks. But 
1. Saint-Priest to Choiseul, 17 October 1770, no.29, C.P., 
Turquie 155, ff.119-3l. 
2. No. 27, C.P., Turquie 155, f.204. See also his letter 
of the same date, no.26, ff.199-203, and that of 13 
November, no.24, ff.180-5. 
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when the war seemed imminent in early December Grimaldi 
suggested to Choiseul that the threatening conflict over the 
Falkland Islands could be linked with the Russo-Turkish war 
to the benefit of the Bourbon powers; Britain had ambitious 
designs, and it did not matter whether war broke out on 
account of Port Egmont or of Britain's alleged desire to 
gain an island in the Archipelago and thereby increase her 
influence in the Mediterranean. l 
It is clear that while Grimaldi upheld French interests 
in the East in the hope of gaining the full support of France 
in America, Choiseul meant to widen Spain's conflict with 
Britain, should it develop into war, to include French 
interests in the Mediterranean. 
After Choiseul's dismissal on 24 December, France's 
policy towards the Russo-Turkish war remained very much the 
same; the emphasis on Eastern issues was, however, stronger. 
But this new development will be examined later, when France 
tries to draw Spain into the Eastern question after the 
Falkland Islands crisis. 2 
1. Grima1di to Fuentes, 3 and 6 December 1770, A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 4574. 
2. See below pp. ~f. 
b) Britain, Spain and France on the brink of war. 
While Choiseul was boasting that France was always 
prepared for any eventuality, Grimaldi was informed that 
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in pursuance of his instructions of February 25th, 1768, the 
expedition to expel the English from Port Egmont on the 
Falkland Islands had left Buenos Aires on April 9th, 1770. 
In a dispatch, which reached the Spanish Court on August 17th, 
Bucareli, the governor of Buenos Aires, reported that he had 
been prompted to take action by the threatening language used 
by the ~nglish commander of Port Egmont, Hunt, in December, 
1769, when the Spaniards from Puerto Soledad - the former 
French establishment Port St. Louis - had visited the English 
for the first time aDd bade them to leave. According to 
Bucareli, Hunt had threatened to expel the Spaniards from 
Puerto Soledad in six months' time. l 
Grimaldi was alive to the seriousness of the situation. 
Bucareli's action, should it succeed, would be regarded by 
Britain as a hostile act that would cause her to retaliate 
or demand satisfaction. As Ossun put it, a practicable basis 
for negotiation would be difficult to come by; for, on ~he 
one hand, Spain could not enter into negotiations with 
1. For this section I have drawn 9a'Pf=1Ntllt1"Uly from 
Martin-Allanic, 11, pp.1002-1195. 1I"'p,s att'nd s , 
lIfe 5; f; se 
Britain without causing prejudice to her rights to the 
Falklands; if, on the other hand, Bucareli's action was 
to be upheld, war seemed unavoidable. 
On August 20th the Spanish minister wrote to 
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Masserano and Fuentes that everything should be done to 
avoid war. It might be possible to soften the first re-
action of the British to the news by volunteering an 
explanation before they were informed from Port Egmont 
itself. Grimaldi had decided to present the expedtt~on as 
an undertaking that Bucareli, roused bJ the threatening 
language used by Hunt, had planned himself. By absolving 
the Spanish Court from direct complicity in Bucareli's 
action, Grimaldi prepared the way for disavowal, sparing 
the Crown the unpleasant prospect of revoking the official 
orders of 25 February 1768. However, Grimaldi was 
reluctant to consider concession by way of satisfaction; 
in a confidential instruction of the same date, he ordered 
Masserano to suggest to the English, but only if it were 
absolutely necessary, that the incident might be negotiated. 
Grimaldi also attempted to put the clock back. Hoping 
against hope, he directed Arriaga to countermand the 
expedition, had it not accomplished its mission on account 
of weather difficulties. In Madrid it was thought possible 
that the advanced state of the season when the expedition 
sailed from Buenos Aires might have prevented it reaching 
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its destination. Arriaga wrote to Bucareli reminding him 
that expulsion must only be undertaken if the British 
establishment was on the Pacific side of Cape Horn. That 
is, the Spanish government intended to indicate that 
Bucareli's action on the Atlantic side of Cape Horn had 
not been encouraged from Madrid. 
When twenty days later the Spanish government was 
apprised that the expedition had already accomplis bed its 
mission, Grimaldi, resisting Aranda who ever since 176; had 
been the foremost exponent of the war party, managed to 
persuade Carlos III that Spain was not a match for the 
British navy and that she had better attempt to appease 
the English nation. It was decided, therefore, that Port 
Egmont should be evacuated, and on September 19th Bucareli 
was ordered to keep a detailed record of the effects taken 
from the English at the time of the expulsion to prepare 
the way for an orderly return of property.l He was, how-
ever, to remove any sign of former British presence, leaving 
1. Masserano reported on June 29th, 1770, that there 
was a trend of opinion in British naval circles 
favourable to abandoning Port Egmont; he therefore 
kept an account of the expenses incurred by the 
English, should they ask for compensation for leaving 
their establishment; no.1897, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6976. 
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only a cross as a symbol and signal of Spanish sovereignty. 
Bucareli was further instructed to use force if the English 
retaliated against the Spanish establishment in the Falk-
lands, Puerto Soledad; but if they returned to Port Eemont 
or founded a new establishment, Bucareli was to ignore the~ 
and report to Ivladrid. 1 
But two days later Masserano's reports of his first 
talks with the English secretary, Weymouth, reached the 
Spanish government. Britain demanded satisfaction, and 
behaved from the moment she was informed of the likely 
expulsion from Port Egmont as if it had already taken place. 
In early September when Masserano explained to Weymouth that 
there were reasons to believe that Bucareli, without 
specific instructions from Madrid, had taken upon himself 
to use force against Port Egmont, the English minister 
demanded disavowal of Bucareli's action and restoration 
of Port Egmont to the status quo ante, and warned that an 
armament was to be prepared to redress the insult to George 
Ill's honour. On the question of right to tbe islands, 
however, Weymouth assured Masserano that the British govern-
ment would not prove difficult if Spain gave the satisfaction 
1. Gil Iviunilla, Mal vinas, pp. 90-101. Hida1go, pp .191-7. 
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required by the English crown. 
The Bourbon representatives in London did not believe 
that Britain was inclined to war, but the weak state of the 
North administration made it particularly vulnerable to 
parliamentary opposition. Parliament was due to resume 
sessions in mid-November and the North ministry was anxious 
not to offer its enemies grounds for criticism. 
Choiseul agreed that Parliament might force the govern-
ment's hand or bring in an administration less inclined to 
peace. It was therefore advisable to accept British terms, 
which he considered reasonable. The French minister saw the 
issue at stake as a hostile act against Britain in peace 
time for which Spain had to make amends. The question of 
right could be discussed in the future, and France would 
then be willing to uphold Spain's claim to the Falkland 
Islands; mutual withdrawal was in his view the best solution. 
Accordingly, he proceeded to r-ress Spain to accept 
British terms before Parliament met, stressing the need at 
all costs to avoid a premature war, while he attempted to 
persuade Britain to give written assurances that she would 
disarm if Spain agreed to her demands. But Britain would 
not disarm before unconditional satisfaction was obtained. 
In4e$d, naval preparations were speeded up. 
Spain, however, showed no desire to comply. The 
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government feared that acceptance of British terms might be 
construed as tacit admission of Britain's rights to the 
Falklands. On Beptember 27th Grimaldi sent Masserano his 
suggestion for a compromise: a convention whereby Spain 
would accept the return of the English to Port Egmont; the 
English for their part would later abandon the establishment 
under the guise, to prevent parliamentary oPPosition, that 
it was too expensive. As Bucareli's action could not be 
disavowed, the Spanish government was willing to express 
its regret on condition that Britain was ready to put part 
of the blame on the threatening behaviour of the British 
commander of Port Egmont, Hunt, who had spurred Bucareli 
on to action. Spain would further abandon Puerto Soledad 
so that no discussion over the question of rights in the 
future should impair Anglo-Spanish relations. 
But Britain rejected Grimaldi's compromise. Since 
September 23rd the English version of the incidents in 
port Egmont was known in London. Somewhat stirred by this 
account of the expulsion, weymouth argued in conversation 
with Masserano in the middle of October that not only the 
terms of Grimaldi's proposals but the manner itself wa~ 
totally unacceptable. Real satisfaction, i.e. pestoration 
and disavowal, was the minimum required. Weymouth also 
referred to the armament undertaken and declared tbat it 
could only be countermanded when satisfaction had been 
obtained. 
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Apprehensive of Britain's positive reaction, Choiseul 
informed Louis XV of the growing tension and increasing 
preparations in England; the King agreed that France should 
not neglect her own navy and army to be prepared for any 
eventuality, but stressed his desire to avoid war and enjoined 
his minister to bring pressure to bear on Spain accordingly. 
Choiseul proceeded to mollify the Spaniards, insisting 
first that France was not prepared for immediate action; a 
period of three months at least was needed to prepare for war. 
If Spain wanted war, she could precipitate it when the 
question of right to the islands came under discussion, 
France would then be fully prepared and well disposed to 
support Spain. In the meantime, Britain had a right to expect 
some satisfaction for the insult; whi~e Spain, Choiseul 
admitted, was entitled to protect her claim to the Falklands. 
The French minister saw the solution in disavowal and 
restoration as demanded by Britain in return for a counter-
declaration giving assurances on the part of George III of 
his intention to disarm and to evacuate the islands or to 
negotiate on the question of right to them. 
Carlos Ill's government, Grimaldi replied on November 
5th, was still of the opinion that it was dishonourable to 
disavow an act which aimed at protecting what Spain believed 
to be hers. As for the restoration of Port Egmont to the 
status quo ante, whereas France viewed it as reparation for 
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an injury, dpain feared that it would necessarily strengthen 
Britain's claim to the Falkland Islands; thus the need to 
secure assurances for the evacuation of Port Egmont by the 
English or some other undertaking that the English would 
not use Spanish satisfaction as a means to put in question 
Spain's claim to the islands in the future. ~egarding the 
method to secure this guarantee, however, the Spanish 
government was quite flexible. It was prepared to disavow 
the expulsion without mentioning Bucareli, and to restore 
everything to the status quo ante, by means of a declar-
ation; the English in return would agree either to add a 
third article to the declaration promising to evacuate 
Port Egmont or to negotiate the question of right, or to 
sign a counter-declaration, post-dated if necessary, 
offering to abandon the establishment, or else a separate 
convention, post-dated and secret, in which case article 
2 of the Spanish declaration should contain a reservation 
of Spanish rights. 
Grimaldi's concessions did not meet with Weymouth's 
approval. On November 23rd the English minister refused 
to consider any terms ether than his original demand, for 
unconditional satisfaction. There were, however, within 
the English government more conciliatory tendencies on 
which to work for a settlement that would give Spain some 
guarantee regarding the question, of right. 
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In his address to the Commons, who had resumed work on 
November 13th, George III had stressed that his government 
was resolved to obtain satisfaction from Spain for the 
hostile_act committed against the Crown. But ~orth, his 
chief minister, told the House on the same day that the 
intrinsic value of Port Egmont was nil and hinted that it 
might be evacuated. l The King himself wrote to ~orth on 
the 23rd that Weymouth's bellicose manner had to be checked. 2 
War with the Bourbon powers was not attractive to the 
English at the time. In the first place, there was the 
prospect of large expenditure which ran counter to North's 
campaign of financial retrenchment; the state of the 
British navy, on the other hand, was not such as to infuse 
unbounded confidence about the prospect of success. 3 
Finally, there was the spectre of Chatham, whose successful 
record as a war minister in the last conflict might force 
him upon George III as the champion of the honour of the 
Crown. 
1. Parliament~ry History, XVI, pp. 1050. 
2. Corr. of George Ill, 11, pp. 1 72-t. 
3. Watson, pp. 153-5; Corr. of George Ill, 11, pp.174-5; 
Parliamentary History, XVII, pp.166 and 946. Cp. 
Mackesy, p. 167, for Sandwich's contention that the 
navy at the time was a paper fleet. 
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The Bourbon representatives for their part gathered 
from the ensuing debates in Parliament that the North 
administration was quite able to manage a safe majority 
in the face of hostile motions against their alleged soft 
tactics in handling the Bourbon powers. Realizing that 
North did not seem to agree with Weymouth's manner, 
Masserano and Frances, the French charge, agreed that the 
latter should approach him to get round the impasse brought 
about bywveymouth' s stiff attitude. This indirect procedure, 
it was hoped, might ease the diplomatic tension resulting 
from the somewhat rigid line into which both Masserano and 
Weymouth were drawn by reason of their position. 
On November 25th Frances complained to North that 
Weymouth seemed to take no notice of the concessions 
Grimaldi was prepared to make for the sake of peace. 
Stretching a little Grimaldi's terms, Frances advanced the 
view that Spain would accept a reservation of her rights to 
the Falklands, leaving it to Britain to propose mutual 
evacuation in her own time. But North insisted on un-
conditional satisfaction; Britain would not fight for Port 
Egmont, nor was she minded to keep it, but the insult had 
to be repaired. If Spain wanted to reach an understanding 
on this basis, she would have to rely on North's verbal and 
private promises to evacuate the British establishment in 
the Falklands. Rochford, the northern secretary, whom 
Masserano and Franc~s saw on November 29th, gave more 
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emphatic assurances regarding their intention to part with 
Port Egmont, but no formal engagement. The Bourbon 
representatives were encouraged, however, by Hochford's 
advice that ]'rances should continue negotiations with 
North alone, for Weymouth was suspected of being in contact 
with Chatham and probably less inclined to conciliatory 
policies. The position as seen by Frances was that Britain, 
despite her naval preparations, was prepared to wait for 
Spain's next proposals. 
In the meantime, Weymouth continued to press his 
colleagues for tougher policies. On 5th December, he 
visualized an attack on the French East Indies and suggested 
~~~ 
that Harris, h±s representative in Madrid, should be re-
called. But in the Cabinet meeting of the evening of the 
5th he found that his colleagues were very reluctant to be 
rushed, especially Rochford, who advised the King on the 
following day that Weymouth should be overruled in the next 
Cabinet meeting, while there was "the least glimmering hope 
of (the Falkland Islands dispute) being accommodated".l 
1. Corr. of George Ill, 11, pp. 174-5. 
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George III agreed that a fresh opportunity should be given 
to the Spaniards to conform to English demands. But Wey-
mouth was not completely overruled, for George III proposed 
a compromise plan: the exact draft of a declaration 
acceptable to Britain should be sent to Spain with 
instructions to Harris to put it to the Spanish government 
that he was to leave the country within twenty four hours 
if Spain did not consent to it. Such measure would enable 
~lasserano to stay in London for some time whereas Weymouth' s 
desire to recall Harris immediately would oblige Masserano 
to leave London Iland consequently entirely shut the door 
against this irksome affair as every honest and consider-
able man must wish". l 
In the Cabinet meeting of the 7th, George Ill's plan 
was discussed; Weymouth categorically refused to instruct 
Harris to renew the negotiations, and the rest of the 
ministry, rather than show the disunion of the adminis-
tration, agreed to send no messenger at all. Rochford and 
North comforted themselves with the thought that while 
relations between Britain and Spain were not yet broken 
the negotiations with Frances might clear the way for a 
1. Corr. of George Ill, 11, pp. 175-6. 
304 
settlement. Weymoutn for his part told Rochford on the 
9th that he could not remain in office if measures proposed 
by him that concerned his own department were persistently 
opposed; he said he intended to lay his resignation with 
the King on the following day, but George Ill, through 
Rochford, persuaded him to delay his resignation for a few 
days. On December 15th, however, Weymouth declined to 
attend at a conference with Francas that was to be held 
on the following day, and on the 19th, Rochford and Sandwich 
kissed hands as secretaries for the southern and northern 
departments respectively.l 
Meanwhile in Paris the situation was somewhat confused. 
Choiseul was working for peace, but he could not let 
Grimaldi's urgings to step up preparations go unheeded. In 
the last resort, the French minister believed, his country 
would have to back Spain if she were attacked. At the 
beginning of November, Choiseul and his cousin the minister 
of Marine, Praslin, had requested the Council of State to 
vote them a subsidy of eight million livres to put the navy 
1. Corr. of Ge@rge Ill, 11, pp.176-90, passim; Chatham .. Corr., 
IV, p.63, note 1. For a contemporary account of 
Weymouth's reasons for resigning, see H.Walpole, Memoirs 
of the reign of King George Ill, IV, pp. 235-46. It 
would appear, as Watson, p. 1$4, puts it, that the main 
factor was that Weymouth went too far in his bellicosity. 
in readiness. IJ:1he subsidy was granted but only 600,000 
li vres reached Praslin. f-iaupeou, the chancellor, and 
Terray, the controller general, alleged that the Treasury 
was empty and ~rance's credit exhausted. Louis XV ordered 
Terray to provide the rest of the subsidy, but made 
Choiseul promise that he would do all he could to prevent 
war. Choiseul's credit with the King was already poor on 
account of the disaffected attitude of the parlements, 
which he was accused of supporting. Failure to prevail upon 
Gr1maldi for the sake of peace would be used by the Du 
Barry cabal to persuade Louis XV that his minister would 
welcome war as a means to strengthen his own position. l 
Furthermore, Austria was expressing her determination to 
keep away from colonial conflicts and bringing pressure to 
bear on Choiseul to deter him from measures, e.g. any 
increase in France's territorial forces, which might 
threaten European peace. Such a course of action, it was 
stressed, IIpourrait etre le seul cas ou l'alliance (the 
Franco-Austrian one of 1756) pourrait crouler".2 
1. Flammermont, pp. 164-70. 
2. Maria Theresa to Hercy, 2 October 1770, Corr.de Mer.cy,I, 
p.6l; see also pp. 57-9 and 78-80, and Arneth, Maria 
Theresia und Joseph 11, I, pp.,08-319. Frederick 11 and 
van Swietan, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, met on 
December ,Oth to neutralize Germany (Pol.Corr.,XIX,p.345) 
and in Vienna Stormont was given assurances that Austria 
had no intention to be drawn into the colonial struggle 
(Brown, H.A.H.R.,v(HJ22), p.429, note 234). 
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Choiseul, bypassing the cipanish government, decided to 
send a new plan to London with a view to reaching an agree-
ment there which he would later attempt to make l'ladrid 
accept. Il;he main point was to get the negotiation started 
from the British end. With Louis XV's approval, he pro-
ceeded to enjoin Frances (December 3rd) to prevail upon 
Masserano to follow Choiseul's instructions rather than 
those from Madrid. While the French minister continued to 
admit that satisfaction for the injury committed against 
Britain was needed, he still maintained that Spain had a 
right to protect her claim to the islands. His draft for 
the Spanish declaration, disavowing the Spanish action and 
restoring fort Egmont to the statusguo ante, also contained 
a reservation of Spanish rights; the latter might go in a 
separate document if Britain so wished. Britain in return 
would accept the Spanish satisfaction and reservation in a 
paper to which she herself would give a name. This was as 
far as Choiseul would go for the sake of peace. 
North agreed at a meeting with Brances on the 16th to 
lay Choiseul's proposals before the Cabinet. The southern 
secretary, Weymouth, declined to attend this meeting 'with 
Frances as well as the Cabinet meeting held later in the 
day. Weymouth's departure was interpreted by the French-
man as an encouraging indication of pacific leanings. 
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Rochford, who took over the southern department, had 
represented Britain in Madrid and in Faris, and was 
believed to be more sympathetic towards the Bourbon powers 
than his predecessor. The Uabinet meeting of the 19th, 
howeyer, proved itself firm in the anti-Spanish attitude 
already adopted. It was decided that Harris should be re-
called from Madrid and that he was to advise British 
merchants and ships to leave Spain in order to avoid the 
embargo which war would inevitably bring. l Rochford pro-
ceeded to implement these decisions on the 21st; Harris was 
instructed to withdraw from Madrid six or seven days after 
sending messengers to Cadiz and other ports of Spain that 
war might break out. 2 Rochford also wrote to Harcourt, 
the French ambassador in Paris, that nothing short of the 
British terms would be acceptable and that it was therefore 
improper to listen to any renewal of negotiations through 
the French Court. Any new proposals had to come directly 
from Spain, Rochford stated, for she would then be more 
manageable. 3 
1. W.e.Down, -The Occupation of the Falkland Is1ands·,pp.52-3; 
C.R.O.P. 1770-1772, p.102. 
2. Falkland Papers, p.29. See also Brown,H.A.H.R.,V (1922), 
p.436, n. 25'. 
,. B.D.I., VII (France)~Part IV, pp.1l7-9. Cp_ North's 
expressions to Frances to the same Furpose the day 
before; (Martin-Allanic, 11, p.1l8l). 
The change of mind was probably motivated by North's 
failure to persuade Frances to accept Britain's terms. 
The English government were aware that any hesitation at 
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this stage would be interpreted as a diplomatic defeat; 
parl~amentary opposition and public opinion would not fail 
to use it as an opportunity to harass the government more 
resolutely than ever. It was imperative to have a satis-
factory answer from Spain before ~arliament met after the 
Christmas recess (22 January 1771). Furthermore, France 
remained firm on principle; although she was urging Spain 
that the British evacuation of Port Egmont should be left 
for a later date, she was supporting her in demanding from 
Britain a written recognition of the Bpanish claim to the 
Falklands. l The English government had hoped to make 
France put pressure on Spain, which would explain why the 
Cabinet was against Weymouth's haste; but when this hope 
came to nothing, the government decided to go ahead and 
attempted to rob Spain of French support. 
Despite the stiffer attitude, the English government 
were still hopeful that a pacific solution might be found 
and kept their decision to recall Harris from the Bourbon 
representatives for two weeks. North was now prepared to 
1. Cp. B.D.I., VII (France) Part IV, p.11?; Corr. of George 
Ill, 11, pp. 186, 190-1 • 
......... 
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accept the reservation of Spanish rights demanded by 
Choiseul, he explained to Frances on December 20th, 
provided it was phrased in such a way as not to imply 
recognition of those rights or surrender of Britain's. 
Neither party's claim need be altered. l What the English 
hoped was to weaken Spanish nerve while holding out hopes 
to Brances that Choiseul's terms of December 3rd might be 
accepted if coming from Spain. 
But Spanish nerve seemed to be holding out. Early in 
December Grimaldi insisted on a formal engagement on the 
part of the British to evacuate Port Egmont at a time to be 
chosen by themselves, and to tempt France, that is in the 
hope of making the war, if it proved unavoidable, more 
palatable to French interests, he suggested to Choiseul that 
the threatening conflict over the Falkland Islands could be 
extended to the East. 2 But when on December 18th he was 
apprised of Choiseul's plan of 3 December, his reaction was 
not hostile. Indeed, he put it to the King in Council three 
days later as the only means to save the situation. 
1. Cp. Goebel, pp.3~6-330. North wrote to George III ~n 
December 26th: "We must continue preparing, but I can 
not yet think, that such a mutual reservation of rights 
as I mentioned to your Majesty this morning, if properly 
expressed ought to be rejected" (Corr.of George Ill, 11, 
p.19l). 
2. See above p.2,l. 
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The position in France, Fuentes had stressed, was not 
very encouraging; there was a strong peace party which 
might prevail upon Louis XV to disregard his commitments to 
Spain; the King himself had already expressed his desire for 
peace to Carlos Ill. In Spain, on the other hand, ~here 
was the majority of the miuisters, with Aranda foremost in 
his opposition, who were against Choiseul's plan; they 
believed it to be a surrender of rights to Britain. Carlos 
III himself was undecided, and preferred to wait and see 
the outcome of Frances's talks in London. Being a 
foreigner Grimaldi was obviously concerned about Aranda's 
insinuations of subservience to France at the expense of 
Spain's interests, and when he was informed on the 26th of 
the little progress made by Frances and urged by Choiseul 
to send instructions to I-iasserano immediately so that he 
might be empowered to reach a settlement on the basis of 
the French plan before ~arliament met on January 22nd, 1771, 
he was not forthcoming. 
But somewhat encouraged by CarIos Ill's rebuke of 
Aranda's disrespectful language in his attempts to win the 
King to his warlike views, Grimaldi continued to put the 
case for peace. On the last day of 1770 it became known 
in Madrid that Choiseul had been dismissed on the 23rd. 1 
1. For a comprehensive account of his fall, see E.Lavisse, 
Histoire de France, ~III, 29 pp. 385-91. See also 
Blart,pp.185-190. 
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Spanish reaction was immediate. Louis XV, who sent the 
news personally to Carlos Ill, protested that Choiseul's 
fall would not alter France's relations with Spain and 
that he was prepared to honour his engagements, although 
France was not in a position for the moment to entertain 
the possibility of war and would welcome any sacrifice that 
Carlos III might be willing to make in order to preserve 
peace. ~his counsel, together with the fall of the main 
promoter of the Family Compact, made the Spaniards doubt 
that the new men would stand by the Spanish alliance. 
Carlos Ill's government therefore interpreted Ohoiseul's 
fall as the triumph of more pacific tendencies in the 
French government and, fearing that the Family Oompact it-
self might be ill jeopardy if Spain proved too stiff, 
Grimaldi proceeded on January 2nd, 1771, to send Masserano 
the instructions requested by Choiseul. That is, Spain was 
prepared to rely on Britain's verbal assurances that they 
would evacuate Port Egmont. Regarding the clause reserving 
Spanish rights to the Falklands, Grimaldi would have liked 
it included in the Spanish declaration of disavowal and 
restoration, but was ready to accept a separate document 
if the English insisted on it. To save face, Masserano 
was ordered not to negotiate directly with the English 
ministers until the French representatives should be quite 
certain that Britain was to agree to Choiseul's plan. 
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In the meantime in London, long before these 
instructions reached him, Masserano was astonished to hear 
on January 3rd that Rochford had ordered Harris to leave 
Madrid. Masserano, fully sUPf.orted by the French represent-
atives,l demanded that~messenger be sent immediately to 
Madrid to counterorder Earris's recall. After a Cabinet 
meeting on the 4th, Rochford called at the Spanish embassy 
on the 5th to tell l'lasserano that the English government 
regretted that he had taken Harris's recall so much to 
heart. Rochford gave again the same assurances that they 
would be willing to discuss the evacuation of Port Egmont 
once the Spanish Crown had agreed to redress the insult 
inflicted on the English King; he maintained, however, that 
Harris could not be ordered to remain or return to Madrid 
until satisfaction had been given. He also warned 
Masserano that was was inevitable if Spain's reply was not 
in London before Parliament reconvened on 22 January.2 
1. In addition to Franc~s, there was Guines, the recent1y-
appointed ambassador to the English Court. Adrien Louis 
de Bonnieres de Souastre, comte de Guines (1735-1806), 
represented France in London until 1776; for his embassy, 
see Recueil, XXV-2, Angleterre Ill, pp.459-79. ' 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 5 January 1771,no.2025, A.G.B., 
Estado, legO 6980; Corr. of GeOr~eIII,II'Pp.202-3; 
B.D.I.,VII (France), Part IV,pp. 18-9; Letters of Wa1po1e, 
V, pp.273-4. Cp. Goebel, pp.347-51. 
j13 
Until Grimaldi's illstructions of January 2nd arrived 
in London Masserano could not make any move. The French 
were in a similar position, for they fully supported 
Masserano's justified decision to remain inactive until 
normal relations between Spain and Britain were restored. 
On the 5th they wrote to Paris asking for instructions in 
the event of Masserano's departure from London. The reply 
reached them on the 14th; they were to accommodate their 
behaviour to that of Masserano, leaving LOHdon if he left. 
The French government looked upon Harris's withdrawal as a 
clear indication of the warlike intentions of the British 
and with a view to see if united action ~ould influence 
Britain, they declared their intention to support Spain 
fully.l 
On the 16th Grimaldi's instructions of the 2nd arrived 
in London. !hey were accompanied by instructions from 
Paris directing the French representatives to support 
Masserano and to act in full agreement with him. The 
Spanish ambassador" and the French representatives agreed to 
1. Masserano to Grimaldi 16 January 1771, no. 2035, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6980. Cp. Martin-Allanic, 
11, pp. 1188 and 1196. 
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demand Uarris's recall to ~adrid or the appointment of a 
new ambassador to the Spanish Court qefore the negotiations 
for a settlement could be resumed; ~asserano was to keep 
his fresh instructions until the very end of the negotiation, 
for the uncertainty of the eventual outcome might make 
Britain more amenable. 
On the 17th Franc~s put to Hochford that the 
instructions received by Masserano could make a settlement 
possible, but Britain had to restore normal relations with 
Spain first. Frances's tone was urgent; he stressed that 
France was solidly behind Spain. The English secretary of 
state was still firm in his demand for unconditional 
satisfaction; he sounded, however, alarmed in his letter 
1 to George III on the same day. The King himself was also 
firm; he instructed North to see him before the meeting 
wi th ]'rances and expressed his view that the French con-
dition should not be complied with until Britain had such 
terms from Spain as were acceptable. 2 
The deadlock was solved by North, who in conversation 
wi th .b'rances in the evening of the 17th, proposed that the 
Spanish project for a declaration, which Masserano had 
1. Corr. of George Ill, 11, pp. 210-1. 
2. Corr. of George Ill, lI, p. 211. 
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received, be presentea to him. If it were acceptable, 
orders to harris to return to hadrid could be antedated to 
the day OD which the negotiations were resumed. This was 
agreed upon and on the following day Masserano received a 
copy of rtochford's instructions dated 18th, in which the 
English secretary, having reasons to believe that IVlasserano 
had orders to give satisfaction for the injury inflicted 
upon Britain in the Falklands, directed Harris to return 
to ~adrid immediately. These instructions were to be sent 
when the declaration had been decided upon, but before 
signing it. 
Thus the negotiations between Rochford and Frances on 
the terms of the settlement started on the 19th. As agreed 
wi th IV1asserano, Hochford was not informed how far the 
Spanish ambassador was allowed to go. On the 21st the 
texts of the Spanish Declaration and the British Acceptance 
were exchanged and collated, and after the Emglish ministers 
were informed of lY,asserano' s authorization to settle the 
issue, the two documents were signed on the 22nd, just an 
hour before Parliament met. 
The Spanish Detlaration, as .expressed in the British 
Acceptance, was a reparation for the insult inflicted upon 
the British Crown by the Spanish expedition dislodging the 
British from Port Egmont on 10 June 1770. It contained a 
disavowal for the action, promised restoration of the 
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English to the statusguo ante, but most significantly with 
an explicit reservation that the satisfaction given by 
Spain did not affect her claim to sovereignty over the 
Falklands. 
The British for their part made no reservation of 
rights, nor did they attempt to demand reciprocal evacu-
ation on the part of Spain of her colony in Puerto Soledad. 
They had also given explicit assurances, though verbal, that 
they intended to abandon Port Egmont at a future date. In 
the light of the Spanish Declaration and the British 
Acceptance, their promises, however unofficial and confid-
ential, were thought to strengthen Spain's claim to the 
islands. The restoration of Port Egmont to the British was, 
in the Spanish view, a mere restitution of possession, and 
future withdrawal would mean admission of Spain's claim to 
the better right. l 
The settlement of the dispute shows that the British, 
from Weymouth's uncompromising terms in mid September until 
---------------------------------------------------- -----------
1. For the negotiations between the 16th and 22nd of 
January, Masserano to Grimaldi, 2~ January 1771, 
no. 20~8, A.H.N., Estado, legO 4261, and Frances 
to Vril1iere, 22 January 1771, no. 70, C.P., 
Angleterre 495, ff. 68-85. Cp. Martin-Allanic, II, 
pp. 1195-1200; Goebel, pp.355-63. 
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the Declaration and Acceptance of J"anuary 22nd, had gone 
half-way to meet the wishes of the Spanish government as 
a means of preventillg war. Spain could not have expected 
these terms, had it not been for French support during 
the crisis. 
But the dispute did not end there, nor were the 
clouds of war completely dispelled. Madrid had accepted 
Britain's terms on the understanding that the evacuation 
of rort Egmont was to follow. It could be argued that the 
actual abandonment of the establishment was needed if 
Spain was to acquire full rights to the Falklands. l 
Furthermore, Grimaldi and Arriaga had always been worried 
at the obnoxious presence of British subject. so close to 
the American possessions south of the Equator and to the 
strait of ~'1agellan. The reinstatement of the English in 
Port Egmont was certainly humiliating for Spain's pre-
tension to maintain South America and surrounding waters as 
a mare clausum. The Spanish government looked on the 
settlement as wholly dependent on Britain's speedy evacu-
ation of Port Egmont. If it did not take place, Spain 
would reckon the Declaration a diplomatic failure. 
1. This is how Goebe1, p. 363, sees the legal 
situation after the settlement. 
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When Grimaldi received ~asseraDo's dispatch of 23 
January with news that war had been averted and an agreement 
reached, he rejoiced. No war, however promising, he wrote 
on February 8th, could be welcomed in view of the large 
possessions that .spain would have had to protect from the 
superior English naval force. But the Spanish minister 
insisted that the settlement of the 22nd would not be 
accepted unless Britain agreed to fulfil her verbal promises 
to evacuate Port ~gmont. In order to put pressure on the 
English to evacuate, Spain maintained a state of military 
preparedness throughout the empire. 1 'rhe ]'rench had 
encouraged Grimaldi to take this attitude, for before the 
settlement, when they were trying to persuade Spain to drop 
her demand for a formal engagement on the part of the 
British to evacuate Port Egmont, it was sUbgested to him 
that the British should be told that Spain would not disarm 
until Britain had fulfilled her promises. 2 As for restoring 
normal relations, Harris's withdrawal was still rahkling; 
when he was ordered to return to Madrid, Grimaldi refused to 
admit him for he had no adequate recredentials; the Spanish 
minister now ordered Masserano to leave London if Britain 
did not appoint a representative of ambassadorial rank to 
Madrid. 3 
1. Cp. Gil Munilla, Malvinas,pp.139-40 and Hidalgo, pp.233-41. 
2. Martin-A11anic,II, p.1773.· 
3. Grimaldi to l"lasserano, 8 ]'ebruary 1771, A.G.S., Eatado ,1egO 
7016. Cp. Nartin-Allanic,II,pp.1205-8. 
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While the question of British diplomatic representation 
to the 3panish Court was easily solved,l the evacuation of 
Port £gmont was a decision that the English government could 
not take as easily as the Spaniards might have expected. 
There was no doubt that they had given assurances to that 
effect. Indeed, at the time of the signing of the agreement, 
Rochford, in reply to Masserano's last attempt to obtain a 
formal promise, had reassured him that he would reply cate-
gorically to the question of the evacuation of Port Egmont 
when he had had time to deal with the Opposition in 
Parliament. On the following day, the King himself expressed 
his wish to settle the issue to Spain's satisfaction. 
Masserano had some reasons to sound hopeful. 2 
But he proved too hopeful. Irrespective of whether they 
meant to carry out their verbal assurances, Parliamentary 
opposition and public opinion had yet to be faced. An hour 
after the agreement was signed, the Spanish Declaration and 
the British Acceptance were put before Parliament. The 
Opposition in both Houses found the settlement far from 
satisfactory, and the decision of the ministry was subjected 
------------------------------------
1. Thomas Robinson, second Baron Grantham (1738-1786) was 
appointed as ambassador on January 25th and, while he took 
up his post in IVladrid, recredentials were sent to Harris on 
February 22nd (Martin-A11anic, II,p-., 1218 i B•D•R",1689-1789 t 
p.13? 
2. Masserano to Grima1di,January 23rd,no.2038, and 25tb,no. 
2039, 1771, 4.G.S., Estado; legO 6980. 
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to fierce attacks. The maia line of arg~ment was that the 
government's failure to uphold Britain's claim to the 
-Falkland Islands justified the action taken by the Spaniards 
in expelling the ~nglish from Port Egmont, since the 
reservation of Spanish rights without adequate safeguards 
for Britain seemed to strengthen Spain's claim. 
The government, after long debates on 13 and 14 
February, managed to prevail over a much weakened opposition 
with a safe majority; but they did not relish the prospect 
of having to discuss the evacuation of Port ~gmont at a 
time when not even its restoration by the Spaniards had 
taken place. There were general rumours that the government 
had entered upon a secret agreement with Spain detrimental 
to Britain's honour. If they decided to evacuate Port 
Egmont now, their decision would be regarded as in fulfil-
ment of a previous obligation to Spain. This explains 
Rochford's stiff attitude towards Masserano, when the 
latter returned to the question of right on February 21st. 
In pursuance of Grimaldi's instructions of February 
8th, Masserano said to Rochford that now that Spain had 
given proof of her pacific inclination, he hoped Britain 
would be willing to settle the question of right and dis-
armament. On the latter the English secretary suggested 
a tripartite arrangement to disarm on a given date. As 
for the former, he proved evasive; he said, however, that 
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the garrison stationed at }ort ~gmont was to be reduced 
gradually to prepare for the final abandonment. When 
pressed by hasserano in subsequent talks, the English 
secretary sUbgested that mutual evacuation of the Falklands 
by means of a verbal agreement could be the solution, for 
in this way the question of sovereignty remained open. 
But hasserano rejected this suggestion, for the evacuation 
of l'ort Egmont had been promised and only the question of 
when it was to be effecteu remained to be settled. 
buch irreconcilable views put both countries on the 
verge of war again. They had not yet disarmed and in the 
heat of the discussions, Hochford and ~asserano exchanged 
threatening words. 
By the middle of March, however, the l!'rench government 
had grown reluctant to support f"lasserano. They feared the 
fall of the British ministry, which would bring into power 
a less conciliatory adffiinistration, and were disinclined to 
put weapons in the hands of the opposition in view of the 
situation in the Near East. l The Spanish ambassador 
realizing the danger wrote to Grimaldi that they would have 
to stop pressing the English, leaving the question of , Port 
Egmont for a later date. 
1. See below pp. 3~ff. 
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Grimaldi chose to regard the British arguments as a 
mere postponement. Anticipating that the Spanish establish-
ment in Puerto Solecad would be able to render the British 
presence harmless, he felt reassured since llochford had told 
Masserano that they intended to keep only a small force 
stationed in the Falklands. J!'urthermore, "che state of 
mili tary preparedness in Britain, Spain and ]'rance, in view 
of the delicate situation in the ~ear ~ast, and France's 
attempts to divert Spain's attention to the East, might 
involve her in Europe. 
Cm April 9th, 1771, Grimaldi wrote to Nasserano that 
nothing was to be gained from further discussions, and 
ordered him not to raise the issue of evacuation except to 
let the English know that Spain relied on Britain's verbal 
promises to abandon Port Egmont. On hearing of these 
instructions Rochford expressed his satisfaction that Spain 
was not minded to press Britain. Rochford gave a fuller 
promise on this occasion; he said that he would resign 
office if Port Egmont was not evacuated, and stressed that 
it would have already been evacuated if parliamentary 
opposition had not been so strong. 
On the question of disarmament it was agreed that 
the three countries involved were to return to their peace 
establishments by the end of April. As for the restoration 
of Port Egmont to the English as stipulated in the opallish 
Declaration of January 22nd, it was ca.rried out in 
September. 1 
Spain's tacit acceptance of Britain's determination 
not to evacuate Fort Egmont for the time being encouraged 
the North ministry in their desire to let the issue drop 
out of sight. It was not raised again until l~72, when 
North, wishing to make economies, suggested the withdrawal 
of the British troops from Port ~gmont. But we shall 
return to this question presently. 
1. Martin-Allanic, 11, pp. 1201-45, 1262-5; Hidalgo, 
pp. 241-58. 
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6. Anglo-Spanish colonial issues after the Falkland 
Islands crisis, 1771-1775. 
Relations between Britain and Spain in America after 
the Falkland Islands crisis of 1770-1771 were very much as 
before. ~he Russo-Turkish war and the Swedish crisis 
directed their attention to other parts of Europe, but their 
careful watch over each other's armament and naval policies 
shows that they did not intend to be lulled into a false 
f °t 1 sense 0 securl y. Grantham, the recently appointed 
ambassador to the Spanish Court, remarked on 12 December 1771 
that he did not suspect any plan of hostile intentions in 
Spain since the accommodation of the Falkland Islands issue, 
but that he could not flatter himself with any real cordial-
ity towards Britain from Spain. 2 
One may speculate that Britain might have profited by 
a friendly intercourse with Spain. It could be utilized to 
undermine ]Irance ' s policies in Eastern and Northern Europe. 
1. A.G.S., ~stado, legajos 6975, 6980-1, 6984, rassim. 
J.H.Broomfield, "Lord Sandwich at the Admira ty; Politics 
and the British Navy, 1771-1772", The Mariner's Nirror, 
LI (1965), pp. 7-18. 
2. No. 25 (private and most secret), S.P. 94/188. 
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There were some signs of coldness in Franco-Spanish 
1 
relations, which might be put to goo~ use; but the 
English government was not inclined to depart from tradi-
tional policies. Besides, colonial and commercial differ-
ences continued to strain relations between the two 
t . 2 coun r1es. 
The English, howeve~, assuming that Spain would be 
disappointed over the outcome of the last crisis, hoped to 
work upon it to strain Franco-Spanish relations. Grantham 
was instructed on 23 May 1771 to use all possible means to 
weaken the ]'amily Compact and to cr~ate a favourable 
impression towards Britain, dispelling the notion that 
Britain had wished to engage in war with "the old and 
favourite ally of (George Ill's) kingdoms" over the Falklands~ 
But these expressions did not represent a genuine attempt 
1. See below p. 36e. 
2. The main source of friction at the time was the illicit 
entry of British ships in Spanish American ports, see 
above p. ~~. Cp. J.C.Beaglehole, The Journals ••• of Cook, 
11, p.908. 
3. Grantham's separate and secret instructions, 23 May 
1771, S.P. 94/187. 
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to move closer towards 3pai:l, but rather the desire to keep 
Franco-Spanish relations strained in order to be able to deal 
with the Bourbon powers separately. Hence consistent British 
opposition to any attempt on the part of the French to med-
iate in Anglo~panish disputes. l 
Some improvement in Anglo-Spanish relations, however, 
may be detected from 1773 onwards. It is shown, first, in 
Britain's decision in December 1773, to evacuate Port Egmont; 
it w'!s effected in !'-iay, 1774. Although the evacuation was 
carried out as a domestic measure, that is as part of 
Britain's economic naval regulations and in such a manner 
as to avoid the smallest indication that it was in fulfi1-
ment of a previous obligation to Spain or that Britain 
renounced her rights, nonetheless, the English government 
had since i'larch, 1772,2 expressed their wish that the 
Spanish should accept the evacuation of Port Egmont as the 
realization of the hopes given to them in the past.' 
1. Rochford to B1aquiere, 2 December 1771, no. 40, S.P. 
78/28,. 
2. Rochford to Grantham, 6 March 1772, no.7, S.P. 94/1e9. 
Masserano to Grimaldi, 17 f-Iarch 1771, no. 2308, A.G.S., 
£stado, 1egO 6984. 
,. Martin-Al1anic, 11, pp. 1416-21. 
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They were obviously anxious to relax tension 
between the two countries, for shortly afterwards the 
English government showed a similar conciliatory attitude 
over the 6:ah Island incident. l 
~he 0panish government welcomed the news of the 
evacuation of Port Egmont. Their main concern had 
always been the existence of a British force close to 
the southern tip of the American Continent. Spain had 
learnt the lesson of her previous disregard for this 
area, and now embarked on a campaign to build up the 
defensive system of the south-eastern part of her empire. 
Buenos Aires became the centre of the new military 
development in Spain's attempts to strengthen her hold 
upon the colonies. 2 
1. Cp. above p. ~~. 
2. Gil Munilla, Malvinas, pp. 148-51. See also 
Geobel, pp. 411-29, for the legal consequences 
of the British evacuation and the bearing on 
it of the ~ootka Sound Convention of 1791; 
Hidalgo, pp. 271-308, for Spain's watch over 
Port Egmont and the life in Puerto Soledad 
until the arrival of the first Argentinian, 
D. Jewit, in 1820. 
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a) The Vieques Island incident. 
It was not the first time that this small island - to 
the English known then as Crab due to the abundance of that 
crustacean - had been the subject of diplomatic negotiations 
between the two countries. In 1698, 1717, and 1753, the 
English had made attempts to settle it but were successfully 
expelled by the Spanish who claimed it as the property of 
the Crown. Since the latter date the Spanish government 
had taken good care to survey the island in order to keep 
away foreign settlers, and from 1763 these surveys were 
carried out periodically. ~ot only Britain but also Den-
mark and l!'rance had shown desire to occupy Vieques. 
Vieques was rich in timber, and its proximity to 
Puerto Rico, lying three miles off its eastern shore, made 
it a desirable base for contraband trade. The island was 
only twenty one miles long by about nine miles wide and, 
except for the occasional attempts on the part of Britain 
and Denmark to settle it, and Spain's periodic surveys, 
1 it was deserted. 
1. H. ~orres, "Isla de Vieques", ~.E.A., XII (19$5), pp. 
449-66. :&'or the surveys of the island after 1763, 
Arriaga to Brimaldi, 20 March 1767 and 10 June 1772, 
A.G.S., Estado, legajos 6964 and 6984 respectively. 
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In October 1771 the English schooner "Betsy" was 
seized and her crew detained by a Spanish coastguard for 
cutting wood on the island. The governor of Antigua, Sir 
Richard Fayne, send a frigate to Puerto Rico, demanding the 
immediate release of ship and crew; he asserted Britain's 
sovereignty over the island. But the governor of Fuerto 
Rico, llilie,uel .l".uesa, rej ected Fayne' s demands. Whereupon 
the colonial authorities referred the issue to their 
. . 1 . E 1 pr1nc1pa s 1n urope. 
On hearing of the incident, Rochford proceeded to 
request information from the colonial office as to whether 
Payne's assertion of British sovereignty was well founded. 
The report sent to him by the Commissioners of Trade and 
Plantations 1,eer1z tw" ""·,,cL • J.ler, on 21 Nay 1772, did 
not throw any light on the matter. It referred to Britain's 
attempts to settle Vieques in 1698 and 1717, and to Spain's 
successful reaction against them; it also mentioned a 
complaint in 1718 to the Spanish government and suggested 
that had an exchange between the two courts taken place, 
there should be evidence in the secretary of state's office 
that might help to substantiate Payne's claim. Rochford 
1. Details of th~ncident may be found in S.P. 
94/189-190, and in A.G.S., ~atado, legO 6984. 
was unable to find records, but proceeded as if Vieques 
belonged to Britain in order to test· Spanish reaction. l 
On 16 June Hochford demanded from Grimaldi the 
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restitution of the schooner and cargo, the freedom of the 
crew and reparation for damages. He argued that such an 
action against an English ship was totally unwarranted, 
for Vieques belonged to George Ill. He accompanied this 
claim with the request that the Spanish officers in 
America be restrained, for their vehement attitude might 
bring on war between the two countries. Rochford, however, 
was not concerned with settling rights to the island; he 
specified that he was only interested in the ship and her 
2 
crew. 
On July 2nd Grantham sent a memorial to Grimaldi in 
accordance with Rochford's instructions.' The Spanish 
minister answered verbally because, he explained, he had 
not yet received enough information from Puerto Rico, and 
1. Rochford to Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 
4 April 1772; Commissioners to Rochford, 21 May 1772; 
Rochford to Commissioners, June 6th; S.P. 94/190. 
2. Rochford to Grantham, 16 June 1772, no.13 (cipher), 
Add. 24158, ff. 99-102. 
,. Copy of the memorial enclosed in Grantham's dispatch 
to Rochford of 2 July 1772, no.17, S.P. 94/190. 
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refused to negotiate the question of s;,tta~sfaction, since 
.--
such demands depended upon the quest~on of right. If 
Vieques belonged to Spain, the hnglish government had no 
right to prot~st against the seizure of the british 
schooner, far less to demand satisfaction aDd reparation 
of damages. ~he heart of the matter, Grimaldi argued, was 
the sovereignty of the island. Be dismissed Britain's 
claim as devoid of any foundation, and alleged that the 
English themselves did not sound very confident for they 
laid before the Spanish government a general claim to the 
. 
island but did not adduce any kind of evidence to prove 
their case. He then proceeded to enunciate Spain's titles 
to Vieques: its proximity to Puerto Rico, the uninterrupted 
possession as shown by the regular surveys and the 
military action taken against intruders, and the tacit 
admission of other powers of Spanish o~nership. A copy of 
the memorial sent to Denmark in 176; when the Danes approach-
ed Madrid with a view to settling the island, was handed to 
Rochford in order to stress that they accepted Spain's 
rights and did not proceed with their plan. l 
1. Grantham to Rochford, 9 July 1772, no.18, S.P. 94/190; 
Grimaldi to Masserano, '14 July 1772, A.G.S., Estado, 
1egO 6984. For the memorial sent to the Danes on 20 
February 176;, see Arriaga to Grimaldi, 10 June 1772, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6984. 
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Hochford's reply was more temperate than his previous 
instructions; war was not mentioned aEd the Eliglish minister 
protested most emphatically that he did not mean to start 
proceedings to .vindicate British rights to Yieques, but only 
to convince Spain that the English government could not 
agree to the confiscation of the schooner "Betsy" and the 
detention of her crew. l 
From the Spanish point of view, however, his proposals 
amounted to asking Grimaldi to recognize that dpain had no 
right to protect territories that she claimed as hers if this 
protection entailed using violence against British encroach-
ments. When Grantham approached Grimaldi at the beginning 
of September, the Spanish minister repeated that the question 
of ship and crew had to be seen from the angle of right. 2 
The situation was very similar to that arising from 
Bucareli's action against Port Egmont. But the English govern-
ment on this occasion were not keen on pressing satisfaction 
for the action taken against the schooner. On 21 September 
1772 Rochford was informed from Faris of rumours that Spain 
was to support France fully if Russia entertained the idea 
of attacking Sweden. 3 To conciliate Spain, Rochford chose 
1. Rochford to Grantham, 14 August 1772,no.15 (cipher), 
ci.P. 94/190. 
2. Grantham to Rochford, 3 September 1772,no.36 (cipher), 
S.P. lj#/19l • 
3. See below p. 38), 
i 
1 
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to ignore Grimaldi's refusal to give satisfaction and the 
issue dropped out of sight for the time being. 
But it cropped up once more in 1774, when the command-
er-in-chief of the fleet stationed in the British Leeward 
Islands, vice-admiral Parry, visited the island as part of 
a general round of His British .t>iajesty's dominions in the 
area. Parry's visit was rumoured to be part of a plan to 
settle the island with families from Antigua sent by the 
governor, }ayne. The Eovernor of Puerto Rico, Miguel Nuesa, 
protested against the alleged plan, and the issue was once 
more transferred to be discussed by their respective 
governments. 1 
Pressed by the Admiralty, Rochford had to approach the 
Spanish government once again. Having no intention of 
encouraging British establishments on the island, Rochford 
wrote to Grantham on April 10th, 1774, the question of 
right was not so important and ought to be avoided. As to 
the main question, Grantham was to reiterate the English 
demand for restitution of the Schooner "Betsy", release of 
her crew and reparation of damages. 2 
1. 0.0. 152/54. Ehclosures in the report of the Admiralty 
to Rochford on 15 April 1774, in S.P. 94/195. 
Escarano's reports from London, in A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6988. 
2. Rochford to Grantham,19 April 1774, no.7 (cipher), 
enclosing copies of his 1772 dispatches; S.P. ~/195. 
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But CIrimaldi, a little apprehensive of formal 
communications from London, had already decided that he 
wanted to treat the matter with Rochford in the English 
capital. l Grimaldi wished to avoid a formal negotiation in 
Nadrid because this might bring about the intervention of 
parliamentary opposition and might consequently make it 
difficult for Rochford to be accommodating. An informal 
interview in London between Rochford and Escarano, the 
Spanish charge during Masserano's long absences for reasons 
of health,2 would spare Rochford the publicity which might 
put him in an awkward position. Grimaldi stressed that the 
English government seemed to accept Spanish sovereignty over 
Vieques for they had not contested his claim as presented 
in 1772; they might therefore send positive orders to 
Antigua for the alleged plan to settle the island to be 
dropped. ~o avoid making the government the addressee of 
his complaint, Grimaldi hinted that the British colonial 
1. Grantham to Rochford, 9 May 1774, no.18 (cipher), 
S.P. 94/195. 
2. From August, 1772, to May, 1775; and later from 
September, 1777, when l~iasserano returned to Spain, . 
to July, 1778, when Masserano's successor, A1modovar, 
arrived in London. Escarano was the secretary to the 
Spanish embassy in London. 
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authorities may be held responsible for having gone beyond 
their instructions; Spain for her part was willing to forgo 
her right to demand satisfaction for the insult inflicted 
upon the Spanish Crown by the landing of British warships 
in Vieques. If Britain agreed to drop any plan to settle 
Vieques and to withdraw any British subjects that might be 
there as part o~ domestic policy, it could not be inter~ 
preted as a surrender of rights, since there had been no 
formal requisition from Spain. 
To bring pressure to bear, Grimaldi for the first time 
referred to Britain's colonial difficulties, insinuating 
that in view of the seriousness of the situation created 
by the Boston Tea Party of 16 December 1773, Britain ought 
to be forthcoming. l 
Thus instructed, Escarano conferred with Rochford. 
The English minister explained that the instructions sent 
to Parry contained directions for a general visit to His 
British Majesty's dominions in that area and that Farry, 
1. Grimaldi to Escarano, 2 May 1774, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 6988. 
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assuming Vieques to be £nglish, must have visited it as 
well. Rochford denied any intention of forming an establish-
ment and gave positive assurances that Parry had not been 
instructed to settle the island. In a second interview and 
after having consulted with Darmouth, the colonial secretary, 
Rochford confirmed his previous assurances. l 
The Spanish government expressed its satisfaction to 
know that the English had stopped acting as if they had a 
claim, and to avoid meeting the English, if they were in 
Vieques, the annual visit was suspended. 2 
The island remained under Spanish sovereignty as a 
dependency of Puerto Rico until 1898, when the group 
was ceded to the United States of America. 
1. Escarano to Grimaldi, May 20th, no. 308, June 7th, no. 
316, and 17 June 1774, no. 320, A.G.S., Estado, legO 
6988. Rochford to Grantham, 10 June 1774, Dol 9 (cipher), 
s.P. 94/195. 
2. Grimaldi to Escarano, 13 June 1774, A.G.S., 
Estadp, legO 6988. 
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b) Balambangan. 
As we have already noted England also wished to extend 
its commerce to the Malayan Archipelago. l The original 
scheme had been designed by Dalrymple, who soon after the 
Seven Years War managed to sign a treaty with the Suluan 
authorities (June 1764), whereby Britain could establish 
commercial entrepSts in horthern Borneo and the neighbouring 
islands. However, the treaty proved of little consequence 
for by virtue of the peace of 1763 Manila was restored to 
Spain and Dalrymple lost the military support of the British 
provisional government of Manila. The 3panish authorities 
once more in control of Manila challenged Dalrymple's plans 
on the grounds that the Suluan Islands were part of the 
Philippine group and its ruler was an ally and tributary 
of Spain. 
Dalrymple then returned to Britain in 1765 to seek 
military support for British commercial interests in the 
area. Dalrymple proposed to the East India Company that an 
establishment should be formed in Balambangan, a small 
island north of Borneo; but his proposal did not meet with 
unanimous support on the part of the Company directors. ~be 
majority, however, was fairly favoijrabl, disposed to 
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Dalrymple's ideas though the Warren Hastings crisis pre-
vented them from adopting a forward policy as suggested by 
Dalrymple, and two years elapsed before they could resume 
consultations on the question of the settlement. In July 
1768 they came to the conGlusion that a settlement in 
Balambangan would give them a convenient foothold to open 
trade in the area, and proceeded to seek government 
support for the venture. 
But the government proved reluctant to add a fresh 
complication to their relations with Spain at a time when 
they were risking war over the Falkland Islands. The East 
India Company, in the meantime, ordered a survey of the 
area and of its commercial value, the result of which 
reached the directors in June 1770 and confirmed them in 
their desire to go ahead with their plans. They fitted 
out a ship for that purpose, but before sending it off, 
they made a last effort to commit the government. Rochford, 
the then secretary of state for the southern department, 
refused to back the expedition with the Sultan of Sulu and 
warned them not to do anythinG that might be regarded in 
Spain as an act of hostility. Somewhat handicapped by the 
government's attitude, the expedition sailed in June 1771 
and arrived in Balambangan in December 1773. A settle-
ment was formed, but it was short-lived; mismanagement and 
the loss of the duluan friendship put an end to it in 
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July 1775 and British uorth Borneo did not come into being 
for another century.l 
Dalrymple's efforts to interest the East India Company 
in his scheme for settling Balambangan were reported by 
Masserano since 1769. 2 Soon after the settlement of the 
Falkland Islands crisis there were rumours that the 
British had accepted Dalrymple's plan. 3 The Spanish govern-
ment did not protest. In the first place, the dispute over 
the Falklands was not yet over and the two countries were 
still armed; secondly, Spain's titles to Balambangan were 
not very solid.4 In order to test British governmental 
attitude, however, Masserano did mention Balambangan in 
conversation with Rochford, who denied any knowledge of the 
establishment and gave assurances that the government would 
not back the East India Company if such a plan were enter-
tained. 5 
1. Harlow, I, pp.80-97. 
2. Masserano to Grimaldi, 11 August,no.1674, and 29 
September,no.1714,1769; A.G.S.,Estado,legO 6975. 
3. Masserano to Grimaldi, 8 February 177l,no.2048, 
A.G.S.,Estado,legO 6980. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 28 
February 1771, no.768;A.G.S.,Estado,legO 4577. 
4. Grima1di to Masserano and Buentes,16 March 1771; 
A.G.S.,Eatado,1egajos 6980 and 4577, respectively. 
5. Masserano to Grimaldi,7 June 1771,no.2130, A.G.B., 
Estado, legO 6980. 
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The Spanish government was satisfied with Rochford's 
explanations. But four years later, when Escarano 
reported that the En~lish had been in Balambangan since 
December 1773, Grimaldi returned to the issue with a 
request that the establishment be abandoned. Escarano 
reported that Rochford was against the continuation of 
the establishment but did not come out openly in favour 
of official action, for he hoped that the Company might 
decide to drop the scheme of their own accord; the English 
minister, however, was anxious to prevent the Spanish from 
resorting to force to expel the English from Balambangan. 
~ithin the East India Company itself, Escarano added, the 
continuation of the establishment was not unanimously 
desired. l Encouraged by these reports, Grimaldi suggested 
the abandonment of the establishment, and to avoid the 
slightest embarrassment to the ministry, he proposed to 
negotiate verbally, as they had done on the question of 
2 Vieques. 
1. Escarano to Grimaldi, 14 October 1774, no. 
377; December 13th, no.409; and 18 Marc~ 1775, 
no. 481; A.G.S., Estado, legO 6975. 
2. Grimaldi to Escarano, 22 Ivlarch 1775, A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 6975. 
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Escarano had an il:terview with Hochford on hay 4th, 
in which the nnglish minister assured him that both the 
government and tbe Last India Company were willing to 
abandon the Balambangan settlement without making too much 
noise about it, but they were a!lxious to prevent the 
authorities of i·'Janila from taking upon thenlsel ves to use 
force against the establishment as had been the case in 
the Falklands. Rochford wanted assurances tbat force would 
not be used in return for his own assurances that the 
establishment would be abandoned. But Britain's claim was 
not surrendered. Rochford queried Spain's case; his 
contention was that the Spaniards had been granted the 
territory by the Suluana but the concession had been re-
voked in 1646, the British presence was therefore no 
infringement of the ~reaty of 1648, article 5 of which 
prohibited the Spanish to expand in this area beyond their 
possession at the time of the signature of the treaty. 
Rochford also contested the validity of Grimaldi's argu-
ment that Balambangan was part of the Philippine group 
and belonged therefore to Spain. l 
1. Escarano to Grimaldi, 5 May 1775, no. 4,94, and no. 496, 
A.G.S., Estado, le gO 6975. Rochford to Grantham, 5 May 
1775, no. 10 and no. 11, S.P. 94/197. 
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Grimaldi for his part was not keen on becoming ~nvolved 
in a long discussion over the question of right to Balam-
bangan. In the first place, dpain's claim would not be easy 
to prove for Britain did not accept the arguments adduced so 
far; if a point was made of the issue British attitude might 
harden. In the second place, Spain was not in a position 
to argue from strength. On 15 July 1775 the armada sent 
against Algiers arrived in Alicante after being unable to 
carry out its mission; what had been meant to restore the 
prestige of Spain's naval forces ended in a humiliating 
fiasco which was heavily satirized in Spain and in Europe. 
Furthermore, there was the dispute with Portugal; Britain's 
attitude towards her traditional ally was not yet known, 
and the Spanish were uneasy about Britain's possible inter-
vention in her defence. l Grimaldi therefore preferred to 
avoid arguments so as to keep Britain neutral as long as 
possible, and the assurances requested from London that 
orders were to be sent to Manila to prevent an armed 
collision were given. Masserano would continue to uphold 
Spain's claim as undisputable, but only incidentally was 
he to touch upon the evidence for Spain's case; he was also 
to hint at Britain's colonial difficulties to show that 
1. See below pp. ~58ff. 
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Spain realized that ~ritain's position was not particularly 
1 
strong. 
Grimaldi's conciliatory attitude was confirmed by his 
reaction to news from the 6overnor of the Philippine 
Islands, Simeon de Anda, that the English were determined 
to go ahead with their plans in the area and were pre-
paring to support the SuI tan of foi,indanao in his struggle 
against the authorities of ~anila. Grimaldi looked upon 
this as an act of hostility against the Spanish Crown, but 
did not change the tone of his instructions. 2 
Rochford for his part, having made sure that force 
was not to be used against the English establishment in 
Balambangan, preferred to postpone any argument until 
further news was received from the settlement; however, 
he reiterated his assurances that Balambangan would be 
abandoned. 3 It is probable that rtochford knew of the 
difficulties with the Suluan authorities, and perhaps 
1. Grima1di-Ivlasserano correspondence, July-August, 1775, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6975. Grantham to Rochford, 25 
May 1775, no.28, S.P. 94/198. Masserano was back in 
London since May 26th. . 
2. Grimaldi to Masserano, 15 and 25 September 1775, 
A.G.S., Estado, le gO 6975. 
3. Rochford to Grantham, 14 July 1775, no.14, S.P. 94/198. 
Masserano's reports, July, A.G.S., Estado, iego 6975. 
344 
hoped that the establishment would come to a natural end, 
sparing him the risk of antagonizing the East India 
Company and the Opposition by appearing too conciliatory 
in his dealings with Spain. 
Indeed, the solution of the problem came from 
Balambangan itself. News of the successful revolt of the 
Suluans against the British reached London in February, 
1776; the settlers were now on the small island of Labuan. 
Weymouth, who had succeeded Rochford as secretary of state 
for the southern department in the previous November, 
communicated it to Masserano, and a few days later, when 
the hast India Company decided to drop the scheme alto-
gether, he showed Masserano the instructions sent to the 
Far East with directives to abandon Labuan and to give up 
any idea of new establishments in the area. l 
Although the diplomatic exchanges between Britain 
and Spain over the Balambangan issue did nothing to affect 
the final solution to the dispute, both governments showed 
considerable restraint and some willingness to settle 
1. Masserano's dispatches of February and March, 
1776, in A.G.B., Estado, legO 6975. 
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their differences in an amicable manner. From the English 
point of view, the explanation for their conciliatory 
attitudes in the last two years seems to lie in the growing 
scale of the ~truggle with the Thirteen colonies. The 
chances of keeping the Bourbon powers outside the struggle 
were slim; as North said to the Commons in January 1774, 
Britain would soon have occasion to use her utmost force 
against the combined navies of France and Spain. l But the 
idea of winning the neutrality of those powers in the 
American War of Independence did occur to the English; in 
fact they made several attempts to obtain it in the course 
of the next three years.2 
8014rbon 
B~t: ~his conciliatory mood ~"b..f)Ml9l1ert't did not prevent the. Po""~n 
from making war as soon as the military victories of the 
American insurgents gave the~B~~~~0~ p~,r, the opportunity 
to fight Britain with good hopes of success. 
1. Parliamentary History, XVII, pp. 945-8. 
2. See below pp. '56ff. 
PART III 
~he Family Compact, the Eastern Question and the 
Swedish Crisis, 1771-1774. 
1. Spain attempts to secure a pro-Spanish minister 
in Paris to succeed Choiseul. 
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After the ¥alkland Islands settlement Franco-Spanish 
relations were somewhat strained. ~he acceptance of the 
British postponement of the evacuation of Port Egmont was 
reckoned a diplomatic defeat for Spain. France's lack of 
support in March, 1771, which Grimaldi was going to magnify 
as a means to counter France's endeavours to involve Spain 
in Eastern and Northern Europe, had been a main factor in 
bringing Spain to accept the outcome. There was, however, 
no doubt as to the importance of the French alliance where 
Spain was concerned, and after 1770 the Spanish Court tried 
to restore the Family Compact to what it was during 
Choiseul's ministry, for since 1763 Spain had been able to 
keep her American interests in the forefront of Franco-
Spanish relations without conceding to France the 
commercial benefits and strategic positions in the Spanish 
empire, which she expected in return for her support against 
Britain. l Such a state of affairs was due largely to the 
1. At the very moment when Spain stood most in need of lDe6eb 
support (end of 1770),she continued to express her strong 
opposition to French ships in Spanish American ports 
(Martin-Allanic,II,pp.1043,1258- 62). 
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peaceful situation in Europe at the time, which shifted 
the attention of the maritime powers to the situation over-
seas; but the presence in France as chief minister of the 
author and foremost advocate of the Family Compact, 
Choiseul, was held in Spain to have played an important part. 
A successor from the Du Barry cabal might not prove 
as sympathetic towards opanish~ interests as Choiseul had 
seemed to be. Indeed, the attitude of France in iVlarch, 
1771, and her attempts since the beginning of the year to 
divert 0pain's attention to the East, to which I shall 
return in the next section, confirmed Spanish fears and 
prompted the government to interfere in French domestic 
politics for the purpose of restoring Choiseul to power or, 
should this not prove feasible, of securing the aPPointment 
of a minister likely to continue his policies. Spain hoped 
to obtain full co-operation from Austria. 
Carlos III personally intervened with Louis XV on 2 
February 1771 in favour of the fallen minister and on 
several occasions thereafter he suggested his return to 
power; but Louis XV, while reassuring the Spanish King that 
the change of minister did not imply a change of policy 
towards Spain, retorted that Carlos IIIls intrusion in the 
internal affairs of his Court amounted to disapproving of 
his reasons for dismissing Choiseul. l In the -meantime 
1. B1art, pp.196-200. 
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Grimaldi, realizing that Choiseul's dismissal would not be 
reversed, instructed Fuentes to work for the appointment of 
Vergennes, the former ambassador to the Porte, on whom 
Fuentes had reported very favourably as likely to continue 
along Choiseul's lines. But Grimaldi recommended caution, 
h h Id ' f th ft' . t 1 lest t ey s ou maKe an enemy 0 e u ure m~lll S er. 
]'uentes seemed to take little notice of Grimaldi' s 
advice. :First, he avoided Vrilliere, the interim minister 
in charge of foreign affairs until June 6th2 and then he 
ignored Aiguillon, the future minister, while all the time 
slighting the royal mistress and deprecating the state of 
the forces and finances of ]'rance. His overbearing manner 
was in part due to his belief that Austria was in agreement 
with Spain; this would explain his surprise and disappoint-
ment when he learned early in the summer that Mercy, the 
Austrian ambassador, had attended a rendezvous at Du Barry's 
rooms. 3 
1. Grimaldi's instructions to Fuentes, April 1771, A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 4578. 
2. Louis Phelypeaux, comte de St. F10rentin and duc de la 
Vri1liere (1705-1777), was the Master of the Household 
to Louis XV. He was succeeded as foreign secretary by 
his nephew, Aigui11on; See Corr.de Brog1ie,I,pp.XC,XCII, 
and 300. 
3. Fuentes to Grima1di,3 August 1771, nos. 888 and 897, A.G.S., 
Estado, 1egO 4579. Cp.A.S.Afton,nSpain and the Family 
Compact,1770-1773·,Hispanic American Essgys,pp.142-3. For 
Emmanue1-Armand de Vi6neret du Plessis de Richelieu, duc 
d'Aigui110n(1720-1788),Louis XV's chief minister from 6 
June 1~71 to 2 June 1774, see Corr.de Brog1ie,I,pp.XC-XCI, 
and 113, note 1. 
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Indeed, Austria no doubt wished to maintain the 
"system of the south" and was glad to see that Spain was 
working to maintain things as they were during Choiseul's 
ministry. But she was not prepared to intervene in the 
choice of his successor, for the Austro-French alliance 
rested firmly on the fact that France needed it; and by 
Nay 1771 the Austrian government instructed their 
representati ve in Paris, I-iercy, and harie Antoinette, the 
recently-wedded wife of the Dauphin, not to avoid the 
company of tbe dominant party and to treat them politely, 
since they had the King's confidence. 1 
At the time Austria was engaged in finding a pacific 
way to check Russia's advances towards the Danube. From 
the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war in 1768 there were 
signs of a rapprochement between Austria and Prussia to 
prevent the destruction of the Ottoman Empire by Russia; 
both were afraid to become involved in a general war 
through their respective alliances with Russia and France, 
and in August 1769 agreed to work together to end 
hostilities through their mediation. 
1. Corr. de Mercy, I, pp. 125, 183-6, 192-6; Corr. Mercy-
Kaunitz, 11, pp. 382-5, 391-3; Corr. de Broglie, 11, pp. 
287-98; cp. Pol. Corr., XXX, pp. 377, 386-7. 
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Choiseul's moves to promote his own mediation, 
together with the aid given by France to the Turks and the 
project of a Franco-Turkish treaty slowly taking shape, were 
an embarrassment to the Austro-Prussian mediation and might 
also increase the daneer of a general war. When Choiseul 
fell the 'l'urks had already declared to Austria and Prussia 
that the Porte would negotiate for peace only through them. 
The Austrians rather welcomed Choiseul's departure and the 
ensuing lull in J.i'rench political acti vi ty abroad; it gave 
them a freer hand in the East, while continuing to make 
use of the ]'rench connection in their dealings with Prussia 
and Russia. 
At the turn of the year, however, Austria was alarmed 
to hear that Catherine 11 had conveyed to Frederick 11 that 
her terms for peace were Moldavia and Wallachia. Austria 
would not entertain the idea of having the Russians as her 
neighbours on the Danube. Furthermore, she suspected 
Prussian acquiescence to these terms as a quid pro quo for 
some ~russian gains in Poland. She therefore decided to 
bring home to them that Austria's palicies had to be 
considered; on 6 July 1771 a defensive alliance was signed 
with Turkey and to accentuate the effect of this treaty on 
Russia and Prussia, Austria sought to secure French diplo-
matic support by appearing on good terms with the dominant 
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party in Paris. The Austrians were still very much pro-
peace, however, and the treaty with the Porte was never 
ratified. It was only a diplomatic feint to press 
Catherine 11 to surrender holdavia and Wallachia to Turkey, 
and to make Frederick 11 more amenable to Austria's terri-
torial objectives in Foland. 1 
Unlike ~ustria, Spain made no attempt to humour the 
dominant party in :F'rance. By personalizing the issue of 
the succession to Choiseul, Fuentes had made it very 
difficult to discharge his duties, and in November he wrote 
that friendliness with Du Barry and Aiguillon was a political 
necessity; he suggested that a new representative to start 
afresh should be sent to Paris. But Grimaldi argued that 
it might be taken to imply a change of policy in Madrid and 
thereby weaken the Family Compact. Besides, there was no 
ad~quate substitute for Fuentes at the time. Grimaldi's 
attitude, however, rather shows a conscious slight towards 
those who had contributed to bring about Choiseul's fall, 
and an indirect reference to Spain's disappointment over 
Britain's postponement of the evacuation of Port Egmont and 
1. Corr. de Mercy,I,pp.57-102 ~aSSim;Arneth, VIII,pp. 592-3 , 
note 416;Pol.Carr.,XXX,pp.3 6-70;XXXI,pp.188-91,231-?; 
cp.Kaplan, pp.143-5. The text of the Austro-Turkish 
Treaty is printed in Wenck, III,pp.820-4. 
to her anxiety over ]'rance's growing involvement in 
the Eest to the detriment of ~panish American commit-
ments. l 
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The French minister, Aiguillon, ignored the slight 
and pretended to maintain a friendly intercourse with 
Grimaldi via Ossun, the French ambassador to the Spanish 
Court. The French government did not wish to dispute 
with Spain: Aiguillon was now trying to find some means 
of halting Russia's progress in Turkey and in Poland; he 
might be able to secure Spanish diplomatic support. 
1. Correspondence between Grimaldi and Fuentes, November 
and December 1771, A.G.S., Estado, legO 4581. Fuentes 
remained in Paris until September 1772. 
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2. Aiguillon seeks to draw bpain into the ~astern 
question. 
Tbe advance of Russia's troops into Turkey and the 
activities of her fleet in the Mediterranean represented 
a considerable danger to France's Levant trade; it was 
known that Catberine 11 hoped to impose on the forte 
freedom of trade in the Black Sea and tbe cession of an 
island in the Archipelago as a Russian base, and tbere were 
rumours that Russia had offered Britain the island of 
Melos. l The French Court ri~htly feared that the increase 
in trade that would follow the presence of the Russians in 
the Levant would accrue to British subj ects. 2 :li'urthermore, 
if Russia managed to force a dictated peace upon the Turks, 
her growing prestige, power and confidence would encourage 
Catherine 11 to try her hand in Poland and Sweden. This 
might bring about the total annihilation of France's 
influence in the East and North. 
But such action as might effectively hinder Russia's 
progress, i&e. sending ships to the Levant in support of 
1. "Anderson", p.162. 
2. B.D.I., VII (France), Part IV, pp.124-5. Cp. 
Corr. de Mercy, I, pp.98-9, note 1. 
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the Turks, had always encountered British opposition,l 
and France was not prepared to risk a full-scale war with 
Britain for the sake of the Turks. Furthermore, France 
could expect little co-operation from her Austrian ally, 
who was pursuing her own policies to satisfy her own 
't '1 b't' 2 terrl orla am 1 lons. 
Aiguillon had thus very little room for manoeuvre; he 
embarked, however, upon complicated schemes to check Russia's 
progress. He took four lines of action which conflicted in 
more than one respect. First, he attempted to reach an 
understanding with Frederick 11; secondly, constant over-
tures were made to the British for some form of co-operation 
in the ~ast, and later in the North; in November 1772, 
Aiguillon approached even Russia with offers of an alliance; 
and all the time, he sought to obtain Spanish support. He 
failed on all four diplomatic fronts. 
Aiguillon's feelers to Prussia followed the arrival in 
Paris of rumours that Austria was negotiating a treaty with 
the Porte. The prospect of an Austro-Turkish treaty might 
conceivably make Prussia more receptive to proposals from 
the ally of her main antagonist, Austria. Furthermore', 
1. See above pp, 2.IB- 9 . 
2. Corr. de Broglie, 11, pp. 260-2, 277-8. 
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Aiguillon feared that Austria's belated and rather dubious 
decision to support iurkey might mean the spread of the 
conflict, for Prussia would have to support her Hussian 
ally and France, for her part, would be forced to come to 
., 'd 1 Austr~a s a~ • 
In August 1771 Aiguillon, availing himself of 
Choiseul's earlier tentative exchanges with the lrussians 
for a commercial treaty which had been called off in 1769, 
suggested in conversation with Sandoz Rollin, the Prussian 
charge in paris,2 that the negotiations should be reopened 
and that an alliance between the two countries might be 
attained. Unlike his predecessor, Aiguillon disclosed his 
game from the start by letting ::Frederick II know the price 
that he was prepared to pay in order to reach an agreement. 
France was obliged to support Austria, if the latter declared 
war on Russia and Prussia joined Hussia; nevertheless, 
1. ]Irance's fear grew as the summer drew on, for Russia 
far from being scared by Austria's treaty with the I 
Porte, requested Frederick II to accord ~n 20,000 A" 
troops, and Austria in turn pressed on wit~ her military 
preparations; see Fuentes' dispatches from Paris 
(August/September 1771), A.G.S., Estado, legO 4579/4580 
passim. Cp. Kaplan, pp.152-5. . 
2. He succeeded Goltz, the Prussian ambassador, in July 1770 
and remained in Paris until 1784, when be left for Madrid 
as minister plenipotentiary; Flammermont, Rapport, pp. 
54-6. 
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Aiguillon specified, France would remain neutral in a war 
occasioned by Austria's desire to prevent Prussia from 
taking possession of some districts in Poland, to which 
Frederick II lay claim, or from seizing Danzig. She would 
only intervene if Austria was attacked in her possessions. 
The Prussian King welcomed such advances, for although 
he appeared quite confident at the beginning of the summer 
that Austria and Russia might be brought to agree on a 
policy over ~urkey and Poland, later on he was somewhat 
alarmed by Austria's attitude. The Austro-Turkish treaty 
of July 1771 he dismissed as highly improbable, but he was 
not so sure about the attempts of the Austrian ambassador 
in Paris, lVlercy, to make up to Du .Barry, and was also worried 
that Austria might try to obtain subsidies from Spain. 
Encouragement from the Bourbon powers would make Austria more 
assertive, which in view of the lack of agreement between 
Austria and Russia over ~oldavia and Wallachia might develop 
into a general war by the spring of 1772. These territories 
Austria wished to be returned to the Porte, for she did not 
want the Russians as neighbours on the Danube; Frederick II 
suggested that they be given to Poland in compensation 10r 
her partition, to which he was now tryin! to persuade 
Austria. Aiguillon's approaches might be used to make Vienna 
more amenable to his plans. 
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Cm September 7th, 1771, :B'rederick 11 instructed Sandoz 
Rollin to make it clear that Prussia had no intention to 
part company with Russia and could not therefore consider 
entering into any ki.l.ld of agreement with France; however, he 
was to encourage Aigui110n to go ahead with his tentative 
approaches, taking great care not to commit himself lest 
Austria, or indeed Russia, should suspect that there was 
something serious going on between Prussia and France. 
But Aiguillon for his part was equally seeking some show 
of encouragement from Prussia, which he could use to improve 
France's standing, and proposed in November an exchange of 
representati ves of higher rank. ]lrederick 11, somewhat 
embarrassed at the proposal, emphasized the soundness of his 
engagements with Catherine 11; nonetheless he continued to 
play along with Aiguillon, but when the latter mentioned the 
marquis de Pons as the French candidate for the Berlin post, 
Frederick 11 dragged matters out alleging that he had not yet 
chosen a suitable person. By this time the negotiations 
between Prussia, Russia and Austria for the partition of 
Poland were well under way.l 
1. Pol. Corr., XXXI, pp.191-629 passim. Cp. Kap1an,pp. 155-65, 
for the negotiations between the three partitioning powers 
of Ioland in the last months of 1771; and F1ammermont, 
Rapport, pp. '59-71, for the exchange of representatives 
between Berlin and Paris, which did not take place until 
late in the spring (1772). 
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when Aiguillon realized that Frederick 11 had no 
intention of listening to his proposals, he turned to 
Austria with the hope of making up for his move towards 
Pr . 1 USS1a. The Austrians, although quite confident that 
there was no danter in Aiguillon's escapade, utilized his 
move towards Prussia, of which they had known through the 
interception of Sandoz's dispatches,2 to silence French 
protests against the partition of Poland. Aiguillon's 
move towards Prussia, Kaunitz alleged, had induced Austria 
to join Prussia and Russia. They would otherwise increase 
their territories at the expense of loland and ~urkey, 
while Austria, her position now weakened by Aiguillon's 
demarche, would be left behind. 3 
The French minister's failure to influence Prussian 
and Aastrian policy gave impetus to bis attempt to work 
out some kind of co-operation with Britain. Since he had 
first come into power, he had entertained the idea of this 
1. Recueil, I (Autriche), pp. 449-51. 
2. It is quite probable that this interception 
was contrived by Frederick 11. 
3. Corr. Mercy-Kaunitz, 11, pp. 398-408; Corr. de Mercy, I, 
pp. 246 ff.; Corr. de Broglie, 11, p. 320. 
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improbable task. l It was certaillly to be desired from the 
French point of view, for if Catherine 11 was deprived of 
Britain's support, ~~ance should be able to hinder Russia 
effectively. 
Aiguillon was hopeful that certain aspects of Russia's 
Mediterranean policy were favourable to a Franco-British 
upderstanuinb, i.e. Britain's uneasiness in respect of 
Russia's demand for an island base in the Archipelago. He 
was further encouraged by Britain's explanation in July 
1771 that she herself had no intention of accepting an 
island in the Archipelago from Russia. 2 
In return for a political understanding with Britain, 
the French minister seemed prepared to offer to guarantee 
Hanover and indicated a general willingness to support 
English policy of opposition to Prussian designs upon 
Danzig; he also envisaged the negotiation of a commercial 
treaty which would prepare the ground for a political 
reconciliation. 
During the last months of 1771 while giving hints of 
1. B. de Fraguier, IILe Duc d'Aiguillon et l'An~leterre 
(Juin 1771-Avril 1773)11, R.H.D., XXVI (1912), pp. 
608-9. 
2. B.D.I., ill (France), Part IV, pp. 120-1; "Anderson" , 
pp. 162 and 174-5. 
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his political intentions, Aiguillon tried to make himself 
agreeable to Dritain by his accommodating attitude over 
minor colonial disputes and by raising various bones of 
contention between Britain and Spain, i.e. the Mosquito 
Shore issue, the alleged erection of a British fort on the 
river St. John (Darien) and, above all, the question of the 
British undertaking to evacuate Port Egmont, and then 
pointing out that J:rrance would not support her ally in 
'nonsensical' quarrels as she had done under Choiseul, for 
the present French government believed that Britain, despite 
Spanish warnings to the contrary, ~arboured no hostile 
intentions against the Bourbon powers.l 
But Aiguillon's attempt to ingratiate himself with the 
English government at the expanse of Spain was ill-advised. 
1. Blaquiere's dispatches to Rochford from Paris, October-
December 1771, S.P. 78/283, passim. The English took 
no Dotice of the reference to the Mosquito Shore 
question; as for the alleged fort, they emphatically 
denied its existence; Corr. de Georfie Ill, 11, pp.304-7. 
For the Spanish attitude regarding arien, in the 
Isthmus of Panama, see l"!. Luengo lI'1unoz, "El Darien en la 
geo:poTIitica internacional del siglo XVIII", E.A., XVIII (1959), pp.139-56. 
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The ~rench minister, no doubt in the hope of magnifying the 
usefulness of his present disposition, mentioned Britain's 
'promise' to evacuate Fort Egmont not only in conversation 
with B1aquiere, the British charge in Paris,l but also in 
an interview he had with Shelburne, leading member of the 
Opposition, returning from a trip to Italy.2 
Rochford was annoyed. Aiguillon's suggestion came at 
a time when he was hoping to persuade Parliament to evacuate 
the establishment or, at any rate, to reduce the expense of 
its upkeep. The Opposition, who in the months following the 
Falkland Islands Settlement of January 22nd 1771, accused 
the North administration of having entered upon a secret 
agreement with Spain to evacuate Port Egmont, might now 
seize upon Aiguillon's remarks to substantiate their charge. 
The least the Falkland Islands were spoken of, Rochford 
instructed Blaquiere on December 27th to warn Aiguillon, 
1. Colonel John Blaquiere was the secretary to the English 
embassy in Paris, and in charge of affairs after the 
departure of Robert Walpo1e, the minister plenipotentiary; 
B.D.R., 1689-1789, pp. 23-4, and B.D.I., VII (France), 
Part IV, p. 107. 
2. Blaquiere I s dispatches of December 18th, 1771, S.P.' 78/ 
283. Nasserano to Grima1di, 17 January 1772, no. 2268, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 6984. 
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1 the better. Aiguillon promptly apologized for having 
used the word annoncer, which meant some Kind of formal 
promise, to refer to the British hopes given to the 
Spaniards with regard to the evacuation of Port Egmont; he 
explained that the word proceeded from a letter from Guines 
of 16 harch 1771, which had come out in his scandal over his 
alleged stock-gambling activities while ambassador in 
London. 2 
Rochford's rebuke did not discourage Aiguillon, for 
underneath Britain's anti-Bourbon official policy there was 
a policy of rapprochement with France which da~ed not come 
into the open; it involved a revolutionary break with the 
traditions of the last forty years. Verbally and privately 
Aiguillon was led to believe that the two countries might 
come to an understanding, and on 23 March 1772 he approached 
Rochford with proposals for concerted action to prevent the 
partition of Poland. 
George III and his ministers dabbled for over a year 
in a policy of co-operation with France as the only means 
of preventing the partition of Poland and of neutralizing 
1. B.D.I., VII (France), Part IV, pp.122-3. 
2. Goebel, p. 410, note 80; Corr. de Bro~lie, 11, p. 310, 
note 3. For a similar attempt in 177 to ingratiate 
himself with Britain, see St. Paul, I, pp. 276. 
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the danger to Dweden arising from the Russo-Austro-Prussian 
understanding. But no one would dare suggest it openly. 
The Opposition, especially the Chathamite party, was firmly 
behind the officially accepted view that regarded Russia 
as Britain's natural ally.l The English as a whole were 
prepared to leave Russia to partition Poland for the sake 
of their expected alliance with that power, and the 
government's attitude in Paris confirmed this view. In 
March, July and October 1772 reports from Faris that a 
French squadron was to operate conjointly with a Spanish 
one in the Mediterranean, produced warnings from Rochford 
that Britain would not remain indifferent if France sent 
ships against the Russians. By the end of 1772 a~l forms 
of international co-operation with France seemed inadmiss-
ible. 2 Aiguillon, however, still hoped for an English 
alliance to restrain Russia and on ~he eve of the Swedish 
crisis in the spring of 1773, as we shall see in the next 
section, he approached Hochford with new proposals. 
In the meantime, Aiguillon tried hard to divert 
Spain's attention to Europe in support of French policies. 
1. For the views of the parliamentary opposition, cp. 
D.B.Horn, British Public Opinion and the First 
Partition of Poland, pp.1-13. 
2. M.Roberts, "Great Britain and the tiwedish Revolution, 
1772-3", H.J., VII (1964), pp.16-24; see also "Anderson", 
pp. 171-7· 
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11he emphasis of the Family Compact in the last seven years 
had been on colonial issues, especially Bpanish, but five 
days after the settlement of the :Falkland Islands crisis on 
22 January 1771 Louis XV wrote to Carlos III to give the 
first in6ication that France ilOW looked on the Husso-
Turkish war and its effects as the main concern of the 
Bourbon alliance. having settled her dispute with Spain, 
Aiguillon tried to make the 0panish government believe, 
Britain had no hostile intentions against Spanish possessions 
in America and appeared willing to co-operate with the Bourbon 
powers in. checking Russia. The ]french minister was hoping 
to persuade Spain that an active policy of support for the 
Turks needed not result in a full-scale war with Britain; 
he was also seeking to dispel Spain's suspicions about his 
own approaches to Rochford. With regard to Austria, 
Aiguillon was anxious that the apparent good understanding 
between Mercy and Fuentes in Paris might prove a serious 
obstacle to his attempt to win Spain for his own plans; for 
this reason, when the Austro-Turkish Treaty of July 1771 
became known, he used it in conversation with Fuentes to 
alarm Spain about Austria's move as being likely to increase 
the +isk of war, and to show that Vienna was Dot acting in 
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accordance with its treaties with France. l 
But the only argument which might conceivably weigh 
with the bpanisb government was his offer to employ his 
good offices with the Porte for the inclusion of Spain in 
the projected Franco-Turkish alliance. As we have seen, 
Choiseul's similar offer in June 1770 had been favourably 
considered in Nadrid. 2 
~he idea of a Franco-Turkish alliance had been resumed 
by the French in March 1771, after the arrival in Paris of 
Saint-Priest's reports from Constantinople that the situ-
ation was now favourable to proceed with the negotiations 
for the treaty. Vrilliere, Choiseul's transient successor 
as secretary of state for foreign affairs, continued his 
policies of secretly and indirectly aiding the Porte while 
encouraging her to fight on and seeking to sign an alliance 
that would not include the present Russo-Turkish war. 3 As 
1. Gil ~.unil1a, pp.179-82; Martin-A1lanic,II, pp. 1200-1 , 
1230-1 and 1245; Aiguillon's instructions to Os sun in 
the summer of 1771, copies of which may be found in 
A.G.B., Estado, legajos 4575/4582; Fuentes to Grirualdi, 
20 September 1771, no.952, A.G.S., Estado, legajo 4580. 
2. See above pp.28l-~. 
3· By indirect aid France meant subsidies given 
and the Polis~ Confederates, which helped to 
Russian pressure upon the Turkish front; cp. 
Broglie, II, pp. 258 and 262, notes 1-2. 
to Sweden 
ease 
Corr. de 
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for Spain's role in future nebotiations with the Porte, 
Vrilliere departed from Choiseul's policy of at least 
appearing to act in concert with Spain. Following Baint-
Priest's counsel conveyed in his dispatch of December 
31st,1 Vrilliere agreed to negotiate, behind Spain's back, 
an article in the projected treaty with the Porte whereby 
Carlos III would accept France as permanent rielebatew to 
act on his behalf in Constantinople. In this way, France's 
prominent position with the Turks would not suffer from 
Spain's efforts to further her own commercial interests and 
the latter would entirely depend upon the former's good 
will. Spain was to be informed of the terms for the treaty 
as envisaged by ~raIlce, except for the article suggested 
. . t Pr· t 2 by Ba1n - 1es. 
In his instructions to Saint Priest, August 1st, 1771, 
Aiguillon expressed the same views as Vrilliere. His 
representative in Constantinople would negotiate on behalf 
of Spain, who would not be a principal to the treaty but 
become an aCcessory when it was completed. 3 And this, one 
1. No. 35, C.P.Turquie 155, ff. 230-44. See also his 
dispatch no.2, 14 ]'ebruary 1771; ff.305-15. 
2. Vrilliere to Saint-Priest, 23 March 1771, no.3,C.P., 
Turquie 155, ff.354-6. See also his instructions of 
]'ebruary 3rd, no.33, ff. 296-9 , and 7th, nb.;4, f!.302-3. 
3. No. 13, C.P.,Turkie 156, ff.205-10;Aigui11on's new 
draft of the projected treaty, ff.179-182. 
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would deduce from his conversation with Fuentes at the 
beginning of oeptember, on condition that Spain became 
committed to French policy of indirect aid to the Turks; 
in fact, Aiguillon suggested that the Turks, whom he 
alleged to be quite cold with regard to Spain's inclusion 
in the treaty, might prove compliant with Spanish wishes 
if Spain agreed to help France subsidize the Polish 
Confederat~s in their struggle against Russia, thereby 
relieving pressure on the Turkish front. l 
But Spain had no desire to become involved in the 
East. In reply to Louis XV's first suggestions after the 
Falkland Islands Settlement of 22 January 1771, Carlos III 
reaffirmed the main principTIe of Spain's European policy: 
the preservation of peace by means of the Austro-French 
alliance making up for the Prusso-Russ'ian understanding 
and the continuation of Prusso-Austrian antagonism - the 
Russo-Turkish war and the partition of Poland being only 
indirectly relevant to Spain in so far as the balance of 
power in Central Europe was threatened. For Spain's main 
concern was Britain's colonial designs, and she insisted 
therefore that the main preoccupation of the Bourbon powers 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 5 September 1771, no. 933, 
A.G.S., Estado, le gO 4580. 
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should be to have a navy strong enough to match Britain's; 
the influence and prestige of the Bourbon powers in Europe 
would follow from it. l 
Hence Russia's progress and the possibility of sub-
sequent improvements in Britain's strategic and cOIlilllercial 
posi ti"on in the hedi terranean caused some anxiety in Spanish 
circles. Indeed, the Spanish government was still keen on 
the idea of a defensive allianc~ith the ~urks, but cautious 
not to be rushed into it by France without full regard to 
Spanish interests and views in the present situation. 2 
On hearing of Aiguillon's proposal for financial support 
to the Foles, Grimaldi immediately instructed Fuentes to 
declare to the French that Spain had no intebion to buy her 
inclusion in the projected Rranco-~urkish treaty by becoming 
involved in Foland. 3 The way to contain Russi~, Prussia and 
Austria, and thus to restore the balance of power, which 
made for peace in Europe, was not to enter into new engage-
ments, Grimaldi insisted a few days later, but to strengthen 
their navies, finances and colonial possessions so as to be 
1. Gil Munilla, pp. 179-182. 
2. Grimaldi to FusIltes6 August 12th, and December 4th, 1771, A.G.S., Estado, leg 4575. 
,. September 19th, 1771, A.G.B., Estadq,legO 4575. In 
addition to Aiguillon's proposal, the Poles themselves 
pestered the Spanish representatives in Paris from March 
1771 to March 1773 with requests for help, but to no 
avail; A.G.S., Estado, legajos 4579/4587 passim. 
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able to face Britain with confidence; the prestige of the 
Bourbon powers thus gained would suffice to maintain French 
influence in the ~ast.l 
Grimaldi was aimillg at avoiding the spread of the 
conflict to Western Europe. The only war visualized by the 
Spaniards was a British and maritime one, and to make sure 
that Britain knew of Spain's intention to remain neutral in 
the present dispute in the ~ast, the ~nglish were given 
assurances that Spain had no business in the present war 
as long as the Italian possessions of Car1os'III's 
relatives were secure and his own possessions in America 
were not threatened. 2 The move was designed not only to 
avoid complications with Britain on the Continent but also 
to give a general indication of peaceful leanings and for-
bearance with regard to Spanish disputes with Britain; for 
Aiguillon's attempt to ingratiate himself with the English 
government at the expense of cipain made the latter's 
position quite vulnerable for the time being. 3 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 30 September 1771, A.G.B., Estado, 
legO 4580. 
2. I>lasserano to Grimaldi, 30 August 1771, no.2181, A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 6981; Blaquiere to Rochford, 25 October 
1771 (Private), S.P. 78/283. 
3. Nasserano to Grimaldi, 17 January 1772, no.2268, A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 6984; Fuentes to Grimaldi, same date, no. 
14, legO 4583. 
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Aiguillon for his part took little notice of Grim-
aldi's attitude. ne believed that he could bully cipain 
into subsidizing the 101es ana on October 11th he said to 
Fuentes that in view of the fact that the inclusion of 
Spain was the only obstacle to the treaty from the Turkish 
point of view and that Spain seemed indifferent to the 
alliance, :b'rance had decided to continue negotiations with 
1 the Porte without her. 
Grimaldi, by now thoroughly annoyed with Aiguillon, 
reviewed the whole situation and sent the French minister 
a stiff and clear reminder of ovain's position with regard 
to the Turkish alliance. In the first place, it was still 
true that Spain wanted it but it was :b'rance who had 
invited her to join, for cipanish support was needed in the 
East: therefore it was impertinent to pretend that Spain's 
share in the projected treaty with the Porte was a speCial 
favour from France for which she would have to subsidize 
the }olish Oonfederates in return. 
If, as France suggested, the main objection to the 
completion of the treaty was the Porte's opposition to 
Spanish entry, Spain was quite prepared to let France go 
ahead alone; in which case Spain would wish to be informed 
of the Turkish point of view as well as of the exact terms 
1. Fuentes to Grill-aldi, 26 October 1771, no.994, 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 4575; C.P.~ Tu~e 156, ff. 
319-348, passim. 
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contemplated by the French, for if the latter, in return 
for some commercial reward in the Levant, entered into 
offensive or defensive agreements, or undertakings to 
supply the Turks with ships or troops - thereby increasing 
the danger of a Mediterranean war and British intervention, 
Spain ought to be able to ascertain the measure of her own 
involvement by reason of her alliance with Jfrance. 
If, on the other hand, Spain's inclusion in the treaty 
was desired and she was to be exposed to the same risks as 
]'rance, she would have to take full participation in the 
negotiations and share in the same advantages; otherwise the 
Spanish Court would not feel obliged to bear the conse-
quences of a treaty that had been negotiated without due 
regard to art. 26 of the Family Compact (it stipulated 
complete exchange of information regarding future engage-
ments and negotiations with third powers in any way bearing 
upon their common interests).l 
Aiguillon realized he had gone too far. Immediately 
after the arrival in Faris of Grimaldi's reply of October 
19th, he tried to explain that the suggestion to subsidize 
the Poles was not meant as a price for supporting Spain's 
inclusion in the projected treaty with the Porte. The 
negotiations in Constantinope, he announced, were to be 
1. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 21 October 1771, and 4 December 
1771, A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 4575. 
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continuea on behalf of tbe two Bourbon powers and to the 
satisfaction of both. l But the chances of success, he 
conceded, were slim; in fact, during the last year Saint-
Priest had not made auy progress. 2 
The 3panish were quite happy to accept Aiguillon's 
explanations. ~he Turkish nebotiation was not in the 
advanced stage that the French minister's earlier express-
ions had led them to believe, and now that Spain was to take 
a full part in it, she needed not be anxious about being 
rushed into any measures contrary to her views. 3 
Furthermore, the Austro-Bourbon alignment, which Carlos 
Ill's government regarded mainly as a stabilizer of power 
in Central Europe making for peace, had been weakened by 
Aiguillon's dallying with Prussia and Britain, and by 
Austria's understanding with Prussia and Russia over Poland. 
Britain was sure to utilize these differences with a view 
to undermine both the Family Compact and the Treaty of 
Versailles.4 
1.Aiguillon to Ossun,7 November 1771,C.P.,Turquie 156, ff.399-
402;Aiguillon to Saint-Priest, 20 DecemberI771,no.2,ff. 
446-7-
2.Aiguillon to Ossun,27 December 1771(Copy);A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4582. . 
".Grimaldi to Fuentes ,10 ~'ebruary 1772 ,A.G.B. ,Estado ,1egO 4575. 
4.Reports from Paris and London continued sounding the alarm 
about a Franco-British understanding until the summer. 
Fuentes to Grimaldi,17 January 1772,no.14,A.G.S.,Estado, 
legO 4583;March 9th,no.61,legO 4584. Masserano to Grimaldi, 
17 March 1772,no.2308 and June 12th,no.2258,legO 6984; I? 
July 1772, no.2274, and August 29th, legO 6985. 
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For the first half of 1772 Grimaldi tUrned his efforts 
to retrieve Aiguillon from his propensity towards Britain and 
to patch up the existing rift between Austria and l!'rance. 
Grimaldi stressed the dangers of neglecting their navies 
and possessions; Britain was their main enemy and France's 
present disposition would only serve to make her more 
dangerous in the future. 1 
Regarding the Austrian end of lithe system of the south", 
"whatever the bad effects of the present agreement between 
Vienna, Berlin and Sj;. PetJersburg~' - wrote Grimaldi on July 
14th -"those that were likely to follow from the split 
between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria could be much 
worse".2 
Spain waS aware that Austria had not acted with the 
consideration towards France that was expected of her by 
treaty, Grimaldi agreed, but France was not blameless 
either, for it was her move towards Prussia in the first 
place which made Austria apprehensive; besides, the partition 
1. Grimaldi to Masserano, 17 February 1762, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 6975; to Fuentes, same date, leg 4583, and 
April 28th, legO 4584. 
2. 'ro Nasserano; A.G.S., Estado, legO 6984. 
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of I-olanci was by the spring of 1772 a foregone conclusion. l 
The best course, therefore, was to forget past offences and 
to restore Austro-French relations to their former under-
standing. Availin€; himself of the friendly intercourse 
existing with ~ercy in Faris, Fuentes was able to ease the 
strain on the Franco-Austrian alliance a little. 2 Aiguillon 
for his part was quite happy to declare his support for the 
Austrian connection. It was still essential to France, and 
especially now that Hussia might try to interfere in Sweden 
to undo the effects of Gustavus Ill's coup d'etat of August 
1772. Indeed, the attitude of the French minister towards 
Spain also became friendly by the end of the summer, giving 
repeated assurances of his sincere wishes to act in close 
concert with the Spanish ally in all questions.' 
1. The Russo-Prussian Convention to partition Poland 
:nad been signed on February 17th with the knowledge 
that Austria would not implement her treaty with the 
Forte, but would join in the partition. The Tripartite 
Convention was signed on 5 August 1772 (Kap1an, pp.146ff.) 
Cp. Corr. de Broglie,II, p.354, note 3. 
2. Fuentes-Grimaldi correspondence ,March-August , A.G.S., 
Estado, legajos 4584/4585, passim. 
3. See Aiguillon's instructions to Ossun from September 
onwards in A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 4582 (copies). 
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3. The attitude of ~pain to the ~wedish crisis. 
Although the Swedish revolution of 19 August 1772, and 
the acute Anglo-French crisis that followed it in the spring 
of 1773, brought out the attitude of the Spanish government 
towards continental Europe and its conception of the Family 
Compact as an alliance that was primarily intended to pro-
tect Spanish territories overseas, Spain took a more active 
part than she had done, 'or was ever likely to do, in the 
Russo-Turkish war. 
The coup d'etat staged by the newly-enthroned King of 
Sweden, Gustavus III - his father, Adolphus Frederick, had 
died in February 1771 - after an abortive attempt to 
r~rtic.~_ 
conciliate the two main ~~~~egJ' of Swedish politics, was 
the culmination of a long-established struggle between the 
Hats, supported by the French, and the Caps, supported by 
Britain, Denmark and Russia, to control power. l 
The events of August were also the fulfilment of 
France's wishes to have a strong friend in the North as a 
means to check Russia's expansionist aims and the threat of a 
'Northern system', that is, the alliance of Britain, Denmark 
and Russia. Since 1766 Choiseu1 had believed that by 
1. By 1772 Sweden had become the political market of Europe 
and all the countries concerned had accepted political 
bribery as the common currency in the North. 
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strengthening the Crown, which leaned towards ]'rance, he 
could establish ~'rance's influence on firmer grounds and 
enable Sweden to build up her own defences; thus relieving 
France of the financial burden. The appearance of a strong 
monarch, Gustavus Ill, on the political scene made this 
possible. But Russia, Denmark, and Britain to a lesser 
degree, disliked absolutism in bweden, assuming that it 
would mean stronger policies abroad and attempts to recover 
land lost in the early eighteenth century. 
The attitude of Russia, and that of her close ally, 
Denmark was one of restraint. ~he Turkish war tied 
Gatherine II's hands and she could not entertain any other 
way of meddling in Swedish politics apart from bidding high 
for the Caps. But this indecisive course of action, which 
Britain's refusal to spend money on political bribery as 
lavishly as the Russians wished made the more inoperative, 
seemed to have stirred the Empress into more effective 
policies to force Sweden into Russia's sphere of influence. 
Furthermore, successive victories over the Turks in 1772 
encouraged her to believe that peace in the East could be 
achieved on her own terms; she could then turn against 
Sweden. Early in 177, Catherine 11 seemed decided on such 
a course. 
As to Britain's attitude, it was determined by contra-
dictory factors. On the one hand, she bad to maintain what 
remained of the former husso-British friendship but not 
at the cost of stimulating the expansionist ambitions of 
at. l'etersburg, which had already won such victories in 
Poland and 'l'urkey. On the other hand, views of general 
policy anQ traditional hostility to ~rance prevented 
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Bri tain from allowing ]'rance, perhaps in co-operation with 
Spain, to take any measures against Russia. Il'hus Britain 
opted for opposing France's decision to send a fleet to the 
Baltic to support Sweden if she were attacked, while giving 
Russia to ul1derstand that her attitude regarding France was 
not to be taken as a sign of British approval of Catherine 
II's schemes, and even encouraging her to believe that 
Britain might co-operate with France. l 
From the beginning Spain was cautious but actively 
engaged in the Swedish question~ To judge from Aiguillon's 
effusive thanks in the summer of 1772, she appears to have 
contributed quite generously to France's political bribery 
in support of the Hats aud the ,Crown. 2 Furthermore, at the 
1. Roberts, H.J.,VII (1964),pp.1-16 and 19-20; "Anderson", 
pp. 178-98. 
2. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 4 September 1772, nos 230 and 247; 
Magallon to Grimaldi, 16 October 1772, no.283; A.G.B., 
Estado, legO 4586. Cp. L.B. de Marsangy, Le comte de 
Ver ennes: son ambassade en Bu~de 1 1-1 ,pe • 
have found no trace of the actual amount n the Spanish 
archives; the only figures I have come across proceed from 
rumours collected by British diplomatists (St.Faul, I, pp. 
74-5; Add.24159, ff.3-4; stowe 262,£.14). 
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request of the French, who hoped to further their interests 
in the North, she showed some favour towards Danish ships in 
the Mediterranean carryins effects of war to Algiers. l But 
she had no desire to be fully committed to a policy of open 
support as Aiguillon would have liked. 
The French minister, rather hastily and prematurely, was 
suggesting in mid September that the Spanish Court should 
join France in her declaration to ~ritain, Russia and 
Denmark that she would support Gustavus Ill's coup by all 
means. 2 ~he terms of the proposed French declaration, 
Grimaldi replied, were too strong and, in any case, Spain 
had no reason to join France in this measure, for she was 
not bound to Sweden either by treaty or by immediate interests. 
However, Spain was prepared to give some indication of sup~ 
port for French policy in the North; Grimaldi would write 
to inform these Courts that Carlos III recognized the justice 
of Gustavus Ill's measures and did not believe that other 
powers should oppose them or interfere in Sweden's domestic 
1. According to the Spaniards it was a violation of article 5 
of the Hispano-Danish Convention of 22 September 1757 
(printed in Cantillo, pp.458-9 and in Danske Tractater, 
175l-l800,pp.15l-5), but they promised not to send specific 
instructions for searching _~~ for those effects as would 
have been the case otherwise. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 3 
August 1772, no.212,A.G.S.,Estado,legO 4585, and Grimaldi 
to Fuentes, 22 September 1772, legO 4586. 
2. Magallon to Grimaldi, 18 September 1772, no.258,legO 4586. 
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affairs. l 
The attitude of Austria, on the other hand, was 
posi ti vely a.iscouragint~. 1!lrance' s German ally had got 
the lion's share in the partition of Ioland2 and it seems 
that she now intended to secure her gains by keeping peace 
in the North. If there was a clash with Russia, 1!'rance 
would call upon Austria - the more loudly since Prussia's 
aid to Catherine 11 was likely to take the form of an in-
vasion of Swedish Pomerania, which Austria, by a guarantee 
of 1757, was bound to protect. 3 Austria would not wish her 
co-partitioning powers to outgrow her at the expense of 
Sweden. Her solution was to get France to persuade 
Gustavus III to restore the Constitution of 1720; that is, 
to return to the situation prior to Gustavus Ill's coup. 
The Austrians professed in October that they did not mean 
to flout the ~reaty of Versailles;however, no encourage-
ment was given to the idea that they would support France 
4 in Sweden. Aiguillon resented the hint of desertion and 
reacted by accusing Austria of dubious conduct with regard 
to poland;5 much to the dismay of Grimaldi, who only three 
1.Grimaldi to LV!agallon, October 1772 ,A.G .S. ,Estado ,1egO 4586 
(written probably at the very beginning of the month). 
2.Kaplan, ch.XIII. 
3.Roberts,H.J., VII (1964),p.ll. 
4.Cp. Ibid.,p.ll, note 35. 
5.Magallon to Grimaldi,October 28th,no.294; Ossun to Grim-
aldi,October 24th; Magallon to Grimaldi, 9 November 1772, 
no. 324; A.G.S., Estado, legO 4586. 
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months earlier was insisting on the dang:ers of a split 
between the houses of Bourbon and Austria. 
A friendly intercourse between the Bourbon powers and 
Austria was now the more desirable as it might help to under-
mine the entente between the three partitioning powers. On 
hearing of the recriminations between Vienna and Paris, 
Grimaldi stressed the need to be patient with Austria. 
While Russia, Prussia and Austria had common interests in 
Poland, the latter would prefer to intimidate France into 
preserving peace rather than break up the existing under-
standing between the three eastern monarchies. The Spanish 
minister suggested that the French ambassador in Vienna, 
Rohan,l should express to Kaunitz verbally and in a friendly 
tone, as if Aiguillon were asking for advice, that the 
Swedish revolution was a domestic affair in which no 
country had a right to interfere. If any power should want 
to use force against Sweden, it would seem the duty of 
Europe to stop that power. 2 
AD this stage Spain was only trying to tread lightly. 
The situation was too fluid. Britain had not spoken her 
1. For Rohan's mission to Vienna, January 1772 to July 1774, 
see Recueil, I (Autriche), pp.447-9. 
2. Grimaldi to l'!agallon, 9 November 1772, enclosing copy 
of the minute of his verbal answer to Ossun; A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 4586. 
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mind yet. ~o drive in his point for circumspection, 
Grimaldi reminded the French of the Bourbon power~ poor 
performance on the question of the Falkland Islands and the 
French allegation at the time that they were not prepared to 
fight Britain. Furthermore, Grimaldi gave Britain assur-
ances of Spain's peaceful leanings. 
In the middle of September the English government was 
thrown into some agitation. ~he English representative in 
Paris, Blaquiere, reported that Aiguillon was believed to 
be engaged in planning a declaration to Russia to demand the 
withdrawal of her fleet from the Mediterranean and that 
Spain was arming to be in a position to join in the declar-
ation. According to Blaquiere, the French minister had 
taken upon himself to declare to the Danish representative 
in Paris that Spain supported France's Swedish policy fully.l 
The English resented jfrance' s triumph in the North -
as exemplified in Gustavus Ill's successful coup - but they 
soon came to accept the constitutional change in Sweden. 
Their policy now was to preserye peace by restraining Russia 
from attacking Sweden and deterring France from sending a 
1. B1aquiere to Rochford, 2 September 1772, no. 43, and 
September 9th, no.44; see also Saint-Paul to Rochiord, 
21 October 1772, no.6; S.P. 78/286. 
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squadron to defend her. On October 9th, 1772, the .&lglish 
government decided to warn the French that Britain would not 
remain an idle spectator if France broke her neutrality in 
the Russo-'l'urkish conflict in any way. 1 Spain was not 
cautioned; Grantham was sent a copy of the warning to the 
French with directions to refer to it only if Grimaldi him-
self mentioned the Swedish crisis and possible French 
. t t" 2 ~n erven ~on. Although it was generally believed that 
Spain would act in close concert with France, it was conven-
ient to treat her as an independent voice in the hope that 
France might be restrained from that quarter as well. 
Spaill, GraLtham reported in the first half of November, 
would not take an active part in the Swedish question or 
against the liussian fleet in the Mediterranean unless forced 
into it by the need to defend France herself. Effects of 
war, financial aid, or such other indirect means, might be 
supplied, Grimaldi specifically stated, but any act of direct 
support, e.g. sending forces to assist the Swedes, which 
might eventually draw Spain into the northern conflict in a 
1. Roberts, ~., VII (1964),pp.14,l9,22. 
2. Rochford to Grantham, 9 October 1772, no.22,S.P. 94/191 
(cp- previous instructions of September 11th, no.18, and 
18th, no. 19, and those of November 13th, no. 25). It 
is worth noting in this connection Rochford's attitude 
on the Crab Island issue; see above p.!eQ. 
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military sense, was out of the question. The idea of a 
close Franco-bpanish co-operation on this issue, Grantham 
concluded, was therefore the creation of Aiguillon himself. l 
Spain for her part was now in a position to evolve a 
more definite policy with regard to Sweden. To judge from 
Grimaldi's talks with Grantham and also from reports from 
London of similar meetings between the Spanish charge, Es-
carano, and the English ministers, Britain did not intend 
to encourage Catherine 11 in her ambitious designs in 
Sweden and was even trying to restrain her, thus pursuing 
a similar objective to that of France, but would not stand 
for a French fleet in the Baltic and would not listen to 
any proposal of co-operation from France to halt the 
u . 2 auss~ans. 
In the first place, Spain was concerned to avoid a 
Franco-British war over the Swedish question, for the Family 
Compact would be invoked. On December 21st, 1772, Grimaldi 
1. Grantham to Rochford, 2 November 1772, no.45, 9th, no.46, 
and 16th, no.47; S.P. 94/191 (cp.Grimaldi to Escarano, 
5 October 1?72, Add. 32300, ff. 128-9; intercepted and 
deciphered). 
2. September-December, 1772, A.G.S., Estado, legajo 6985. 
In his no.83 o£ December 28th, Bscarano informs that 
North was pressing to cut the navy vote and to reduce 
the number of sailors in active service (cp. The Private 
Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, I, pp. 20-4). 
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warned lt'rance that a ]'rench fleet in the Baltic would cause 
Britain to retaliate. l\<ieans other than those regarded as 
hostile by Britain ought to be afforded to Sweden. He also 
admonished that Spain might not be bound to assist :b'rance 
in a northern conflict, for article 8 of the Family Compact 
excluded German and territorial wars from the scope of the 
alliance. 
Grimaldi, rather unrealistically, continued to hold 
that the Austrians might be persuaded to discourage Russia. 
Undoubtedly, there was no better check to Russia in Sweden, 
or indeed in Turkey, than to lessen the Prusso-Russo-
Austrian understanding, but Grimaldi himself had admitted 
earlier on that the three eastern monarchies were welded by 
. d . t th·· 1 the1r eS1re 0 secure e1r ga1ns. Indeed, Austria 
continued to insist throughout the winter of 1772-177, that 
it was up to France to preserve peace by getting Gustavus 
III to return to the Constitution of 1720. 2 
1. Grimaldi to wagal16n, 21 December 1772, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4586 (There is also an undated minute of an 
instruction to be sent in cipher, which appears to be of 
the same date as well). 
2. Magal16n to Grimaldi, 21 November 177" no.,42, Aigu1110n 
to Ossun, 1 December 1772 (copy); A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4586. f'Iagallon to Grimaldi, January 8th t no. 8, and 
January 22nd, 1773, no. 29, legO 4587. Cp. Corr.de Mercy, 
I, pp. 421, 426; Corr. hercy-Kaun1tz, 11, pp.416-B. 
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With no ellcouragement within the 'system of the south', 
Aiguillon had no option, if he wanted to protect France's 
political prot~g~ in the ~orth against Russia, but to 
endeavour to obtain an ~nglish alliance or a collusive 
agreement to stop Catherine 11 in the Baltic. Aiguillon 
was led to believe that such an agreement was not impossible, 
for althou3h official warnings continued to be given to the 
French that Britain would not tolerate a French arwameIlt 
either at ~oulon or at ~rest, Rochford unofficially and 
secretly assured them in December that France might be 
allowed to send a swift expedition to the Baltic to trans-
port troops to ~weden's assistance. In the hope of English 
connivance in this regard, Aiguillon decided not to send 
ships to the baltic. ihe Franco-Swedish Convention 
concluded in February 1773, confirmed the new approach; 
Louis XV pledBed himself to supply Gustavus III with 
800,000 livres a year for three years from 1 January 1773 
to be used to improve the ~wedish army and navy, and 
promised to send ten to twelve thousand troops (but nO 
ships) in.the event of war. In return for French subsidies 
Sweden engaged to have an army of 47,000 men, and 2l.ships 
in readiness by January, 1776. As to the question of how 
to get the French units to G~teberg or bow to protect the 
transport ships against the Danish and Russian fleets, it 
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was believed that Britain might not object to a small 
escort of French warships, provided they came straight home 
after seeing the troops safely landed in Sweden. 
The expected crisis arrived at the end of March. On 
the 28th Paris received the news that the invasion of Sweden 
by Russia was inevitable. Aiguillon had already decided 
(seven days before) to send a secret agent to Hochford to 
asce:btain British reaction in the event of Ji'rench inter-
vention in the Baltic and, unbeknown to the secret agent, 
had turned soon afterwards to an alternative line of action. 
rrhe pressure on Hussia was now to take the form of a ,F'rench 
squadron in the Aegean ~ea; the orders for the preparation 
of twelve ships of the line and six frigates were sent to 
Toulon on March 26th. Aiguillon must have thought that a 
Nediterranean action was less likely to offend British public 
opinion; furthermore, Spain might be prepar~d to sUlPort a 
French squadron in the IIJedi terranean for the sake of her 
commercial interests. 
But this chan~e of course spoilt any chance there may 
have been of effective British connivance. With regard to a 
French squadron in the Baltic, Rochford promised a collusive 
delay for arming of at least eight days' start of England's 
to enable France to launch a swift attack on the Russian 
fleet and return immediately to port. As to an expedition 
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to the nrchipela[o, however, Hochford warned the French 
against it. ~he Enflish miuister rightly believed it would 
be too late to help ~weden; moreover, he could not forget 
that Britain had alreaty committed herself to assist 
Catherine 11, if ~rance should attack the Russian fleet in 
the Aegean ciea. Although the ~~ench navy was afforded not 
1 
eight days' start as promised by dochford but fifteen, 
France could not transfer the 'l'oulon squadron to the Atlantic 
in such a short time, nor indeed prepare a new one in Brest. 
Official british policy, on the other hand, continued to be 
voiced in the best anti-French manner, especially by 
stormont, whose warnings of retaliatory action Aiguillon 
began to take seriously by the middle of April; so that by 
the 16th the French minister sent orders to Toulon to slow 
down preparations and the squadron was suspended on the 19th. 
By May 21st the crisis was over. 
These transactions had no direct part in averting the 
Russian threat, for the danger to bweden was over before the 
Anglo-French crisis as a result of Russia's attitude which 
1. From April 8th to the 23rd, when the British mobilization 
was made public; it was actually ordered two days before. 
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began to soften at the eIld of ~arch. In a broader sense, 
however, the solution of the crisis could be credited to 
the British and ~rench policy, to the general belief that 
they might agree to halt Russia. Indeed, the apparent 
consensus of opinion between France and Britain on the need 
to curb the predatory system of the three eastern monarchies 
might have resulted in some kind of understanding, had it 
not been for the long-standing antagonism between the two 
countries. As it was, Anglo-French relations returned to 
familiar channels. Although the suspension of the French 
armament had preceded by four days the announcement on 
April 23rd of the British mobilization, public opinion 
generally concluded that France had had to climb down in 
the face of British menaces. ~he English for their part 
gave voice to their feelings of triumph by staging a grand 
review of the fleet at Spithead on June 22nd. The opportun-
ity of a rapprochement was lost, and with it the only 
chance to influence events in the East. l 
Spain's bearing on the outcome of the Anglo-French 
crisis was minimal, for the Toulon squadron was ordered to 
be prepared and suspended before she could act. From the 
1. For this episode and some interesting reflections on the 
logic of an Anglo-French entente to curb Russia, see 
Roberts, H.J., VII (1964), pp. 22-46. 
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point of view of the E'alllily Co;:,pact, however , it is 
relevant to stress that Spain, who received the news of 
the roulon armrunent, together with Aiguilloll's request for 
Spain to do likewise, when the French squadron had already 
been suspended,l took steps to solve the ~wedish crisis 
along lines which would halt Hussia in the borth without 
committing herself to the conflict in a military sense, 
least of all if Britain was in any way involved on the 
other siae. 
Enlarging on his previous instructions of 21 December 
1772, Grimaldi instructed 1'la5allon on April 25th to su~gest 
to the French that cipain might be prepared to suvport them 
militarily against Russia and Denmark, as long as Britain 
remained neutral; otherwise, ~pain would contribute towards 
the defence of 8weden only financiall~ and indirectly, 
through France, without treaties or agreement of any kind, 
as a personal subsidy from friend to friend. This specific 
pledge of financial aid was not imparted to France or 
Sweden; it was hoped that a prompt peace might spare the 
1. hagallon to Grimalai, 6 April, no. 86, and 16 April 
1773, nos 103-105, A.G.S., ~stado, legO 4588. 
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Spanis h Il'reasury this heavy uncertaking. I 
The main concern from the Spanish point of view was to 
-I 
find out .t3ri tain' s atti tucie. ri'he Toulon squadron, Grimaldi 
warned the ]'rench, ought .oot to have been ordereci without 
her knowledge, nor without the advice of Spain, for France 
would not be able to invoke the ~amily Compact unless she 
acted in close consultation with her ally.2 Grimaldi would 
have liked France and Britain, and Spain as well, to declare, 
jointly or separately, to Catherine 11 their intention to 
prevent an attack on Sweden; but failing this, Britain should 
be prevailed upon to permit France to defend ciweden and to 
stop the Russians in the Mediterranean, but no action was to 
be taken without a clear undertaking from the British. 3 To 
1. Grimaldi to Llano,26 April 1773, A.G.S.,Estado,legO 6703; 
Grirnaldi to Magal16n, 25 April 1773,(Confidential), legO 
~588. Gustavus III had requested financial support from 
Madrid in the middle of March (Llano to Grima1di, 18 
harch 1773, legO 6703). Sebastian de Llano y la Quadra, 
Count of Santafe and Order of Carlos Ill, served in the 
first secretaryship of state since 1760; he went to Den-
mark in 1763, and from there to Sweden in 1772;transferred 
to Amsterdam in 1789, he died four years later (A.H.N., 
~stado, legO 3416/2). 
2. ~o emphasize his warning, Grimaldi actually sent Magall6n 
extracts of It'rench correspondence on the Falkland Tslands 
to be shown to the French minister;it was purported to 
point out that Aiguillon's present haste to uphold Gustavus 
III was at variance with France's reluctance to support 
Carlos III in 1771. 
3. Griwaldi's instructions to fv1agallon, 25 April 1773, A.G.S., 
Estado,legO 4588. (To judge by the number of minutes of the 
various ciispatches of this date, Grima1di took great care 
to draft them). Cp. his instructions to Escarano of the 
same date (legO 6986). 
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make sure, Grimaldi cave Grantham assurances to the effect 
that oh'rance was going to explore every expedient in London 
before deciding to act, and stressed that opain had no agree-
ment or treaty by which she could be drawn into thG llortherl1 
conflict. The ~nglish ambassador in Madrid, however, 
observed correctly that Spain woula have to arm if Great 
Britain armed, not on account of the uwedish issue but to 
defend France. l Grantham proved right. On being apprised 
that Britain had ordered fifteen ships of the line to be 
fitted out at Spithead,2 Grimaldi intimated to the English 
that Spain would feel obliged to arm an equivalent number 
of ships unless the present British and French armaments 
were suspended.' But the crisis was already over. On May 
11th ~agal16n reported from Paris that the danger of an 
4 Anglo-]'rench confrontation in ciweden had passed. 
Grimsldi was relieved to hear it. Indeed, he hurried 
to ensure that no financial commitment to oweden was under-
taken now that the threat to Gustavus III had ceased. 5 But 
1. Grantham to Rochford, 27 April 1773,no.15, and April 29th 
no.16; S.P. 94/192(cp. his letter to Stormont,no.2, of 
the 27th, in hdd. 24177, ff.10-13. 
2. bscarano to Grimaldi,21 April l773,nos.140/141,A.G.S., 
Estado,legO 6986. Rochford to Grantham,23 April 1773, 
no. 9, S~P. 94/192. 
3. Grimaldi to .t.scarano,lO May 1773,A.G.S.,Eatado,legO 6986. 
4. A.G.~., hstado, legO 4588. 
5. Grimaldi to Llano, 20 May 1773, and Garlos III to Gustavus 
Ill, same date; Llano to Grimaldi, 8 July 1773, no.l; 
A.G.o., Estado, legO 6703. 
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the ~ussian threat to the European balance of power still 
remained. dussia might now turn all her strength against 
Turkey. In fact, there were rumours that the united fleets 
of rtussia and Denmark were to proceed to the !Viedi terranean 
to put the screw on Oonstantinople. During the ~wedish 
crisis Grimaldi warmed up to Aiguillon's oontention that an 
Anglo-F'rench entente was the only way to set bounds to the 
system of plunder of the three eastern monarchies. Consider-
ing that Spain was minded to ward off a conflict with Britain 
for the sake of Anglo-French antagonism in Europe, and that 
the Family Uompact was the ohly connebtion Spain could look 
to in a colonial war with England, an Anglo-French under-
stan<iing on the Continent was desirable •. On Jl'lay 20th 
Magal16n was instructed to approach AiguillOn to insist on. 
the need to fi.Gd out about .ori tish and Austrian attii;ude~. 
If France wished, Spain was prepared to act in conJunction 
with her in Vienna and in London for the purpose of obtain~ng 
their support against Russia's expansion. l 
But Britain would not part with her policy of losing an 
eye in order to blind the French, as Grimaldi put it. There 
1. Grimaldi to ~agall6n, 20 May 1773 (two dispatches: 
official and confidential), A.G.S., Estado, legO 
4588. 
-were certain alliances, .l.l.ochforci said to ~sccfrano in j une, 
w~ich coulu not be effectee OD principle. l Aiguillon for 
his part admitted to ~a5al16n that he was restr~ined from 
taiin~ active measures to help the ~orte by Britain's 
absolute refusal to allow anything of this kind. 2 
Despite .liguillon's conciliatory manner towards Britain 
and ~panish assurances to the effect that the bourbon powers 
would. not ent.age in any undertaking to support L;he Turks 
without first acquainting themselves with Britain's feelings 
about it,' the ~nglish government remained suspicious of 
both :French and Spanish intentions in the eastern 
. dOt 4 
.t-'le ~ erranean. 
~he Russo-Turkish war ended in July 1774, The ~reaty 
of Kutschuk-Kainardji established Russia in the black Seaf. 
1. In pursuance of an earlier hint from Grimaldi to Grantham, 
.c;scarano had suggested a tripartite declaration to the 
Russians;Escarano to Grimaldi, 4 June 1773, no.167(cp. 
his no.161 of ~'iay 21st) ,A.G.B., Estado, legO 6986. 
2~ Magal16n to Griwaldi, 3 June 1773,no.157(cp.Grima1di to 
Nagal16n of June 21st), A.G.S., Estado, legO 4589; 
Grantham to Rochford, 23 December 1773, no.51,S.P. 94/194; 
"Anderson", p.187; Corr.de Brog1ie, II, p.4l9, note 1. 
3. Grantham to Rochford, June 7th, no.23, and 14th, no.24, 
1773 (S.P. 94/193). 
4. Roberts, H.J.,VII (1964),p.36;St. Paul, I,pp.307-308,3l4; 
Add. 2415~ff.181-2; Add. 24160, ff.33-46. 
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Catherine 11, therefore, was the main beneficiary from 
Franco-Dritish anta~onism in hastern Burope. 
By now the attention of the western maritime powers 
was diverted to America. Yet the peace of Versailles of 
1783 was not yet signed before France, and Spain also, were 
trying to secure British collaboration in Constantinople in 
an effort to save the Turks from rtussia and Austria. l And 
in 1787, when the second Russo-Turkish war broke out and 
France appeared to countenance the Russo-Austrian league 
against the Sublime Porte, ]'loridablanca, Grimaldi' 8 
successor, resisted ~'rench attempts to draw Spain to their 
side and embarked upon a sustained effort to make peace in 
co-operation with bri tain. 2 }i'ra.nce, by this time, had 
turned back on her own role of sole protector of Turkey 
and was psychologically prepared for her partition, in which 
she expected Egypt as her share of the spoils. 3 As for 
1. Floridablanca to Campo (London),19 July 1783,(A.G.S., 
Lstado, legO 8138); Liston (I"Iadrid)to Fox, 29 September 
1783, no.8 (F.O. 72/1). Cp.N.S.Anderson, "The Great Powers 
and the Hussian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-1784", 
'l'he Slavonic Review, 37(1958-9), pp.17-41. 
2. F.O.72/10-15 and A.G.S., Estado, 1egajos 8145-8147, 
passim. Cp. Garrigues, pp. 198-213. 
3. h.~.Andersoll,The Slavonic Review,37(1958-9),p.41; see a180 
his The Eastern Question, p.ll. 
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bpain, her chief minister, I!'loridablanca, expressed in 1788 
that in the event of the collapse of Turkey she might profit 
by seizing the African coast facing the Spanish peninsula. l 
Indeed, Spain' s position ill the l,;edi terranean could 
not otherwise be much improved. 1espite British opposition 
and :I!'rellch obstructions, :b'loridablanca manat;ed to sign 
several treaties of peace and commerce with the Porte and 
the ~arbary 8tates in the early 1780's; but there was no 
real improvement in ~pain's commercial standing, and the 
situation at the end of the century was, on the whole, no 
different froffi that which Grirnaldi had hoped to correct in 
1770, when he was approached b~ Choiseul with an invitation 
to join France in a treaty with the Turks. 2 
1. B.A.~., vol. 59, pp. 261, 270-2. 
2. Cp. Anderson, B.l.H.R., 29 (1956), pp. 91-2; M. Conrotte, 
Espana y los paises musulmanes durante el rninisterio 
de Floridablanca. 
:F AB. '11 I V 
~he Iortuguese question, 1763-1783. 
1. The position after the peace treaty of 1763. 
The Hispano-Portuguese dispute over the territories 
to the west of the Uruguay and f'arans. rivers, between Rio 
de la Plata and Sio Paulo, was of long standing. It goes 
back to the end of the fifteenth century when the two 
countries siGned the iJ.'reaty of Tordesillas (14-94-) to parcel 
out their respective shares in the newly-discovered P~erican 
continent. ~his stipulated that the dividing line between 
the Spanish ana. Portuguese territories in South America 
should be drawn along the meridian at 370 leagues from the 
Cabo Verde lslanas: the territories to the west of this 
line, which in Spanish eyes run from the east of the mouth 
of the Artazon to the west of the present town of Santes 
lIc.ar 
~sao Paulo), belonged to opain, and so did those lands 
that she could reach by sailing westwards. '110 the east of 
the line lay the fortuguese share. 
For over a century neither Spain nor Portugal showed (J. a.hreti C."'B\ a",rnl..j ai" 
much interest in the Rio de la ~lata area ~\V la 
Oriental), and the dividing line remained undefined. 
But in the 1620's and 1630's the Spanish Jesuits from 
Paraguay tried for the first time to expand their mission 
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system into the disputed territories, which were uninhabited 
except for the occasional raids of the slave-huntin~ Paul-
istas (bandeirantes) from S;o Paulo. After a bitter 
struggle with them, the Jpanish Jesuits succeeded by the 
end of the century in foundins the famous thirty villages 
in the Paran&-Uruguay basin. They introduced large herds 
of cattle and horses, and started a prosperous group of 
rural communities. ~he success of these settlements aroused 
the interest of the Portuguese authorities, who now claimed 
these fertile an~ vast lands as belonging to Portugal by 
virtue of the ~reaty of Tordesillas. 
Portugal's concern for the southern boundaries of her 
dominions iD brazil became discernible with the foundation 
of Sacramento in 1680, a small colony situated on the 
northern bank of the estuary of Hio de la Plata facing 
Buenos Aires. The foundation of the colony gave official 
backing to the slow, but effective, infiltration of the 
bandeirantes in search of slaves, mineral wealth ana. Jesuit-
claimed livestock. Brazilian colonisation now turned to the 
rich pasture lands of Santa Catarina and Hio Grande de SuI 
_ where the Portuguese settled Rio Grande, between Lago'a 
des Pates and Lag6a Mirim, in 1737 - to fashion the logical 
complement to the mining regions of .Brazil (Minas Gerais, 
Goias and Lviato Grosso), which bad also been the result of a 
398 
process of westward expansicl", also started in the late 
seventeenth century, beyond the Tordesillas line. 
~he boundary treaty of 1750 gave legal status to the 
new situation on the priQciple of uti possidetis. 
}ortugal agreed to surrender .::.acramento to :3paill in return 
for the seven missions of the Jesuits to the east of the 
Gruguay river, the recognition of her claim to a large part 
of the Amazon basin,' and the retention of coastal Rio 
Grande do Qul to the east of a line which ran, according 
to article 4 of the treaty, from Castillos Grendes along 
modern Baje to meet the River Ibicul and then down river 
to its main stream, the Uruguay, and following the course 
of this river northwards. l 
The freaty met with the armed resistance of the 
Amerindians of the Jesuit missions to the transference of 
the seven Indian villages to the Portuguese and F'ombal, 
on coming into office in 1750, used this resistance to 
return to expansionist policies in the Rio de la flata area. 2 
1. Cantil1o, p.403. 
2. Sabastian Joseph de Carvalho e l"lell0 (1699-1782), 
Count of Oeiras (1759) and Marquis of Pombal (1770), 
was Jose I's chief minister from his succession to 
the throne in 1750 to his death in 1777 (N.C.M.H., 
VII (J.O.Lindsay), pp.290-1; VIII (J.Lynch), pp. 
376-8. 
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Al thou[;h blarnin[: the Jesuits for the failure to carry out 
the 1750 treaty, he was glad of the excuse to keep Sac ra-
mento as a basis for southward advance and was willing to 
return the missions to Spain. In 1761 the two peninsular 
nations agreed to restore the question of boundaries in the 
Rio de la Plata area to the status quo ante 1750.1 
With the outbreak of the beven Years War, Spain hoped 
to find a solution to her dispute with her neighbour. In 
conjunction with ~rance she first tried to win Portugal 
to their side as a means to cut off the naval and commercial 
benefits that Britain derived from her alliance with the 
Portuguese. But when }'ombal refused to be drawn into the 
war on the Bourbon side or to close Portuguese ports against 
the English, France and Spain declared war on him. A 
joint Hispano-French attack on metropolitan Portugal was 
accompanied by a Spanish campaign to expel the Portuguese 
from bacramento and hio Grande do SuI. ~he energetic 
governor of Buenos Aires, Pedro de Cevallos, succeeded in 
regaining ~acramento and driving back the Portuguese from 
Rio Grande to the northern end of the Lagoa des Patos and 
the lower Jacut valley.2 But Spain's poor performance in 
1. C.B.Boxer, Irhe GoJ.den Age of .l3rasil.,tpp.2;7-245,293-6. 
Op.N. C.I"i. H. ,Vii (3 .H.Parry) ,pp.497-'}, and VIII 
(R.A.Humphreys),pp.41l-;. 
l3. D .AIden, 'lI.rhe Undeclared War of 1773-1777 :Climax of 
Luso-Spanish P1atine Rivalry",H.A.H.R., 4l(1961),p.59. 
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metropolitan PortuGal ana in other battlefields compelled 
Carlos III to restore all his conquests before news of 
Cevallos's successful campaign had even reached hadrid. 
In accordance with the Spanish interpretation of the 
Treaty of laris of 1763, Carlos III agreed to restore the 
territories conouered in metropolitan lortugal and Sacra-
mento, which had been given to Portugal by the 1713 treaty; 
but not Rio Grande, and the islands of Martin Garcia, San 
Gabriel and Dos Hermanas, in the River Plate estuary. 
Spain also demanded the restitution of Santa Rosa de Mojos 
which the lortuguese had taken in 1733; she further chall-
enged ~ortugal's claim to Santa 0atarina, and even Parana,l 
siuce the 1761 treaty - recognized in the Treaty of Paris 
(articles 2 and 21) - stipulated that the boundary situation 
in the Banda uriental was that prior to 1750, and Spain was 
therefore in a position to auestion Brazilian advance on 
the southern border in the first part of the century. 
Carlos Ill, anxious to secure the integrity of the 
Spanish American empire, embarked upon a sustained effort 
to invigorate the governorship of Buenos Aires. It was not 
1. In a map of the disputed area among the Grantham 
Papers, Add. 24160, f. 24 verso, Spain was said 
to be aiming to push the Portuguese behind the 
River Ti~te. 
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only Portugal's ambitions in Rio de la Plata that emphasized 
the need to strengthen this vulnerable area, but also the 
obnoxious presence of illicit british traders iLl the 
estuary uuder cover of their alliance with Portugal and 
Bri tis h attempts to pave the way to the r'iagallan .strait and 
to the route of the 60uth Seas. l After 1763 Cevallos was 
instructed to secure the northern bank of the River Plate. 
The ciefences of haldonado (Punta del Este) and JYlonttvideo 
were to be improved, and Cevallos was ordered to defend Rio 
Grande and the islands of r'~artin Garcia, San Gabriel and 
Dos Hermanas against possible attempts of Portugal to take 
them over. 
The retention of these bases would make possible wider 
plans to expand as far north as the island of Santa Catarina 
and from there to move southwards to expel the Portuguese 
from the whole territory between that island and Rio de la 
Plata, thus tightening the grip on Sacramento and keeping 
the estuary easily under control. Cevallos was also ordered 
1. The commercial importance of contraband trade in 
oacramento with the Spanish Buenos Aires may be 
seen in H.E.S.Fisher, "Anglo-Portuguese Trade, 
1700-1770", p.88; he stresses the ending in 1762 
of this prosperous trade as one of the main factors 
for the contraction of the Portuguese market for 
English manufactured goods in the 1760's. 
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to force the lortuguese out of Santa dosa de Mojos. ~his 
boruerland, together with Chiquitos, to the east of the 
Andes in eastern bolivia, was mission land and the passage 
through which the brazilians seemed minded to expand their 
own mining areas to reach Feru's mineral wealth. To 
achieve these plans Cevallos was sent a considerable body 
of forces and full discretionary powers to obtain financial 
means from Lima. l 
Pombal for his part was equally determined to expand 
the boundaries of Brazil, especially the southern one which 
according to him the 1713 treaty had established on the 
northern side of the Rio de la Plata from Sacramento east-
wards. 2 But, on the other hand, this minister was minded 
to free his country from the British control of Portuguese 
trade • Britain's commercial position ill PO.rtugal was 
regulated by a series of seventeenth century treaties, 
1. Gil Munilla, pp.107-111. Cp.AIII, pp.52, 74-5, 89-92 and 
203-210. 
2. As early as 1741 Pombal, who began his political 
career as head of the London mission in 17,8, 
made it explicit to the English; Simio Jose da 
Luz Soriano, Historia do reinado de el-rei D. Jose 
e da administracao do Marguez de PombaI, 11, p.565. 
For Portuguese military preparations and objectives 
in South America after 1763, see Egerton Mss. 525 
and C.B., Ill, chapter vi. 
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culminating in that of 1703, which had turned Portugal's 
traders in the main into comrnisaries for British merchants. l 
In this respect 10rtu5al was in a comparable position 
to that of Spain. Indeed, their commercial policies in the 
l760's, and also those of Naples, were so similar that it 
was Buggested in London that the three countries might be 
co-operating in a joint campaign to curtail British trade. 
Pombal's policies, in particular his measures to promote 
Portuguese trade with the colonies and to improve Portu-
gal's own manufacturing power, had some success a8 shown 
by the decline of the English trade in this period;2 but 
in addition to the difficulties encountered by the Spaniards 
in their attempts to promote their own trade and industry, 
Pombal had to contend with resolute British traders, naval 
officers and diplomats, trying to resist his measures. The 
period under consideration showed a continuous tug of war 
between Pombal and British trade interest, which strained 
Luso-British relations considerably. Pombal hae to strike 
a careful balance in his treatment of British trade; how-
ever heavily British commercial privileges weighed on 
1. 
2. "Fisher", pp.77-92, for a detailed account of the 
marked contraction which Anglo-Portuguese trade 
underwent in the 1760's. 
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Portugal's economic resources, she could not afford to 
alienate Great britain lest she should be left alone to 
, ~,l face a more v1gorous bpa1n. 
In 1764 Pombal approached britain to obtain some 
encouragement for his intention to resist Cevallos's 
retention of Rio Grande and the islands of ~artln Garcla, 
San Gabriel and Dos hermanas. his argument was that 
articles 21 and 23 of the ~reaty of Paris stipulated that 
Spain should restore to lortugal Cevallos's conquests during 
the cieven Years War; therefore Rio Grande and the islands 
had to be returned. lombal tried to scare Britain with 
stories of ~ranco-Spanish plans against brazil. Britain 
would lose profitable markets in America if the Bourbon 
11 d t t th ' b't' 2 powers were a owe 0 carry ou e1r am 1 10ns. This 
approach was to persist throughout the period. 
But the £n61ish government did not take Pombal's 
reports very seriously, dismissing them as traditional 
suspicions of Spain. ~he Bourbon representatives in London 
for their part assured Britain that the Por~uguese alleg-
ations were Fombal's fabrications, while the Spanish tried 
1. Cp. J.Lucio d'Azevedo, 0 Margu~s de Pombal e a sua 
epoca, pp.211-3. 
2. Cp. Rochford's reports from Madrid in the last 
three months of 1764; S.P. 94/168. 
405 
to find out how far tbe British were prepared to go to 
support Portugal's claim. l 
Too mucb was however at stake for Britain to remain 
totally uncommitted in Luso-Spanish relations. She bad 
no desire to encourage Portugal to adopt forward policies. 
In his reply to tbe ~ortuguese representative to the Court 
of St. James, fv;artinho de f"Jello, Grenville gave warning 
that Britain was not to be taken for granted as the 
guardian of her ally's possessions and ambitions. But he 
added, for Fombal to draw the opportune moral, that 
Britain resented the way the Portuguese minister treated 
British trad.e; that is, there was a price to be paid in 
return for Britain's encouragement. 2 As to the specific 
point at issue, nritain was not yet prepared to intervene. 
however, the English ambassador in Madrid, Rochford, was 
instructed to support and countenance his :Portuguese 
1. Jvlasserano' s reports from London (November-
December) and Grimaldi to I"lasserano, 24 December 
1764, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6958. Rochford to 
Halifax, January 1765, S.f. 94/169. 
2. Azevedo, pp. 244-8. 
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counterpart, Ayres de 
, 
Sa, in whatever may relate to 
the execution of the ~reaty of Paris, but not to join him 
in any step of importance witbout particular directions 
from London. Furthermore, Spain was not to be led to 
believe that Britain would remain an idle spectator where 
lortu~al was concerned, and this general warning was trans-
mitted to the Spanish government by Rochford. 1 
1. Halifax to Rochford, 18 December 1764, 
s.p. 94/168; Rochford to Halifax, 
9 January 1765, S.P. 94/169. 
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2. Pombal calls the tune for a negotiated settlement. 
In the meantime Pombal proceeded to remonstrate with 
Grimaldi against Cevallos's failure to abide by the Portu-
guese interpretation of the Treaty of Paris. l The Spanish 
minister replied a month later (6 February 1765) that the 
territories retained by Ceval10s were not comprised in the 
1763 treaty as they had been occupied against the stipul-
ations of previous treaties between the two countries. The 
treaty of 1761, which restored boundaries in the Hfo de la 
Plata area to what they were before 1750, had not yet been 
complied with before the war of 1762. Pombal, Grimaldi 
argued, w"s now attempting to find support for his unlawful 
claim in the clauses of the Treaty of Paris. This treaty 
was no more than an armistice as far as the question of 
boundaries in America was concerned. It opened the way 
to a negotiation of the unsettled issues; it did not assign 
provinces. 2 Grima1di was, in fact, willing to explore the 
possibilities for an amicable discussion; in March' he sent 
1. Geiras to Grimaldi, 6 January 1765; printed in 
C.B., Ill, pp. 131-3. 
2. Grimaldi to Ayres de Sa, 6 February 1765; 
printed in C.B., Ill, pp. 133-7. 
instructions to his ambassador in Lisbon, Atmodovar, 
to the effect that no obstacle should be thrown in the 
way of a pacific settlement. l 
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When Grimaldi's riposte of February 6th reached Lisbon, 
Pombal was already aware of Britain's hint at a price for 
her support. The Portuguese minister reacted by emphasizing 
the dangers to Britain if his country was absorbed into the 
Bourbon side. ~ombal enjoined Mello to put the whole case 
before the Lnglish and let them know that Grimaldi, having 
sent no suggestions for a compromise solution, seemed to 
him bellicose. Nello was also ordered to stress both the 
Bourbon threat to British trade in South America and the 
Bourbon temptations put in Portugal's way to wean her from 
B 't' 2 rlo alone 
In compliance with his instructions, Mello plagued 
English ministers with repeated statements of the justice 
of Portugal's claim; Britain, his main point was, could not 
1. Gil IV!unilla, p.lll. Don l'edro de Gongora y Lujan, marquis 
of Almodovar, was ambassador in Lisbon from 1765 to 1778 
when he w~s transferred to London; his dossier in A.H.N., 
Estado, legO 3433(1). 
2. Oeiras to IVlartinho de Me110, 16 February 1765; 
quoted by Azevedo, p.251. Hay to Halifax, Lisbon, 
21 February 1765, S.P. 89/60. 
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fail to see that the 1763 treaty was obserVed. But his 
Spanish counterpart, ~asserano, was also actively working 
on Halifax to neutralize the l-ortuguese's allegations; the 
way Portugal presented her case, he argued, was based on 
the assumption that the 1763 treaty was the only one 
applicable; there were also the treaties of 1750 and 1761, 
which were equally bin<iing. I:ialifax gave heed to Nasserano; 
he requested Mello to send him copies of the treaties 
mentioned by the Spanish ambassador so as to be able to form 
his own opinion. l'lello' s delay in fulfilling this request 
led Halifax to suspect that Fortugal might not have a strong 
case, especially as the English government had in its 
possession a copy of the note sent to Ayres de Sa by 
Grimaldi on l!'ebruary 6th (the Portuguese ambassador him-, 
self had given it to Rochford).l 
For five months diplomatic activity on this issue 
dropped. 'J:he weakening of the Grenville administration 
during the spring months deterred Portugal from importuning 
1. Enclosed in his dispatch to halifax of 
February 9th, 1765, S.P. 94/169. See 
also Masserano's reports to Grimaldi 
for March and that of April 12th, no. 432; 
A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 6958. 
London again. But as the Rockingham government settled 
down, the Portuguese laid their case before the Buglish 
again. 
410 
In September 1765 IVlello approached the new secretary 
of state for the southern department, Conway, bringing with 
him (as suggested by Halifax in Narch) copies of all the 
treaties and communications bearing upon the subject of the 
Portuguese dispute with Spain. ~o press Britain, the 
Portuguese openly stressed that Spain had proposed to them 
to abandon the English alliance as the best way to sort out 
Hispano-Portuguese differences. l 
rfhe Rockingham ministry did not prove keener on the 
idea of supporting Portugal than their predecessors. More-
over, as Pombal continued his commercial policies it was 
clear to British commercial interests that the Portuguese 
minister was not prepared to be generous in return for any 
encouragement he might receive from Britain. The English 
government naturally sounded Pombal on his intention to 
pay for British support, but they Beemed more concerned 
about France's possible intervention on the Spanish side. 
They were already aware of the French support given to 
1. Mello to Conway, 10 September 1765, S.P. 100/ 
43; Hay to Conway, Lisbon, 9 October 1765, 
s.P. 89/60. 
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Masserano's representations in London. l ~o gain time Mello 
was told that britain riid not intend to interfere in the 
Hispano-Portuguese dispute unless France intervened. 2 But 
Pombal relentlessly continued his campaign to shake off 
British commercial tutelage, and Shelburne, the southern 
secretary UI10er Chatham, wrote to the British representative 
in Lisbon on 14 October 1766 that an extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary envoy, W.H. Lyttelton,' was to be sent to 
Portugal with instructions to show Pombal how strongly 
Britain felt on commercial matters. 4 
hasserano kept his principal well informed about the 
strain in commercial relations between Portugal and Britain. 
If they continued to worsen, he submitted, there was a good 
chance of weaning Portugal away from her British ally. 
1!\urthermore, Nasserano was given to understand that Britain 
would remain uncommitted as long as Spain kept the dispute 
with Portugal as a purely Luso-Spanish one. 5 Pombal's un-
1. Rochford to Halifax,15 April l765,S.P. 94/170; Conway to 
Rochford,19 September 1765,S.P. 94/171. See also Fuentes' 
dispatches from :taris (l'1arch 1765) ,A.G.S. ,Estado ,1egO 4560. 
2. Azevedo, pp. 255-6. 
3. Formerly governor of Jamaica. 
4. Shelburne to Hay,14 October 1766,00. 4; S.P. 89/62 (cp. 
Conway's previous instructions of 18 February 1766). 
5. Masserano to Grimalii,23 February 1766,00. 648,February 
27th, nos 65l-2(A.G.S., Estado,legO 6960), and 10 
January 1767, no.905 (legO 6964). 
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expected offer in April 1766 to put down the riots against 
Esquilache, tho~gh unaccepted, and subsequent Luso-Bourbon 
co-operation on the matter of the expulsion of the Jesuits 
from cipain ana Spanish America in ~arch 1767, seemed to 
correspond with Ivlasserano' s expectations. Illhe Spanish govern-
ment, who were afraid that the Portuguese minister might make 
good use of Spain's internal difficulties, took the expressions 
of Pombal's approval of their Jesuit policy as a hopeful token 
of his willingness to establish amicable relations. l The 
Spanish for their part contributed to this apparently favour-
able mood by sending in July 1766 a Real Orden to Charcas 
with directions to drop all hostile preparations against 
the Portuguese in Santa Rosa de Mojos.2 
Confidence grew that a negotiated agreement with the 
Portuguese over limits in R10 de la Plata was possible. 
Spain showed real desire to make it easy for Portugal to 
climb down from her interpretation of the 1763 treaty. 
1. guadro elementar, VII,pp. 227-9;AzevedSJ~p. 257-261. 
For the Esquilache incident, above pp.~I. . , 
2. Gil l~~unilla, pp.ll3-4 (cp.C.B. ,III,pp.122-131, for 
tentative Spanish plans in 1764-6 to recover Santa 
Rosa de Moj os) • 'llhe exclusion of any proYisions 
regarding Portugal in the Spanish war plan sent to 
Choiseul in November 1766 on the occasion of the 
Falkland Islands issue, point this way also (see 
above p.tal). 
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Furthermore, the 0panish seemed prepared to accept lortugal's 
advance westwards beyond the Tordesillas line for the sake 
of definite and definitive boundaries in RIo de la Plata 
on the basis of recent treaties. Portugal's claim to a 
large part of the Lmazon basin had already been recognized 
in 1750, but the treaty having been abrogated in 1761 the 
Spanish might be able to offer to renew their recognition 
as a new concession in the hope of obtaining acceptance for 
their interpretation of the 1763 treaty and a permanent 
. A . 1 peace 1n mer1ca. 
Despite the Spanish government's inclination to resume 
negotiations with Fortugal on a friendly basis, they felt 
unable to initiate talks. Grimaldi had challenged Pombal's 
interpretation of the 1763 treaty on 6 February 1765; it 
was now up to Pombal to answer it. 
The lortuguese minister for his part seemed willing to 
fall in with Spain's wishes for a negotiated ~greement. 
Britain's reaction to his soundings had not been encouraging; 
and the military situation in brazil did not warrant bold 
policies. But he was not inclined to give up the Portuguese 
1. This may be inferred from Arriaga's reports to Grimaldi, 
28 December 1766; cit. in Gil Munilla, p. 144. 
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inteppretation of the 1763 treaty. Pombal had to bide his 
time; he tried to ~eflect Spanish attention from the dis-
puted points by negotiatiolls for an alliance with Spain 
which might produce concession~. His congratulations on 
the expulsion of the Jesuits was part of a programme of 
gaining the confidence of the Spanish government; and as 
early as I'larch 1767 he eave Almodovar to understand that 
an alliance between the two peninsular nations was looked 
upon favourably in Lisbon. l By IVlay 8 the Spanish ambassador 
could report to hadrid that both Pombal and Jose I had 
spoken to him of Britain's commercial ambitions and of the 
dangers of the Jesuits' intrigues and plots against Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial control. Their expulsion from the 
American continent might induce them to seek support in 
Britain. Jose I referred enthusiastically to the advantages 
of forming a united front against their common enemies and 
recommended utmost secrecy in order not to alarm them. 2 
Similar ideas were conveyed to Grimaldi by the 
1. Almodovar to lirimaldi, 8 fJ!arch 1767, A.G.S .. , 
Bstado, legO 7290. 
2. Gil Munilla, pp. 120-1. 
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Portuguese aIIlbassac. or to Carlos Ill, Ayres de Sa y lVlello. 
After several tentative talks with upanish officials, 
Ayres de cia spoke to Grimaldi in June of the need to 
discuss not only the Jesuit danger but also the question 
of the alliance between the two countries. Grimaldi, 
expressing his willingness to consider a rapprochement with 
the neighbouring kingdom, tried to pin him down as to terms; 
but the Portuguese ambassador replied that he was not 
authorized to go any further. Grimaldi did not like Sa's 
evasive answer. He was afraid that IJombal might be trying 
to entanEle Spain into useless discussions while continu-
ing preparations in America to strike unexpectedly in Rio 
Grande or some other part of America. Almodovar was 
instructed to find out Pombal's intentions before Spain 
committed herself; he was to point out that an alliance 
between the two countries, if ever agreed upon, was 
particularly useful to Portugal and it was therefore up 
to her to put forward explicit terms. 1 
When Almodovar approached Pombal at the beginning of 
July, the Portuguese minister gave vent to his aversion for 
1. Grimaldi to Almodovar, 25 June 1767, (cipher), A.G.S., 
Estado, legO 7290. 
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the Jesuits and spoke of plans to obtain the suppression 
of the Order from Rome, out of the alliance he said no-
thing. Almod6var commented that Fombal's vehement 
diatribes against the Jesuits were meant to exageerate 
their power in order to justify sending reinforcements 
to Brazil to deal with them effectively.l 
~his information reinforced Grimaldi's suspicions. 
Ayres de Sa had quite plainly stated that the King, his 
master, rejoiced over the joint ef~rts of the two 
countries to wipe out the Jesuits from their dominions 
because of the obstacles which the Jesuits were likely to 
have placed in the way of an alliance; but Pombal did not 
affirm this. Yet Grimaldi was willing to give Pombal the 
benefit of the doubt. He was encouraged by the friendly 
tone of Carlos Ill's private correspondence with his 
sister Mariana Vitoria, Jose I's wife. 2 
He chose therefore to blame Almod6var for what, he 
wrote on 24 July, must have been a misunderstanding of 
Fombal's words. The Spanish ambassador was instructed to 
1. His dispatch to Grimaldi of 7 July 1767 (cipher); 
cp. his dispatch en clair of July 31st (A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 7290). 
2. This correspondence on the advantages of a political 
union between the two countries went on from April 
1766 to May 1768; A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 7290. 
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press Pombal for rortugal's terms regarding the alliance 
and was enjoined to report his talks with Fombal point by 
point in order to prevent further misunderstanding. l In 
another dispatch of the same date, Grimaldi explained that 
a Hispano-Portuguese alliance would have to be part and 
parcel of the Family Compact; for the time being, however, 
it was preferable to keep France out of these tentative 
exchanges until such time as the two powers had come to 
some preliminary understanding. 2 
An intercepted letter from Pombal to his representative 
in Paris, Souza, reassured Grimaldi. 3 Pombal expressed him-
self willinE to move closer to the Bourbon powers in order 
to thwart Britain's exacting attitude in commercial matters; 
as to the reinforcements sent to Brazil, Pombal explained 
that they were precautionary measures to forestall possible 
infiltration of the Jesuits in co-operation with Britain.4 
1. No. 2; A.G.B., Estado, legO 7290. 
2. No. 1; A.G.S., Estado, legO 7290. 
3. Vicente de Souza y Coutinho represented Portugal 
in Paris from 1763 to 1792 (he was promoted to 
ambassador in 1772); Flammermont, Rapport, pp.488-91. 
4. Oeiras to Souza, 16 June 1767, copy enclosed in Grimaldi 
to Fuentes, 31 July 1767; A.G.S., Estado, legO 4564. 
Cp. Quadre elementar, VII, pp. 270-7l, 274-5; Alexia de 
Saint-Priest, Histoire de la chute des Jesuites au 
XVllle siecle, 1750-1782, pp.257-63. 
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The letter may have been meant to be intercepted, 
Fuentes warned; it may well be desigLled to rouse Britain 
to Portuguese support and softer commercial treatment for 
fear that Portugal might join the Family Compact. l But 
Grimaldi was still prepared to accept Pombal's reassurances 
about the forces sent to Brazil. He pointed out that the 
Portuguese expeditionary force was out of all proportion 
to the threat represented by the power of the Jesuits; 
nevertheless, Grimaldi was ready to admit, Pombal's 
exaggerated fear of them could very well be the re.son for 
it. The weakening of Portugal's metropolitan defences, 
exposing her to retatliatory action from Spain, also 
seemed to point in the same direction. 2 
Grimaldi thus showed himself ready to dance to 
Pombal's tune. No doubt Spain's strained relations with 
Britain over the Falklands lent weight to the view that it 
was of the utmost importance to attempt winning Portugal 
to the Bourbon side in anticipation of a conflict with 
Britain. rievertheless, the Spanish government threw 
caution to the wind in accepting Pombal's pretext for 
1. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 19 August 1767, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 4564. 
2. Grimaldi to Nasserano, 10 August, 14 September, and 
8 December 1767, A.G.S., ~stado, legO 6965. ' 
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building up Brazil's military strength. Illhis enabled him 
eventually to force Spain to act on the defensive, milit-
arily as well as diplomatically, or to risk weakening her-
self vis-a-vis Britain by sending a large expedition from 
the metropolis to redress the balance of power between 
Spain and Portugal in the Rio de la llata area. Grimaldi 
failed to see the weakness of his position till it was too 
late. Pombal's warnings that no European power would allow 
Spain to launch an attack on metropolitan Portugal un-
1 
molested, in addition to Fuentes' to the effect that the 
Portuguese minister might be bringing France into the 
Hispano-Portuguese exchanges as a means of putting pressure 
on Britain, ought to have put Grimaldi on his guard. 
Choiseul for his part seemed quite pleased with 
Pombal's demarche. Although the Fortuguese minister did 
not appear to be well thought of in Paris, the French were 
prepared to overlook his devious ways for the sake of 
potential commercial and political advantages. 
~he French were anxious to improve conditions for 
their trade in Portugal. They were aware of the main' 
obstacle in the way of a mutually satisfactory arrangement 
with the Portuguese: the complementary character of Anglo-
1. Gi1 Muni1la, p.121 and note 82, for Pomba1's warning 
in conversation with A1modovar. 
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Portuguese trade. FurtherQore, Pombal's measures to streng-
then his country's economy hit :B'rench trade harder than it 
did the Lnglish, for the French derived their commercial 
benefits, such as fiscal exemptions, mainly from favourable 
treaties that the Portuguese now managed to circumvent; 
whereas the English still retained their financial and 
technical superiority which secured for their products 
easier access to Portuguese markets. Pombal's most effect-
ive line of action from the French commercial point of view 
w,,"s the forcible naturalization of ]'rench traders in Portu-
gal; thus they were deprived of the tax exemptions to which 
they were entitled by treaty. Choiseul hoped to have Franco-
Portuguese treaties renewed, especially that of 1667, and 
the forcible naturalization of French traders stopped. 1 
In addition to direct representations to the Portuguese, 
Choiseul resorted to hired pamphleteers to spread his 
propaganda that Britain was using tortugal for her own 
benefit. 2 
1. Jorge de hacedo, A situa ao economica 
pp.101-ll5; Christe ow, H.A.H.R., 47 , pp. , 
27-8; Recueil, 111, pp.342-353; Quadro elementar,VII, 
pp.l06 ff. 
2. Hay to Shelburne, Lisbon, 25 March 1767, no. 8, 
s.~. 89/63. 
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0n the political level, Portugal's friendship could be 
of [Teat assistance in a future conflict with Britain. De-
barred fro~ Fortuguese ports the effectiveness of the English 
navy would be considerably reduced. ~he chances of drawing 
Portugal out of her British connection were very slim, but 
Choiseul hoped that some loose convention of Portugal and 
the Bourbon powers might be practicable. France did not 
need military or naval aid from Fortugal; it was far more 
important to her that Dritain should not be allowed to use 
Portuguese ports and Choiseul would be satisfied if ~rtugal's 
strict neutrality could be obtained. At the end of 1764 he 
sounded Fombal about joining the Family Compact with the 
stipulation that Portugal would not be asked to go to war 
" h B "t" 1 Wl.t rl. al.n. ~he French representative in Lisbon was not 
hopeful of success,2 but Choiseul persisted in his conviction 
that it was worth while to attempt to gain Pombal's confid-
ence. He was to be disappointed. 
1. Choiseul to Saint-Priest, 27 November 1764; calendared 
in Quadro elementar, VII, pp. 159-160. 
2. Fuentes to Grimaldi3 19 August 1767, A.G.S., Estado, leg 4564; 26 November 
1767, legO 7290. 
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3. Pombal terminates the negotiation (1767). 
Indeed, Pombal had no intention to part company with 
Hritain; nor to compromise over boundaries in southern 
Brazil. In July, 1766, he instructed its viceroy, Cunha, 
to continue strengthening them. Spain's domestic difficult-
ies (the Esquilache incident) ought to be used to push 
southwards. The Brazilians were to simulate desire to 
remain on good terms with Buenos Aires, while surreptitiously 
continuing their infiltration into Rio Grande do SuI, and 
any attack or insult from the Spanish was to be countered 
swiftly and effectively, while trying to make them appear 
1 
as aggressors. In ~arch, 1767, coinciding with Pombal's 
first suggestion to Spain that"their common attitude towards 
the Jesuits might pave the way for a political understanding, 
Cunha was urged to avail hims~lf of every opportunity to 
push ahead in accordance with the strategy outlined in 
July 1766. 2 
Yet the European rapprochement had some effect. On 
20 June 1767 Pombal told Cunha not to irritate the Spanish 
1. Oeiras to Cunha, 22 July 1766; Revista do Instituto 
Historico e Geographico Brasileiro, 35 (1872), Part I, 
pp. 212-5· 
2. I"1endoza ]'urtado to Cunha, 22 March 1767; C.B. ,III,pp. 
pp. 141-4. 
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Americans an6 to refer to Lisbon any disputes which mi5ht 
arise. ~ombal also used the apparent ,cordiality in 
Hispano-Fortuguese relations to a~proach Bucareli, the 
governor of Buenos Aires, with a reouest to raise the block-
ade of Sacramento: the colony had been severely restricted 
in its commerce since the Peace of Paris had returned it to 
the portuBuese. l Although Cunha was to adopt a friendly 
tone in his relations with the Spaniards, be was neverthe-
less uirected to keep territories whicb he might already 
have occupied in pursuance of earlier orders and to secure 
any fort at }do Grande or Hio Pardo which the Spaniards 
might have left unguarded under the pretext that the 
frontiers had to be protected against Jesuit infiltration, 
specifying that the limit to Portuguese expansion on this 
front was the northern bank of Rio de la Plata. 2 
Pombal did not lose sight of the need to make Britain 
well-disposed to his efforts in America. Relations over 
commercial matters continued to deteriorate but on the 
poli tical level l'ombal saw to it that the En81ish were 
periodically reassured of his intention to remain britain's 
ally.3 At the same time he continued by semi-secret 
1. Alden, H.A.H.R., 41 (1961), p. 60. 
2. C.B.,III,pp.163-5. For the reinforcements sent from 
Portugal and the reorganization of Brazil's military 
force, see R.I.H.G.B., 35(1872), Part I, pp.227-36, 
and A1den, H.A.H.R., 41(1961), p.62, note 23. 
3. s.P. 89/62-64 passim. 
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exch~ 0(',e8 v.,i th Chcisel.1l to mGKe t~e I'UllIoureG entente 
between tr.~ J:\ourbon powers arJL.. PortuEol at-pear ij18.usiole. 
In the uutu£:,n of 17G7 sou;e une;;:siuess at 1 Ol'tuft"l' s 
sce[!jLj~', inclilJc::tion towarcs tbe 'system 01' the s0l.4th' m~y 
be detected in London. But fencrally sfe~u:illl tbe J:;ui:;lish 
~ overnldent pcicl little attention to thE: penilJSl;lur ciisf'ute 
over tbe hi V(,l' llate boumlaries anc &1 pe2.reu r~ui te coufiL-
ent of the soundness of their enLaEements with lortugHl. 
As lont; DS ~'rance cl id not c.c ti vely ir. terfere, .l:;ri tsin 
treDted t'ombal's alarmiuE reports of Bourbon desi£ns to 
seduce him as an argumel,it of li ttle suLstance, and sbowed 
much more concern in f:,etting, reGress for her cOlLmercial 
grievances. The EnSlish accepted the Jesuit motive of the 
hispano-Portuguese rapprochement at its face value. l 
~ombal hod no reason in 1767 to feel encouraged oy 
britain's attitude and. bad to steer a woaerbte course. 
~'or Sp&in might send forces to America to redrt:ss the 
balance of power, in which case his plan to push forwurd 
------------------------------------------------------------- .-----
1. ~.f. 89/63 passim. Cp., on the other hand, the stron6 
British re&ction when it Was reported from Paris in the 
spring of 1772 that a commercial treaty between ~rance 
and ~ortugal was being netotiated and !ombal's speedy 
explanations; Rochford to ~alpo1e, ;1 March 1772, no. 4, 
and ~alpole to Rochford, 15 April 1772, no. 11, ~.P. 
89/72. 
step by step wit hou t brinblnl, UpOIJ himself cUl opeu (;01.-
flie t with t'.aGrid would be in jeopardy. vII the otnt:l' Uell,a, 
he could !lot evade the alliance issue for ever. L.e wUS in 
t:1fect forced to proceed by the arrival in l.,iS()OIl on 
"";epterr,ber 6th 01' news from Hio de Juneiro thClt the ~PClIlish 
h:;..d been driven away from tbe northern L>all~ of the ",iver 
uraude (this nBme was also usea. to cescribe tile river which 
dischvrced its waters ir.to the l,a~da dos j;'atos trom tl'e 
~orth) by Custodio de S', military commander 01 the area, 
in June 1767 before the conciliatory orders of June 20tu 
bad reached him.l 
~his act would not seem consistent with ~offibbl's 
professions of good will towCirds tbe Bourbon powers. tipain 
miGbt retaliate. lombsl promptly apologized to ~p~in for 
the unauthorized attack and offered to restore ~be state 
of things in America to what it WetS before t,be incident. 
un ~eptember 10th, four days after the arrival in Lisbon 
of uews of it, l'ombal instructed Ayres de Sa to disavow the 
action and to explain to Griwaldl that it had been a shock 
to him in view of the existing friendly intercourse between 
1. Hio Grande or Rio Grande de Sio Pedro was the name 
given to the town on the wide outlet to the Atlantic 
of the Lagea dos ~atos, to the cbannel itself, and to 
the area between Lakes Mirim and Patos and the 
Spanish Jesuit missions. 
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their two countries; the officer responsible would be 
brought to Lisbon to answer fur his actio... At the same 
time 1-. oUILal insinuated that the Jesui ts hli~:tlt Le t be cause 
of the pr'esent frictiol' in the Hio de la .i lata area: uS they 
were iutrif5uiLlf iu Hri tuin B[ainst lortu~al , it was also 
pos5ible that ttley were stlrrinL up strife 0etween Spaniards 
and l:ortucuese in Americe. 
~ight days later 6~ sent a memorial to Grimbltii 
containinc l'ombal' 5 iz!structior.s of Septel/lber 10th; 1 
lirimsldi uccepted l-'ombal's fJromise to return to "normal" 
as genuille. 2 But the alliance ne50tiations did not prosper; 
S~ wrote to Grimaldi on 30 ~eptember that }ombal had decided 
to postpone them till after the ~ociety of Jesus had beeu 
dissolved by Home. The arguru~nt used was that the allibnce 
negotiations might incite the Jesuits to intrigue with 
brituin in America; it was preferable to neutrulize them as 
1. 0a to Grimaldi, 18 September 1767, enclosing 
copy of Jose Custodio de Sa (Portuguese military 
commander in Rio Grande) to ~arcelino de Figuereido 
(governor of Hio Grande), San Cayetano Camp, 28 ",ay 
1767, to show that Custodio ordered the attuck against 
Lisbon's instructions; both printed in C.B., Ill, pp. 
145-50. Cp_ Gil hunilla, pp. 122-4. 
2. ~., Ill, p. 151. 
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a political power, and then the two natious could resume 
h 0 10t O 1;<0 0 1 t e~r po ~ lC~ vlScuss~ons. In contrast to these delay-
ing tactics ~ombal su~gested that the negotiations on the 
question of boundaries in Lmerica should proceed. 
Griffialdi pointed to this discrepancy in his uctober 
talks witiJ cia, but to tempt Pombal the Spanish minister 
hinted, verbally and informally, that he himself would be 
prepared to recommend Carlos III to solve the dispute on 
boundaries in £ortugal's favour, if she signed a defensive 
alliance with Spain first. 2 Spain was now pressed enough 
to drop her demand that terms should be offered by Portugal. 
She now put forward terms herself and at Carlos Ill's 
sUfgestion a craft treaty was transmitted via Sa. to Lisbon 
on vctober 21st, being carried by one of Grimaldi's couriers. 
'l'his draft project contained full prov~sions for mutual help 
in maritime and American wars. As for Europe, the alliance 
was to be effective if either of the signatories-to-be were 
attacked b;y any power in their metropoli tan territories. To 
assuage 10rtugal's misgivings about parting company with 
Britain, she was given assurances that she would find 
1. S~ to Grimaldi, 30 September 1767; A.G.S., 
hstado, legO 7290. Cp. Gil l'-'lunilla, pp. 124-5. 
2. Cp. Gil Munilla, p. 400. 
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adequate protection within the 'system of the south'. A 
speedy answer was reauested. It was hoped that Mariana 
Vit6ria's influence in Lisbon miEht help to produce a 
positive reply.l 
Spain was, howeve~, prepared to wait. The advantages 
of a Fortuguese alliance in the winter of 1767-1768, when 
Spain was about to decide on expelling the English from the 
2 Falklands by force, were great. Grimaldi did not seem to 
want any diplomatic decision on the boundaries at that time. 
He meant to test how firm the Portuguese alliance with 
Great Britain was. However, disregarding Fuentes' earlier 
warning, which he now repeated, and Masserano's that Pombal 
was trying to hoodwink Spain while pushing ahead with 
military preparations to gain undisputed mastery over the 
debated lands in the River Plate, and attempting to induce 
the English to support Portugal's claims and to make 
Britain's friendship less onerous commercially by arousing 
their fears of a rapprochement between the Bourbon powers 
and Fortugal,3 Grimaldi weakened Spain's position still 
1. Grimaldi to Almodovar, 21 vctober 1767; Carlos III 
to Kariana Vit6ria, same date; A.G.S., Estado, legO 
7290. 
2. Cp. Fuentes to Grimaldi, 12 February 1768, and Grimaldi 
to Fuentes, 2 March 1768, A.G.S., Estado, legO 4565. 
3. Masserano to Grimaldi, November 6th, no.1156, and 24th, 
no.1175, 1767, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6965. Fuentes to 
Grimaldi, 20 November 1767, A.G.S., Eatado, legO 7290. 
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further by approachinl Fortugal in March 1768. His 
intention was to ascertain rombal's attitude towards Spain 
before deciding on the course of action to be followed in 
respect of the british establishment in the South Seas, but 
his anxiety no doubt added to ~ombal's confidence in his own 
methods. 1 
The upanish diplomatists were proved right. CarIos III 
was the first to know, for hariana Vit6ria wrote to him on 
23 March 1768 that the Portuguese government would not 
accept Spain's proposals for an alliance. Fombal told 
Almod6var that Portugal had no intention to part company 
with Britain, nor had she any desire to become involved in 
an Anglo-Bourbon conflict. In fl'ladrid Sa alleged that 
~ortugal had proceeded that far in the belief that only the 
question of boundaries in America was under discussion; 
however, he gave hopes that the alliance negotiations might 
proceed if Spain was prepared to make sacrifices in America 
as Grirnaldi suggested he himself was. Sa did not hesitate 
to lay before Grimaldi Portugal's terms:a11 the territories 
lying north of the Hiver Plate. 2 
1. Above p. ~~-1. 
2. hariana Vit6ria to Carlos Ill, 23 March 1768; 
Almod6var to Grimaldi, 3 April 1768; A.G.S., 
hstado, legO 7290. Ayres de Sa to Grimaldi, 
14 April 1768, mentioned by Grimaldi in his 
instructions to Almod6var of 20 May 1768 
(printed by Gil ~unilla, pp. 399-400). 
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But even at this price Spain might not have got the 
alliance, since I'ornbal in a letter to Azambuja - who had 
succeeded Cunha as viceroy of Brazil in ~ovember 17671 -
on 28 January 1768 described the alliance as well as the 
hope of curtailing or stoppin@ Portuguese expansion as 
Spanish follies. He also wrote he had no desire to be 
caught up in the apparently impending war between the 
bourbon powers and bri tain. l~ombal now enjoined the vice-
roy Lot to be deceived by the Hispano-Portuguese co-
operation over the Jesuits, which was limited to their 
mutual desire to expel these from their American dominions, 
and ordered him to press forward towards the River Flate 
once more. Aza~buja should always act on the assumption 
that Spain was not sincere and harboured hostile intentions. 2 
Pombal's ostensible wish to discuss boundaries in 
America was no more genuine than his former suggestion for 
a political un6erstauCing between the two countries -
though he would have been glad to get an extension of the 
Portuguese territories in America at no real cost in 
commitment to the Bourbon powers. He tried to win Choiseul 
1. G.B., Ill, p. 152. 
2. C.B., 111, pp.166-7. 
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for the continuation or the discussion over boundaries. 
0n harch 20th he conveyed the Portuguese answer sent to 
Grin;aldi to l: aris • :I!'rance had shown that she would accept 
Portugal's neutrality in Lnglo-Bourbon wars, Fornbal 
stressed; there was no reason, therefore, why an amicable 
ne€:,otiatioll of the question of boundaries in southern 
Erazil should entail a reconsideration of the political 
systems of the countries involved. l 
In view of the ~amily Compact Fombal did not expect 
France to support lortugal's cla.im in America - though he 
believed th&t Choiseul would not permit Spain to gain any 
great advantages in Fortu~al.2 His main reason for 
approachin~ Choiseul - against Grimaldi's specific request 
to solve their dispute amongst themselves - would appear 
to be his desire to cause some anxiety in British circles. 
Anglo-J!'rench antagonism might serve to prevent Spain from 
sendin6 forces aw&y from Europe, and Portugal would be able 
to push southwarcs in the Rio de la Plata area. 
Choiseul now realized that the chances of bringing 
1. Pombal to Souza, 20 March 1768; copy enclosed in 
Fuentes to Grimaldi of April 30th; A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 7290. 
2. Lyttelton to tihelburne, 26 April 1768, no.50, 
~.P. 89/65. 
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Portu~al to agree to close her ports to English ships in 
case of war were very slim; but he did not give up. In 
August 1768 a new represelitati ve was sent to Lisbon, 
Clermont d'Amboise, with instructions to go on tryinE, to 
conciliate Pornbal. l 
Spain for her part was not prepared to continue the 
, 
negotiations on the limited lines sUbsested by Sa. On 20 
May Grimaldi wrote to Almod6var two long instructions. In 
his no. 2, which was to be laid before lombal, Grimaldi 
gave a narrative of the negotiations with Portugal since 
May 1767, to demonstrate that the Portuguese had been the 
first to mention an alliance and that his informal and 
verbal offer of favourable terms on the question of 
boundaries was conditional on the signature of the defen-
. 11· 2 S1.ve a 1.ance. In his no. 1, Grimaldi expatiated on 
Fombal's ill will and referred to his approaches to 
Choiseul as the best proof that Pombal was trying to confuse 
1. Choiseul to Pornbal, :3 I"lay 1768 (Quadro elementar, VII, 
pp.329-33); Hecuei1, Ill, pp.357-68. Fuentes to 
Grimaldi, 6 May 1768 (A.G.S.,Estado, legO 7290), and 
23 December 1768 (legO 4566). Cp. Martin-Allanic, 11, 
pp. 942-3, 952-3. 
2. Printed by Gil r'iunil1a, app.2, pp.394-40l. This 'was 
also the end of the private correspondence between 
Carlos III and Mariana Vitoria on the subject of the 
Alliance for the present; see Carlos Ill's letter to 
his sister of l'.ay 19th (A.G .S. ,Estado, legO 7290). 
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the hispano-Fortuguese American issue by bringing France 
into it. Grimaldi concluded that Portugal was firmly 
anchored to the hD~lish alliance and that Spain had to come 
to terms with this fact. l There was no room for a middle 
course in Spain's relations with ~ortugal, Grimaldi wrote 
to Fuentes three days later. Gnce the prospect of a 
negotiated agreement had failed, the only solution it was 
felt in Madrid, was the use of force; rather let force 
decide ill the future than giving away something now. 
France would have to be informed of this change in policy, 
but she was to be prevailed upon not to interfere in Spain's 
relations with Portugal. Spain wanted a free hand, but it 
would be danterous to give other nations cause to believe 
that the Bourbon powers were not in complete agreement. 2 
(;ne point that emerEed quite clearly from the Hispano-
Portuguese exchanges in 1765-1768 was Spain's consistent 
policy to look on the Portuguese issue as her private con-
cern. She visualized a defensive alliance with Portugal as 
part and parcel of the Bourbon system but wished to sign it 
1. A.G.S., ~stado, legO 7290. Cp. Gil Munilla, p. 126. 
2. Grimaldi to Fuentes, 23 May 1768; cp. his confidential 
instructions of June 25th; A.G.S., Estado, legO 
7290. 
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first as a Hispano-Fortuguese engagement, to which ~rance 
w6uld accede later. Iu this way Spain would prevent the 
risk of haviLg to defer to the economic interests of 
France. But the failure to reach a political understanding 
with lombal, compelled the Spanish to accept lortugal as 
Britain's traditional ally, and the only area where Spain 
might obtain some territorial gaias to compensate for 
losses likely to occur in the expected conflict with 
Britain over the Falklands. With war as the alternative 
to a peaceful solution of Spain's disputes with Portugal 
and Britain, Grimaldi had to consult with the French, as 
their help would be needed to defeat I"ortugal in Europe. 
un June 13th Grirnaldi reouested Aranda to prepare a 
plan for the invasion of Portugal. Grimaldi suggested a 
rapid action to conquer her, "un l-lan de campana para la 
mas rapida conquista de portugal,n l to be carried out by 
two equally strong armies, French and Spanish, which 
would act separately and independently but to the same end. 
In specifying that the two armies should act 'independently', 
Grimaldi was acceding to the request of Choiseul: they both 
agreed, however, in wanting a plan similar to Arande.'s in 
1762-3, except for that qualification. Aranda reported two 
1. As auoted in Aranda to Grimaldi, 10 August 1768, 
A.H.N., Estado, legO 4414. 
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months later and, after Carlos Ill's approval, his detailed 
plan of operations was forwarded to Choiseul on August 29th.l 
In the view of the 0panish government, therefore, the 
disfute with Portugal had become part of the conflict loom-
ing with Britain. It is understandable that the Spanish 
sbould have assumed that Pombal's devious ways and lortugal's 
activities in southern brazil, and britain's occupation of 
the ~alklands, were different stages of a joint undertaking, 
which threatened the governorship of Buenos Aires. The 
lach of realism in hoping to halt Portuguese infiltration 
in America by a war with Britain lay in fortugal's reluct-
ance to tal\.e part in another Anglo-Bourbon conflict. 2 
Spain would have to force a war on her as she had done in 
1762, and the results of the Seven Years War in regard to 
the hispano-Portuguese dispute were not in the least 
encourae:ing: Spain had to return her gains in Portugal and 
Hio de la llata for lesses elsewhere. She also overlooked 
that France's intentions regarding Iortugal were to be 
reckoned with. Choiseul's belated reply early in 1770 to 
Aranda's war project of 1768 showed that the French did not 
intend to leave Spain a free hand in Portugal.; His reason 
1. Grimalui to It'uentes,29 August l768jenclosing Aranda's war 
project of August 10th, with a comprehensive operational 
plan and maps;A.G.S.,Estado,legO 4566 (Aranda's report 
may be seen in A.H.N.,Estado,legO 4414, and the maps in 
the Nap Collection,24-Xe-98). See also Fuentes to 
Grimaldi,27 June 1768,A.G.S.,Estado,legO 4566. 
2. Azevedo, pp.270-1; Quadro laementar,VII,p.407. 
3. Fuentes to Grimaldi,22 January l770jprinted by Gil Munilla, 
pp.40l-404. 
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for preferring two independent armies, the French 
minister explained, was the poor performance of the 
~panish troops in 1762; he did not wish to risk French 
soldiers fer lack of coordination between commanders or 
faulty supf-ly lines iE the ~panish camp. But one may 
aSSLme that Choiseul was also thinking that shou16 a 
li'rench arnlY succeed in t.aining some territories in Portu-
gal siugle-hande6, he might be able to use it for France's 
benefit in the cOllimercial field. For Choiseul did not 
envisage territorial gains; nor Qid he wish Spain to 
expand at the expense of Portugal. Indeed, his suggestion 
for slow action to pin down English troops in Portugal, 
that is a war of diversion, rather implies that he was 
against the war of expansion suggested by Spain. 
But whatever the chances of settling the American 
dispute in llietropolitan Portugal in a war with Britain 
over the Falklan6s, which depended in the first place on 
whether ]'rance would be willing to tight over this issue, 
Spain was badly in need of improvement in her military 
position in Buenos Aires if she expected to make Pombal 
more amenable to a negotiated solution. A better navy 
was of course the best solution; not only in so far as 
Portugal in ~urope was concerned, but also in the wider 
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strategic necessities of the Spanish American empire. But 
this was a long term project and Britain would never let go 
her naval superiority, which indirectly helped her ally. 
As second best Spain could keep a large body of land forces 
posted in America's vital points: this alternative was 
costly. 
~he Spanish government had not the resources needed 
in Hue~os Aires. Until 1771 Spain's hands were tied by 
the prospect of war with britain, and when the Falkland 
Islands crisis was over, the fear of Britain's hostile re-
action to Spain sending a large expedition to Buenos Aires 
was still felt. Furthermore, the financial means to main-
tain a large force in the governorship of Buenos Aires were 
difficult to come by. Since 1763 Spain had tried to make 
do with the organization of militias throughout the 
empire, but they were no adequate substitute where a 
professional Portuguese army would have to be fought. The 
situation worseaed as the Portuguese strengthened their 
southern defences ana grew more and more aggressive. From 
1768 to 1774 they stepped up their operations over a wider 
area: along tte Jacui river, Tapes (to the east of the 
Lagoa dos Patos) and the mission lands. At the beginning 
of 1774 Vertiz, Bucare1i's successor as governor in Buenos 
Aires, send an expedition from Santa Tecla (modern Baje), 
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recently-createC fort to serve as operational base for the 
area, tc push the ~ortuguese back. Although some small 
success was achieve6, tte only result of this tentative move 
was that the FortuBuese, alarmed by it, strengthened their 
own borderland defences and prepared to launch an attacK on 
Santa ~ecla. ~he situation was such that V~rtiz, while 
advisiL~ ~he central government of the impending action 
aBaiDst aanta ~ecla in the autumn of 1774, requested that 
no reinforcements be sent to him as there were no means to 
support them. Vertiz held at the time that 9,000 men were 
needed to pursue his policy of defence; be only had about 
3,000 badly paid troops. ihe central government for their 
part did not seem unduly worried. ~he only aid sent from 
the metropolis (late 1774) was a ship of the line and a 
frigate, with several transports carrying a regiment, and 
additional financial resources from Lima. l 
1. Gil ~unilla, pp.189-242 passim; G. C'spedes del 
Lima Buenos Aires. Re ercusiones economicas 
de la creacion del virreinato del P ata, pp. 4-
B.A.H.R.,IlI (1961), pp. 62-4. en, 
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4. Brit&in presses Portugal to resume talks (1774). 
~eantime in Lisbon, Pombal learnt from the british 
representative, Walpo1e, in the ILiddle of June 1774 that 
Spain was fitting out (in ierrol) two ships of the line and 
two transports with 2,400 soldiers to be sent to Buenos 
Aires. l lombal was afraid lest this force should enable 
Vertiz to act on the offensive. He used this news to tell 
Walpole that brazil could defend herself but should Spain 
send reinforcements from home, Portugal would need naval 
support from Great Britain as guarantor of the 1763 treaty, 
alleging that dpain, probably in co-operation with .l!'rance, 
was planning to strip Portugal of her American possessions. 2 
This line of argument or that 0L the Bourbon powers aimed to 
draw Portugal into the ]'aI1iily w.ompact, as I have already 
indicated, persisted throughout the crisis. 
Britain was not alarmed. She preferred to believe that 
a negotiated settlement of the Hispano-Portuguese dispute 
was possible, and be~an to work for one. On 19th July 
Rochford enjoined Walpole to persuade Pombal to resume talks 
wi th ~pain. 'lihe Portuguese minister was to be reminded that 
British support, even diplomatic support, carried a pri~e. 
1. This convoy must have been the one mentioned above. 
2. Walpole to Hochford, 18 June 1774, no.2l,S.P. 89/76. 
Cp. C.B., Ill, pp. 292-3. 
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N.ociJ.ford alluded to the fact th8.t bri tish ships found little 
assistance in Portuguese American ports.l On the same day 
he directed Grantham to warn Grimaldi that Britain was 
minded to see that the terms of 1763 were observed, and 
Stormont in laris was told to approach Vergennes with a 
view to obtain his co-operation for a pacific aajustment. 2 
But Pornbal rejected Britain's suggestion of a negot-
iated settlement. he said to Walpole that the Brazilians 
would press on towards the River Plate, as indeed they were 
instructed to do on 9 July,3 to expel the Spanish invaders 
from what they claimed to be their lands, trusting that 
Britain would never allow the Bourbon powers to fulfil 
their ambitious aims. 4 At the end of August, Pombal 
indicated that he would like to see an English fleet 
blockade }'errol or, as second best, to have Grantham 
authorized to enquire about the reasons for the Spanish 
armament. 5 
1. ~o. 7; ~.P. 89/76. 
2. 
3. 
No.13, S.P. 94/195, and No.34, S.P. 78/292, respectively. 
~., Ill, pp. 293-8. 
4. "alpole to Rochford, 1 August 1774, no.28 (cp. 
to Walpole, 2 August 1774, no.10), S.P. 89/77. 
5. Walpole to Hochford, August 29th, no.,,; 31st, 
and September 1st, no.35, 1774; S.P. 89/77. 
Rochford 
no. 34; 
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'llhrough Granth&'II: Rochford learnt that Spain wished 
the dispute to be regarded as a minor issue likely to be 
terminated in America as one of those squabbles between 
Spanish and Fortuguese colonial authorities,l a view 
which must be incicative of Spain's desire to keep Britain 
from supporting Portugal with her naval power. 
Rochford did not ~islike the prospect of letting them 
sort out their differences, but feared that unforeseen 
developments might push matters to the extremity of war. 
British pressure to restrain her ally might not prove 
enough. Stormont was, therefore, to insinuate in Paris 
that a localized dispute over limits in the River Plate 
need not alarm the peace of Europe. In this way Britain 
hoped also to restrain France. 2 At the same time Roch£ord 
acted in hadrid and Lisbon. In the former Roch£ord used 
the proximity of Hritish dominions to the American local-
ities in dispute as a pretext to enquire whether the 
preparations in Ferrol were intended against Britain or 
meant to produce any alteration in the last treaty of 
1. No. 30, 1 August 1774; S.P. 94/196. 
2. Rochford to Stormont, 21 September 1774, 
no. 49; S.P. 78/293. 
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peace. l In the latter Walpole was urged to insist that 
~ortugal's lack of consideration towards British commercial 
and shipping grievances was not the most conducive way to 
2 obtain Britain's diplomatic support. 
From Spain came assurances that she was prepared to 
listen to Yortugal but expected her to make the first move. 
On 3 October Grantham had a long conversation with Grimaldi 
in the course of which the latter protested that by restor-
ing Sacramento to Portugal Spain had fulfilled her part of 
the 1763 treaty. It was Portugal, Grimaldi retorted, who 
was acting contrary to the stipulations of that treaty. 
Article 21 confirmed previous treaties between the two 
countries but Portugal now claimed territories - conquered 
by Cevallos in 1762 - which she had retained against the 
clauses of the 1761 treaty. Grimaldi's explanations and 
peaceable expressions, Grantham reported, could be depended 
upon. He dismissed Pombal's allegations and concluded that 
the main obstacle to a negotiated settlement had to be over-
come in Lisbon, where it was said that a negotiation was 
worse than a war. 3 
1. Rochford to Grant ham , 21 cieptember 1774, no.18;S.P. 94/196. 
2. Rochford to Walpo1e, 27 September 1774, no.16jS.P.89/77. 
3. Grantham to Rochford, 5 October,17?4, nos 4a and 4}, 
s.P. 94/196. 
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Spain was prepared to negotiate the issue with Portu-
gal, but she was anxious not to have a settlement imposed 
on her by Britain and France. The Spanish would rather 
tackle lortugal on their OWll, provided Britain 1lould be 
induced to give some indication that she would permit 
Spain to resort to a limited war. Grimaldi, therefore, 
following upon his conference with Grantham on 3 October, 
decided to put this to the test. In London Nasserano was 
to expose ~ombal's aggressive behaviour which could only 
be explained by his confidence in British support. l It was 
hard to reconcile Britain's pacific protestations and 
Portugal's military build-up in southern Brazil. Spain 
might feel compelled to resort to force, Grimaldi insinuated, 
unless Britain restrained her ally. Instructions were also 
sent to France to sound her attitude on a limited Hispano-
2 Portuguese war. 
1. ~he recipient of these instructions was not 
Masserano, who was detained in Paris by gout 
when on his way back from Spain, but Escarano, 
the secretary to the Spanish embassy in London 
and in charge of affairs; Masserano to Escarano, 
Paris, 11 October 1774, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6988. 
2. Gil Munilla, pp. 232-8. 
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Britain hati already llibved to the extent of pressing 
Portugal to approach Spain. The day after the arrival in 
London of Grantham's dispatches of October 5th, Walpole 
was directed to put Spain's case to Fombal and to prompt 
him to resume talks with the Spanish Court. Grimaldi's 
memorial of 6 February 1765, it was adu:itted, W3S shame-
fully evasive, but Portugal had never answered it and thus 
had failed to put her own case. l Hrance was also pressed 
by Stormont to help, while Grantham was instructed to let 
Grimaldi know that Britain was trying to moderate the 
t 1 · 2 For uguese po ~cy. but there were no signs that Fombal 
might De conciliatory, and Rochford - weary of the 
Portuguese's bellicose mood - gave assurances to the 
Bourbon powers in hovember that Britain was not supporting 
Pombal's intracto.bili ty. When Escarano approached him the 
English minister gave a more specific pledge. He even went 
as far as to insinuate that Spain might be permitted to seek 
satisfaction by use of force as long as she limited the 
area of coaflict to the disputed territories in the River 
P1ate. 3 
1. Rochfora. to Walpole, 18 October 1774,no.17,8.P. 89/78. 
2. HochfoI'd to Stormont, 21 October 1774,no.54,S.P. 78/283; 
Rochford to Grantham, 25 October 1774,no.20,S.P." 94/196. 
3. Escarano to Grimaldi, London, 15 November 1774, no. 394, 
and November 18th, no.396; A.G.S., Estado,legO 6988. 
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H.e[arGiI:q=~ :E'rance , Britain was aui te convinced that 
she had no wish to interfere &s neither Kadrid nor Lisbon 
had L:.formed Vergennes of their differences. Storrnont, 
however, cautioned Lcndcn that Spain may have determined 
to strike a sudden blow, and to leave to sucb events, as 
must naturally arise, to force her ally to follow. l 
Indeed, Spain berself suspected Pombal of the same designs. 2 
Hence t he need to get lfrance to moderate her ally. 
Like Britain, :France had no desire to let the penin-
sular quarrel develop beyond the limits of the territorial 
dispute in America. Vergennes represented to the Spaniards 
that a specific denial of hostile intentions against Brazil 
was desirable in order to allay British suspicions; he had 
inferred from utormont's language that Britain was sincerely 
inclined to peace. His plan was to let her urge moderation 
on iorubal in the hope that Portuguese displeasure might 
induce that court to have recourse to France as their 
intermeaiary with the Spaniards. Vergennes would then be 
able to keep a restraining hand upon France's ally, and 
reap some benefit in the shape of improvement of her 
1. Stormont to Rochford, Paris, 28 September 1774, ' 
no. 85, S.P. 78/293. 
2. Gil ~unilla, p. 236. 
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commercial position in Portugal from a grateful Pombal. l 
but Fombal was impervious to arguments for a negot-
iated settlement, short of ~pain restoring all territories 
taKen by Cevallos in 17l2. heantime he continued to play 
upon AnBlo-Bo~rton antagonism, and to deflect Rochford's 
pressure for a reply to Grimaldi's memorial of 6 February 
1765 on tbe question of boundaries, he reverted to the 
subject of bourbon attempts to turn him away from Britain. 
Fombal took a bold line, confident that in the last 
resort he possessed the means to molify Great Britain and 
bring her to his side through redress of her commercial 
. 2 
gr~evances. 
1. Stormont to nochford, 26 October 1774, no.94, s.P. 
78/293. Cp. Doniol, I, pp. 31-5, 59. 
2. Gee Wa]pole-uochford correspondence, October 1774 to 
January 1775, S.P. 89/78-79 passim. Cp. C.B., Ill, pp. 
294-8. 
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5. ~he Al[iers fiasco causes Grimaldi to induce the 
second phase of the negotiation: the Franco-English 
mediation. 
Grilli&lui for bib part beC~le preoccupied with North 
Africa and had to neglect the l-ortuguese negotiation. On 
19 September 1774 l'"orocco and. Algiers had declared war on 
Spain in the hope of recovering possession of the Spanish 
holdinbs: Ceuta, helilla and V~lez (claimed by Morocco), 
anti Oran and hers-el-Kebir (claimed ~y Algiers). Spain 
accepteQ the challenge on October 23rd. Morocco laid 
siege to helilla in December, but its garrison, with re-
, 
inforcements frOIn Ivjalaga, held out. As to the Day of 
Algiers, who had undertaken to conquer Oran, he failed even 
to attempt it. By f-larch 1775 Sidi Mohammed of Morocco was 
asking for peace, and to propitiate Spain he suggested a 
joint punitive expedition against Algiers. 
Spain seized upon these events as a chance to attempt 
a definitive solution to the African threat to Spanish 
shipping ill the IVlediterranean, e.g. by accepting Moroccan 
friendship and diverting the large expeditionary force 
gathered at Cartagena to Algiers, whose ships were the 
most active in their hostility against Spain's. From the 
military point of view it was easier to cope with the Dey. 
448 
~o avoid delays and outside interference, Grimaldi kept 
these African plans secret from both Britain and :h'rance. 1 
Behind the naval armaments directed towards North 
Africa, lay the plan of bein~ prepared in the military and 
nayal sense to use the opportunity for the :h-'amily Compact 
to fight Britain should the unrest in Britain's American 
colonies grow to revolution. Vergennes was the prime 
mover in such plans. He warned Spain of the implications 
of the British decision to announce that commerce with 
their colonies was to be stopped and foreign ships carrying 
warlike stores to the insurgents would be confiscated, and 
formulated a plan to use the opportunity if Britain had a 
revolt on her hands to reverse the balance of power 
established in 1763. At the same time Vergennes cautioned 
Spain against British military and naval preparations, for 
there was the fear of an attack on the French We.t India 
Islands and the colonial possession of Spain if Chatham 
returned to power. 
:L'he .spanish ambassador to the French Court, Aranda, 
shared these feelings, and he also began to moot war plans 
and think of territorial compensations. The African 
1. V.Hodriguez Casado, La politica marrogui de Carlos Ill, 
chapter VII. 
449 
expedition was ill his view a good pretext for having a 
large armament at the ready in preparation for a war with 
the English; he hailed the raising of the seige of Melilla 
as a boost for Spanish morale and prestige abroad. When 
VerBennes inquired of him in March about the Spanish force 
at 0artagena, Aranda, who did not know its destination, 
presented it as evidence that Spain was giving serious 
attention to her navy, and urged the French minister to do 
likewise in respect of his forces. 
Grimaldi was less carried away than Aranda, and urged 
caution. un 25 April 1775 he suggested a joint Bourbon 
request for information as to the purpose of the British 
concentration of forces in American waters and a demand 
for adequate assurances for the security of their American 
possessions. But this found no favour with Aranda and 
Vergennes who pointed out that such a step would prompt 
Britain to demand reciprocal guarantees from Spain and 
France, which would prevent them from bringing their 
power up to Britain's level. The danger of Chatham's 
return to power, Vergennes urged, was a remindeR of the 
need to hold themselves in readiness. Grimaldi gave way 
as he saw the sense of this. l 
1. Doniol, I, ppL40-81 passmm; J.]'.Yela Utrilla, Es~ana ante 
la independencia de los Estados Unidos,I, pp.42- ; and 
Gil Munilla, pp.244-51. 
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Spanish armMlents and reported French naval prepar-
ations l alarmed Great Britain. ~hey could not, it was 
argued, be destined solely against the Moors: an attack 
on ~ortugal or Drazil was feared. Grimaldi, concerned to 
keep his Algiers plan secret both from France and Britain, 
simply reiterated that his armaments were intended against 
the ~oors. As for the French naval preparations, they 
proved without foun~atioQ.2 
heantime, amidst great expectations, l\adrid received 
the news on 14 July 1775 that the descent against Algiers 
on the 6th (after a month's delay in Cartagena) had been 
repulsed and the Spanish expeditionary force, composed of 
some 20,000 men with forty-seven armed vessels and trans-
ports, compelled to withdraw in disarray on the same day. 
'llhe ships now lay at anchor , relatively undamaged, at 
Malaga and. Cadiz. 3 Grimaldi's position was adversely 
affected; undoubtedly the fiasco contributed to his 
4 resignation sixteen months from now. 
1. In mic April it was reported from Paris that France 
intended to arm a fleet seventeen-sail strong in hrest. 
2. Escarano to Grimaldi,19 hay 1775, no.507,A.G.S.,:bstado, 
legO 6989; Rochford to Grantham, 16 June 1775, no.l;, 
S.F. 94/198; Doniol, I, pp.55-6,80,112-3; St.Paul,II, 
pp. 44-l 55,passim. 
,. Danvila,IV,pp.22l-243;Rodr!guez Casado,Pol:i:tica maDt>gui, 
pp. 235-44. 
4. See below p.~'I. 
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Aranda, still influential in government circles, 
viewed the situation optimistically. African provocations 
had enabled Spain to get a large armament in readiness for 
any eventuality. 1 'llhe ]'rench minister also played down 
the fiasco for prestige reasons; Vergennes remarked that 
the fact that Spain had been able to mobilize 20,000 
soldiers was a sign that her military and naval machine 
was well prepared. 2 
But Grimaldi saw no consolation in possessing an 
armament that had failed lamentably before a minor power. 
This was no encouragement to entertain positive policies 
regarding Portugal as Aranda was suggesting. In these 
circumstances, on 17 July, three days after the arrival 
in Madrid of the news about Algiers, Grimaldi seems to 
have given some indication to Souza Coutinh03 that be 
might be willing to reopen negotiations on the question 
of boundaries in the River Plate. Grimaldi meant no 
1. Gil l'lunilla, pp.249-54; Danvila, IV , pp.243-250. 
2. Doniol, I, pp.111-5. 
3. In December 1770 he was appointed to the Spanish 
embassy to succeed Sa, who returned to Lisbon to 
take charge of the foreign secretaryship (Walpole 
to Rochford, 14 December 1770, no. 50, S.P. 89/ 
78). 'llhe Portuguese ambassador in Paris was his 
brother. 
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official move, but rombal used it as such. l Grimaldi's 
efforts to obtain French help i~ getting negotiations 
boing once more by pressing Portugal, point in the same 
direction. ~his approach to France is evidence of the 
weakening of Grimaldi's position. It was fraught with 
danger for that independent policy Grimaldi had tried to 
2 pursue. The interests of France would have to be 
considered. 
In the mediation policy, in which·he hoped to be 
joined by Britain, Vergennes, like Choiseul, wished to 
obtain some commercial reward in return for his offices as 
a benevolent broker by inhibiting Spain's territorial 
claims and by emphasizing Britain's lukewarm support for 
the Portuguese case. On the other hand, Vergennes was 
already preparingfue ground for an eventual understanding 
with the Americans, who had had their first armed encounter 
with British troops in June. Vergennes wanted to have the 
Spaniards well disposed towards a policy of intervention 
in American affairs. On 20 August 1775 he recommended that 
1. Grantham reports that it was Souza who went to 
see Grimaldi on July 17th to offer a conveyance 
of any dispatches for Lisbon with the Portuguese 
messenger from Rome; but he knows nothing of what 
went on between them, except that Lisbon sent 
instructions to Madrid which were proposed to 
Grimaldi on 12 August (29 November l775,no.63,S.P. 
94/199). 
2. Cp. Gil r-:;unilla, pp.255-7, 261-3. 
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several thousand troops and some ships of the line be sent 
to Buenos Aires to redress the balance of power and referred 
to the possibility of seeking friendship with the American 
insurrectionists. However, he did not wish to be hurried 
into war with Britain until the chances of winning it were 
more than even: least of all to strengthen Spain at Portu-
gal's expense. Having exerted military pressure OD 
Portugal in America, taking good care not to adopt measures 
of such consequence as might induce Britain to intervene, 
Vergennes would then try to make Spain "relacher de 
l'exactitude rigoureuse de ses anciennes fronti~res".l 
Aranda supported Vergennes' recommendation to send rein-
forcements to Buenos Aires whole-heartedly, and warned 
Grimaldi against ~ombal.2 
But French hopes and Aranda's counsel were to some 
extent circumvented by the direct negotiations which began 
on 12 August - five days after Spain had solicited France's 
help as mediator - when Souza announced in Madrid that he 
had been authorized to propose an amicable settlement of 
1. Recueil, Ill, pp.371-380. Cp. Doniol, pp.ll6-;28 passim; 
Quadro elementar, YIII, pp. 99-116. 
2. Gil I'1unilla, pp.265-6, 406-7; Yela, I, pp. 46-9. 
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their differences in the alo de la ~lata area. While 
these netotiations lasted, .souza suggested, the .orazilian 
authorities would be ordered to cease all hostility against 
the Spanish Americans, and these in turn were expected to 
be given similar instructions. Grimaldi, without any 
formal guarantee from Lisbon, did not hesitate to send 
1 these illstructions to Buenos Aires the same .day. Grimaldi 
still clung to the hope that a pacific settlement was 
possible. 
~he Portuguese minister had no intention to hold his 
hand. Souza's opening to Grimaldi on 12 August was 
followed on the 26th by an instruction to the governor of 
Brazil, Lavradio, pressing him to expel the Spaniards from 
Rio Grande without delay in pursuance of his earlier 
ir:..structions of 7 J·uly 1774. Spain had suffered a serious 
set-back in Algiers, .. Pombal observed, which had made her 
solicitous of an amicable discussion with Portugal. 2 On 
the one hand, Pombal unoerstood that the Spanish armament 
1. Ibid., p.265; C.B., Ill, pp.337-8. 
2. C.B., Ill, pp.338-41. Cp. Alden, H.A.H.R., 41 
(1961), p.66. 
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now back in Spanish ports might be sent to Buenos Aires; 
a pretence to ne~otiate might prevent this. Cn the other 
hand, if a real negotiation was started, the possession 
of the territories under dispute would enable Pombal to 
negotiate from strength as would his allegation that 
Spain had solicited Portugal on July 17th. Me~while, he 
needed time for his tactics could only succeed if Britain 
was seen to be giving lortugal some encouragement. He 
was playing on Spain's fears that this might be the case. 
But he needed reassuring, for Britain's involvement in 
North America might make her reluctant to embolden Portugal. 
un August 23rd, three days before Lavradio's 
instructions, lombal had a conference with walpole, in 
which the Portuguese minister alleged that Grimaldi, 
accommodating as to terms, had invited Portugal to settle 
their boundary disputes on July 17th; he requested British 
diplomatic support to secure the restitution of the 
territories conquered by Cevallos in 1762 as stipulated, 
according to the Portuguese interpretation, by article 21 
of the 1763 treaty. He also raised the old story of the 
Bourbon threat to Portugal now that Britain was deeply 
involved in America. l 
1. Walpole to hochford, 2 September 1775, no.42 (cp. Pinto 
to Hochford, London, 27 September and 8 October 1775), 
s.P. 89/80. 
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But J:3ri tain was not in a '[-osi tion to encourage 
Portugal. 'llhe .b.merican insurrection was making increasing 
~ernan6s on her resources, and she had no wish to be seen 
to connive at ~ornbal's policies, for fear of provoking the 
Bourbon powers. Indeed the English were prepared to give 
assurances that Britain did not contemplate attacking 
French or Spanish possessions in America; in November 1775 
Rochford suggested a tripartite understanding, with mutual 
guarantees by ]f'rance, Spain and Great . Britain. l Reports 
from fYiadrid and .J:aris confirmed Rochford in this dis-
position; according to Grantham and Stormont the Spanish 
and French Courts were inclined to find a pacific solution 
to the Portuguese issue; it was Pombal who had to be 
forced to be reasonable. 2 
Hochford argued for peace more resolutely than he 
had done in the previous winter. The Portuguese were told 
that it was utterly impossible for Britain to give them 
any assistance at this moment and that they had to find 
1. Yela, I, pp. 55-6; Gil Munilla, pp. 283-4. 
2. Grantham to Rochford, 21 September, no. 52, and 
9 November 1775, no. 58 (S.P. 94/199); 8tormont 
to Weymouth, 1 November 1775, no. 22 ~S.P. 78/ 
297). 
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some expedient to accelerate an accommodation. Both 
Grimaldi and Vergennes were acquainted with this move, and 
Hochford urfed that ~rance should also use her influence 
with Spain in a peaceful direction. l 
In l\;.adrid Grirnaldi soon began to grow anxioLlS. 
Fombal's evasiveness and the active measures suggested by 
Vergennes and Aranda roused him from his passive waiting. 
In 0ctober he held several meetings with his colleagues to 
decide whether to remain on the defensive but well prepared 
to counter any sudden attack, to send an expedition to 
Buenos Aires, or to wage preventive war against Portugal 
and, by implication, Britain. Aranda was foremost in 
advocating war on Portugal, while adopting defensive 
measures in the rtiver Plate. But if negotiations with 
Portugal could be started, he still insisted that military 
pressure in Brazil was necessary, and indicated that 
Britain, in view of her invoivement in North America, 
might turn a blind eye to a Spanish e~edition to Buenos 
1. Rochford to Stormont, 3 November 1775, DO. 13 (o.P. 78/297); to Grantham, Novembe~ 7th, no. 23 
(S.P. 94/199); to Walpole, same date, DO. 23 (S.!>. 89/80). 
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Aires if it were c..Clle c..iscreetly. 'i.'he miLister of war, 
rticla, suggested an offensive war in the peninsula with 
France's support; in return for the conquest of Fortugal, 
Vertiz in Buenos Aires would help the Brench to conquer 
Portugal's American possessions. Cevallos, the governor 
of Buenos Aires during the ~even Years War, gave an opinion 
more akin to Grimaldi's. Ee advised against aggressive 
measures either in Portugal or in Brazil since either would 
immeuiately Qraw ~ritain to Portugal's support and Spain 
was not prepared. It was preferable to bide time while 
military and naval efficiency was improved, and Britain's 
power was diminished, surreptitiously supporting the 
American insurrection... 'l'hen, Spain should be in a position 
to attack metropolitan Portugal with the help of ~rance and 
extract from her advantageous terms in America. 
By order of Carlos III Grimaldi transmitted these 
views to Aranda on uctober 18th to be discussed by the 
French King and his ministers. His own counsel was to 
remain on the defensive but well prepared in Spain, while 
waiting for Pombal's next move. He still wished that the 
mediation of ]'rance and Britain should proceed, and his 
one positive suggestion was to press Pombal for a negotiated 
solution by stationing several regiments along the Portuguese 
border and parading some ships of the line and frigates 
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befoloe Lisoon. 
while waiting, for tbe :French reply Grimaldi, aware 
of lombal's efforts to 6raw British support, demanded an 
answer on November 20th to his proposal of September 17th 
(following Portugal's own suggestion on August 12th which 
Grimaldi had already complied with) that hostilities should 
be suspended before negotiations on detail began; on the 
24th he reiterated this demand in the most urgent manner. l 
One may speculate on whether Grimaldi was not now in 
a vosition to force Portugal's hand rather than hope, as 
he seemed to be doing, that the Portuguese build-up in the 
Rio de la l'lata area might justify his appeals to Britain 
to restrain her ally or to allow Spain to do it herself in 
America. No doubt there was the serious risk of British 
intervention, if Spain decided to send an expeditionary 
force to Buenos Aires; on the other hand, the English bad 
clearly indicated that they might turn a blind eye to a 
Spanish action in America if confined to the aisputed 
areas between Spain and Portugal. France's exclusion 
1. Gil hunilla, pp. 254-5, 269-78, 407-414. 
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from s~ch bU enterpribe hli6~t be aeemea adequate 
guarantee in ~ritain's ~yes that dpain would not go be-
YOl.lG. it. 
l.W [lis procrastination Grirnaldi was playing Pombal' s 
game. ]'or as time 'went on, the larger the expedition 
requirea to redress the balbnce of power between bpain and 
Portugal in the Hi vel' llate woula be, ami this in turn made 
it tu.e more likely that Dritish suspicions would be aroused 
when the time CaIlJ8; eS1Jecially as growing :b'rench concern 
in the strue:;gle of the American colonies against Britain 
would make it wore difficult for Spain to keep the two 
issues separate. A slow but steady flow of troops towards 
Buenos Aires might have been the best method to thwart 
Pombal's policies. Eventually, Spain would find a solution; 
but it was imposed upon her at a time when she was no~ able 
to obtain all the benefits she may have expected. 
French reaction to the Spanish communication of 18 
October once again showed that Spain would not be en-
couraged to rise at the expense of Portugal. Vergennes 
had no desire to acquire new territories - his objectives 
were more limited than Choiseul's - but only to retrieve 
]'rance 's pas! tion in the European balance and to expand 
her trade; new conquests might transfer the jealousy 
provoked by the spectacle of britain's recent successes to 
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li'ra~~ce. be 'tJ8..S bhd:l£.. his time and was quite determined to 
preveDt the Iortuguese issue from rushiDg things. As for 
an attack on Fortugal, he argued that Spain had no legitim-
ate brounds to start a war. Vergennes recommended Spain 
to be moder~~e tuwards the ~ortuguese, and should war 
prove iGBvitable, he favoured an attack on ~ortugal, keepins 
the baias on deposit to use as compensation for losses 
1 ' 1 e sewnere. 
~be ~nBlisb 60vernmellt for their part became ever more 
positive iLl their refusal to Powbal's requests for support; 
Powb8.1 l\.B.tJt on insisting tLlat ll'rance was fully committed to 
Gpain. 2 Weymouth, since 9 ~ovember Rochford's successor in 
the southern department,' was, like his predecessor, a 
little anxious about France's attitude; but reports from the 
bourbon Courts reassured him that the only obstacle in the 
way of Cl. neGotiated settlement was the obduracy of the 
1. 10niol, I, pp.306-12; Gil hunilla, pp.415-6. Op. 
P t 7.7 0 at erson, pp. ~ -~. 
2. Walpole to dochfor~, 19 November 1775, no. 51, and 
Weymouth to ~\!.alpole, 5 December 1775, no.25; S.P. 89/80. 
,. 1681-1 8 , p. 180. 
~or a short while t e Bour on powers, remem er ng Wey-
mouth's attitude in 1770, were apprehensive of t~e new 
appointffient; hasserano to Grimaldi, 14 November 1775, 
no. 127 (A.G.3., Estado, legO 6991); Gil Munilla, p. 
276; Doniol, I, pp.236-8. 
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lortuguese :ninister. Grantho.:., froil; haciriLl, expresseu his 
view tha~ ~pain was entitlea to & declaration of non-
a6bression frolli ~ortugal in view of the fact that Griwaltii 
haa given such a aeclaration on cipain's behall,l and 
. 
we;YlIlouth Llstructeci ~alpole 011 .iJecemoer 12th 1775, to get 
~ombal to sive explicit assurances to Spain, while prowis-
ing diplomatic support to achieve a negotiated solution 
acceptable to ~ortugal. Grantbam was also informed so that 
he ~icht help in Madrid to procure the explicit answer 
dewandea by Grimaldi. 2 
British pressure eventually told on Pornbal. On 
December 14th ~ouza was 6irected to inform Grimaldi that .a 
ship had been ordered to set sail for Rio de Janeiro with 
instructions to stop hostilities against the Jpaniards and 
to bring matters baCk to what they were before July 17th. 
bouza himself had to take the blame for the delay because 
he ha~ not acquainted Lis~on, until ~ovember 27th, so it 
was alleged, with the ~panish instructions sent to Vertiz 
on August 12th to suspend hostilities. 
1. Weymouth to Stormont, 17 J.~ovember 1775, 00.14 (S.P. 78/ 
297); to Grantham, no.24 (S.P. 94/199); Grantham to 
Hochford, 29 November 1775, no. 63, (S.P. 94/199); 
Masserano to Grimaldi, 8 December 1775, no. 146 (A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 8133). ., 
2. Weymouth to Walpole, 12 December 1775, nos 26 and 27 
(S.P. 89/80)j to Grantham, no.26 (S.P. 94/199). Cp. 
B.D.I., VII ~Frallce), }art IV, p. 149. 
46, 
~his statemeut, transmitted to the Bpanish government 
OL Vecemuer 10th, was objecte~ to as it established July 
17th as the opelling of tbe preseut talks an~ in6icated that 
a ship had been ordereu to set sail, not that she had been 
dispatched. with Grantham's as~istance, <..riDaldi prevailed 
upon Souza to accept a lliore satisfactory draft on the 21st 
wllich stateCi that a ship had been dispatched, 1 and omitted 
the date July 17th at the cost of ignoring the question of 
mutual restoration of territories. Bouza also accepted 
Grimaldi's counter-declaration of December 22nd that the 
Spanish orders of August 12th for ceasi~g hostilities had 
been sent to Buenos Aires on the understanding that the 
IJortuguese troops "no obrarian contra las Espanolas, ni 
procederia a nuevas Usurpaciones de Territorio". Botb 
siaes now settled down to detailed negotiations since 
Souza had received authorizatioo. 2 Some delay was caused 
by Portugal's objectinb to the wording of the notes 
exchanged between Grimaldi and Souza, especially the 
appearance of the word 'usurpations' in Grimaldi's note.3 
1. In fact, this ship was not dispatched until 15 January 
17~6 (A1den,H.A.H.R.,4l (1961), pp. 67-8). 
2. A copy of Grimaldi's note is enclosed in Grantham to 
Weymouth, 14 March 1776,no.8 (S.P. 94/200). See also 
Grantham's dispatches of 11 December, no.65; 21st, no.66; 
and 28 December 1775, no.67(S.P. 94/199). Walpole to 
Weymouth, 10 January 1776, no.2(S.P. 89/81). Cp. §g 
Munilla, pp. 282-j. 
3. Grantham to Weymouth,18 January 1776,no.2 (S.P. 94/200); 
Stormont to Weymouth,14 February, nos 1, and 14 (S.P. 
78/298) • 
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fombal was iu any Ci:;t.se anxious to spin out the neesot-
iations in the hope of iwprovinb Portugal's barbaining 
position. He first su~gested (24 January 1776) a meeting 
of a congress in ~aris to adjust the 6ispute by tbe mediation 
of Paris and London. Britain was requested to propose and 
spoLsor his sUbgestioll~ in Madrid and }aris. He followed 
this by an intensive diplomatic campaign against Grimaldi, 
whom be accused before Vergennes of tr~ing to involve France 
in a war. At the same time he tried to put the sULgested 
mediators at loggerbeads by telling Weymouth that ~rance 
plafined to belp the insurgent colonies. l 
Neither Hri tain nor indeed l!'rance wished tu commit 
themselves before Spain expressed her views on the proposed 
cOIlgress. ~be former, although willinb to concur in the 
measure, would have preferred France to handle Spain alone. 
France for ber part intimated that she would agree to 
mediate jointly witb Britain, but that Portugal would have 
to broach tbe subject in Madrid and, should Spain prove 
agreeable, she could then mW~e an official proposal to 
France. 2 
1. wa1pole to Weymouth, Lisbon, 24 January 1776, no.5' (S.F. 
89/81); Quadro elementar, VIII, pp.l11-160 passim. 
2. Weymoutb to Walpo1e ,20 ]'ebruary 1776,no.3(S.P. 89/81); 
Weymouth to Btormont,16 February,no.11, and 23rd, no.13; 
Stormont to Weymouth,21 February,no.17, and 23rd, no.21 
(S.P. 78/298). Quadro e1ementar,VIII,pp.162-6. 
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6. Spain decides to use force. 
before these exchanges were known to the lortuguese 
bovernrl,ent, news frcLi! ~outh America brought the negotiations 
to a halt, wLich was to prove final. In the previous SUllilller 
a .:>panis i.1 mercaautmaLl ail(;. Cl. frigate hb-cl been <letaineci, 
se&rClle<i and, after sowe bo.ro.ohip, released by tbe brazilian 
a.utho~·i ties. ~'urth~l.'lllOre, on 28 vctober 1775 the Spanish 
post of ~an hartin, which had been established to keep a 
watch on the Portuguese at nio }ardo, was attacked an~ its 
garrison, cattle anu ei'fects taken away, by Pinto Bandeira. 
Un 12 ]'ebruary 1776 Grimaldi declared that no further 
negotiation on the question of boundaries could proceed 
until full restitution be made and satisfaction given to 
Spain. Pombal answered on the 29th that it was the hostile 
activities of the Spaniards that had provoked the Portuguese 
to retaliate in ~an Martin in a defensive action. l He 
f'uI,ther observed tt1at the maritime incidents and the attack 
on San Martin could not have been prevented, even if there 
had been a formal suspension of hostilities following upon 
1. Walpo1e to Weymouth, 6 March 1776, no. 10; enclosing 
the lortuguese account of these incidents (S.P. 89/ 
81). Cp. Gil r-lunilla, pp. 289-90; ~., Ill, pp. 341-
6. 
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the talks of July 17th and August 12th, for it usually took 
the post till'ee months to arL'ive in America. Pombal tbere-
fore saw no need to delay the discussion of the question of 
boundaries and now formally proposed a congress at Paris to 
Grimaldi. ~he Spanish minister accepted on condition that 
Portugal first gave satisfaction for the incidents and 
secondly that Spain was allowed to submit a statement of 
her case in reply to }ortugal's memorandum, submitted by 
Souza to the Spanish Court on January 16th but withdrawn 
soon afterwards. 1 On il'Jarch 17th Pombal, ignoring Grimaldi' s 
conditions, reiterated that the question of limits be de-
ferred to the joint examination of Britain and France not 
as mediators but as arbitrators. Here was a new point, 
which again altered the whole aspect of the foregoing talks 
between the two countries, and therefore added new obstacles. 
Yet Grimaldi accepted this change in the status of Britain 
and ]'rance, but added to the two conditions mentioned above 
that Portugal should make the proposal uirectly to Spain or 
throuBh a third party (France or Britain), and a term of no 
more than six months was fixed for the congress to reach its 
1 . 2 conc USl.ons. 
1. Walpole to Weymouth, 6 harch 1776, no.l0; Pinto to Weymouth, 
7 harch 1776 (S.P. 89/81). Some of these papers are printed 
in St. Paul, 11, pp.339-44. Op. Gi1 Muni11a,pp.285-7. 
2. Grantham to Weymouth,18 March 1776, no.9(S.P. 94/200)· 
Stormont to Weymouth, 27 ~larch 1776 ,no. 38(8.P. 78/2983. 
Cp. ii1 LV.unilla, pp. 287-9. 
.. 
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heanwhile, ~ombal intensified his efforts to pre-
disfose .Dri taiIl and. ~rance in his favour. ne was aware 
that Britain because of her own North American troubles 
might not pay as much attention tc Fortuguese interests 
as otherwise would have been tLle case. 
Pombal in his men.oranduIH wanted to focus attei1tion 
on article 21 of the 1763 treaty; building his case on 
the F'ortuguese interpretation of this article he sought 
to secure Rio Grande de sio Fedro, now about to be seized. 
But he indicated his willingness to sacrifice his claim 
to the northern bank of the River Plate, the length of 
coast fron: Cape Santa Naria to Castillos and all the 
'profitable' territories extending as far north as the 
River Ibicu1, in return for the 'worthless' seven missions 
east of the Paraguay. 
of the 1750 treaty. 
Il'hese terms wer~, in fact, those rill 
Pombal desired the renewal of this 
treaty to make use of the article 25 which established a 
mutual guarantee and defensive alliance between the two 
signatories in South America; this suggestion might not 
be welcome to France because it was incompatible with 
similar stipulations in the Family Compact of 1761. For 
this reason this demand may have been forw~rded in order 
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to s~in out t~e work of the arbitrators. l 
Spain also worked out her terms, to be submitted to 
the arbitrators. Going back to the de~arcation line of 
the ~rbaty of iortesillas of 1492 (as bUbbested by ~randa), 
Grimaldi proposed that a panel of experts from the 
.Acadenlies of Science of Paris and London should m:rs.w the 
meridian referre6 to in 1494. Pombal, who maintained that 
the 1494 treaty had been abolished by that of Utrecht, 
could not be expected to relish this; the Spanish proposal 
l1ligbt be taken us an attempt to question Portugal's terri-
torial gains in the heart of Amazonia. ~he position of 
Bpain in the .bhilippine IslciDds and that of .t-ortugal in 
the ';pice Islands (l"loluccas) would also have to be 
included in the discussions. 2 
1. Walpole to Weymouth, 16 March 1776, no.12; 23 March, 
no.14· Pinto to Weymouth, 7 and 26 April 1766 (S.P. 
89/81). Stormont to Weymouth, 13 March 1776, no. 32; 
20 March, no.34 (~.P. 78/298). Bt. Paul, 11, pp.337, 
348-56; Quadro elementar,VIII,pp. 172-224 passim. 
2. Hy the Treaty of Zaragoza of 1529 Carlos V pledged 
all his rights in the Moluccas to Portugal for 350,000 
ducats in cash. The Philippine Islands had been 
settled by Spain in 1565. According to the 1494 
treaty Spain could claim what she reached by sailing 
westwards and the Portuguese what they found by going 
to the east. There was never a demarcation line in 
the lacific like the one in the South Atlantic (N.C.M.H., 
11, pp. 568-9, 604-12). 
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It is liAely that 0ri~al~i was no mure in a hurry 
to reach a decision ~han Portugal, for at this time~e 
question of usin6 force agai~st the Brazilians was once 
L:lOre deo<;.ted in Ladric.. It was envisoe:,E:Q, first, laying 
waste ;3acramento, demolishinb the town ami obstructinE; 
its port, so that it could never be restored to its former 
position as a military and cOQmerciul bridge-head to 
Buenos Aires; whatever the diplomatic outcome of the 
present dispute. It was feared that britain, because of 
the benefits she obtained from trade in the colony, might 
object to letting Fortugal part with it; there was also 
the 1713 treaty which had given uacramento to ~ortugal. 
clecondly, the Spaniards planned to occupy Santa Catarina 
Island to stop l'ortuguese infiltration in Rio Grande do 
SuI. 'llhere was hope that the Brazilians might eventually 
be forced to withdraw to the northern bank of the Hiver 
I ' 1 guazu. 
No speedy progress was likely to be made and 
Britain in particular was beginning to grow anxious about 
1. Gil hunilla, pp. 285, 291-300, 319. 
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the dea~lock. Throushout the sprinG of 177G, the ~nblish 
were kept well illformed of li'rench secret sUfport to the 
American insur-rectionists, naval preparations, al1G.. un-
official relations between the ~rench government and re-
presentatives of the insurgent colonies, as well as of 
Spain's financial contribution. Some of the reports 
stressed .Aranda' s important role in persuading Vergennes 
to be prepared to go to war aEainst Eritain. Further, 
there were also reports of naval activity in ~panish 
ports an6 large forces alonB the Portuguese border. l 
i~ew pressul'e was therefore put on Lisbon. 2 '.rowards 
the ~iddle of hay ~owbal, givinb up his demand to discuss 
the maritime indidents and the attack on the Spanish port 
of San hartin in 1775 as part of the negotiations on 
boundaries, sent instructions to his representative in 
}aris conveyinb the draft of a note to be discussed with 
Vergennes before offering it to Spain as satisfaction. 
1. Add. 34413 passim; St. Paul, 11, pp.329-435 passim; 
Quadro elementar, VIII, pp.l67-219 passim. Cp. S.F. 
Bemis, "BriLtish Secret Service and the Franco-
American Alliance", A.H.R., 29 (1924), pp.474-95; 
J.P.Boyd, "Silas Deane; Death by a kindly teacher 
of treason", William and Mary Quarterly, 16 (1959), 
pp.165-87. . 
2. Weymouth's instructions to Walpole, April 1776, 
s.P. 89/81. 
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But VerL~nnes thought it insufficient; he suggested that 
a satisfactory document would have to contain reparation 
for the damage, disavowal, aDd a proruise to punish the 
officer responsible for the seizure of the Spanish ships 
in the summer of the previous year. the French minister, 
who was now quite stern in his sup~ort for Spain in pre-
paration for a Joint intervention in the ~orth American 
conflict, also suggested that the question of satisfaction 
be arranged in l.\'~adrid between Souza, ussun and Grantham 
to speed thinbs up; the latter would first make the 
application to Pombal through Walpole, who wo~ld in turn 
transmit f'ombal's answer to Grantharn; the instrument of 
satisfaction would then be drafted in lvladrid and submitted 
to the Spanish government as soon as assurances that it 
would be acceptable were received from them. This pro-
ceedure brought great pressure to bear upon Pombal. Not 
only was his sUbgestion for arbitrators disregarded, but 
the mediation was now to take place in Madrid, improving 
the Spanish position. Yet Britain approved of it, which 
shows her conciliatory attitude towards the Bourbon powers. 
bpain for her part seemed now decided to let force 
have the last word. On 22 June 1776 the Portuguese 
ambassador in I"ladrid, Souza, agreed to give satisfaction 
for the last incidents in America (reparation and disavowal), 
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to reprimand Lavradio, the viceroy of brazil, and to 
punish the officers responsible for the seizure of the 
two 0panish ships. Grantham believed that the Portuguese 
offer was adequate; Grima16i now insisted on a public act 
of atonement to make an example and in token of Portugal's 
sincerity. The ~panish minister mibht have accepted the 
Portuguese offer, Grantham observed, but news from America 
reached hadrid on the night of the 23ro and on the 24th 
he suspended the negotiations till the 27th when the 
Court and government should. be baCK in hadrid from 
A . 1 ranJuez. 
'l'alks which had hardly got going ran aground for the 
last time. The Spanish government was apprised on June 
23rd 1776, that the Fortuguese had occupied Santa Tecla 
(~arch 25th), and coastal Rio Grande de S~o fedro (April 
1st), and attacked some Spanish vessels. The occupation 
of Rio Grande took place on the very day that Pombal's 
1. weymouth to Grantham, 28 hay, no.11, and 29 May 
1776, no.12 (S.P. 94/2(0)" Grantham to Weymouth, 
Aranjuez, 20 June, no.23, 24 June, no.24, and 
19 July 1776 (from Madrid), no.30 (S.P. 94/201). 
St. Eaul, 11, pp. 381-435 passim; Quadro elementar, 
VIII, pp. 224-251 passim. 
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in.structiolls sellt on January 15th, 1776, to suspend 
hostilities reached ~io de Janeiro. l 
Forubal atteruptea. to ussuage Spain and the prospective 
mediators on July 6th; he offered his apologies to Grim-
alcii thruugh Cssun and Grantham, and excused the action by 
the fact tbat his instructions had not reached Brazil in 
t ' 2 lIDe. But it was obviously too late. GraJ.1tham observed 
that the time for Spain to use force against the lortu-
guese in southel'n Brazil had, in his opinion, come; he 
expected troops to be sent to Buenos Aires immediately. 
Perhaps thus armed, Gran thaw reruurked, Spain might still 
be prepared to carry on the negotiations. 3 
Spain had no intention of resuming talks with 
Lisbon before her military position in the Rio de la 
l'lata area was conoiderably strengthened. In the second 
part of July the 0panish ministers worked out the plan 
for action. In aCidition to the expeditionary force to 
be sent to Buenos Aires, a naval £orce to intercept any 
succours that might be sent to Rio de Janeiro was to 
1. Gil hunillo., pp. 291, 300-1; C.~.,I~I,pp. 346-394. 
2. Grantham to Weymot,lth, 15 J-u1y 1776, no.29 (S.P. 94/ 
201. Cp. Gil buni11a, pp. 301-2; 9uadro elementar, 
VIII, pp. 251-9, an& XVIII, pp. 406-9. 
3. Granthrun to Weymouth, 27 June 1776, no.25, and 
1 July 1776, no. 27 ~S.P~ 94/201). Cp. St. Paul, 
11, pp. 435-6. 
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patrol the waters be1iWeel: tlle Canaries a.:.H1 .Lisbon, and 
troops wert; t,o be postea. alonl tlle Portuguese border to 
oblige tbew to keep their forces in reserve in the 
.1 1 pen~nsu a. 
Cavallos was appointed to commalld the expedition; 
his instructions were signed on 4 August 1776. Lis 
commission was not only as cOilimander-in-chief, he was 
also the first viceroy of Buenos Aires. The expedition 
did not actually sail till 1j ~ovember.2 It was composed 
of some 10,000 men, with seven ships of the line, eight 
frisates, seven arDee vessels and one hundred and sixteen 
transports. 3 
During these months Spain kept aloof in her 
relations wi tb. Ji'rance ano. .J::$ri tain. There was relief at 
the llews of July 19th frcm hasserano that he was given to 
1. One may add here Spanish permissive policies in regard 
to American privateers, especially if they brought in 
Portuguese prizes, in Spanish American ports, which were 
nominally closed to all foreign ships (Yela,II,pp.18 and 
24-5). 
2. Gil hunilla, pp.309-20; for the foundation and importance 
of the new viceroyalty, Ibid, ch.VIII, and Lynch, pp.40-5. 
3. Grantham's reports in November, 1776, S.P. 94/202. 
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unuerstanc. that .britain would not take it amiss if Spain 
sent troops to Bueuos Aires to redress tbe balance of 
power in tbe River Flate. l .but Britain was still suggest-
ing that negotiations might be possible and desirable if 
Fombal agreed to restore everythinb to its state prior to 
17 July 1775; Weymouth urged Pombal to do this. 2 
Opposition to the cipanish decision to resort to 
force came rather from their own ally, France, who kept 
trying to restrain Spain from offensive measures to gain 
some rewards from a successful mediation; her desire to 
keep Spanish forces in reserve for a battle with britain, 
on the other hand, must not be discounted. 
heserve therefore was essential to success; specially 
in view of ]'rance' s growing disposition to join the 
Americans in their struggle against Britain. Premature 
involvement, or the appearance of it, would endanger 
Spain's freedom of action regarding Portugal. Indeed, 
1. Gil ~unilla, pp. 305-7. 
2. Weymouth to Grantham, 30 August 1776, 
no. 17 CS.P. 94/201). For Weymouth's 
efforts to prevail upon Pombal, S.P. 
89/83 passim. 
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when Vergennes heard of the l'ortuguese attacK on Rio 
Granae, he iILmediately attemptea. to link the peninsular 
dispute with the American rebellion. 0n July 8th he 
insinuated to Spain the advantaGes of initiating conver-
sations with the insurE;ent colonies. ]'i ve weeks later 
news of the American Declaration of Independence of July 
4th arrived in Paris. this, tOGether with the evacuation 
of Boston by Lowe's army in March, gave the French minister 
a favourable impression of the fighting capacity of the 
colonies. 'llhe occasion seemed ripe. On August 31st, 
Vergennes presented the case for war to the King in 
Council, and eiBht Ciays later it was transmitted to the 
Bpanish government. Vergennes proposed that Spain should 
opeu hostilities against metropolitan Portugal. Britain 
would thea be forced to suPVort her ally, and France in 
her turn would join the conflict as Spain's auxiliary. 
Vergennes' proposal reached Madrid accompanied by Aranda's 
wholehearted approval. 'l'he impetuous ambassador in Paris 
still believed that France's disposition might be made use 
of to annex Fortugal. 
Grimaldi was reluctant to adopt such a co~rse of 
action. He preferred to keep Spain uncommitted in Britain's 
colonial conflict and to keep his own dispute with Fortugal 
separate. His attitude towards the Americans during the 
first half of 1776 shows that he was more anxious to secure 
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Spain' s possessions in "~merica than to weaken bri tain' s 
hold ove£.: tJ.ers. i.::lpain had fuuch to lose in a general war; 
furthermore, the rise of ail independent state in North 
America would be no less of a threat than Great Britain. 
From the Spanish point of view, it seemed wiser to exhaust 
both the colonies and the metropolis. In March, Grimaldi 
decided to give secret assistance to the colonies; four 
months later his first million of livres tournaises was 
forwarded to Paris to match Louis XVI's recent gift of 
another million. ~his was meant as a secret subsidy to 
keep the insurrection going; Grimaldi took care not to 
commit Spain to any financial contract with the colonies, 
and the transaction was conducted through France. 
When Vengennes' proposal reached Grimaldi, the 
Spanish minister replied (8 October) that long term 
American resistance could not yet be relied upon. In 
principle he was for war, but a further period of waiting 
could enable the Bourbon powers to ensure success. As 
for Portugal, Grimaldi warned that in such a war Spain 
would aim to annex her neighbour. For Cavallos' 
expedition would prove sufficient to abtain satisfaction 
in the Americas. In view of Vergennes' attitude in 
November 1775 against it, this attempt to pin the trench 
minister down illay have been intended to halt the French 
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6esi~e for war, leavin~ Bpain free to settle with ~ortugal 
in America. If.so Gri;.Jald.i scored a success. Vergennes 
now argueu for peace. his 0esire to avoid hostilities 
was, of course, influenced by washington's rout at the 
battle of Lonb Island (27 August 1776).1 
~hat Grimaldi, however anxious cipain as a whole may 
have been to obtain Portugal, was at this time restricting 
his objectives is clear from his repeated assurances to 
Grantham that no attack on metropolitan Portugal was 
intended; though willing to refer the dispute to a future 
mediation, Grimaldi meant only to reinstate Spain in Rio 
Grande do SuI before she was prepared to resume negot-
iations with her neighbour. ~hese assurances were meant 
also to counteract Aranda's warlike attitude in Paris. 2 
.B'or their part British statesmen went out of their 
way to reassure Spain that the arming of thirty ships of 
the line in the autumn of 1776 had been prompted by 
1. Doniol, I, pp. 231-688, passim; Ye1a, I, 
pp. 63-108; Gi1 ~uni11a, pp. 302=42: 
2. Grantham's reports from July to 
December, 1766; S.P. 94/201-202. 
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:'Fr(;l.rlce I S naval preparations anll was in no way connected 
with the Spanish expedition to the Biver Plate. In fact, 
the ~nslish warned Lisbon that their naval dispositions 
were not to be taken as encouragement for her unjust 
1 quarrel. ~hese mutual explanations point to a certain 
rapprochement in Anglo-Spanish relations, both attewpting 
to restrain their respective allies. 
~ews from Lisbon was also encouraging. At the 
be~inning of December the Portuguese King was reported to 
be ill. 'llhis weakened }ombal' s position as hariana Vi toria 
had greater influence on business. Indeed, his own polit-
ical career was tottering. Should the King die, he would 
be the first casuality of the new regime. Making use of 
this opportunity Grimaldi sent Ceva110s two more ships 
and a frigate with instructioDs to proceed immediately to 
Santa Catarina Island and conquer it. 2 
1. 1"1asserano I s reports during the autumn of 1776, 
specially no. 380 of 8 Noveulber and no. 388 of 
15 Hovember, A.G.S., Estado, legO 6995; B.D.I., VII, 
(France), Part IV, pp. 153-4; Weymouth to Grantham, 
17 January 1777, no. 1, S.P. 94/203 (Cp. Gil Muni1la, 
pp. 325, 344-7). For British pressure on Pombal, see 
Weymouth's instructions to Walpole, October 1766 
(S.P. 89/83). 
2. Gi1 Muni1la, p. 32G. 
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Pombal was still worl:ing for official British support. 
On May 2nd, 1776, it was enacted in London that all trade 
and intercourse with the insurgent colonies was absolutely 
prohibited to foreigners. l Portugal was the only country2 
who in compliance with British request, pledged her word 
not to trade with the illuerican colonies and agreed to 
close her harbours to .timerican vessels. On J-uly 5th Pombal 
also reverted to his allegations against the Bourbon 
powers, and offered to launch an attack on Spain if Britain 
would agree to blockade Brest and Cadiz. 3 But all was in 
vain; Britain did not wish to give Spain a good excuse to 
support the American insurrectionists, who were at the 
time pressinb the Bourbon powers to come to their help. 
with Franklin, who arrived in France in December 
1776, came Congress' authorization to make such offers as 
might be necessary to secure immediate military and naval 
1. Statutes at Large, 16 George Ill, c. 5. 
2. S.F. Bemis, ~he Dip~omacy of the American 
Revolution, p. 115 (quoted in future as ~emis). 
3. Walpole's reports to Weymouth from August to 
October, 1776 (S.P. 89/83); S.P. 89/92, ff. 305-
312; Add. 24162, ff. 141-2; Quadro elementar, 
XVIII, pp. 406-7; Gil Munil1a, pp. 418-9. 
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assistance from the Bourbon powers. fhe acceptance of 
these proposals meant the recognition of American il1depend-
ence and subsequent war against Britain. Vergennes, who 
was not yet decided on a course of open su~port, answered 
that he had to consult with France's ally. Grimaldi, 
after a ministerial meeting at the end of January, stressed 
to Vergennes the need to strengthen Bourbon defences in 
America rather than entertain offensive views. l 
Spain continued to give verbal encouragement and 
secret assistance to keep the insurrection going; she also 
resi~ted British attempts to persuade her to stop trade 
with the insurrectionists and to close her ports to their 
ships and prizes. 2 France was also unsuccessfully 
approached.' But no official support which the Americans 
might utilize to compromise Spain in the opinion of London 
was given, and Spain tried to be discreet in those measures 
1. Yela, 11, pp.49-64; Doniol, 11, pp. 218-25. 
2. Benlis, pp. 45-55.; Yela I, pp.70-2. Grantham 
sUbgested in August 17;6 that Spain might follow 
~ortugal's example (her edict of 5 July 1776), 
but Spain showed no desire to discuss the matter 
(Grantham to Weymouth, 19 August 1776, no.41, S.P. 
94/201). 
3. Gtormont to ~eymouth, 31 July 1776, no. 57, 
s.p. 78/299. 
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tbat miGLt 3eew ~o ~oint otberwise; as exemplified in her 
attitude reg8rdiLg british general proposals for SOilie kind 
of agreement to disarm, and the attempt 01 one of the 
American cOlllrnissior.ers in ro1'is to eo to 0pain to deal 
directly Viii th the 0panish govel'nmeYJt. 
FollowinL Britain's decision at the end of 1776 to 
bring thirty-six ships of the line into commission at home, 
the Bourbon powers expressed their concern. The English, 
wbile reassuring Spain that their armament had been 
prompted by French naval preparations and was in no way 
meant to encourage Portugal in her dispute with her neigh-
bour, sUGgested that France and Britain might come to an 
agreement on disarmament. Neither Masserano, who was the 
recipient of this sUGgestion, nor Grimaldi, thought it 
practicable; it was, however, transmitted to France, who 
would not hear of it. Grimaldi was glad to let it appear 
that it was F'rance who had opposed it, much to Vergennes' 
annoyance. As for his part, Grantham was led to believe, 
the Spanish minister would like to induce such explanations 
as would restore confidence between Britain and the Bourbon 
powers.l 
1. Masserano's reports, January-February 1777, in A.G.S., 
~stado, legO 6996 (cp. Donio1,II,pp.146-56,201-10,230-
5,331-3). Weymouth to Grantham,17 January 1777, no.l, and 
Grantham to Weymcuth,lO iebruary 1777,no.6(S.P.94/203). 
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Later on, in Iv1arch, the Americans tried to commit 
~pain to a policy of support. Gne of their commissioners 
in Paris, Lee, wa~ sent to Spain to deal cirectly with the 
Spanish government. Grimaldi, on his way to ~ome, managed 
to turn him back in Burgos, explaining that since France 
and 6pain were acting in complete agreement there was no 
need to proceed to Madrid; Lee should be able to carry out 
his mission in faris with the French government and Aranda. l 
This was, in fact, Grimaldi's last intervention. 
Weary of the office and under heavy criticism for the 
Algiers fiasco and his conduct of the Portuguese negotiations, 
Grimaldi had for the last few months been requesting Carlos 
III to allow him to resign and to retire to Italy. Early 
in November 1776 Carlos III accepted his resignation, as 
well as his counsel to appoint Jose Monino, Count of Florida-
blanca, as his successor. Grimaldi remained in fvladrid 
until the arrival of Floridablanca on 18 February 1777 from 
Rome, where he had successfully represented Spain since 
1773 to be succeeded now by Grimaldi himself. 2 
1. For this incident Ye1a, I, pp. 161-80. 
2. Above, p.!', n. ~. 
7. Floridablanca in charge of the ~ortuBuese negotiation: 
the treaties of 1777 and 1778. 
While Floridablanca pursued broadly the same aims as 
Grimaldi he was more positive in laying long term plans 
to profit from the American insurrection. The broad front 
of Spain's foreign policy at the time consisted in press-
ing forward for a quick and satisfactory settlement of the 
Portuguese question, taking care not to arouse Britain 
while force was used against Portugal and avoiding France's 
interference, and in the meantime keeping the insurrection 
going by secret means in the hope of making full use of 
the possibilities posed by Britain's colonial struggle. l 
Like Grirnaldi, he was alive to the dangers of a powerful 
nation growing on the northern border of Spain's American 
possessions. From the Spanish point of view, it was 
preferable to wear them both down; and then, through a 
Franco-Spanish, or solely Spanish, mediation to get them 
to make peace on the basis of a truce which would bring 
something short of independence for the colonies and leave 
1. For Floridablanca's attitude regarding British 
proposals for limitation of armaments, see his 
instructions to ~asserano of March 5th, April 7th, 
and hay 18th (A.G.S.,Estado,legO 6996), and June 3rd, 
1777 (legO 6997). Cp.Bemis,p.20, note 11, for 
~erBennes' opposition to any such agreement. For 
F10ridablanca
'
s intention to avoid French interference 
in the Forguguese question see his instruction to Aranda 
of Narch 5th, no.4, in A.H.N.,Estado,legO 4072(1). 
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theu; and the mother country still hostile to each other. 
In return for her mediation Spain might obtain Gibraltar 
or f'linorca, or might regain what she had lost in the 1763 
treaty.l As to Portugal, the situation was now 
ripe. In view of nritain's apparent disregard for the 
Fortuguese case, the Cevallos expedition, which was feared 
by the Brazilian authorities,2 would be all the more 
pressing upon Lisbon. Furthermore, Jose I died on February 
24th, and on LVlarch 4th the first act of government of his 
daughter and heir, Maria I, was to remove Pombal, the main 
obstacle to an understanding between the two peninsular 
countries. 
Twenty days later, the new Queen wrote to her uncle, 
Carlos Ill, that the negotiations between their two 
countries could now be resumed and brought to conclusion. 
'llhrough her mother, the Queen Dowager, she advanced pro-
posals for hostilities in Buenos Aires to cease, and 
suegested a political and commercial convention on hay 'rd.' 
1. Yela, 11, pp.182-5, 189-93; Doniol, 11, pp.297-301. 
2. Alden, H.A.H.R., 41 (1961), pp.70-2. 
3· Naria I to Carlos Ill, 24 March 1777; Mariana 
Vitoria to Carlos Ill, April 12th and May ,rd; 
A.G.S., Estado, legO 7421. 
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~he speed of this move seems to indicate a desire to 
halt action by Cevallos. In his reply to his sister on 
May 16th, Carlos III stressed that, however conciliatory 
Spain was prepared to be, Portugal should bear in mind that 
she -had provoked her neighbour who was entitled to satis-
faction. Carlos III also urged prompt and specific 
instructions to be sent to Souza, and great secrecy to be 
kept in their dealings. l The Spanish minister stressed to 
his representative in Paris, Aranda, that Spain was now in 
a good position to adjust the question of boundaries, and 
to obtain commercial advantages and some kind of political 
understanding with Portugal, as long as no third power was 
given an opportunity to strengthen Portugal's position or 
to weaken Spain's.2 
The armistice in America solicited by Portugal was 
si~ned in Aranjuez on June 10th and instructions to cease 
hostilities were dispatched on the following day, while 
the Portuguese foreign minister, Ayres de Sa, agreed to 
conduct negotiations in Madrid through Souza as suggested 
1. A.G.S., Estado, legO 7421 (part17 printed in C.B.,III, 
pp.475-6); see also Carlos Ill's letters to Maria I of 
April 4th, and to Mariana Vitoria of April 24th. _ 
2. Floridablanca to Aranda, 11 June 1777, nos 1 and 2, 
A.H.N., Estado, 1egO 4072(1), and 19 July, no.l1, 
legO 4072(2). 
487 
by Carlos Ill, promising to observe the secrecy en~6ined.l 
By the time of the signature Floridablanca had already 
been apprised that Santa Catarina Island had fallen to 
Cevallos on February 20th. In fact, on June 6th, he 
~~commended discretion to the Spanish representative in 
Lisbon. 2 Portuguese fears that Spain would want to keep 
the island were, all the same, aroused: the loss of this 
island would threaten the te~ritoriai contiguity of Brazil 
and leave the whole area of Rio Grande do SuI and Santa 
Catarina in a very difficult position. Maria Vitoria 
accused her brother of double-dealing. 3 Carlos III for 
his part hurried to give assurances that he would retain 
the island only as a means to secure Portugal's acquies-
4 
cence. 
1. The French representative in Lisbon, Blosset, and 
his ~nglish counterpart, Walpole, had in fact been 
given evasive answers to their attempts to interfere. S' to Souza, 27 May 17?7(A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7417); 
Floridablanca to Almodovar, June 11th, and the latter's 
report of June 15th(legO 7312); cp.Add.24163, ff.163-4. 
See also C.B.,III, pp. 477-8. 
2. A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7312. The Portuguese were not 
apprised~ the events in America until June 19th, 
according to Almodovar's report of the 24th(legO 7312). 
3. In a letter of 29 June (A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7421). 
4. Carlos III to Mariana Vitoria, 10 July 1777; C.B.,III, 
pp. 476-7. 
While the bases for a boundary settlement with 
Portugal were prepared, Floridablanca had to turn his 
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attention to France where Vergennes had returned to the 
plan of weaning Portugal away from her British connection. 
. . 
In fact, the French minister was advising Spain to com-
promise on the subject of territorial claims, and hoped to 
participate in the Portuguese settlement in order to get 
it 6ecided speedily in a way which suited his war policy. 
Vergennes would be satisfied if Portugal was persuaded to 
maintain a neutral position by giving to France equal 
facilities as were given to British ships and goods. 
Vergennes was now in favour of all out war with 
Britain, following American offers in the spring to 
secure an alliance with the Bourbon powers. Since Louis 
XV gave his consent to war on 23 July 1777 only on con-
dition that Spain agreed, Vergennes had to persuade 
Floridablanca that the time had come to act openly in 
support of the Americans and that the Porguguese issue 
had to be arranged accordingly. Reports from Madrid 
referred to Floridablanca's reserve towards France on the 
subject of Portugal and his inclination to believe that 
Britain had no wish to antagonize the Bourbon powers. 
To overcome this disposition, Vergennes reverted to the 
danger of a British attack in American waters and alleged 
that.the English government was hostile to Cevallos' 
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victories as goinG beyond Grimaldi's assurances that the 
expedition was not intended to make new acquisitions. The 
American commissioners in Paris for their part quite un-
realistically offered Spain to help her conquer Portugal. l 
But Floridablance, secure in his knowledge that 
Britain was prepared to 1.et Spain free to tackle lortugal 
in return for her forbearance in respect of the war against 
the insurgent colonies, was unwilling to fall in with 
Vergennes' plans. 2 Only France's presence in the negot-
iations between Spain and Portugal would stir Britain. 
Accordingly he tried to moderate France's apparent dis-
position to throw in her lot with the Americans in the 
next winter. Indeed, his assurances to Grantham that Spain 
was minded to keep France at bay, were accepted by the 
English as clear proof of the Spanish minister's pacific 
1. Yela, II, pp.122-9; Doniol, II, pp.434-7~, 508-9 and 605; 
Vergennes also expected a favo~rable settlement of the 
boundary dispute in Guiana from his intervention in the 
Hispano-Portuguese negotiations. For the American offer 
to help conquer Portugal see Bemis, p.52, note 24. 
2. See Masserano's reports of June 1777 (A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 
6997) for British lack of concern when it became known in 
London that Santa Catarina had been taken. For Spanish 
reports from Paris of Vergennes'intentions regarding 
Portugal, see Aranda to Fl~ridablanca, 22 June 1777, no. 
1056 (A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7417); cp. Baredia (Aranda 8 
secretary) to the minister of Justice, Roda, 21 June 1777 
(Gracia y Justicia, le gO 778). 
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leaninGs, and of his intention to reach a fair settlement 
with the Portuguese without French interference. l 
Floridablanca was still anxious to settle the 
Portuguese question as soon as possible in order to be in 
a better positiop to profit by Britain's coloni~l diffi-
cuI ties. II'herefore, on August 8th, 1777 (the same day 
that he sent Vergennes his pacific reaction on the latter's 
war proposal) Floridablanca instructed Almodovar.to 
negotiate a preliminary treaty on the American boundaries 
with secret provisions for a definitive one of territorial 
limits, alliance and commerce. A draft of the treaty was 
given to Souza, who was intimated that Carlos III demanded 
a response to his offer of renouncing the island of Santa 
Catarina in the interests of a fair and speedy settlement. 
Having had no reply from Lisbon for a month, the Spanish 
minister threatened that Carlos III was prepared to wait 
no longer. 2 
1. Weymouth-Grantham correspondence from May to August 1777 
(S.P. 94/203-204 passim); cp.Bemis, pp.56-7. See also 
~alpol~'s reports from Lisbon in the summer of 1777 
(S.P. 89/84 passim). 
2. ATImodovar to Floridablanca, 17 August 1777,A.H.N., 
Estado,legO 2458;Floridablanca to Ayres de Sa,September 
10th, and to Almodovar,September19th(A.G.S.,Estado,leSO 
7L~17). I have not been able to :find the Spanish projected 
articles for the treaty,nor indeed the Portuguese re-
action(enclosed in Sa's letter to Souza of September 17th, 
of which copy in A.G.S. Estado,legO 7419). There is a 
legajo(Estado,legO 7320~in Simancas which very probably 
contains these documents;unfortunate1y it has been mis-
laid. I have therefore assumed that the final draft was 
more or less what Floridablanca proposed now, except for 
one or two points. 
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'l'he lirni ts proposed by })'loridablanca were in part 
consistent with Cevallos' achievement. After taking ~anta 
Catarina Island, 0evallos had been uiverted from Rio Grande 
de Sao Fedro by an unseasonably early storm. He then 
turned hi.$ efforts to Sacramento, which fell to him on 
June 4th, and proceeded to demolish the citadel and to 
block the harbour as instructed. The signing of the arm-
istice in the peninsula, news of which reached Cevallos 
on August lOth,l prevented him from making another 
attempt against Rio Grande, which therefore remained in 
Brazilian hands. 2 
}'loridablanca sugt,ested that Sacramento should 
return to ;Spain and Hio Grande de Sao Fedro should stay 
with Portugal. ~he sacrifice of the island of oanta 
Catarina was said to be motivated by the failure to take 
Rio Grande, for the former would have been too vulnerable 
a target in wartime without the latter. But it would 
appear from the criticism levelled against this decision 
1. C.B., Ill, p. 478. 
2. A1den, B.A.H.R., 41 (1961), pp. 72-,.· News of 
the fall of Sacramento reached Europe at the 
beginning of September. 
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that ~loridablanca's main consideration was to facilitate 
a settlement. l In return for ~anta Catarina Island Portu-
gal was asked to Give up the seven missions to the east of 
the Uruguay river and to be excluded from the Plate and 
.. 
Uruguay basins behind a line from the southern end of 
Lag'Oa f'-.irim (Chuy) to the Hi ver Pepiriguazu where it dis-
charges i~waters into the Uruguay. Beyond this point 
the demarcation line was renewed as defined in the boundary 
treaty of 1750. 
~his preliminary treaty of limits went beyond America. 
PO~T"'i.a," 
ii) • i 11 engaged to renounce all claims to the Philippine and 
Molucca Islands derived from the treaty of Tordesillas of 
like. ~ll1o 
1494 and the Act of Sale of Zaragoza of 1529, and "Fun *"1 1 
agreed to transfer to Spain Annobon and Fernando Poo in 
the Gulf of Guinea to give her direct access to the slave 
trade. 
Floridablanca further sent to the Portuguese govern-
ment several separate and secret articles connected with 
the d.fensive treaty. They contained a mutual and 
1. See Egerton 373, ff.2-37, for a virulent attack on 
Floridablanca's account of the treaty with Portugal 
in his memorial to Carlos III on 10 October 1~88 
(B.A.E., vol. 59, p.308). Floridablanca alleged 
that it was Cevallos who had advised to sacrifice 
the island; but his criti~maintained that Ceva110s 
had always been in favour of keeping it. 
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reciprocal gu~raotee of possessiuns and frontiers in the 
South AIl;erican conti:1ent, ana a Hiutual urJl.ertakinB not to 
support in any way each other's enemies in warlike oper-
ations. In case one of the two signatories should be 
enbBcea in war, the other should observe strict neutrality. 
In peacetime, the treaty would also include a mutual under-
taking not to give aie to foreign ships, friends or 
neu traL3, or admit them into AIrierican ports if .known to 
be eugaged iu cOlltraband trade with the other. 
'.I.'he new boulldar;y line was substantially that of the 
boun6.ary treaty of 1750, which had confirmed Portugal's 
extensive territorial claims in Amazonia and in the Banda 
0riental, except for the seven Indian villages to the 
east of the Uruguay river. ~ombal's consistent efforts 
to reach forward to the northern border of the Rio de la 
Plata were therefore thwarted; but so was Spain's desire 
to expand as far north as Banta Catarina. Eventually, 
in 1801, a successful Iortuguese campaign to retake the 
seven missions restored the situation to what it was 
when lombal rose to power in 1750.1 
The compromise thus reached was the result of their 
mutual realization that no benefit to either count~y was 
1. Alden, H.A.H.R._, 41 (1961), p. 74, note 76. 
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oerived from their endless squabbles in the American area. 
Furthere,ore, a permanent settlement in the South American 
continent need not alter their European connections. 
InCieed, Spain herself WaS unwilling to enter into a defen-
sive alliance with Portugal for fear that the defence of 
oer colonies might become the responsibility of her already 
strained I'esources. 1 'llhe terms pr9posed by ]'loridablanca 
point to Spain's ~esi~e to stabilize the situation in 
America; cooperation between them would guard their 
possessions from comrllercial competition or territorial 
ambitions of others. lortugal was also alive to this need. 
Britain had expressed in the past some desire to gain a 
foothold in the River Plate; she would become a dangerous 
r·· 
neighbour. c 
But Portugal was anxious not to offend Britain because 
of her need for her naval support in Europe. For this 
reason 30uza was ordered to introduce a clause in article 2 
1. Cp. "Instruccion Reservada", para. 376 (B.A.E., vol.59). 
2. There is a paper in A.G.B., Estado, legO 6963, undated 
and unsigned (probably from Pinto~ the Portuguese 
representative in London, in 1780) in which on the 
occasion of some talk of a British attack on Buenos 
Aires it is argued that Britain ought to be kept ,from 
South America. Cp. Saint-Priest, p.260, for Portuguese 
opposition to a similar project by Cathcart in 1740. 
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of the separat8 aDO secret ones to safeeuard previous 
enbasements with Dritain. un 0eptember 22nd, 1777, Florida-
blanca a~reed to this tbough he asked in return for a 
mutual ~isclosure of a~y Becret articles or treaties in 
conflict with their present stipulations, and presse~ for 
a speedy sibnature of the prelimina.ry treaty of lim,its in 
terms not far short of an ultimatum. l 
the Prelill!inary 'l:reaty of Limits and its Separate 
Articles were sisned in Madrid on October Ist,2 Florida-
blanca insistinb that the secret articles should be kept 
from ~ritain and Mrance lest these powers might put 
obstacles in the path of the definitive treaty. The 
Preliminary 'l'rcaty was to be published once it was 
ratified. 3 
1. Floridablanca to Souza, 23 tieptember 1777, and to 
Almodovar, 23 and 26 September, A.G.S., Estado, 1egO 
7419. Carlos III to hariana Vit6ria, September 
26th, legO 7421. 
2. The .spanish and i'ortuguese texts are given in 
Calvo, Ill, pp. 130-67, and Ferreira, Ill, pp. 
230-67, respectively. 
,. Floridablanca to A1modovar, 1 October 1777, 
and to Aranda, October 23rd, A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 7314. 
In effect, V~rgennes was already pressing to be 
included in ~pain's political exchanges with Portugal. 
Availin6 himself of 3&'8 su~gestion to ~losset that a 
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defensive alliance between the .dourbon powers and Portu-
gal need not be more difficult than the present pacifi-
cation between bpain and Portugal as long as it did not 
conflict with her mercantile and political engagements 
with Britain, Vergennes instructed his representative in 
hadrid on Gctober 17th to put it to Floridablanca that 
:B'rance wished to pursue that suggestion. By virtue of 
the ]'amily Compact, Vergennes argued, lfrance was implicitly 
included in any reciprocal guarantee that Spain may have 
contracted with Portugal. l Vergennes suspected that some-
tbinb of a political nature had been signed in addition to 
the preliminary boundary treaty. 
Floridablanca agreed with Vergennes in principle but, 
reluctant to let France's own proposals endanger Spain's 
political unGerstanding with Portugal, rejoined that 
France's premature involvement might scare Lisbon off on 
account of Britain's probable opposition to a tripartite 
arrangement. 2 
------------------------_._--------
1. Doniol,II,pp.604-6 (A copy of these instructions was sub-
mitted to Floridablanca;A.G.S. ,Estado,.legO 741l,doc.26). 
Vergennes may have also been encouraged to pursue this 
suggestion by }ortugal's willinsness to come to a mutual 
agreement on the subject of the right af escheat, which 
was abrogated in both countries on 21 April 1778; 
Ferreira, Ill, pp. 292-9. 
2. Donial, 11, pp. 606-8. 
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Vergennes' allusion to a secret guarantee was inter-
preteci. by the upanish minister as conclusive evidence 
thut Portugal had informed .b'radce of the secret articles 
and was therefore willing to admit the French into the 
talks. Not an entIrely unplausible conclusion consider-
inb that Ayres de ...)a, though denying FloridablaL1ca' s 
veiled allegations, continued to express some willingness 
to discuss France's participation. Unlike most of his 
colleagues Ayres de Sa was not pro-Bnglish. 
Un November 2nd, 1777, Yloridablanca sent detailed 
instructions to his representative in Lisbon, Almodovar, 
to prevent France's accession to the negotiations before 
they were completed. Ayres de Sa was reminded that 
Spain had requested secrecy; no formal complaint was made, 
however, lest the Portuguese should take it amiss. If 
they decided to admit France to the negotiations, Florida-
blanca proposed that Portugal could either negotiate with 
:E'rance separately or include her in the main hispano-
~ortuguese negotiation. Spain herself preferred to 
in vi te ]'rance to accede later, when she and Portugal had 
signed their definitive treaty. Floridablanca cautioned 
Almodovar to express this preference in a guarded manner 
for it was important not to give the Portuguese a handle 
to strengthen their negotiating position with the threat 
of French intervention. Floridablanca stooped to the 
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deceit of insiLluatLlg that l!'rance was also in favour of 
acceding later. he was now in earnest to get the matter 
of the alliance settled. In fact, he invited Portugal 
1 to suggest the terms. 
Portugal for her part was not anxious to become 
committed to the Dourbon powers as a group or to annoy 
Spain in view of the critical situatioll in Franco-British 
relu.tions. :E'or this reaSOll it waS sUt:)gested that there 
would be no specific reference to ,E'rance as prospective 
accessory, but onlJ a general provision for the accession 
in the future of other powers. Availing himself of 
Floridablanca's lax attitude as to the terms of the 
alliance, Ayres de Ba proposed simply strict neutrality 
if one of the signatories was involved in war and a 
mutual guarantee of their possessions in Europe and in 
South America where they confine with each other. 2 
As to Vergennes, he soon let the matter drop for he 
was not in a position to exert pressure on Spain. On 
December 17th he had prornised to the American commissioners 
1. Corres,bJondence between :&'loridablanca and Sa in November 
1777, in A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7411, documents nos 25,27, 
3l-j3. 
2. Floridablanca's minute of the state of the negotiation 
with Portugal, 25 January 1778; A.G.S.,Estado,1egO 
7411, no.37. 
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recognition of the Lnited utates and a treaty of alliance, 
and be was now hoping to persuade upain to join France in 
such an alliance. l 
~hus unhindered, ~pain aud ~ortugal signed a defin-
itive treaty or limits, friendship, alliance and commerce 
on 24 hurch 1778. 2 ~he treaty, also called a treaty of 
neutrality, contained., first of all, a mutual uncertaking 
not to support in any way each other's enemies in warlike 
operations and to keep each other informed of any other 
treaty or engagement in conflict with their present 
stipulations (art. 2). They further engaged themselves 
to guarantee mutually their possessions and adjacent 
islands in Europe. In respect of South America the mutual 
guarantee included their possessions and islands, and 
their frontiers as established in the preliminary treaty 
of uctober 1st, 1777; as well as the Atlantic coast from 
the Orinoco river to the f/;,agellan Btrai t. II'he two signa-
tories also agreed to help each other against any attack 
1. Floridablanca's minute of a talk with ~ontmorin (Ossun's 
successor since November 1777)on January 16th,1778, A.G.S. 
~stado,1egO 741l,no.36;cp. Donio1,II,pp.608-9,and Bemis, 
p.60. For Vergennes' dissatisfaction over the Portuguese 
negotiations,see Aranda to ~'1oridab1anca,7 Narch'1778, 
A.G.b.,Estado, Libro 179. 
2. The Spanish and f'orguguese texts of the treaty are given 
in Canti110,pp.547-52, and Ferre1ra,III,pp.268-91, 
respectively. 
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or invasion (this cl&use was, in fact, article 25 of the 
1750 treaty). ~n case one of them shoula become involved 
in war outsi~e the scope of-the wutual guarantee, the other 
woulu n&ve to observe the most strict aDQ scrupulo~s neutral-
ity. Finally, previous treaties with third powers were 
specifically safeguarded (articles 3 and 4). 
As regards COIl:IllerCe, Spain was Branted the same 
position as Britain in 1667 an~ provisions were made to re-
examine the tariffs and customs duties of the 1668 treaty, 
whicb regulated tr~de between the two countries (articles 
7-12). It was also stipulated that neither partner would 
allow into American ports foreign ships aiming to trade 
with the other power (art. 5). 
Floridablanca seemed elated by the conclusion of the 
1 treaty. Apart from the benefits derived from a friendly 
understanding in South America, it was hoped that Britain's 
maritime opportunities in the southern Atlantic might be 
reduced and British warships might even be excluded from 
1. See his letters to Aranda of 24 ~~ch 1778, 
in A.G.S., Estado, Libro 179. 
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I Portuguese ports in time 01 w~r. Without port facilities 
in fortuguese ~jerie&n w&ters in time of war or peace, the 
ran~e of the ~nGlish navy in Spanish America would become 
considerably sillaller and so would British cOlilmercial in-
filtration. ~his in turn would lessen Spain's dependence 
upon }t'ranee for support; she should now be able to face 
\ 
the opportunities posed by the American revolt more 
confidently. 
However, the new situation was not as advantageous 
as }'loridablanca would have liked to believe. He himself 
had admitted as much in conversation with Montworin in 
January. In effect, we have already noted how Spain 
limited her objectives for the sake of a settlement with 
Portugal. ~rance would not allow Spain to conquer Portu-
gal, Floridablanca said to Montmorin; it was therefore 
preferable to join her in the hope of obtaining, at least, 
her neutrality in case of war with Britain. 2 Reports from 
1. 'fhe English representative in Madrid in 1783, Liston, 
admitted that this stipulation was clearly imp1ie~in 
art.2 of the 1778 treaty (his re~ort no.5 to Fox of ~l 
September 1783, F.O. 72/1, f.649). . 
2. Ninute of l!'loridablanca-Montmorin talk on 16 January 
l778;A.G.3.,Estado,legO 74ll,no.36. Spain still nursed 
dynastic claims to Portugal and successive marriages 
were arranged in l785(Ferreira,III,pp.324-347,362-409) 
to promote an eventual reunification of the two countries; 
but death shattered the hopes for this outcome, which was 
otherwise unlikely to be to~rated by Britain and France; 
see B.A.E., vo. 59, IIInstruccion Reservada ll ,paragraphs 163, 
375 and 378. 
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Lisbon were also diffident; the position of british trade 
made it difficult for the Spaniards to obtain the commercial 
advantages, e.g. opening of Fortuguese markets to Spanish 
goods through the reduction of import duties; on the 
political level Fern'n ~~~ez, Almod6var's successor in 
Lisbon since September 1778, expressed his belief that 
Portugal woulo. lean towards JJritain if she had to decide 
in a war between that country and Spain. ~he }ortuguese 
ministry, includinG the chief minister marquis of Angeja, 
was on the whole pro-~nhlish, Fern&n N~~ez reported, with 
the exception of the foreign minister, Ayres de Sa, who 
was more independent in his policies. l The Spanish hoped 
to counteract English influence in Lisbon through their 
friendly relations with the Portuguese Queen and her 
2 
confessor. 
1.26 Fe?ruary 1779, A.G.S., Estado, legO 7322 (cp. 
Almodovar's dispatch of 28 September 1777, legO 7417~and 
Floridablanca to Souza, 30 September 1777, 1egO 7323). 
'J.lhe instructions of Carlos Jose Gutie:r;rez de 10s Rios, 
count of Fern&n N~nez, of 21 September 1778, A.G.S., 
Estado,le~O 7317; his credentials in A.H.N., Estado, 
legO 3421(2). 
2. ~ernan N6!ez's instructions, see note above. Cp. 
Hillsborough to Walpole, 9 December 1780, secret and 
confidential (S.P. 89/87), for reports that Spain ~ay 
be trying to bribe the Portuguese tilueen's confessor. 
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}ortugal had her own reasons for welcoming the treaty 
with opaiu, since her neutrality in the impending maritime 
conflict between Britain and France, and probably l.:)pain, 
was thus relatively secure. ~he memory of the Seven Years 
~var reminded her of the danger of becoming a pawn in the 
Anblo-Bourbon conflict. ~he Portuguese did not mean to be 
ranged on the side of the Bourbon powers, but rather to 
ward off Spanish territorial pretensions and the French 
conception of a war of diversion in Portugal. 
Indeed, the British were not alarmed by either the 
commercial or the political clauses of the Hispano-
Portuguese treaty, of which copies were sent to London by 
Sa with assurances of the Portuguese intentions to honour 
their engagements with Britain. Portugal was seen to have 
weakened her dependence upon Britain a little, but art. 4 
of the treaty safeguarded their previous arrangements; 
there was no stipulation in the treaty, concluded Walpole, 
that miBbt prevent britain from calling on her ally of 
1703 if Spain decided to wage war on her. l 
1. walpole to v~eymouth, April 13th, no.12, and Nay 5th, 
no. 14, 1778, S.P. 89/85; Grantham to Weymouth, 19 
April 1778, no. 25, Add. 24176, ff. 76-7. 
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8. Lispano-Iortuguese relations during the American war 
of l.ndependence. 
i.l.'he value of the treatJr of 1778 can be assessed once 
.spain haC. entered the American war of Independence. (;n 
6 February l77b, Vergennes had signed a treaty of defensive 
alliance with the American commissioners. Although hostil-
ities between Britain and France did not begin for a few 
months, this meant war. France's precipitate action in 
joining the Americans ~itbout waiting for Spain's concurr-
ence gave Floridablanca a welcome pretext to remain outside 
the war while exploring the possibilities of attaining some 
of ~pain's objectives from ~ritain, first, through peaceful 
means and failing these, through full participation in the 
war. 
bpain had no desire to be rushed into war. In the 
first place, she was reluctant to encourage rebellion in 
the American Uontinent, which might easily spread to her 
own restless dominions. In the second place, Spain with 
her vast overseas possessions had far more to risk than 
]'rance. At that moment she also bad such hostages on the 
seas as Cevallos' expeditionary force on its way bac~ from 
the Hiver Plate and the annual treasure fleet. l 
1. Bemis, pp. 61-7. 
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~~en cipain was apprised of the French formal notifi-
cation to Dritain on 13 harcb of the treaty with the 
Americans, she hinted to :France that a casus foederis 
would not arise for there had been no previous consultation. l 
'i'o Grantham, who approached Floriuablanca on the subj ect, 
the cipanish minister gave specific assurances that Spain 
had h&d no part in France's decision and therefore was not 
~ 
bound by the Family Compact.~ ~his, Floridablanca warned 
his representative in London on the very day of the signa-
ture of the treaty with lortugal, was not to be taken as 
a denunciation of their alliance and friendship with France, 
but simply as a refusal to join her in an act of such 
consequence because she had not secured Carlos Ill's prior 
consent. Indeed, Floridablanca insinuated, Spain's future 
policies would depend on Britain's attitude; there was in 
his instruction to ~scarano a guarded invitation to 
Britain to give Spain such advanta5es as might induce her 
to continue these policies.' 
1. Yela,I,pp.329-30 (Cp.pp.269-304 and II,pp.l88-l95). 
2. Grantham to Weymouth,24 lViarch l778,no.l4, and his "most 
secret" dispatch of the same date; S.P. 94/205. 
3. Floridablanca to Escarano,24 March 1778; A.G.S., Estado, 
legO 7000. Cp. Yela,I,pp.338-69, for Floridablanca's 
steps to neutralize Aranda' s bellicose attitude in Paris'. 
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weYhuutD 8..ccepte(;. }'loridablanca I s assurances but 
su~geste6 tbat he shoul~ cive proof of hi~ pacific pro-
testations by disarming the Gadiz fleet. He also asked 
that Floridablanca would speak out on the advantages 
Spain expected to gain from ber neutrality.l 
Floridablanca was prepared to sell Spanish neutrality 
and good offices as mediator for Gibraltar and possible 
~inorca - Spain would give 0ran and hers-el-Kebir in 
return; other compensations envisaged were Florida, and 
British withci.rawal from lionduras Bay aud the hosquito Shore. 2 
But britain, overconfident that she could beat the Family 
Compact as she had done in the Seven Years War, failed to 
offer tQe specific positive bribes expected in Spain. 
Gibraltar was the least acceptable of the Spanish suggest-
ions. 'llhere were some members of the English government 
(Hillsborough, ~orth, and Stormont, who was to become 
secretary of state for the North in October 1779) who would 
seem to have been prepared to discuss Gibraltar. 3 The 
1. Weymouth to Grantham,8 April 1778,no.6 (cp.also his 
confidential instruction of the same date);~.P. 94/205. 
See Yela,I,pp.346-7, for Escarano's account of his own 
interview with Weymoutw. 
2. Floridablanca's instructions to J~lmod~var of 30 May 1778 
on his appointment to London to negotiate the mediation; 
A.H.N.,Estado,legO 3456(1). Almodovar arrived in London 
on July l3th(Escarano to Floridablanca,14 July 1778, 
no. 201, A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7001). 
3. Mackesy, pp.3l5-5,37l-2. See also Vo1tes,pp.199-207. 
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~nblish 8li,bassauor in i';[lCrlC, Grantharr" kept on reminding 
his principal until the eve of the Ang16-Spanish .t', in 
June 1779 that Spain may have been persuaded to remain 
neutral, for she was averse to American independence. l 
In Augu;:;t, 1778, he sucgested that SOUle relaxation of 
British behaviour retarding Spanish shippin5 hlight inauce 
Spain to give a more specific declaration of neutrality 
which would be a safeguard against the two countries 
driftinb into war. 2, Grantham was, in fact, suggesting 
that Britain ought to maintain, at least, a pretence of 
talks on the subject of Spain's expectations. But to no 
avail. 
George III was quite opposed; likewise he was against 
:b'loridablanca's proposal that the American colonies be 
recognized as independent de facto during the peace 
negotiations which he hoped to bring about through his 
mediation. The then secretary of state~r the south, 
'w'eyrnouth, . whose hostile 'attitude towards Spain we have 
1. 3ee, for instance, his dispatch, one of the 
last from Spain, in this vein of 27 ~ay 1779. 
no. 29 (S.P. 94/208). 
2. s.P. 94/206; see his "most confidential" dispatches 
of August 7th, 1778, cp. Weymouth to Grantham, 25 
August 1778, no.18, S.P. 94/206, and to Wa1po1e, 
13 October, no.14, S.P. 89/85. 
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seen durin£. tbe first months 01' the :Falkland Islands cr'isis, 
\vas ;;150 agaillst any kL}(i of compromise and thought that 
Spanish neutrality coulG be bought with fair words only. 
Furtherbore, pU01ic opinion was behind the more militant 
elements in the governilient. 
~he browing awareness teat britain was not forthcoming 
maCe Floridablanca turn to FraDce once more. But he kept 
the door open to ~ritain, for it was hoped that France 
miGht be frigLtened into promising to secure all Spanish 
desiderata an~ to accept Spanish strategy in the war. 
Floridablanca's hand was considerably strengthened when 
Vergennes, after the indecisive battle of Ushant (27 
July 1778), realized that Spanish naval aid was essential 
to defeat Britain. 'llhe li'rencb minister now became a more 
eager suppliant for Spain's help and Floridablanca was 
able to force the ob'rench minister to accept Spa.in' s every 
objective in the ]'ranco-cipanish Convention of Aranjuez of 
April 12th, 1779; Gibraltar, the river a.nd fort of hobile, 
iensacola and Florida, British withdrawal from Honduras 
anL. Losquite ,shore, and fv1inorca. As to the strategy of 
the war, Vergennes was made to agree on a descent on 
England rather than a diversionary attack on Ireland .as 
he himself proposed. He also agreed to continue fighting 
until Gibraltar was conquered. Spain entered the war on 
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1 June 21st .J.'ne iiillilediate cause of their decision, the 
Spa~ish alleb8u, was the high-handed treatment meted out 
to ~panis b. s hips by Bri tis n commano.ers aLle. ad.miral ty courts. 2 
In t his war, }'loridablanca wrote in 1788, the benefits 
derived froD the Portuguese friendship were remarkable. 
~ritain had been thwarted in her projected expedition 
against the hiver flate by tte protests of Portugal; Spain 
had been able to elude English privateers by bringing 
American treasure in Portuguese ships; and :Portugal had 
beeu prevailed on not to harbour English ships, thus de-
priving them of a base from which to prey upon shipping from 
;Spanish America. 3 
1. Patterson,pp.39-54;P.Voltes,"Irlanda en la estrategia 
franco-espauola de 1779", Boletin de la Real Academia 
de la historia,143(l958),pp.21=42. Cp.Bemis,pp.77-87. 
Gibraltar was not conquered, but its danger together 
wi th the fear of a ]'ranco-Spanish invasion of England 
(it did not materialize), contributed to draw British 
navy's strength into the defensive which in turn caused 
Britain to lose the initiative in American waters to the 
advantage-of the Bourbon powers (Machesy, pp.5l2-t). 
2 •. ~here is a summary of all the cases (27) laid before the 
En~lish from January 1777 to May 1??9(S.P.98/208,ff.567.-
74);there is also a list of Spanish ships or goods (11) 
proceeded against in the High Court of the Admiralty (ff. 
253-9). Grantham reports Floridablanca as saying that the 
number of prizes taken by the English in the West Indies 
amounted to a hundred (17 May 1779,00.25). Cp.F~Vpltes, 
"Los incidentes maritimos hispano-britanicos como ante-
cedentes de la guerra con Ioglaterra de 1779-1783", 
lievista General de Narina, l52(1957),pp.264-76. 
;. IIHemorial",p.,08, and "Instruccion Reservada",para.377 
(B.A.E., vo159). 
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Such a favourable view of Fortugal's conduct during 
the war was however due to Floridablanca's motive; he 
was writing an account of his administration to Carlos III 
in answer to criticism levelled against his policies. The 
real situation was somewhat different. Portugal's conduct 
shows some determination to make use of the war for the 
purpose of curbing British political and commercial domin-
ance in her own interest. But this policy also helped 
Jpain, which lends some weight to Floridablanca's inter-
pretation. 
In this respect Portugal's opposition to British 
plan~ to operate iL America, whether bpanish or Portuguese, 
benefitted ~pain.l ~he more so since Portugal, having 
undertaken to guarantee Spanish American possessions, 
mi§;ht become involved in the war to protect them. How-
ever, Floridablanca was incorrect in giving Portugal's 
protests as the main reason for Britain's decision not 
to go ahead .with a project for an expeditionary force 
against Buenos Aires. This project was dropped when the 
rupture with the Dutch Republic (December 1780) compelled 
the English to divert the expeditionary force, which was 
ready to sail to South America, to seize and keep the 
1. See above p. ~q~, note~. 
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Ccpe 01 \Jooe. ~,ope which WC;l.S Dutch aLlG. consti tuteci with 
Ceylo ... , also Dutc(~, a forli.idaolE:: threat to sea cOIIlInuni-
cations with Indiu. 
As for the subsequent british occupation of the 
Islant of ~rinitade or ~rinid&d in the South Atlantic, some 
600 lliiles to the eastward of rlio de Janeiro, in Lctober 
1781 by COilllliodore JOo hnstune, it did draw rej oinders from 
Spain based on tlle mutual guarantee for their American 
possessicns to the danger of a British cruising base on 
the Cape ,,~orn route to the :t'acific. 'l'he Portu6uese govern-
~ent complained against the occupation of an island, which 
they claioed was theirs, and the new foreign minister, 
Grallthalil, who had already been apprised of the conflicting 
evidence as to its suitability for a permanent settlement, 
complied with the lortuguese representation immediately; 
the whole enterprise being Johnstone's own scheme to 
avoid retul'ning home from one of his expeditions empty-
, -, 1 
naDGea.. 
As for -B'loridablanca' s claim that Portugal rendered 
1. A.H.~., Lsta~o, legO 4533(2) ~assim; Grantham to 
Pinto, 19 July 1782, F.O. 63/. For the larger 
issues bebind these South American adventures, . 
that is British commercial strategy in the eastern 
seas and the sea-route to India, see Harlow,I, 
pp.106-25; cp. also Mackesy, pp.373-6. 
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a ~ervice 01 consi~er&ble importunce as the s&fe carrier 
of .JpaniStl treasuI.'e from llEerica al1d was prevailed on not 
to hartour LTIE,lish ships , it was certainly exaGgerated. 
vn 5 July 1776 FortuBal bad formally agreed to 
corr.ply with tbe oWllLlish rebulation 01 hay 2nd probibitinb 
all trade and intercourse with the insurgent colonies. l 
DurinG 1778-1779 the ~n51ish were quite satisfied with 
the Portuguese attitude towards their privateers, prizes, 
and warships, and witb t~e exclusion from Portuguese ports 
of American vessels. The English Government for their 
part saw to it tbat the lortuguese were given satisfaction 
whenever British naval officers infringed the regulations 
in their ports, which was quite a normal occurrence. 2 
But as the war proceeded pressures were building up 
on PortuGal. Bhe was by no means hostile to Bourbon 
shippinB in her ports. 3 But the Bourbon powers were more 
1. Above p .~'80. 
2. S.P. 89/85-86 passim. 
3. un 17 September 1780 (No.24,S.P. 89/87) Wa1po1e 
reportee.. tbat four l!'rench privateers and twice 
the number of prizes had been seen in the l1agus 
estuary; see also his dispatch no.12 of 20 May 
for British concern over the arrival in Lisbon of 
a Portuguese warship carrying Spanish treasure, . 
other effects and passengers from Spanish America, 
and A.G.S.,Estado,legO 7327 for the Spanish treasure 
ship "Buen Conse~oll and the protection which she was 
given in Lisbon (cp.Har10w,I,p.390, note 125). 
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int(;:;re:.otec. ilJ uepri vine; .i.~ri tain of port facilities in 
PortuEal, for they thehlselves had no need of lortuguese 
ports ..1.'h8Y were also concerned about wglish trtatrHent 
of French ant Spanish property in Portuguese bottoms. 
dpain and France, having insufficient merchant shipping of 
their OWIl, relied heavily on neutral carriers. ~hey there-
fore desired the principle 'free ships, free goods' to be 
universally established as well as a narrow definition of 
contraband to enable them to receive supplies of raw 
materib-ls. .britain, on the other hand, had a merchant 
fleet sufficient for her needs and a fighting navy; 
conseq~ently, she treated enemy property on neutral ships 
as rightful prize and attempted to enforce as wide a 
definition of contraband as possible. l 
'l\he bourbon powers wished to convince Portugal to 
accept their interpretation of neutral rights and contra-
band trade. They therefore welcomed and fully supported 
Russia, the prime mover of the armed neutrality, when in 
the spring of 1780 she invited Portugal to join the other 
neutral trading nations. But in July Portugal refused to 
1. For a discussion of the question of neutral shipping and 
neutral rights, and Spain's attitude to them, see 'I. de 
hadariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 
1780, pp.57-95 and 156-185 passim. 
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Join the neutr01s. ~he bourbon powers then re-Qoubled 
their efforts to prevail upon Portugal not only to adapt 
her ~aritime priDciple~ as reGards neutral shipping to 
those of theirs but also to close ber ports to britisb 
privateers, to prevent t0b sale of their prizes in Portu-
t,L-ese pO.l:t~, ana to allow British warships entry only 
tbrouBh stress of weather and to prevent them from 
establishing a permanent station off the Portuguese coast. 
~he French insisted on the ~paniards to step up their 
pressure on Portugal, since they were justified in demand-
ing her not to sUI-,port British warships as contrary to 
article 2 of the Hispano-lortuguese treaty of 1778. 1 
Lisbon was anxious lest sbe might be drawn into the 
conflict as in 1762. 0he had to make some appeasing 
6esture to the ~ourbon powers. un the other hand, the 
reaction of Dritain was feared. Portugal, therefore, tried 
to steer a middle course. Quite suddenly and unexpectedly 
as far as the English were concerned, on September 9th, 
1780 the Portuguese published the decree of August 30th 
1. Floridablanca-Fernan l~unez, April-August 1780, A.H.N., 
Estado, legajos 4539(2) and 4452. P.Fauchille, La 
Di lomatie fran aise et la Lt ue des Neutres de-r.80, 
pp. 556-62 quoted in future as Fauchille • Cp. above 
p.'~, note 1, for Liston's similar interpretation 
of article 2. 
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refusinb atmission into their ports to the privateers 
of belli~erent nations ane their prizes, and laying those 
tnat were alreac.y in Fortuguese ports under embargo. 
But des~ite Sa's assurances to this effect, the decree 
contailled no reference to the alleged practice of british 
warships statioain[ off the Portuguese coast; S' 
explained that Britain migb~ not tolerate this. However, 
some attempt had already been wade to give satisfaction 
to the bourbon powers in this respect as well, as the 
Dritish rebction to the cecree showed. l 
walpole reported the measure to his principal on 
Septelliber 17th. Despite ~ortuguese explanations to the 
effect that the decree had been issued to avoid applicat-
ions of a more serious nature from the Bourbon powers, 
which the foreign secretary hopefully admitted as proof 
that the Portuguese may not intend to enforce it against 
Lnblish ships, Walpole indicated that the measure was 
hostile to the ~ritish, stressing that Bourbon ships had 
no need of Portuguese ports and emphasizing the sudden and 
--------- ------------------- --
1. It'ernan hunez to l!'loridablanca, 12 September 1780, A.H.N., 
~stado,legO 4539(2); Floridablanca to Fernan Nunez, 
September 8th and 22nd, and Fernan NUIlez to Florid'a-
blanca, October lOth, legO 4452. Ope Fauchille, pp. 
563-5. 
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unexpecte6 manner in which it \AlaS promule:;ateCL ; it gave 
Britain no chance to make her case, nor indeed to salvage 
1 some of the ships from the emhargo. There was also some 
apprehension ttlat the Portuguese might be persuaded to 
decree against the ste.tioning of British warships in or 
near their ports; Pinto had already remonstrated against 
the presence of Cornruodore Joonstone and his squadron in 
the ~agus estuary for some weeks early in 1780,2 and S& 
was now expressing doubts as to the port facilities en-
joyed by British ships for over a century. But the 
secretary of state for tbe southern department, Hills-
borouBh, although alleging that Jobnstone had not been 
permitted to return to Portuguese waters since Pinto's 
representation, instructed Walpole to expostUlate with S& 
about his insinuation lest he might be encouraged to make 
a point of it. 3 Future complaints (March 1782) against 
---------------
1. walpole to HillsbDrough, 17 September 1780, no.24, 6.r. 89/87. 
2. Cp. ~ackesy, pp. 313-8. 
). hillsborough to Walpole, 13 0ctober 1780, no. 5, 
and Decemb~r 9th, no. 6; in bis secret and confident-
ial instruction of the same date, the secretary of 
state expressed bis fears that clpain might be attempting 
to bribe the Portuguese Queen's confessor to obtain a 
cecree against entry of British warships. 
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the toleroflce Sllown to nritish warships in Portugal would 
seem to in~icate that the Lisbon goverrunent was not pre-
parcd to have a serious cuarrel with Britain on this 
. 1 lssue. 
with respect to british treatment of French and 
Spanish property in Fortuguese bottoms, however, the 
lortuguese were beginning to feel their way towards 
eventual acceptance of the maritime principles of the 
other neutral trading nations~ In fear of a strong 
British reaction to their decree of August 30th against 
privateers and pressed as they were by the Bourbon powers 
and Russia, the Portuguese sounded the Spanish government 
as to what protection the Bourbon powers would afford 
them if they were to express their adhesion to the mari-
time principles of the neutrals. On October 4th, 1780, 
Floridablanca replied that Carlos III was resolved to 
respect their ships, except for those carrying enemy 
property fallinb_ under' the narrow definition of contra-
banG. which both the Bourbon powers and the neutrals 
accepted. But if britain persisted in treating Bourbon 
property in Portuguese ships according to her much wider 
definition of contraband, CarIos III was prepared to' enter 
1. A.H.~., Estado, legO 4533(2). 
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into ~ ~etbiled convention with Portugal to protect her 
a[&inst .J3ritaii1 and compensate for any damage she might 
s~ffer as a result. l 
~here seelliS to have been no response. Britain's 
reaction to the Dutch decision to join the league of 
neutrals - it resulted in war in December - must have 
confirmeu. PortuGal in her intention to tread lightly 
2 while tt:..e war WG-S on. Jfurtbermore, the l!;nglish tried to 
win the Portuguese to their wide definition of contraband 
by allowin6 free entry in Britain to Portuguese mercban-
aise ana produce in Fortuguese ships; they seemed to 
succeed for the Portuguese agreed to incorporate the 
:british definition of contraband in article 1 of the trade 
regulation of May 8th. But the Bourbon powers returned to 
threats, and Lisbon agreed to annul art. 1 on 23 August 
1781. 3 Britain was quite anxious and apprehensive of a 
change in lortugal's amicable disposition. 4 However, it 
1. ,It'loridablanca to ,It'ernan J.~unez, 6 October 1780 (four 
enclosures),A.li.N., Estado, lego 4552. Up. Fauchi11e, 
pp.566-9. 
2. Cp. Fauchille, pp.569-70. 
3. Floridablanca to Fernan ~unez, 31 August 1781, A.H.N., 
l!;stado, legO 4533(1); Fauchille, pp.572-4. 
4. Hillsborough to Walpole, 16 November 1781, no. 13, 
l!'.li. 63/-2. 
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\v8S not until 24 July 17(:,2 tLot lortugal agreed to accede 
to thb league of neutrals. 
by this tiDe the risk of war was more remote, since 
peace talks were already boing on in Paris. l In addition, 
?ortugal wislleci to paI'ticipate in tbe discussions of the 
neutral powers in order not to be excluded from their 
commercial agreements, to profit from new connections and 
GO open up fresh markets. 2 By accedinG to the league, she 
also hoped to promote commercial relations with Russia 
witn whom sbe had started to trade quite recently: wine, 
fruits and vegetable oils in return for raw materials for 
bel' navy.3 Portugal now agreed to admit France into her 
treaty with Spain of 1778; the accession tOOK place on 17 
July 1783, but it did not bring to ]'rance the commercial 
acv&ntages expected for so long, firstly, because of the 
well entrencbed position of British trade, and also because 
4 Spain was not willing to encourage French trade in Portugal. 
1. In August Vergennes made fresh proposals to enter the 
Bispano-Portuguese ~reaty of 1778, but Portugal still 
maintained that she qould risk war if she agreed to it; 
l!'loridablanca to ]'ernan Nunez ,27 December 1782 ,A.H. N. , 
bstacio,legO 4531. 
2. Fernan ~unezls dispatches to Floridablanca of 6 June 1782, 
A.H.1.,Estado,legO 4533(2). 
3. 0n 20 December 1787 Portugal signed a commercial treaty 
with hussia(Ferreira,III,pp.428-71). This trade was based 
upon the same lines as the Spanish trade with Russia, and 
was tberefore noted with uneasiness;Jose del Rio (Consul 
in Lisbon)to Floridablanca,12 May l778,A.H.N.,Estado,legO 
4429. Cp. Fauchille,PP.575-6. 
4. Recueil, Ill, pp.395-406. 
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ro~tuGcll a~pear~ to have benefitte~ by tbe treaties 
wi t t-:: GpaiD r:;orE: thc:,n her neie:,hbour <lid.. ]'ir'st CJ.nd fore-
iT:ost, l-orttlt;ul lliClDClbea. to ilIlpose on Spain her interpret-
aLion of ~he 176j treaty, repairinb the losses of the 
i:.JeVe~1 Years War. Pombal's ambitious aim to reach the 
kiver Plate had to be aban~oned; nevertheless, Portugal 
regaine~ recognition for her extensive territorial claims 
in Amazonia and in the Banda Oriental, which had been 
wit hctrawn in 1761. ]'urthermore, the American settlement 
was achieved at no extra cost in terms of political 
coulmi trnent to the BOl,,1rbon powers in hurope; thus Portugal 
succeedea. io maintaining her neutrality, avoiding a 
repetition of the Bourbon invasion of the Seven Years War. 
By playinG on British fears of a possible connection 
oetween her and the :Family Compact, ..t-ortugal was in a 
position to cha11ente britain's commercial predominance; 
an opportunity of which Portugal failed to make full use 
for fear of the Enllish reaction. Portugal did manage, 
however, to open a breach in Britain's unique commercial 
status; but this achievement is not so remarkable if we 
bear in mind that Britain, and indeed France, were 
already moving towards unrestricted trade and eventuB+ly 
agreed to help implement it in the Anglo-French commercial 
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t t ,', 1"'" 1 rea y Ol (.:5'--. 
liro;,; t~le '::'panisb point of view, the bo..ins in America 
were helpftil in thbt there was peace, at last, in the border 
lauGs between brhzil and Spanish America, and they had co-
operated in keepin[ Dritain away from ciouth America during 
the Americun ~H:ir of Independ.ence. But the political ad-
vantages whicll Spain had hoped to get in Europe were 
limited. Apart from her dynastic claims to ~ortugal, which 
" Spain still nursed,L the main objectives in a rapprochement 
with her neighbour had been to deprive Britain of ~ortu-
guese support and to reduce her own dependence upon France. 
No doubt 3pain ir:lproved her diploIllatic position in Burope 
as a consequence of the ~ortuguese friendship;' but on 
the whole tbe conduct of l.ortugal during the American War 
of Independence does not seem commensurate with Spain's 
favourable disposition towards Brazil after Cevallos' 
successful campaign in 1777. It is my contention that the 
1. E'or the changing situation of Anglo-Portuguese 
trade in the 1780's, see ~hrman, pp. 5-16, 70-5, 
90-2, 148-51. 
2. Cp. above p.SOl, note 1.. 
,. Liston (San 11defonso) to Fox, 29 September 178;, 
no. 8j ]'.0. 72/1. Liston to Carmarthen, 5 December· 
1784 l..confidential), F.O. 72/,. Cp. Ehrman, pp. 
149-174 passim. 
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re&SOL for this is to be fauna in bpuin's procrastination 
and passivity in the face of Portugal's purposive policies, 
which in turn were chiefly due to the fear, always alive, 
of having to defer to the specific requirements of Anglo-
French relations. 
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cc C}/':SIvlTS 
------
;J.Ihe )ur)ose of t.tlis study -as indica tedin the ti tle-
has been to survey Anglo-S~anish relations from 1763 to 1783 
8.nd a0sess tne 'influence of the Spani'sh alliance wi th France, 
t:Cl::~t is, tile 2ar:l:~ly C')t:1;)8,ct of 1761, on these relations. Suhh 
a research-Jroject seemed justified since historians of Bri-
tish fore~gn policy in this period haTe concentrated on 
~'l.nGlo-:B'rench relati.ons and h8.ve assumed -as did many contem-
]Jorary l3ritish statesmen- that Spanish foreie:,"D. policy in this 
)eriod was dominated by France. This assumption was in part 
founded on the fact that the Bourbon powers hoped to reTerse 
the verdict of the 1763 treaty, and much effort by British 
diplomatists -not always followed up by their principals in 
IJondon- "ms spent in at-tempts to diTide the Bourbon powers,' 
or at least to de.al separately with them, in the hope of 
min:;.::nizing the power of the Family Compa.ct. HoweTer, l.t was 
not fully realized by the English that the needs of the 
J:3ourbon powers did not always coincide, and that Britain 
might have explored more purposefully and oonsistently 
o2Portunities for playing them off against each oth,r. 
It is possible to distinguish three broad ph .. ~es 'lri. 
~. ~ • 4, ,~ • " 
Anglo-Spanish relations in the period. examined. The first 
extends from the Treaty of Paris of',~J763 to the eettlemctnt 
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~::l tc;r~s ts loo:1ec1 l,lr..jc. ~he second takes us to 1775, the eve 
o~' the /L:!Ieric'?n i,12.r of Inde)cndence: during these years there 
\ias? ;;encrC),l relaxation in Allt!,lo-Spanish relations in Amerioa 
an,:; [~. sluft 'Jf 8.ttention from America to Europe. The third 
ran 0 cs from the Hls;ano-Portuguese negotiations leading to 
thG settle2ent of the their dispute in the River Plate(1774-
I 778) to the :xlrt taken by S )ain in the American struggle 
a~ainst Britain(1778-l783). 
For the whole period the SI)anish objectives in 1761 
are significant. At the time of Carlos Ill's arrival on the 
0,)snlsh tl1rone(1759), the main concern in Spanish gOTernment-
al circles was America. The signing of the Family Compact of 
1761, and the subsequent entry of Spain in the Seven Years i'; 
War, were prim~rily caused by her desire to stabilize the 
si tU2_tion in the Americas on the basis of the balance of' 
power 1)etween France, Britain and Spain. The attack againe't' 
Portubal and her American possessions in the River Plate ip . 
1762 was, ~:2.s far as Spain was concerned, part and parcel ol: 
this oain objective. Spanish territorial claims to metro";,':} 
po1i tan Portugal were also consider'ed,as were the str-.tegi'" 
.,' . 
implications of a ter-ri tor-ial war in the lb~rianp'en'ineuli 
it was believed that Spain' could pertotm bettet:,1R"tliisc 
and miGht thus be able to make up 'Nr:,~babl:e1oss&$ "'09""",,,.' 
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h'.~r obj r:;c ti ves, but aL)o;;i\:cC~l1CC S8e:,:8 to :2.2.v(~ :n::.d e "Lwe of 
J:ain to s~areler own lo~ses. The Yranch cession of Louis-
J.ain wsa h?sten-
':';:le llo~.sibil.~ties o~· an at ,ae' on IJo:ctugal. l'lost important 
of all, S)ain was now left to j'.ceur to the British threat 
in America sin::;:le-h::::nded, wi thout the counterpoise of l!'rench 
n ""'1' ... " 1 V CA .. }. dt:_,: . .l.. 
~he Peace ~reaty of 1763 demoDEtrated the extent of 
~;l)8..in' s de:~'ea t. She would .ilO'.1 !~:J.ve tu think twice f)efore 
embarking again upon·a war with ~ritain, and would have to 
El'lee c1r8.stic ref,~rms in the Liefence of an empire which had 
outgrown the cCl..l.)acity of its administrative ;~nd military 
;13.chinery. In tl<.s, respect, the French were the only support 
she had; indeed trlere was close co-operrrtion between France 
and SJain in defensive matters, but Spain was conc~rned lest 
she should have to ~ay France too high a price for her 
su~port. Spain had to resist French solicitations for a large 
8h3,1"'e in the Sllanish and Spanish American trade, and the 
1. See above rp. 17-21. 
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..:-l'.'_ t_:::h tlLreat-, v~.ilile llt:v:~n to rel~l vl=ry ,leavil~r on French 
to \lin new frienos to free herself 
from total de~)endence on tl1e J:!\amily C:om~)act. Eer efforts in 
this direction were also intend3d to stabilize diplomatic 
relations elsew~lere in order to be able to concentrate all 
her attention on the main task of facing British challenge 
in Amei:ica. 
She fl£S~ approached Austria. Their co-operation in 
Italy durin,[ the Seven Years V/ar })romised- well, 2 but wi th 
Italy at peace,. there was little they cO'lld offer each other 
to m;ike an all:~ance mutually advantageous. After the peace 
treaty of 1763 these two lJowerS showed signs of willingness 
to move closel' together, .A.ustrla in particular hoping to 
obtain sup)ort in GermC'illY and in the East; yet basically 
they were not )repared to promote each other's divergent 
interests. Austria made it clear, not only to Spain but also 
3.. 
2. 
See above pp. 55-68. 
In t.1:lis resr)ect Si)ain had been able to make· good use of 
the Family bompac~; see above ~p.·2l-27. 
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to illVulvC':.:lcnts in Gentr2.l and ~a:3tern ~lu"O)e. 
ln0 of some kint were n~l. Yet friendly relations were still 
d eerned d esLcable, 'oe th in Viellna and in l'l:~: (;r:LQ. Pro~ the 
Aust~ian8' Joint of View, a fr_ecdly intercourse with S~ain 
~i ht be used as leverage to assert their interests in respect 
of tneir alliance VIi th the }':cench; while the SJ.)ani~.:.r(;s reg':,rd-
ed it as a means of keelJing secure the possess~;_ons of the 
. I~2.li::m branches of the House of Bourbon, and of maintaining 
,general peace in Gerclal1Y on the -vasis of the Austro-:Fru[.';si<?_n 
antagonIsm, to free their attention from Europe. 1 
A secotld line o:!:' a])~):co3ch on which Spain embarked to 
lessen .her poll tical de:gendence on Erance for SUIll)Ort against 
britai.n, vo'as in the direction of Portugal. Both countries 
could profit from an alliance to settle their differences 
in Ar.1Crica and strengthen theil~ posi tion vis-~l-vis their 
respective allies. lo achieve closer links, S)ain was prepared 
to compromise; but lombal, the Portuguese chief minister, 
:nad no more desire th:::m Austria to make an enemy of Britain. 
1. See above DJ. 90-119 
I 
PJs~tion ~n Portucal, Pom~21 nevertheless realized that he 
was in a strone p0s~tion because neither Britain nor Fr2nce 
woulC allow Spain to agbrandize herself at the expense of 
J:'ortuficil c~lld, in the las t res~)rt, he h'JJi che meana to bring 
llri tc:dn to ;lis SlOe ~hrou.:h redress of her commercial criev-
anecs. ~urther~ore, Spain's friendly 8.._rronches did not 01-
together d:is.::-'el fortue:11,ese sus,,~;cions of her real intentions; 
ai'ter all, S:)c;..l.n had laU'lched an attack on Portugal and her 
colonies in 1762, and "'as nOi1 upholding her interpretation 
of tlle 1763 treaty, which endorsed Cevallos' s campaign in the 
River llate. 1 By 1768, Spain was made to realize that there 
W2S no hope of weaning Portugal away from Britain, and she 
had to resi,gn herself to the 110pe 'that outstanding Hispano-
Po~tuguese problems would have to be solved durinG that war 
w~th ~ritain which Spain co~sidered inevitable. 
Like France, who ejected British saltrakers from the 
Turk's Isl':nds( in the southern extremity of the Bahamas) in 
June.1764, Spain decided to test Britain soon after the 1763 
peace treaty. Article 17 of the Treaty of Paris had left un-
settled the question of limits in the logwood cuttini area 
i'n Honduras Bay, and at the beginning of 1764, the Spanish 
1. ~ee above pp. 399-402 
t~~h ~ntdrpret~tion of the 1763 treaty was to take a strong 
line W"tll Sjain. ~e was proved right, for in September of the 
2~~G Y8ar bo~h the ~;nurbon )owers -Spain following Frnnce-
cl~ve in; t, cy were too weak to risk military conflict. 1 
.ues;Ji te trnG'et-'S'.ch, dpain tried age .. in to a,chieve a 
sollltion fayoura~le to herself in the Manila ransom issue. 
,\'fhen 1'13n113o W8.S taken in October 1762 by the English, the 
island aut~orities to prevent it from being pillaged agreed 
to pay a large sum, 1":alf of which was to be drawn on the 
Spanish Tre"sury. Since the autumn of 1763, the English 
goverf~::aent h1d claimed this money i'rom Hadrid. The Spanish 
refused to pay, but by the spring of 1766 their position 
beg~nto weaken and the Family Compact seemed to offer no 
lh~ll) in this issue. The .B'rench, anxious lest the anti-Bourbon 
Pi tt rn'~;ht return to power and thus increase the danger of a 
1. See above fP. 135-145. 
>,':::.'·iou', \u+:~ "\··,." .. ·j'1'l ~L"'~;' :11, 'I','~' " ':' ''>·''11 .1-) 'l'" U' v_ V v ~ '-J _ 1,.A.~0-: l ;:) ': • ..\,-. u l .J.,:,...:...~ i:'. In 
j.ll June 1766 t.h.",t tile lUlL1:::. rClnsom iS8ue shoulcl be Iteferred 
to the arbitration of rra8si~. fo no avail, howevdr, for 
neither rruss2.::,> , nor Lndeed .imf:tr'is, whose (iet~;"ched c1,ttituc1e 
t-,war 8)_"'1in WS1.S 'i<~de ,tl 1 E301utely clear, ": .. .s in the lC~Lst 
i.i.clined to be emr;r-Jiled .in :1.nt;lo-lsourbon differonces. 1 
fiwse rebuffs f:J.2"de ~;;)ain more de1endent on the Pamily Co~n.:act. 
It Vias at this time tnat the ]1a lkland Islands question 
cane to the forefront of A!l~l~-Spanish relations. The s~akes 
-
were high: the ~ritish were challenging Spain's monopolistic 
claims to maintain Americao as a mare clausum. At the end of 
August, 1766, the Spanish were informed that the ~ritish 
Jabinet, now headed by the ·;'.nti-Bourbon Chatham, had decic'\ed 
to send an exvedition to strengthen their recent establish-
'(lent on the Viest .Palkland island, Port Egmont, in the South 
Seas. fhe first reaction from Madrid was quite firm: Carlos 
III wo,uld not allow such an establishment and would resort 
> , 
to force, if necessary, to ~revent it. fhe Spanish had a 
stronc case. AlthOUGh it could be argued that article" 8 of 
the Treaty of Utrecht of '1713, which they had invoked to 
support their mono1101istic views, did not go beyond those 
1. See 2bove pp. 155-191. 
territories and islands already occupied by them at 
tbe time of the signature of that treaty (therefore 
excluding tbe Falkland Islands), the fact that the 
first occupant of those islands, France, surrendered 
her establishment in the East Falkland, St. Louis, 
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in May 1766, gaTe Spain a good basis to claim undis-
cOTered or unoccupied adjacent islands and to American 
waters on either side of the Horn, and made her confident 
that France would giTe whole-hearted support to her 
protest in London. 
But Choiseul, anxious lest Chatham should use 
Spanish firmness as a pretext to precipitate war at a 
time when France was unprepared for military action, 
acted as moderator rather than as the staunch ally of 
Spain. He worked for a compromise solution hinted at 
by the English themselTes: the Manila ransom money was 
to be paid in return for British withdrawal from Port 
Egmont. This suggestion, howeTer, was not welcome to 
either disputant. Spain rightly feared that payment of 
the ransom could be construed as compensation for the 
British withdrawal, whateTer proTisions to the contrary 
were written into a settlement, and would consequently 
impair her exclusiTe claims. Britain was only prepared 
to accept the quid pro quo as long as. she was assured of 
her right to naTigate both the Atlantic and the Pacific 
on either side of the Horn, and/or of her right to settle 
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unoccupied islands in those waters. 
With France not giYing unqualified support, Spain 
became resigned to accepting the French compromise, but 
only if it were the sole alternatiye to war. She hoped 
to delay a decision till France was better prepared; this 
was a sensible policy, considering Choiseul's promise of 
support in two or three years' time. To minimize the 
effect of the difference of opinion between himself and 
the French minister, Gr~aldi, the Spanish chief minister 
and foreign se~retary since 1763, explained to Choiseul 
in January 1767 that they differed only in that the French 
minister belieTed Britain to be prepared to go to war for 
the sake of the Manila ransom money. He himself did not 
. think she would, and therefore did not intend to pay. 
Grimaldi was, howeTer, willing to take the risk of war ae 
an important Spanish principle was at etake, trusting 
that France would feel obliged to support Spain in such 
a war. 
Grimaldi's supposition that London did not want to 
risk war proyed correct. Britain did not press for an 
answer from Spain. She did not want to sacrifice the 
claim to the Falklands, already weakened by the Jrenoh 
handing oyer of their establishment, for the Manila ransom 
money; the passage of time would strengthen it. But most 
of all" Britain had no wish to teat the atrength of the 
Family Compact. Indeed from January 1767 onwards, the 
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passive policies of the British government caused the 
Bourbon representatives in London, Masserano and Guerchy, 
to say that Britain had neither the means nor the incli-
nation to engage in war. These pacific leanings, chiefly 
explained by Chatham's removal, the increasing importance 
of the American conflict, and the arrival in power of the 
peace-loving Bedfordites, who wished to preserve peace in 
Europe in order to carry out their chosen American 
policies, together with Choiseul's promise to be prepared 
to support her i~ two or three years' time, encouraged 
Spain to stop British infiltration in the South Seas by 
direct action. 
By the beginning of 1768, the Spanish government was 
apprised of the exact location of the British establish-
ment in the Falkland Islands and the transference of the 
French establishment on the East Falkland Island to Spain 
had actually taken place in April 1767. The situation 
seemed ripe for action and in February 1768 Spain decided 
to use force to expel the English from Port Egmont. 
Before putting the necessary measures into effect, 
Grimaldi wanted to make quite sure that Spain could count 
on the full and explicit support of her ally. Such an 
assurance was given him on March 15th by Louis XV via the 
Spanish ambassador in Paris. France Buffered, as much as 
Britain" from Spanish claims of monopoly in the South 
Seas. Nevertheless, France had t.o resist British 
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aggrandizement at the expense of Spain, or else she would 
not be able to count on an ally in her plans to reverse 
the 1763 treaty. French policies at this moment were 
also influenced by the need Choiseul felt of the Family 
Compact: Genoa's cession of Corsica to France, which was 
negotiated during the first months of 1768, made the 
French minister anxious to call on the Spanish should 
Britain react strongly against the French annexation of 
Corsica. As it happened, Britain's passive acceptance 
of the French tri~ph in the Mediterranean only served 
to strengthen the feeling in Paris and Madrid that she 
was not in a position to entertain hostile views against 
the Bourbon powers.l 
But two years later, when the Spanish expulsion of 
the British was effected, French support for Spain had 
weakened.2 The reasons for this were several. The 
expulsion took place on 10 June 1770; when the news of 
this arrived in Europe in the middle of September, Choiseul 
was no longer firmly in the saddle. His political future 
was uncertain; and the Russo-Turkish war, which had broken 
out in October 1768, threatened to spread throughout 
1. See pp. 247-258 
2. In addition to the time needed to furnish the ships, 
it would seem that the main reason why it took so 
long to put the Spanish decision into effect was the 
desi~e in Madrid to fall in with Choiseul's timing of 
the showdown with Britain for 1770; see above pp.243-46. 
536 
Europe. Choiseul found himself obliged to urge Grimaldi 
to play down the Port Egmont issue. In respect of the 
Spanish claim to the Falklands, however, the French 
minister continued to give full support. 
Grimaldi realized that satisfaction for the act of 
violence against the British establishment in time of 
peace was due, but he was anxious lest satisfaction 
might impair Spain's monopolistic claim to South American 
waters and adjacent islands. Both Bourbon powers, there-
fore, maintained ~ temporizing attitude, hoping for 
better times to press their case. 
Britain for her part proved easier than might have 
been expected over the Port Egmont affair. Initially the 
secretary of state for the South, Weymouth, threatened 
war if immediate and unconditional satisfaction was not 
given, but, as the autumn of 1110 wore on, the head of the 
administration, North, showed signs of a pacific turn of 
mind in his exchanges with French diplomats. War would 
endanger his campaign of financial retrenchment which 
became all the more urgent as the conflict with the 
thirteen colonies widened. At the same time the state of 
the British navy was such that he had no unbounded 
confidence abouj the prospect of success in a head-on 
collision with the Bourbon powers. Pinally, in the back-
ground there was the fear of Chatham's return to power. 
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With his record as war minister during the Seven Years 
War, he would be recalled to champion the honour of the 
Crown if war seemed probable. 
North's pacifism gave an opportunity for Choiseul 
to suggest a compromise which was weighted in Spain's 
favour. This compromise was, in fact, the basis for the 
settlement of 22 January 1771, a month after the French 
minister's dismissal from power. 
Spain had to give satisfaction for the act of violence 
committed against Port Egmont, but she obtained a written 
reservation of her rights to the Falklands and a clear, 
though verbal, undertaking from the British that Port 
Egmont would be evacuated. From the point of view of 
prestige, the outcome would seem to have gone against her; 
she had to climb down in the face of a British challenge. 
But her claim to the islands, was protected in writing, 
while Britain failed to obtain a similar safeguard for 
her interpretation of the position in the South Seas. 
This Spanish victory was only possible because Choiseul 
had strongly supported a settlement which safeguaaded 
Spanish rights and had been able to use North's pacific 
inclination to secure it.l 
1. See above pp. 292-317. 
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Spanish and French historians have held, generally, 
that France let Spain down; it has further been main-
tained that Choiseul's fall on 23 December 1770 was the 
sign of France's defection. l Yet France's explicit 
support for Choiseul's compromise plan continued after 
his fall, from December 1770 to 22 January 1771.2 The 
contention that Spain from now on was going to pursue a 
more independent line in response to the alleged French 
defection is also inaccurate; 3 we shall find the Family 
Compact operative in'the 1770's. 
1. Renaut, pp. 448-9; Rousseau, 11, pp. 77-81; Blart, 
p. 203; Gil Munilla, Malvinas, pp. 153-4; ~~aigo 
Nieto p. 213. ' 
2. The American historian of. the Falkland Islands(1927) 
Goebel, pp. 340-6, though still referring to the 
French base desertion of their ally, points out that 
Spain benefitted from Choiseul's fall in that the 
diplomatic control of the situation passed from Paris 
to Madrid. Martin-Allanic in his recent contribution 
on the subject of Bougainville navigateur et le~ 
decouvertes de son temps(1964), pp. 1182-1200,. as by 
implication referred to the important part played by 
the Family Compact in helping Spain to obtain a 
compromise solution. But the large extent of French 
support, before and after Choiseul's fall, has,bever 
been stressed before. 
3. Renaut, pp. 448-9, argues that the alliance was 
practically dead after December 1770. See also 
A.S. Aiton, Hispanic American Essays, pp. 134-49, and 
Gil Munilla, Plata, pp. 171 ff. 
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Nonetheless, there was a wave of anti-French 
feeling in Madrid after the 1771 settlement, which 
Grimaldi himself may have encouraged to divert criticism 
from the government; but it was chiefly directed against 
those who had brought about Choiseul's fall, since he was 
thought of as a sincere supporter of the Family Compact. 
It was realized that Choiseul in supporting Spain had 
been aiming at restraining Britain in America and in the 
South Seas, but his attitude, whatever his motives, had 
in the end been to Spain's advantage. The loss of the 
minister, with whom Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in 
Paris, and Grimaldi maintained a very friendly intercourse 
and correspondence, contributed to a fear that his 
successors might not have Spain's colonial interests so 
much at heart. Indeed, these apprehensions were increased 
when France's attention was diverted to the Russo-Turkish 
war and the Swedish crisis of 1772-3. 
This shift of attention in French politics, however, 
has been shown not to be due to a change of policy on the 
part of the new ministers, but rather to the increasing 
tension in Europe. The French felt themselves obliged to 
turn to the East in the hope of curtailing the growth of 
Russian power at the expense of Turkey and Sweden. 
Grimaldi, intent on safeguarding Spanish interests, often 
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complained that France had given only half-hearted 
support to 'Spain during the Falkland Islands crisis, but 
he did this as part of his general policy of restraining 
France from provmking a conflict with Britain in Europe. 
Grimaldi was against war in Europe because Spanish 
interests were not affected. 
In the last resort, Spain would have intervened to 
defend France just as France, it could be assumed, would 
have come to Spain's rescue if she had become embroiled 
in war with Great Britain in America. Yet the Spanish 
preferred to avoid getting involved in Europe. This 
attitude became explicit when Gustavus Ill's coup d'etat 
on 19 August 1772 and Russia's opposition to the strength-
ening of the Swedish monarchy threatened to engage Britain 
and France in war with one another. 
A desirable solution from the Spanish point of view 
was the plan proposed by Aiguillon, Choiseul's successor, 
to obtain British co-operation in deterring Russia from 
meddling in Sweden. Spain, in fact, was quite active from 
October 1172 to April 1773 trying to restrain her ally from 
interfering without prior consultation with Britain. 
Furthermore, the English representative in Madrid, Grantham, 
was apprised by Grimaldi of his efforts to restrain France 
and of his pacific intentions. But this attempt to obtain 
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British collaboration with the Family Compact was in the 
end unsuccessfull. For a brief period George III and some 
members of the government -the southern secretary Rochford 
amongst them- toyed with the idea of reaching some kind 
of political understanding with France to check the 
predatory system initiated by Russia in league with 
Austria and Prussia. But nobody else dared to advocate 
openly co-operation with the traditional enemy, France, 
and no attempt was made to pursue Spain's assurances to 
Grantham. 
There was no doubt, Grimaldi concluded after the 
Swedish crisis, that Britain was prepared to risk her own 
sta~ding and influence in Europe for the sake of prevent-
ing the Bourbon powers, and especially France, from 
increasing theirs. This very opposition to France in 
Europe and to Spain as France's ally served to cement the 
Family Compact and to make co-operation between Britain 
d S " 'bl 1 an pa~n ~mposs~ e. 
In respect of her relations with Spain in America, 
on the other hand, from 1774 onwards Britain attempted 
to relax tension in various ways. No doubt her troubles 
with the thirteen colonies were responsible for this 
conciliatory attitude. First, the evacuation of Port 
1. See pp. 346-395 
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Egmont in May 1774 which, although carried out as a 
domestic measure, was nonetheless intended to please 
Spain. This could be interpreted as the realization of 
the oral promise given to Spain in the past. Similarly, 
Britain's restrained manner over the Vieques Island and 
the Balambangan incidents show her in a pacific mood.! 
In fact, by the end of 1775 Britain was clearly courting 
Spain in the hope of securing her neutrality in respect 
of the American struggle. She would have been glad to 
come to some agreement for the exchange of mutual 
guarantees of their respective American colonies. She 
was also giving clear signs that she would not encourage 
her ally, Portugal, in her dispute with Spain in the 
River Plate. 2 
This dispute had dragged on since the peace treaty 
of 1763, with the two parties putting forward their 
different interpretations of the clauses of that treaty 
which stipulated the restoration of the territories 
conquered by Spain in the Iberian peninsula and in the 
River Plate in 1762. During the first stage of the 
dispute (1763-1768) Britain gave some support to the 
Portuguese interpretation in the hope of getting redress 
1. See pp. 326-345 
2. See pp. 456 ff. 
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for her commercial grievances. But when the dispute 
flared up again in 1774, after a long lull induced by 
the Anglo-Spanish tension in America, she began to exert 
a restraining influence on Portugal. As the North American 
conflict widened, and France appeared more a.d more willing 
to risk war with Great Britain, to keep Spain neutral the 
British became willing to sacrifice their support of 
Portugal. For the opposite reason - in order to gain Spain's 
collaboration in a war with Great Britain-France was not 
prepared to exert restraint on Spain in the Portuguese 
issue, though she tried to participate in the formulation 
of the Spanish objectives for the sake of her own commer-
cial and political interests in Portugal. 
Spain used the opportunity of being courted by both 
Britain and France to the full. She used Britain's 
sacrifice of Portugal to embark on a military campaign 
in the River Plate in the summer of 1776. Santa Catarina 
Island fell to the Spanish expedition under the command 
of Cevallos in February 1777 and Sacramento in June. 
Spain enforced a settlement on Portugal, which restored 
Sacramento and the seven missions to the East of the 
Uruguay river to her. Santa Catar1na was returned to 
Portugal, who also kept Rio Grande de Sio Pedro. 
While this was being effected, Spain restrained 
France's military ardour in North America so as to keep 
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Lritain's goodwill. Finally, by playing on France's need 
of her as an ally against Britain, Spain kept Paris out 
Ol her negotiation with Portugal. 
But the terms of the settlement with Portu~al were 
not as favourable as might ."ave been expected in the 
circumstances. The new boundary line established in the 
preliminary treaty of October 1st, 1777, was substantially 
that of the boundary treaty of 1750, which had confirmed 
Portugal's extensive territorial claims in Amazonia and 
in the River Plate. Yet it was a considerable victory 
for Spain in America, for the Spaniards could not have 
possibly thought of going back beyond the situation in 
1750. 
Spain disposed of the Portuguese interpretation 
of the 1763 treaty and managed to establish a fixed 
and permanent southern boundary to Portuguese expansion 
at a considerable distance from the northern bank of the 
River Plate, with a mutual and rec$proca1 undertaking 
to guarantee their respective colonies and frontiers in 
America. In Europe Spain, in the definitive treaty of 
24 March 1778, settled for an agreement of neutrality 
in respect of a war between· herself and Great Britain. 
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This was far from the aims of the middle 1760's to wean 
Portugal away from the Dritish connection and linking 
her politically to Spain, but it was a significant gain 
in that Britain was later restrained from using Portuguese 
and Brazilian ports freely in her war against the Bourbon 
powers. 
Grimaldi did not make full use of the opportunities. 
He realized that he could not revive pre-1763 hopes and 
plans; neither Britain nor France would permit him to 
go too far. Nevertheless, he is partly responsible for 
not getting as good a bargain as the circumstances seem-
ed to make possible. He was too cautious, and this enabled 
Pombal to take the initiative most of the time. Grimaldi's 
successor after February 1111, Floridablanca, who was in 
charge of the negotiations in their last stage, was also 
anxious to get the treaties safely signed in order to be 
fre~to exploit to the full the American War of Independence. 
On the very day that the treaty with Portugal was 
signed(24 l~rch 1118), Floridablanca instructed his repre-
sentative in London to give the English to understand 
that Spain might remain neut'ral- in the Anglo-French"' 
conflict if Britain offered some considerable territorial 
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gain. With France already committed to the American 
struggle for independence and in serious need of naval 
support, Spain was in a better bargaining position to 
profit by the Family Compact of 1761 tham she had ever 
been. Floridablanca, first, tried to sell her neutrality 
and her good offices as mediator to Britain. Spain had 
no wish to help consummate the independence of the 
American colonies; nor was she prepared to help bring about 
the total destruction of ~ritain tm the advantage of the 
French, or vice~ersa. But she was intent on obtaining 
some of her objectives: Gibraltar was the most important, 
~ but Minorca, Florida, and ritish withdrawal from Central 
America were also envisaged. Spain was prepared to give 
Oran, Almansa and Mers-el-Kebir(in North Africa) in re-
turn for Gibraltar and Minorca, and London was given to 
understand that the terms were negotiable. But the English 
government refused to make any offers to secure Spain's 
neutrality and did not accept her terms for a settlement 
in America through her mediation. Failing to get more 
than fair words from the English, she turned to France; 
and Floridablanca was able to frighten her into promising 
to secure all Spanish desiderata. On 21 June 1779 Spain 
entered the Anglo-French war on France's side. 
Britain's attitude from April 1778 to May 1779 
would se~m to have been short-sighted. Had she been 
prepared to consider Spain's proposals, France would 
not have been a~le to stand up to the Dritish navy 
and Britain would have probably retained most of her 
colonies. Furthermore, the Family Compact might not 
have survived. Spain's expectations for the negotiat-
ion of peace were quite high; but Britain ought to 
have explored the possibilities of an understanding 
with Spain by maintaining, at least, a pretence of 
talks on the subject of her expected compensation. 
This is indicatiTe of the failure of British gOTern-
mental circles, and most of all of British public 
opinion, to realize f~lly the differences and sus-
picions within the Family Compact and to play upon 
them for the purpose of dividing the Bourbon powers. 
The late 1110's had been particularly favourable for 
this kind of exercise. 
Britain's main reason for not responding to 
Spanish proposals was overconfidence. Furthermore, 
I would venture the hypothesis that, on the whole, 
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Britaln did not wish to put herself under constraint 
by agreeing to some political understanding with Spain. 
Friendship with that country would inhibit her from 
trying to get whatever she could in Spanish America. 
As it happehed, Spain's entry in the war caused Bri-
tain to lose the initiative in American waters. Gibral-
tar's danger(it was besieged by a combined Franco-
Spanish force), and the fear of a Franco-Spanish in-
vasion of England, contributed to draw the British 
navy's strength into the defensive in Europe. 1 
In the peace treaty of 1783 Spain gained more 
than France in terms of territory; not Gibraltar, 
which had gallantly resisted the joint Franco-Spanish 
descent, but Minorca and West Florida, which she had 
captured, and East Florida, which she had not. In re-
turn she restored the Bahamas to Britain, and acknow-
ledged the British right to cut Honduras logwood, but 
within well-defined boundaries as desired by Spain 
since the negotiations of the 1763 treaty.2 
1. See above p. 509, note 1. 
2. See above pp. 149-154. 
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Although in retrospect, we find that Spain's con-
tribution to the American struggle for independence was 
a dangerous precedent for her own colonies, and that the 
presence of the United States in the Mississippi, with 
their right to navigate it to the Gulf o~ Mexico inherit-
ed from the English in the peace trea~y, became an avenue 
of penetration into Mexico itself; nevertheless, as re-
gards the objectives set out in 1763 in respect of Bri-
tain, Spain had met with considerable success by 1183. 
The requirements of the Bourbon pov/ers during these 
twenty years did not always coincide. Both were militarily 
weak(but rearming) and mindful of the need for each 
other's support against Britain. At times of unprepared-
ness or when particular interests loomed large(France in 
the early crises in the 1160'i and Spain in the later 
peace period) each put pressure on the other to sober 
down. But the Family Compact remained a corner-stone 
for both and flourished in the War of American Indepen-
dence, when some of their important aims were fulfilled. 
The Family Compact did not come to an end, 
officially, until February 1193, when Revolutionary 
France drew ~ritain and Spain together for the purpose 
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of preserving the established polttical order. Yet 
had it not been for the excesses of the Revolution, 
from a diplomatic point of view Spain would still 
appear to have been in need of the French alliance 
as the only support available against Britain impre-
rial and commercial designs. As exemplified in thw 
NooGka Sound controversy of 1790 Pitt, like his 
father in 1766, 1 challenged Spain~1 exclusive claims 
in the Pacific, reiterating the yrinciple :'f freedom 
of trade and navigation. While the two countries were 
moving towards a military and political alliance against 
France, Pitt unsuccessfully strove to make this condition-
al upon a trade agreement which would give ~ritain 
free access to the mar~ets of the Spanish empire. 2 
Looking back on the ~eriod here examined, i t,.~e 
clear that Anglo-Spanish rivalry overseas formed the 
back-cloth to their diplomatic relations in Europe. 
Spain strove, successfully on the whole, to preserve 
1. See above pp. 201 ff. 
2. Har1ow, II, pp. 441-71; Ehrman, pp. 172-3. 
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her vast possessions and claims, and in this received 
qualified support. of France, herself competing with 
both Spain and Britain for territorial and commercial 
gains in America; while Britain was prepared to accept 
strained relations with Spain, until her own American 
conflict for:ced her to make concessiomto Spain. What-
ever advantabes Spain gained, she gained either by the 
support of France or by exploiting the Family Compact. 
Great Britain's reluctance to make real sacrifices to 
buy Spain off in the 1770's remain inexplicable in 
retrospect, but at the time it was consistent with the 
general desire to extract whatever advantages could 
be gained from Spain and her possessions overseas. 
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